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Abstract 
This thesis examines how urban infrastructure is funded and financed in cities in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The thesis brings together the diverse and disconnected 
literatures on infrastructure, capital investment and urban development and creates a 
framework for understanding the changing landscape of infrastructure finance. Drawing on 
primary empirical research, this framework is then used to examine the funding and financing 
of infrastructure in the cities of Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield in the UK and Buffalo, 
NY, Chicago, IL, and Stockton, CA in the US. The objectives of the empirical analysis are: 
to explain the types of funding and financing being used within the case study cities and to 
identify emergent trends; to understand the multiscalar factors driving the adoption and use 
of those practices; to analyse the key mechanisms, processes and systems that are implicit in 
a range of capital investment strategies; and to explain the implications of the ways in which 
infrastructure is funded and financed for urban development within the case study cities.  
This thesis argues that the practices used for funding and financing infrastructure in cities 
are becoming increasingly financialised, and that this is having transformative implications 
for the urban environment. As such, the thesis makes four main contributions; first, it 
demonstrates how the process of financialisation is changing the ways in which infrastructure 
is funded and financed; second, it shows that financialisation is changing the politics of 
infrastructure and fuelling a process of reterritorialisation but, at the same time, that the state 
continues to have a major role in the funding and financing of infrastructure; third, it 
contends that the financialisation of capital investment is encouraged by instances of fiscal 
stress, and yet that it can also catalyse overaccumulation and cause further fiscal crisis; and 
fourth, it suggests that increasingly financialised models of infrastructure investment are 
reinforcing patterns of uneven development and causing an intensification in the process of 
urban splintering.  
More broadly, this research begins to address a gap in the literature on financialisation, which, 
to date, has been criticised for lacking sufficiently in-depth and fine-grained analyses of 
financial actors, markets and systems. In particular, the empirical evidence and comparative 
case study analysis illustrates that financialisation is not an overpowering and all-consuming 
behemoth but a highly variable process that is negotiated, managed and regulated in different 
ways in different geographical contexts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Infrastructure is a central part of the modern economy. It enables the movement of people 
from one place to another; it underpins trade and commerce; it makes up the built 
environment of our towns and cities; it enables technological advancement; and it provides 
the foundations from which society develops and evolves: 
‘Infrastructures are at the very heart of economic and social development. They provide 
the foundations for virtually all modern-day economic activity, constitute a major 
economic sector in their own right, and contribute importantly to raising living 
standards and the quality of life’ (OECD, 2006a: 14). 
In addition to performing a direct function (for example, a bridge enabling a car to cross a 
river), infrastructure plays a broader role as an agent of progress in the contemporary world. 
According to the World Bank (2011), for example, infrastructure is a fundamental 
component of global development:  
‘Infrastructure can be a vector of change in addressing some of the most systemic 
development challenges of today’s world: social stability, rapid urbanization, climate 
change adaptation and mitigation and natural disasters’ (World Bank, 2011: iv). 
Perhaps most significantly, infrastructure is widely regarded as a cornerstone of economic 
growth and development. Not only is infrastructure an ‘indispensable input in an economy’s 
production’, but also, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that investing in 
infrastructure enhances economic ‘output’ (IMF, 2014: 78). 
The link between levels of infrastructure investment and economic productivity is not new. 
In a seminal paper in 1989, for instance, Aschauer noted that between 1973 and 1985 there 
was a correlation between the productivity declines experienced by countries such as Japan 
and the United States and their respective levels of public capital expenditure (Aschauer, 
1989). Although these conclusions are disputable (see Gramlich, 1994), it appears as if the 
underinvestment identified by Aschauer has continued, and has grown into a major global 
economic challenge. The World Economic Forum (2014: 3), for instance, suggests that there 
is a ‘shortfall in global infrastructure debt and equity investment [of] at least US$ 1 trillion 
per year’, while the World Bank (2011) maintains that the ‘infrastructure gap’ in low and 
middle-income countries alone currently stands at US$1 trillion. 
Following Aschauer, contemporary analysis indicates that the growing infrastructure gap and 
continuing investment shortfalls are likely to have a negative effect on global economic 
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growth and productivity. According to a major engineering association, for example, the 
UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could have been 5% per year higher between 2000 
and 2010 were it not for the country’s ‘significant infrastructure deficit’ (CECA, 2013: 6-10). 
Similarly, in the US, if levels of infrastructure investment are not improved between 2012 
and 2020, there will be a cumulative cost to the US economy of $3.1 trillion in GDP and 
$1.1 trillion in total trade (ASCE, 2013: 5).  
While the poor state of infrastructure in the US and UK is undoubtedly due to a ‘legacy of 
historic under-investment’ (see HM Treasury, 2013a: 13), the need for more infrastructure 
investment has arguably only hit home in a period of crisis and severe economic 
underperformance. Indeed, the advent of sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007, an event which 
triggered one of most severe and tumultuous periods of financial and economic crisis of the 
modern era, arguably signalled the beginning of what might be called a new infrastructural 
paradigm. Since 2007, the phrase ‘infrastructure investment’ has become synonymous with 
economic prosperity: infrastructure has come to symbolise a beacon of recovery, a pillar of 
growth and an essential component of economic competitiveness for all forms of territorial 
unit. In particular, it is through its renowned ability to create jobs, stimulate growth and 
enhance economic competitiveness that infrastructure has been presented a potential ‘spatial 
fix’ to contemporary urban and economic crisis (Hall and Jonas, 2014: 15).  
Alongside the emergence of a new a new infrastructural paradigm, a key question for 
policymakers, voters, businesses and investors alike has been how new and improved 
infrastructure can be paid for and who should bear the cost. This question, of how 
infrastructure can be funded and financed is the focus for this thesis. As shall be elaborated in 
Section 1.2, funding refers to how the cost of the infrastructure is actually borne, whereas 
financing refers to the financial arrangements that enable the costs to be met as they are 
incurred. 
Perhaps most importantly, the increasing demand for more infrastructure investment has 
coincided with traditional models of funding and financing becoming increasingly out-dated 
and unavailable. Arguably, the same context of financial and economic crisis, which has 
resulted in widespread fiscal stress – defined as the worsening of a governmental entity’s 
financial condition (Hendrick, 2011: 22) – has been central to the increasing difficulties of 
funding and financing infrastructure. At the local level in particular, floundering tax receipts 
have compounded the burden of spending cuts being passed down from higher levels of 
government as the politics of crisis and austerity unfold (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; Peck, 
2012). Thus the presentation of a dilemma: at a time when infrastructure investment is 
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arguably more important than ever, governments are in an especially weak position to 
undertake such investment.  
While the Vice President of the EIB, Plutarchos Sakellaris, points to the ‘double-need of 
fiscal consolidation on the one hand and infrastructure renewal and upgrading on the other’ 
(Sakellaris, 2010: 5) and the CBI (2012: 4) notes that the ‘challenge lies in securing funding 
for infrastructure at a time of austerity’, one report’s suggestion that ‘a dark cloud of 
sovereign debt looms over future publicly funded infrastructure’ (PwC, 2011a) paints a more 
ominous picture.  
As a result of the increasing strain on public finances, traditional approaches to funding (such 
as direct taxation and public grants) and financing (such as the use of project revenues on a 
‘pay-as-you-go’ basis), have been unable to meet the levels of investment needed to close the 
infrastructure gap and to achieve the elusive spatial fix. It is in the climate of economic and 
fiscal crisis, then, that the search for new and innovative models of funding and financing 
infrastructure has begun in earnest.  
In what follows, this thesis seeks to analyse and explain the changing landscape of 
infrastructure investment. This Chapter introduces the core themes and arguments of the 
thesis, highlights the gap in the existing literature that this research seeks to address, outlines 
the methodological and theoretical frameworks that are employed throughout the research, 
and provides an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The contested category of infrastructure: towards a definition 
In order to address the processes of funding and financing infrastructure, producing a 
conclusive definition infrastructure would seem to be an essential task. Given the highly 
contested nature of infrastructure, however, perhaps a more appropriate objective is to 
outline concretely what is meant by infrastructure in the context of this study.  
Arguably, the most definitive characteristic of infrastructure is its multifarious and highly 
disputed nature. According to Weber and Alfen (2010: 7), the term ‘infrastructure’ was first 
used to describe ‘military assets such as caserns and airfields’ (Weber and Alfen, 2010: 7). 
However, as infrastructure has evolved as a category, its meaning has been stretched and 
subdivided to incorporate a huge range of different conceptions, including ‘hard’ 
infrastructure – more recently branded ‘economic’ infrastructure – which consists of ‘energy, 
transport, digital communication, flood protection, water and waste management’ (HM 
Treasury, 2010a: 5), ‘soft’ or ‘social’ infrastructure, which describes the systems that support 
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community cohesion and societal progress, such as such as ‘police, education, medical or 
legal services’ (Vickerman, 1990: 7), and ‘green’ infrastructure which supports and protects 
the environment (Marshall, 2013: 4). 
Neoclassical economists have traditionally preferred the term ‘public good’ or ‘collective 
consumption good’ (see Samuelson, 1954: 387-9), implying that infrastructure is defined by 
public capital investment made in response to market failures. In addition, this school of 
thought asserts that infrastructures are ‘natural monopolies’ (O’Neill, 2010; also see Sharkey, 
1982) and possess the properties of ‘non-excludability’ and ‘non-rivalry’ in their consumption 
(Deneulin and Townsend, 2007: 20). However, through the ‘unravelling’ of natural 
monopolies (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 199) and the emergent processes of privatisation 
and financialisation, these neoclassical understandings of infrastructure are becoming 
increasingly redundant – in the contemporary economy, infrastructure can neither be broadly 
characterised as ‘public’ nor as exempt of competition. Nevertheless, the notion that 
infrastructure is a ‘sunk cost’ (Clark and Wrigley, 1995: 211) and requires significant public 
capital investment is still highly relevant (for example, see OECD, 2012a). 
In its contemporary context, infrastructure has developed multiple meanings that are shaped 
by an unbounded web of discourse and perception. Indeed, its position in time and space 
are integral to its precise calculation.  
For some, infrastructure is defined by its physical manifestations, so that infrastructure means 
‘roads, gas and electricity supply, water supply, drainage and sewer systems, bridges, harbors 
and river transportation systems, slaughterhouses, irrigation systems, and marketplaces’ 
(Hansen, 1965: 151).  
For others, infrastructure is defined by the function it performs and the service that it 
delivers: for example, infrastructure is ‘an enabler of the supply chains and divisions of labour 
needed for expanding markets’ (O’Neill, 2013: 444; emphasis added). Such a reading is both 
in line with the neoclassical growth model, which suggests that infrastructure plays a role in 
maximizing productivity (Arrow and Kurz, 1970), and with Marxist thought, which interprets 
infrastructure as facilitating production, consumption, capital accumulation and as a solution 
to ‘overaccumulation’ – as it enables capital and labour surpluses to be ‘absorbed by temporal 
displacement’ during periods of crisis (Harvey, 1985a: 26).  
Further still, infrastructure may be understood by its transferability between different 
categories, and its ability to transcend both the material and abstract worlds: for instance, 
rather than being defined by its physical manifestations, infrastructure can instead be 
understood as a financial asset or security which ‘represents a high-quality, long-term, 
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income-oriented investment generating stable returns, with an upside potential, relatively 
uncorrelated with equities or business cycle fluctuations, but positively correlated with 
inflation’ (Solomon, 2009: 5). Indeed, in the contemporary economy, infrastructure has 
become to be understood as something that is tradable, exchangeable, fungible and liquid. 
Rather than defining infrastructure by its distinctiveness as a concept or form, it is perhaps 
more appropriate to define infrastructure by its relational characteristics: that is, viewing 
infrastructure as part of a network or system in which one item of infrastructure cannot exist 
in isolation: 
‘[I]nfrastructure [is] the physical assets and processes of the inter-related systems that 
provide the resources and services essential to sustain or enhance economic growth and 
quality of life at a range of scales’ (Dawson, 2013: 2, emphasis added). 
Although this research focuses on the funding and financing of urban infrastructure and, 
therefore, adopts a definition of infrastructure that prioritises the urban scale, acknowledging 
that infrastructure has emerged in a multiscalar and interconnected system (or ‘system of 
systems’) is crucial for understanding the whole array of factors that might shape or drive 
the funding and financing of infrastructure in the contemporary global economy.  
Taking into account the wide range of definitions from an array of different disciplines 
presented above, then, this research defines infrastructure as the interrelated physical components 
of the urban environment requiring significant capital investment, which have multiple transferable meanings 
and representations, and which enable economic growth and capitalist development. More practically, the 
focus in this research is on infrastructure that is created to support or stimulate urban 
development and economic growth, such as a transportation system or a city-centre 
regeneration scheme. 
 
1.2 An introduction to the funding and financing of infrastructure 
Understanding how infrastructure is funded and financed is a central objective of this research. 
As such, it is essential to dedicate some space to explaining what is meant by the terms 
‘funding’ and ‘financing’. 
According to (Maxwell-Jackson, 2013: 5), the terms ‘funding’ and ‘financing’ are 
‘fundamentally different’ when used in the context of infrastructure investment. While 
‘funding’ describes the process of ‘paying for the infrastructure over time’, ‘financing’ 
describes the process of ‘meeting the upfront costs of construction’ (ibid.).  
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Such a definition appears to be generally accepted across the literature, especially in 
practitioner reports and publications. For example, according to the Australian Financial 
Services Council and Ernst and Young (2011): 
‘…[t]he funding of infrastructure [is] defined as the allocation of ultimate cash flows 
that support the construction and operation of infrastructure. The financing of 
infrastructure [is] defined as selecting the immediate source of cash that will physically 
develop the assets with the repayment of this investment over the life of the asset. 
Funding is the revenue stream that repays the financing’ (Australian Financial Services 
Council and Ernst and Young, 2011: 6). 
In summary, funding is taken here to mean the sources of income that defray infrastructure costs over 
time, whereas financing is understood as the financial arrangements that enable the costs of a project to 
be met as they are incurred. 
In the current policy and practitioner discourse, a precise definition of the origin of sources 
of funding and financing is perhaps more elusive, especially in terms of whether an item of 
infrastructure is publically or privately funded and/or financed. 
Vander Ploeg (2011: 41) argues that there are only two possible sources of funding for 
infrastructure: ‘taxation’ and ‘user fees’. This is echoed in a report by PwC (2013: 12) in which 
it is suggested that funding for infrastructure can either be obtained ‘[t]hrough users paying 
a charge for the use of the infrastructure’ or ‘[t]hrough Government spending’. As such, it 
appears as if a distinction exists between public funding (government spending/taxation) and 
private funding (user fees/project-generated revenues). In realty, however, this distinction is 
not always clear. Take the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) as an example: although the 
‘private’ in PFI directly refers to the way in which an infrastructure project is ‘financed’ 
(typically PFI schemes are ‘funded’ by mortgage-style payments from government (Leyshon 
and Thrift, 2007)), complex accounting standards provide room for interpretation and have 
led to PFI being classed as privately funded infrastructure by some (for example, see CECA, 
2013: 9).  
An equally simple distinction could be made between forms of financing. According to 
Vander Ploeg (2011: 41), financing is either achieved on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis (that is, 
infrastructure costs are met as revenues arrive) or through ‘debt finance’ (that is, borrowing 
in order to meet the costs of infrastructure before repaying lenders using future revenues). 
Again, however, this simple binary definition arguably fails to capture the complexity and 
variation of infrastructure financing. In fact, it is maintained here that there are multiple 
forms financing, many of which cannot be defined as exclusively public or private. 
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Figure 1.1 presents a framework through which infrastructure funding and financing can be 
understood. The Figure differentiates between funding and financing and also indicates 
whether types of funding and financing can be considered as public, private, or both.  
 
Figure 1.1 An illustration of infrastructure funding and financing 
Source: Author’s own. 
Private funding sources include project-generated revenues (such as user fees) and other 
commercial revenues (such as land sales or advertising revenue), while public funding sources 
comprise taxes and assessments, public sector availability payments, grants, and other 
government contributions. In some instances, it is possible for funding to be generated from 
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public and private sources simultaneously, such as in instances of joint development where 
factors such as public ownership can actually add value to an otherwise privately funded 
project.  
In terms of financing, as exhibited in Figure 1.1, private sources include project-generated 
or commercial revenues as they arrive (pay-as-you-go); conventional debt finance through 
banks and other institutions (such as loans); bonds that are issued through the capital markets 
by either a public entity or special purpose vehicle (SPV); hybrid packages of project finance; 
and indirect finance through the secondary markets. Public sources of financing include 
taxes, fees and grants as they arrive; specialist public sector lending vehicles (such as the 
Public Works Loan Board in the UK); and other forms of hybrid investment (such as 
through the European Investment Bank (EIB)). Equity investment can be public or private. 
In addition, some forms of public financing are increasingly being delivered through private 
forms, such as sovereign wealth funds or public sector pension funds. 
It is important to interpret the sources of funding and financing outlined in Figure 1.1 as a 
series of over-arching categories, rather than a comprehensive list, as the potential number 
of variations within each category is almost infinite. Indeed, a key objective of this thesis is 
to explore and begin to make sense of the complexity of the ways in which infrastructure 
investments take place beyond these broad categorisations. 
Nevertheless, this thesis will suggest that the ways in which urban infrastructure projects are 
being funded and financed can broadly be regarded as undergoing a process of 
transformation. Traditional sources of funding, such as direct taxation, government grants 
and user charges, are being replaced by novel and alternative sources, such as the additional 
value created by an infrastructure item that is capturable in a range of monetary forms. In 
addition, traditional forms of financing, such as ‘pay-as-you-go’ tax, grants, project-generated 
revenues and plain vanilla debt issuances (that is, simple issuances requiring minimal financial 
engineering), are being replaced by more innovative and complex forms of financing, such 
as bespoke public-private partnership arrangements (involving complex legal structures such 
as special purpose vehicles) or securitisation transactions (which involve packaging debt that 
has been issued against future revenue streams into tradable parcels – see 2.1.2 for further 
explanation). 
Such transformation, it is argued, can be described as a process of ‘financialisation’. 
Financialisation is a concept that describes the increasing influence of financial processes and 
systems in economic and political life (Pike and Pollard, 2010), and, in particular, the 
emergence of a more intense form of capitalism which constantly seeks to accelerate the 
 20 
circulation and accumulation of capital in order to produce greater than ever profit and 
reward (Aalbers, 2008).  
Financialisation must be understood as bound up in – yet distinct from – the process of 
neoliberalisation, which can be defined as the prevailing process of ‘market-driven social and 
spatial transformation’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102). Like financialisation, 
neoliberalisation is articulated in an infinite range of unique and geographically specific ways 
(Peck and Tickell, 2002), and underpins a more contradictory and crisis-prone form of 
capitalism. However, whereas neoliberalisation is typically considered to have emerged as a 
new form of capitalist development in the second half of the 20th Century, in which a 
political alliance emerged (typified by the dominant global influence of Reaganism and 
Thatcherism) that promoted market integration, actively encouraged the expansion of 
structures of accumulation and consumption, and set in place an ‘exclusionary and 
hierarchical’ system of social relations (Gill, 1995), financialisation can be viewed as a more 
recent consequence of the proliferation of financial technologies (such as securitisation and 
derivatisation) which has transformed the financial sector from an important enabler of 
industrial production into a self-sustaining and hyper-productive tool for capital 
accumulation (Boyer, 2000; Duménil and Lévy, 2004; Bryan and Rafferty, 2006). 
Importantly, though, the increasing influence of financial markets, their intermediaries and 
processes can be viewed as ‘enabled’ by neoliberalisation: specifically, ‘neoliberalism [has] 
released the constraints against it’ (Kotz, 2011: 15). 
 
1.3 Outlining the framework of research: a UK-US comparison 
The objective of this research is to undertake an in-depth and fine-grained analysis of the 
funding and financing of urban infrastructure in the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK). The comparative dimension is a crucial part of this approach, providing a 
rich source of empirical material on which key conceptual and theoretical arguments and 
contributions are based. For the comparative element, the research focuses on six case study 
cities (three from each country), which have been chosen using a robust methodological 
framework (Chapter 3). The ‘city’ is chosen as the unit of analysis (instead of possible 
alternative, such as specific infrastructure projects or specific funding mechanisms) because 
it enables an understanding to be developed of how the context and characteristics of a 
particular place drive, shape or make possible certain models of capital investment. 
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In the US, the selected case study cities are Buffalo (State of New York), Chicago (State of 
Illinois) and Stockton (State of California). In the UK, the selected cities are Manchester, 
Newcastle and Sheffield. These cities have all been chosen as ‘critical cases’ which have the 
potential to make significant conceptual and theoretical contributions (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Barnes et al., 2007). In particular, the cities were chosen according to their ability to address 
and answer the research questions that are presented at the end of Chapter 2.  
The case study material used throughout the thesis has been obtained from over one hundred 
semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders and a careful reading of key primary and 
secondary documents. The methodological opportunities and challenges of this approach 
are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3. Importantly, in contrast to what could be called 
positivist ‘like-for-like’ comparisons, which seek to identify the similarities and differences 
between case studies and before categorising the case studies according to a pre-established 
theoretical model, this research adopts a ‘relational’ approach to comparison in which the 
understanding of one case study helps to shape an inform the understanding of another 
(Ward, 2010b), thus helping to develop new conceptual and theoretical insights. 
 
1.4 Key conceptual and theoretical contributions 
This research, which explores the funding and financing of urban infrastructure, aims to 
contribute towards a better understanding of the interaction between finance and urban 
development and, in doing so, seeks to address a series of gaps in the existing literature. 
Just as the global financial crisis has positioned infrastructure at the forefront of 
contemporary political strategy, it is also unquestionable that the crisis has catalysed the 
emergence of new political, economic and academic approaches to finance and the global 
financial system. In particular, the global financial crisis has fuelled the spread of a 
geographical approach to finance, which interprets the global financial system as highly 
variegated, embedded in place, and decidedly uneven (inter alia French et al., 2009, 2011; Lee 
et al., 2009; Pike and Pollard, 2010). Such an approach builds upon an earlier body of work 
on the geographies of finance pioneered by the likes of Clark (1993, 2005), Leyshon and 
Thrift (1996, 1997), Martin (1999), Mason and Harrison (2002), Pike (2006) and Pollard 
(1998, 2003), which, in turn, had its roots in the reinvigorated Marxist political economy that 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s and that conveyed finance capital as a key driver of an 
uneven and crisis-prone form of capitalism (for example, Boyer, 1990; Cerny, 1993; Harvey, 
1973, 1982, 1985a, 1985b; Harvey and Chaterjee, 1973). 
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Despite what is evidently a rich intellectual heritage, contemporary geographical approaches 
have arguably failed to influence the understanding of financial systems and processes within 
mainstream economic and political discourses (Engelen and Faulconbridge, 2009; 
Muellerleile et al., 2014). In part, it is the underdeveloped nature of the concept of 
‘financialisation’ (see Section 2.1), a potentially transformative analytical tool, that has 
confined geographical accounts of finance to spaces of heterodoxy. 
Whilst acknowledging its potential theoretical significance, Christophers (2012) bemoans the 
lack of any significant conceptual or empirical interrogation of financialisation: 
‘In all manner of different accounts of contemporary political economy and of, not 
least, its recurrent crises, capitalism’s financialisation is typically envisioned less as a 
contestable hypothesis requiring empirical substantiation, and more as something 
axiomatic, a taken-for-granted of social-scientific understanding: established and 
beyond dispute… [H]owever, the accumulated body of analytical (as opposed to 
anecdotal) evidence for ‘actually-existing’ financialisation is, for such a shibboleth of 
contemporary scholarship, remarkably and curiously thin’ (Christophers, 2012: 272). 
This view is also shared by French et al. (2011: 809) who maintain that there are too many 
‘generic accounts of financialization’ which do not focus enough ‘on the specificities of new 
financial values and technologies’, and by Pike and Pollard (2010: 31) who point to a ‘relative 
dearth of empirical work’ that engages with the topic of financialisation. 
In addition, although one of the concept’s key attributes is arguably its ability to draw 
attention to the highly uneven spatialities of financial processes and systems (French et al., 
2011; Pike and Pollard, 2010), Weber (2010) suggests that insufficient attention has been 
given to understanding the effects of financialisation at the local and urban scales, especially 
in terms of analysing how place-based actors and institutions negotiate multiscalar financial 
process and what implications this has for local and urban development:  
‘With the exception of a few recent analyses (Hackworth 2007; Ranney 2002), we know 
little about the politics of financialization at the local level… [M]ore conventional 
accounts of urban governance, emphasizing regimes, power, and formal legal 
arrangements, can assist critical geographers in their studies of the place-based 
articulations of global finance’ (Weber, 2010: 270-1). 
In order to address this shortcoming, this thesis focuses on the interplay between finance 
and urban infrastructure, taking into account key local factors, such as local political agendas, 
the financial condition of local governments, and the restructuring of local institutions, as 
well as being sensitive to broader political-economic factors, such as the evolution of the 
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national regulatory landscape. In doing so, the thesis also follows Pike and Pollard’s (2010: 
38) call to tackle head on the apparent tensions between territorially ‘bounded’ entities (such 
as an item of infrastructure or a governing institution) and territorially ‘unbounded’ flows 
and circulations (especially including flows of investment capital).  
In addition to enhancing the conceptualisation of financialisation as a highly variegated, 
multiscalar and at times contradictory process, this thesis also seeks to address the empirical 
void highlighted by Pike and Pollard (2010). In particular, by undertaking an empirically-
driven and fine-grained analysis of the funding and financing of urban infrastructure, this 
research aims to go beyond a ‘generic’ account of financialisation (French et al., 2011: 809) 
and to draw attention to the ‘complex processes of transformation’ that constitute and result 
from the process of financialisation (van der Zwan, 2014: 120).  
Although the concept of financialisation arguably emerged from political-economic roots 
(see above), Pantich and Konings (2009) suggest that the role of the state has been somewhat 
underemphasised – if not ignored – in contemporary debates: 
‘Of course it has become commonplace to assert that states and markets should not be 
seen as really counter-posed; but such claims have tended to remain rather perfunctory, 
and most research has remained guided by the notion that financial expansion has been 
accompanied by the attenuation of the state’ (Pantich and Konings, 2009: 68). 
In response to the neglected role of the state, this research heeds the call to adopt ‘a fuller 
engagement with political economy approaches to money’ (Hall, 2013: 286-7). A key 
argument of this thesis, for example, is that, in contrast to accounts of the increasing 
privatisation of infrastructure (e.g. Whitfield, 2010), the state actually plays a larger than ever 
role in funding and financing infrastructure, and, as such, is entering new and untested arenas 
of financial calculation and risk taking, with potentially significant implications for its 
territoriality. Accordingly, then, this research also links the topic of financialisation with a 
‘broader analysis of state power and network relationships’ (Ashton et al., 2014: 13).  
This analysis also has important implications for our understanding of the process of 
financialisation in relation to neoliberalisation, as well as other processes such as 
commodification, marketisation and privatisation. Whilst financialisation has emerged in the 
context of a multiscalar reconstitution of state-economy relations in which market-based 
regulatory arrangements are strongly promoted (Brenner and Theodore, 2005), 
financialisation can be regarded as distinct from the process of neoliberalisation. Although 
financialisation is also a strategy of the state’s enduring territorial ‘struggle’ (see Castells, 1996; 
Brenner, 2001), it is specifically focused on utilising finance capital and financial technologies 
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(e.g. securitisation and derivatisation) to accelerate the circulation of capital while 
simultaneously aiming to disperse, transfer and even extinguish the risks typically associated 
with such circulation (Aalbers, 2008; Clark et al., 2009). Similarly, although privatisation and 
commodification provide new channels through which finance can penetrate into previously 
inaccessible spheres (e.g. the privatisation of infrastructure has enabled the securitisation of 
revenues from previously state-owned infrastructure monopolies) (Allen and Pryke, 2013), 
and thus have been important in the emergence of financialisation, financialisation uniquely 
describes the complex and spatially differentiated ways in which finance capital is increasingly 
taking advantage of these and a plethora of other such opportunities. 
The transition from the global financial crisis to the sovereign debt crisis that followed the 
unprecedented government bailouts of distressed financial institutions (French and Leyshon, 
2010; Lapavitsas et al., 2010; Peck, 2013) reinforces the notion that the state and its fortunes 
are bound up in the process of financialisation. Despite the clear link between the meltdown 
of financial markets and the emergence of fiscal crises across multiple levels of government, 
there has been very little conceptual engagement with fiscal stress, its relation to flows of 
finance, and its implications for urban development. Whilst a body of work on the politics 
of austerity is emerging (e.g. Peck, 2012; Schäfer and Streeck, 2013), alongside more 
mainstream debates about the economic (il)logic of austerity (Dymski, 2013), it is arguable 
that there has been insufficient coverage of how the process of financialisation might pose a 
risk for the financial condition of governments – defined as the extent to which a governmental 
entity can meet its financial and service obligations (Hendrick, 2011: 18) – and, in turn, how 
fiscally stressed governments negotiate financialisation going forward. 
Of course, there are some exceptions to the general lack of crossover between ideas of 
financialisation and fiscal stress. These include: Kirkpatrick and Smith’s (2011) analysis of 
the challenges for municipal investment and growth agendas in crisis-riddled cities, in which 
a focus is placed on the emerging conflicts between bondholders and municipal employees; 
Davidson and Ward’s (2014) account of the dire fiscal implications of an overtly speculative 
form of urban development in pre-crisis Californian cities; Peck’s (2013: 17) discussion of 
the proliferation of ‘risky experiments in fiscal entrepreneurialism’ as part of an ‘increasingly 
speculative, debt-leveraged and risk-prone’ model of urban development in fiscally stressed 
American cities; and, Hall and Jonas’s (2014: 2) examination of a ‘speculative spatial fix’ to 
urban infrastructure in the bankrupt city of Detroit. Nevertheless, an explicit attempt to 
combine fiscal stress and financialisation in a coherent theoretical framework has yet to 
emerge. As such, this thesis seeks to build on this nascent body of research, and, crucially, to 
 25 
begin to construct a framework through which financialisation and fiscal stress can be 
understood in tandem. 
A final area in which this thesis seeks to develop new conceptual and theoretical insights is 
in improving existing understandings of how the funding and financing of infrastructure 
might affect the quality and form of social and economic development within cities. Notably, 
the research draws on Graham and Marvin’s (2001) conceptualisation of ‘splintering 
urbanism’, in which the unbundling, segmentation and privatisation of infrastructure leads 
to a highly uneven provision of networked infrastructures. Specifically, an attempt is made 
to link the concept of splintering urbanism to political-economic approaches that emphasise 
the uneven and sometimes destructive nature of the circulation of capital through the built 
environment (see Harvey, 1985a). In particular, O’Neill’s (2013) suggestion that the 
segmentation and unbundling of infrastructure has been a key driver of the financialisation 
of infrastructure provides the context from which to question whether the process of 
financialisation might serve to intensify splintering urbanism. By merging Graham and 
Marvin’s concept of ‘splintering urbanism’ with a political-economic approach to 
financialisation, which positions financialisation as an agent of the acceleration of capital 
circulation (with increasingly uneven and destructive implications), this thesis seeks to 
improve and refine the concept of splintering urbanism while also crystallising the value of 
adopting a political-economic approach to financialisation. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured into seven further chapters. In Chapter 2, a critical analysis of the 
literatures relevant to the funding and financing of urban infrastructure is presented. The 
chapter begins by reviewing the literature on ‘financialisation’, before developing a political-
economic approach that positions the state as a key actor within contemporary financialised 
capitalism. The role of the state is further explored in Section 2.2, in which the effects of 
financialisation upon urban development and governance are analysed using the concept of 
‘reterritorialisation’. Section 2.3 examines the fiscal challenges facing governments at all 
levels, assesses the impacts of fiscal stress on the ways in which infrastructure is funded and 
financed, and questions the implications of more financialised models of investment for the 
future financial condition of urban governments. Beyond the fiscal effects of infrastructure 
investment, Section 2.4 explores the potentially splintering implications of financialisation 
for the broader urban environment. In the final section of the literature review (Section 2.5), 
an analytical framework is proposed and the main research questions outlined.  
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Chapter 3 explores the methodological challenges of undertaking international comparative 
research and attempts to build a robust methodological framework. In particular, the chapter 
follows Ward (2010a) in making a case for a more ‘relational’ approach to comparative 
research, as well as outlining the justification for the choice of case studies and methods used 
in the research. The chapter concludes with a concise depiction of the methodological 
framework. 
In Chapter 4, the case studies are contextualised through an exploration of their 
characteristics and economic geographies in order to gain a sense of the factors that might 
influence the ways in which infrastructure is funded and financed within each city. Section 
4.1 focuses on the US case studies: it discusses the American system of intergovernmental 
relations, reflects on the importance of the municipal bond markets for public finance in the 
US, and details some key features of each US case study city. Section 4.2 outlines the key 
characteristics of each UK case study city, sets the case studies within the context of a highly 
centralised system of government and governance, and introduces the prospect of a new 
round of reterritorialisation through the (partial) devolution of financing powers to English 
cities.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are where the main body of the empirical case study analysis takes place, 
with every case study being referred to in some form in all three chapters. This approach is 
adopted instead of undertaking the empirical analysis in six case-specific chapters. Such an 
approach would encourage an overly descriptive interaction with the case study material and 
could result in an under-developed analysis that also lacks continuity between chapters. By 
contrast, the aim of spreading the empirical analysis over three thematically designed chapters 
is to ensure that the study remains as analytical as possible, and to enable the key themes and 
arguments to flow throughout. 
Chapter 5 provides evidence that the funding and financing of urban infrastructure is 
becoming financialised. The Chapter emphasises the geographical variation of 
financialisation, exploring the evolution of infrastructure investment strategies in Manchester 
that prioritise financial returns on the one hand (Section 5.2.1), and demonstrating that 
traditional forms of less financialised investment are still important in Buffalo, NY, on the 
other (Section 5.1.2). The chapter also undertakes an in-depth analysis of tax increment 
financing (TIF) in the cities of Chicago, Newcastle, Sheffield and Stockton, illustrating how 
the apparent level of financialisation is dependent on a cocktail of place-specific factors. To 
conclude the chapter, Section 5.3 reflects on the extent and nature of the financialisation of 
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infrastructure investment across the different case study cities and argues for a more refined, 
nuanced and geographically sensitive conceptualisation of the process of financialisation. 
Chapter 6 examines more closely the interaction between financialisation, the state and fiscal 
crisis. In particular, it questions whether the challenges of fiscal stress and the need for 
infrastructure investment are causing the state to undergo a process of reterritorialisation. 
Drawing on the case studies of Chicago and Buffalo, Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 develop the 
concept of ‘fiscalisation’ in order to examine the fiscal and territorial impacts of financialised 
infrastructure investment strategies that are deployed in times of fiscal stress. In order to 
develop this inquiry, Section 6.1.3 provides a fine-grained analysis of the fortunes of 
Stockton, illustrating how the combination of fiscalisation and speculative urbanism sent the 
City of Stockton into bankruptcy, and how the city continues to be vulnerable to the forces 
of systemic competition and bound up in a form of State-driven reterritorialisation. The 
remainder of the Chapter explores the process of reterritorialisation that is occurring in the 
UK in response to challenges of engaging in financialised investment practices under a 
centralist framework. All three UK case studies are drawn on in order to examine the 
unfolding process of decentralisation, the emergence of ‘City Deals’, the creation of new city-
regional institutions, and the impact of these processes on the funding and financing of 
infrastructure.  
In Chapter 7, the aim is to analyse the implications of the shift towards more financialised 
forms of funding and financing infrastructure, especially for urban development and the 
wider urban environment. Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 analyses the geographies of risk and return 
in Sheffield and Manchester, question the ability of the private sector to fund and finance 
infrastructure in underperforming economies and examine the extent to which the state takes 
on new risks when engaging in financialised investment practices. This argument is 
developed in Section 7.2.1 in the context of the City of Chicago’s notorious programme of 
selling off public infrastructure assets to private investors on long-term leases. Sections 7.1.3 
and 7.2.2 provide further analysis of the splintering implications of financialisation, 
suggesting that attempts to accelerate the circulation of capital through the built environment 
in Buffalo and Newcastle have led to an intensification of the process of ‘creative 
destruction’. Finally, the Chapter turns to the bankrupt City of Stockton and questions the 
ways in which Stockton’s bankruptcy has seemingly rewarded the capital markets at the 
expense of the employees, retirees and citizens of Stockton. 
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Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of the research, focusing on answering the research 
questions, crystallising the key arguments of the thesis and reflecting on how conceptual and 
theoretical understandings could be developed and improved as a result.  
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Chapter 2: The geographies of capital investment and 
infrastructure finance 
This thesis aims to explain how the infrastructure is funded and financed, what is driving a 
transformation in the funding and financing of infrastructure, and what implications evolving 
models of investment have for urban development, urban governance, the financial 
condition of governing entities, and for the broader urban environment. This chapter 
provides a review of the literature that engages with these issues.  
The chapter aims to draw out a set of core themes from the literature in order to create a 
framework for the analysis of the funding and financing of infrastructure in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. This framework is split into four main sections that guide 
the principle arguments within this thesis; first, the geographies of financialisation and the 
financialisation of infrastructure; second, the role of the state in infrastructure provision and 
the financialisation of capital investment; third; infrastructure investment and the financial 
condition; and fourth, the financialisation of infrastructure and the intensification of urban 
splintering. Crucially, the analytical framework creates the foundations for addressing the 
core research questions of this study, which are presented at the end of this chapter. 
 
2.1 The financialisation of infrastructure and urban development 
The ‘growing influence of capital markets, their intermediaries, and processes in 
contemporary economic and political life’, known as the process of financialisation (Pike and 
Pollard, 2010: 29), is a central feature of the contemporary global economy. Of the 
definitions cited by French et al. (2011) in a recent review of financialisation, central themes 
include the ‘increasing role’ (Epstein, 2005: 3) and the ‘growing and systemic power’ of 
finance in the global economy (Blackburn, 2006: 39), as well as the trend towards a financially 
driven ‘pattern of accumulation’ (Krippner, 2005: 174) which is shaped by ‘the logic and 
imperatives of interest-bearing capital’ (Fine, 2010: 99). 
At an analytical level, it is also an essential concept for understanding the financial system. 
In particular, as a ‘profoundly spatial phenomenon’ (French et al., 2011: 800), the concept of 
financialisation facilitates a geographical exploration into the global economy and financial 
system. The spatially sensitive reading of financialisation adopted by contemporary theorists 
has its roots in more traditional approaches (for a review see French et al., 2011; Lapavitsas 
and Powell, 2013). First, the concept is heavily influenced by Marxist conceptions of the 
 30 
financial system as capable of providing (temporary) solutions to crisis in the world of 
productive accumulation, whilst enabling a class of financial elites to further enhance their 
power and (temporarily) stabilise their hegemonic position (Dumenil and Levy, 2004; Harvey 
1982, 1985b; Lapavitsas, 2013). Second, and related, it has been shaped by the search of 
regulation theorists to explain how capital accumulation is stabilised in its social context by 
a dominant regime (see Aglietta 1979; Boyer, 1990), the latest of which is portrayed as a 
financial ‘mode of social regulation’ (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Becker et al., 2010; Boyer, 
2000). And third, parallels can be drawn between financialisation and Hilferding’s 
proclamation of a new of financial epoch – later transposed by Keynes in his articulation of 
monetary policy as a mediator in ‘the class struggle between capital and labour’ (Kennedy, 
2013: 152). 
 
2.1.1 The geographies of financialisation 
Geographers have sought to understand the rise of a finance-driven economy by analysing 
the hyper-mobility of capital (Clark, 2005; Epstein, 2009); the reworking of ‘management 
objectives’ (Williams, 2000: 6); finance and the firm (Pollard, 2003); the increasing influence 
shareholder value (Froud et al., 2000, 2006; Pike, 2006); the impact of financialisation upon 
everyday life (Martin, 2002; Langely, 2008); the heightened crisis-prone tendencies of 
financialised capitalism (Leyshon, 2004); and the geographical causes and implications of the 
global financial crisis (Aalbers, 2009a, 2009b; French et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Martin, 
2011). 
Despite the growing body of work addressing the previously neglected theme of finance 
within geography (see Martin, 1999; Pollard, 2003), Christophers (2012: 272), posits that the 
concept of financialisation is ‘anaemic’ and lacking in empirical foundations and explanatory 
clout. It could also be argued that financialisation theorists fail to engage, to a sufficient 
extent, with the burgeoning literatures from other disciplines, which provide focused and in-
depth coverage of financial markets, systems and processes. Equally, the concept of 
financialisation, as articulated in the geographical literature, has had relatively little 
penetration beyond the remits of geography and sociology (see Engelen, 2012). Whilst the 
financial crisis in particular has increased the interest in finance within the geographical 
discipline, commentary and analysis from prominent economists (for example Shiller, 2008; 
Krugman, 2009) has arguably been far more influential in shaping perceptions of the financial 
crisis and the role of finance in the contemporary economy. 
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Financialisation, however, is a treasured concept amongst geographers because of its ability 
to provide a critical understanding of the global financial system and to emphasise the 
importance of scale, place and geographical unevenness. Nevertheless, French et al. (2011) 
argue, that its key strengths are underexploited in geographical research: 
‘…while it is unquestionable that work in this field has been highly significant, 
generating rich, critical and innovative insights into the workings of contemporary 
financialized capitalism,… work on financialization has been insufficiently attentive to: 
the role of space and place; the geography of money and finance; and earlier work in 
the Marxist and international political-economy tradition that effectively focused on the 
problem of financialization before the neologism was coined and mobilized’ (French et 
al., 2011: 800). 
Furthermore, they maintain that there are too many ‘generic accounts of financialization’ 
which do not focus enough ‘on the specificities of new financial values and technologies’ 
(French et al., 2011: 809). How, then, can a geographical reading of financial systems and 
their processes become more meaningful? The next section delivers a critique of 
conventional understandings of financialisation to create a concept that is more adept at 
analysing and explaining the transformation of contemporary urban economies. 
 
2.1.2 Securitisation, capital switching and the transformation of capital accumulation 
Perhaps the most theoretically productive accounts of financialisation can be found in the 
analysis of the process of securitisation, which – counter to the critique presented by French 
et al. (2011) – is strongly advancing the political-economy tradition and providing critical 
insights into the implications of financialisation for the capitalist system. In particular, the 
process of securitisation has emerged as a key theme for analysis in the wake of the chaos of 
the global financial crisis (Aalbers, 2009b; French et al., 2009; Wainwright, 2009). 
Specifically, securitisation – the issuance of debt against future revenue streams and the 
packaging of such into tradable parcels – allows funds to be raised at a lower cost than 
through traditional debt or equity channels (Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988; Schwarcz, 1994). 
This is facilitated by the processes of isolation, pooling and tranching, which enable risk to 
be divided up, shared or transferred (DeMarzo, 2005; Kravitt, 2007; Schwarcz, 1994; 
Wainwright, 2009). Problematically, these processes can also distort risk, create contradictory 
investment products, heighten systemic vulnerability to crisis, encourage regulatory arbitrage, 
and exploit the underlying fund raisers whom securitisation was initially designed to serve 
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(Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Fligstein and Goldstein, 2010; Froud, 2003; MacKenzie, 
2012).  
Because securitisation enables an increasing proportion of economic assets and income 
streams to be rendered tradable on the financial markets, its proliferation has been hugely 
significant for the increasing size and influence of the financial system in relation to other 
sectors of the global economy. Whilst this remains a central theme of analysis for 
geographers, it is the ability of securitisation to distort and manipulate circuits of capital 
accumulation that provides the greatest opportunity for enhancing the analytical and 
explanatory power of financialisation. 
Drawing on Marx, via Harvey (1982, 1985b), and through an analysis of securitisation, 
Aalbers (2008: 148) characterises financialisation as ‘capital switching from the primary, 
secondary or tertiary circuit to the quaternary circuit of capital’. This reading suggests that 
financialisation provides a solution to the accumulation of surplus capital in either the 
primary (industrial), secondary (infrastructure and the built environment), or tertiary (science, 
technology and soft infrastructure) circuits, by allowing surplus capital to be transferred to 
the quaternary circuit (the financial system). Financialisation, then, creates a (temporary) fix 
to the crisis of overaccumulation by opening up new financial spaces into which surplus 
capital can flow. Not only does financialisation ‘rewrite the rules of capital accumulation’, 
but it also decouples the financial system from the other sectors of the economy and 
transforms it into ‘an investment channel in its own right’ (Aalbers, 2008: 150). Crucially, by 
facilitating capital switching, the process of financialisation actively enables and encourages 
overaccumulation, and thus intensifies the crisis-prone nature of capitalism (also see Jessop, 
2013; Gotham, 2009). 
Aalbers’ reading of financialisation as capital switching no doubt lends to the explanatory 
power of the concept. However, as the primary, secondary and tertiary circuits of capital 
become increasingly influenced by financial markets, the nature of those circuits 
fundamentally changes. So whilst ‘for Marx, capitalist commodity production was always-
already monetized and dependent on credit-debt relations’ (Jessop, 2013: 49), the process of 
financialisation (when conceived as the ‘growing influence of capital markets, their 
intermediaries and processes’ (Pike and Pollard, 2010: 29)) has caused the primary, secondary 
and tertiary circuits to become increasingly interconnected with the quaternary circuit and, 
as a result, the barriers between them have been broken down. In other words, the primary, 
secondary and tertiary circuits are becoming financialised.  
 33 
For instance, traditional manufacturing industries, such as the automotive industry, are 
increasingly deriving profits from providing financial services that enable consumers to 
purchase their manufactures (Froud et al., 2010). In addition, the built environment is as 
much about mortgages, mortgage-backed securities and a vast range of other financial 
products as it is about bricks and mortar (Gotham, 2012). Indeed, ‘the large multinationals 
that dominate the world economy have [themselves] become ‘financialised’’ Lapavitsas and 
Powell, 2013: 363).  
As the primary, secondary, and tertiary circuits begin to replicate features of the quaternary 
circuit, and there is a merging together and a dismantling of the boundaries between them, 
arguably their individual categorisation becomes increasingly meaningless. Furthermore, as 
the various circuits become more financialised, the opportunities for capital switching actually 
decrease and, therefore, further limit the possibilities for surplus capital absorption and crisis 
prevention. This critique extends the somewhat limited analysis of circuits of capital 
presented as distinctly separate, which lacks relevance in an increasingly financialised world. 
An important difference exists between the argument presented here and that of Lapavitsas 
and Powell (2013). They argue that the quaternary circuit does not absorb surplus capital and 
is unable to prevent crisis because finance is separate, distinct and autonomous: 
‘[Financialisation] does not represent the escape of capital to the sphere of finance in 
search of (possibly speculative) higher profits, not least because the sphere of finance has its 
own internal logic and cannot act simply as a refuge for capital abandoning production’ (Lapavitsas 
and Powell, 2013: 362-3; emphasis added). 
In contrast, here, it is argued that finance is integrated with – and integral to – industry 
(primary circuit), the build environment (secondary circuit) and social infrastructure (tertiary 
circuit). Financialisation, then, is not about the separation of finance and the economy, but 
about transformation; the transition from an economy driven by capital-labour relations to an 
economy driven by the imperative of finance. Indeed, ‘capital itself is breaking down these 
distinctions both conceptually and in reality’ (Bryan and Rafferty, 2013: 135). 
 
2.1.3 The financialisation of infrastructure 
The process of financialisation and the proliferation of financial technologies are arguably 
enhancing the efficiency of the relationship between cities and financial markets (Corpataux 
and Crevoisier, 2005). Crucially, the processes of ‘asset creation, valuation, and securitization’ 
serve to open up aspects of the urban environment that were previously closed to global 
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flows of finance (Weber, 2010: 270). That is, ‘assets once thought to be valued only for their 
uses (infrastructure, pensions, and tax revenues) [can be] converted into securities and traded 
at a distance’ (ibid: 257). Through securitisation, for example, it is possible to calculate 
specific sources of value that might exist in pieces of infrastructure in the future and then to 
extract that potential value and render it concrete as capital in the present. This enables 
investors to accelerate capital accumulation and profit generation and enables cities to tap in 
to new sources of previously unavailable finance, transform infrastructure from a sunk cost 
into a productive resource, and convert infrastructure projects into revolving funds that 
stimulate additional investment in the urban landscape (Dornan, 2002).  
The increasing ability of infrastructure to act as a conduit for capital accumulation, however, 
has been dependent on a fundamental transition in the organisation and delivery of 
infrastructure, defined by a ‘widespread retreat from collectivised, integrated and ‘bundled’ 
ways of managing urban infrastructure’ that had been dominant features of the post-war 
model of infrastructure provision (known as the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’) and the 
emergence of a more segmented, privatised and competitive infrastructural economy 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001: 95). This on-going transition is referred to by Graham and 
Marvin (2001) as the ‘unbundling’ of infrastructure. 
The processes of segmentation, privatisation and unbundling have enabled infrastructures to 
be packaged into categories defined by value, risk profile and potential returns on investment. 
This, in turn, has facilitated what O’Neill (2013) terms the financialisation of infrastructure. Rather 
than being a sprawling web of interconnected systems and processes, infrastructure can now 
exist in distinct and measurable parcels, which can be separated and placed into a framework 
of financial calculation. In such a calculative framework, the ‘specific infrastructure sector or 
supply characteristics of the physical infrastructure assets’ become almost irrelevant, while 
the ‘specific risk-return profiles’ of the parcels of infrastructure at hand take centre stage 
(Weber and Alfen, 2010: 7). 
As an example, Allen and Pryke (2013) demonstrate how household water systems have 
become financialised: 
‘[Water systems that produce] guaranteed revenue streams over time can be securitised, 
that is, turned into a tradable financial product, broken up into separate earnings 
packages, assigned a risk profile and sold onto investors seeking long-term real returns. 
Crucially, it is not the asset itself that is sold on but the performance of the asset that, 
in the case of household water bills, is their anticipated ability to pay inflation plus 
revenues over the long term’ (Allen and Pryke, 2013: 422).  
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The increasing ability to assign value to individualised and geographically confined 
infrastructure assets and, more specifically, to their revenue generation ability has created 
unprecedented opportunities for investing in infrastructure. In parallel, it has encouraged a 
wide range of actors, from diverse origins, to become involved in infrastructure investment. 
Institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and hedge 
funds, for example, are all striving to gain competitive advantages by expanding their 
portfolio of ‘alternative’ assets, either through direct investments in infrastructure 
companies, through investments in listed infrastructure funds, or through equity-style 
investments – usually in unlisted funds (Inderst, 2010: 74).  
 
Table 2.1: Ranking of alternative asset managers: total assets by asset class 
Position Name of parent 
organisation  
Main country of 
domicile  
Total assets under 
management (USD 
million)  
Asset Class  
1 Macquarie Group Australia 94,845.70 Direct Infrastructure Funds 
2 Bridgewater Associates  United States  84,042.00 Direct Hedge Funds  
3 CBRE Global Investors  United States  80,000.00 Direct Real Estate Funds  
4 BlackRock  United Kingdom  74,000.00 Direct Commodities Funds  
5 Goldman Sachs & Co.  United States  68,000.00 Direct Private Equity Funds  
6 AXA Real Estate  France  65,453.46 Direct Real Estate Funds  
7 Brookfield Asset 
Management  
Canada  65,163.00 Direct Real Estate Funds  
8 UBS Global Asset 
Management  
United Kingdom  65,036.61 Direct Real Estate Funds  
9 Blackstone Capital 
Partners  
United States  57,090.00 Direct Private Equity Funds  
10 TPG Capital  United States  54,526.00 Direct Private Equity Funds  
Source: Towers Watson, 2013: 18. 
 
Most notable has been the rise of the Macquarie Group from relative obscurity to champion 
of global infrastructure investment. Now the world’s largest alternative asset manager (see 
Table 2.1), Macquarie’s pioneering approach has revolutionised infrastructure investment 
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and positioned infrastructure as a viable alternative to other asset classes such as bonds and 
equities (Solomon, 2009). Specifically, Macquarie’s model is built on: the sheer number of 
funds managed, giving them global access to capital and flexibility to meet the needs of a 
diverse range of clients and investors; the diversity of geographical and sectorial coverage of 
investments; the long-term ownership and control of infrastructure assets; and, the ability – 
through intricate financial engineering techniques – to charge fees for managing the assets 
under their control and to tap into revenues generated by the asset itself whilst minimising 
the group’s exposure to risk (Allen and Pryke, 2013; Jeffries and Stillwell, 2006; Solomon, 
2009; Torrance, 2008). 
The need for financial institutions to diversify their investment portfolios has been 
fundamental to the rise of infrastructure as an asset class: any particular item of infrastructure 
occupies a unique geographical location, time horizon, and expected return on investment, 
all of which can be compared in relation to other asset classes, such as equities or fixed-
income securities (see Figure 2.1). Although infrastructure must meet the desired risk-
adjusted returns of investors, it is also meets investors’ demand for an ‘alternative’ asset class 
that delivers both sanctuary and untapped profitability (see Newell and Peng, 2008; Torrance, 
2008).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Comparing the risk and return of different asset classes 
Source: Torrance, 2009a: 813. 
 
The processes of unbundling, segmentation and privatisation that have occurred as part of 
the collapse of the modern infrastructural ideal, have created the conditions in which 
 37 
infrastructure can be categorised, valued according to a particular framework of financial 
calculation, securitised, and then traded in the global financial markets. At the same time, 
some of infrastructure’s attributes are proving to be particularly resilient, such as their quasi-
monopoly, integrated and networked characteristics (O’Neill, 2013), and, as such, serve to 
provide assurance that calculated sources of revenue generation will remain durable, 
accessible and predictable. 
 
2.1.4 The financialisation of public policy and capital investment 
It is not just financial markets and institutional investors that are driving the financialisation 
of infrastructure. Infrastructure is only useful for institutional investors as far as it matches 
a very particular set of requirements: it is clear that where these criteria are not met, there is 
still a need for infrastructure investment from elsewhere. As a result, the state is forced to 
resume its traditional role of funding and delivering infrastructure in order to support its 
citizens and drive economic growth.  
The state performs a vital role in creating markets and in generating the conditions in which 
financialisation has emerged (Fligstein, 1996). As the state has adapted and changed in order 
to best pursue its self-interests in an anarchical world, the way it provides infrastructure has 
also changed. The transformation of the state and the changing ways it funds, finances, 
delivers and operates infrastructure, however, has received insufficient coverage in the 
financialisation literature.  
In particular, the reading of the financialisation presented by O’Neill (2013) and Allen and 
Pryke (2013) is largely missing an interrogation into the continuing role of the state as a 
primary provider and funder of infrastructure. Whilst O’Neill (2013: 445) acknowledges that 
the financialisation of infrastructure is ‘entirely dependent on state recognition and 
protection… as a distinct form of property, and [on] state maintenance of a regulatory 
environment’, and Allen and Pryke (2013: 435) suggest that the financialisation of 
infrastructure is discursively produced as ‘postpolitical’ by the state, questions as to the 
changing nature of the provision of infrastructure by the state are largely ignored. Indeed, 
the dominant contemporary narrative is one of state retrenchment, privatisation and the 
increasing influence of financial markets over the state (Marshall, 2014; Raco, 2013; 
Whitfield, 2010). However, it is possible to challenge this narrative and, instead, to view the 
state, in its various guises, as still fundamentally important to the ultimate provision and 
delivery of infrastructure.  
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In a ground-breaking paper, Weber (2010: 252) develops an intriguing argument that local 
governments in the US ‘have come to rely heavily on financial markets… for the provision 
of standard public services’. Importantly, however, rather than emphasising the overbearing 
might of financial markets, Weber (2010: 256) characterises the process of financialisation as 
the ‘growing integration’ between the state and the financial system. Indeed, her contribution 
implies that the financialisation of infrastructure is, in part, driven by a transformation in the 
ideologies, practices and expressions of the state. In addition to the unbundling and 
segmentation of networked infrastructures, then, the financialisation of infrastructure can 
also be viewed as part of a bottom-up process of innovation, entrepreneurial policy-making 
and changing attitudes to risk across the multiple formations of the state. For example: 
‘Local governments moved beyond simply financing collective infrastructure and doing 
so with general obligation bonds, backed by their full faith and credit. Instead, cities 
and, increasingly, special authorities extended credit to privately owned development 
projects with nonguaranteed debt, such as revenue bonds… Municipalities added new, 
risk-laden instruments to their debt portfolios, including variable rate debt, interest rate 
swaps, auction bonds, and derivatives – often with disastrous effects’ (Weber, 2010: 
256). 
As such, the financialisation of infrastructure can be seen emerging alongside, and as part of, 
an increasing sense of urban entrepreneurialism and more entrepreneurial forms of local and 
urban governance (see Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1998). Perhaps, even, the current transition can 
be described as the financialisation of capital investment, public policy and the state (see Weber, 2010: 
252, 270). In a study of municipal finance, for instance, Hackworth (2007: 26) argues that 
local governments are ‘increasingly expected to behave as businesses’ and, as a result, that 
‘local governments are more keenly pressured to produce tax revenue generators than before’ 
– a claim that is explored in more detail below. In addition to fulfilling the role of market 
creation, which plays a vital role in facilitating the proliferation of financialised capitalism 
(Fligstein, 1996), then, the state is undergoing a continuous process remoulding, reorienting, 
and reforming in order to manage and exploit the intensification of financial flows. 
Perhaps the central feature of the financialisation of public policy is the rise of innovative 
and entrepreneurial methods of making capital investments, financing infrastructure and 
stimulating urban redevelopment. Drawing on the case study of Chicago, Illinois, Weber 
(2010: 254) argues that the City of Chicago ‘has created new opportunities for policy 
financialization through its use of a powerful redevelopment incentive, Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF)’. TIF involves the securitisation of incremental property taxes in order to 
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raise funds for up-front investment in infrastructure, or for compensating developers for 
making this up-front investment (Strickland, 2013; Weber, 2010; Weber et al., 2003, 2007).  
 
Table 2.2: Key characteristics of the financialised investment practices 
1 The growing involvement of financial actors or intermediaries. 
2 An increasing exposure of cities to – or dependence on – financial markets. 
3 The increasing use of financial technologies, such as securitisation. 
4 A reliance on a framework of financial calculation to predict, model and speculate against 
the future. 
5 A transformation in the purpose, function, values and objectives of government, which are 
being brought in line with those of financial actors and institutions. 
6 An increase in public sector indebtedness and risk taking. 
7 The transformation of infrastructure from a physical and productive component of the 
urban environment into a financial asset defined by risk and return. 
8 The increasing control over infrastructure by yield-seeking surplus capital. 
9 The transformation of infrastructure into an engine for economic growth and tax base 
expansion. 
10 The highly geographically uneven ability to engage successfully – if at all – in funding or 
financing infrastructure. 
Source: Author’s own 
 
Crucially, the characteristics used to describe the financialisation of infrastructure (see 
discussion above) are increasingly exhibited in such models of capital investment (Table 2.2). 
That is, in order to stimulate economic growth (or accelerate capital accumulation), public 
capital investment packages the urban landscape and its infrastructures and places them into 
a framework of financial calculation. As a result, the geographically defined parcels of the 
urban environment – and, most importantly, their potential ability to generate revenues and 
taxation – are assigned a value according to particular risk-return criteria, and can then be 
securitised and traded in the global financial markets. In short governments are beginning to 
engage in what might be called financialised investment practices (Table 2.2).  
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Unsurprisingly, there is a close relationship between the financialisation of infrastructure and 
the financialisation of capital investment. Indeed, the rise of TIF in Chicago is closely aligned 
with the extensive unbundling and privatisation of infrastructure that has occurred within 
the city. Rather than bypass the state, these processes have been explicitly driven forward by 
the neoliberal regimes led by Mayor Daly and, more recently, Mayor Emmanuel, which have 
pursued the unique and ambitious ‘Chicago Model’ of privatisation (Weber, 2010; Ashton et 
al., 2012; Farmer, forthcoming). While the Chicago case might not be typical, since it is in 
the vanguard, it is illustrative of the changing nature of capital investment, and demonstrates 
the ability of cities (and the state more broadly) to accelerate urban development in an 
increasingly unbundled and segmented urban environment. 
 
2.2 State reterritorialisation and the governance of capital investment 
According to Adam Smith ([1776] 2012: 707-730; also see O’Neill, 2013) the state, as a 
sovereign entity in the Westphalian system, has legitimised its authority by performing three 
fundamental ‘duties’; first, protecting society from invasion and its associated violence; 
second, protecting society from crime, injustice and oppression; and third, establishing public 
institutions and constructing public works which, by their nature, are beyond the capabilities 
of private enterprise to provide. The state, therefore, has been built, both literally and 
figuratively, on providing core infrastructures for enabling economic, social, cultural and 
political progress. 
However, the role of the state in funding and financing of infrastructure has not been 
constant by any means. Rather, as the state has negotiated the crisis-prone nature of 
capitalism in all of its ‘variegated’ forms (Peck and Theodore, 2007), its involvement in the 
provision of infrastructure has varied hugely across time and space. For example, the 
evolution of the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ and the nationalisation of networked 
infrastructures (Section 2.1.3) occurred in a spatio-temporal context defined by 
industrialisation, urbanisation and war. Prior to the turn of nationalisation, however, a more 
segmented and localised landscape of state infrastructure provision existed, where local units 
of government ‘had a clear interest in the provision of infrastructure in order to secure a 
framework for development’ in the absence of a broader and more integrated national 
strategy (Ennis, 2003: 3). 
While the state’s role in the provision of infrastructure has constantly adapted to the changing 
requirements of capitalist development, the form, function and territoriality of the state has 
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also undergone significant changes. In particular, this interpretation draws on draws on the 
concept of ‘reterritorialisation’ (Brenner, 1999, 2004a, 2004b), which implies a constant – 
albeit highly politicised – adaptation of the state in response to the unique challenges 
presented by the recurring crises of capitalism. This section explores the role of the state and, 
in particular, its response to contemporary urban crisis. Crucially, it is argued that the current 
transformation in the funding and financing of infrastructure – driven by the process of 
financialisation – is coinciding with profound changes in the form, function and territoriality 
of the state. 
 
2.2.1 Positioning the state at the centre of analysis 
Public capital investment is becoming financialised, is beginning to incorporate technologies 
like securitisation and is becoming increasingly dependent on generating returns on 
investment (Weber 2010; Strickland, 2013). In the literature, however, there is a lack of 
engagement with the drivers and implications of this transformation. In particular, the role 
of the state in determining the changing nature of capital investment is noticeably under-
theorised. Furthermore, questions such as ‘How is the financialisation of capital investment 
shaped by the multiscalar relations of the state?’, ‘What are the implications of financialisation 
for the structure, form and durability of the state?’ and ‘How is capital investment governed 
in urban jurisdictions?’ remain largely unaddressed. In contrast, the processes of unbundling 
and segmentation that have characterised the financialisation of infrastructure and the 
collapse of the modern infrastructural ideal have received considerable attention (Allen and 
Pryke, 2013; O’Neil, 2013). 
The relationship between the state, the financialisation of infrastructure and the 
financialisation of capital investment is worthy of interrogation because financialisation has 
created new spaces of state activity, initiated fresh power struggles between multiple levels 
of government, redefined urban governance and politics, connected cities to a wide range of 
financial actors, intermediaries and markets, and set in motion a series of changes in the 
territoriality of urban space. In tandem, the funding and financing of infrastructure is 
beginning to take place through novel actors and institutions, at new spatial scales, and in a 
myriad of new, innovative and improvised ways.  
Moreover, the financialisation of capital investment can be linked with broader processes 
that have characterised state transformation in recent years. For instance, the transition 
towards financialised models of capital investment can be viewed as part of the state’s effort 
to enhance its position in an increasingly competitive and neoliberalised world, in which the 
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state is in a constant search to find spatio-temporal fixes to the persistent and increasingly 
potent crises of capitalism (see Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner et al., 2010). As the pressure 
for cities to compete intensifies and the recurrent crises in capitalism become more severe, 
the demand for investment in the built environment – which is predicated on the ability of 
capital investment to create jobs and economic growth – surpasses the limits of conventional 
investment models and necessitates that city governments devise ever more entrepreneurial 
investment solutions. 
The argument that the financialisation of capital investment is implicated in the 
transformation of urban governance, and in the transformation of the state more broadly, 
fits into the argument that a process of ‘market-driven social and spatial transformation’ 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 102) is encouraging the marketisation of the core functions 
of government and thus enabling capital accumulation to occur through the provision of 
public infrastructure and the delivery of local services (Crouch et al., 2001). The 
financialisation of capital investment is the logical progression for the neoliberal state which 
has actively sought to privatise pubic services and facilities in order to manage public sector 
debt, generate private sector efficiencies, and to become ‘lean and mean’ (Mirander and 
Lerner, 1995: 193; Crouch et al., 2001; Fuller and Geddes, 2008).  
 
2.2.2 The state and its strategies of financialisation and urban redevelopment 
Drawing on Lefebvre, Poulantzas and Castells, Brenner (2001) argues that cities (or ‘the 
urban’) can be regarded as a terrain of struggle, in which a variety of social movements 
collide, evolve and fight for control over socio-political relations. According to Brenner, the 
state plays a fundamental role in mediating this process of struggle. Specifically –adopting 
Lefebvre’s reading of the state as a ‘hyperproductivist politico-institutional ensemble’ – 
Brenner (ibid: 791) asserts that the role of the state is to assist and underpin the expansion 
of production and capital accumulation, a project which is achieved through the active 
development and deployment of strategies of retrenchment, spatial reconfiguration and 
uneven development. Importantly, whereas historically these strategies may have been 
understood as the pursuit of a singular central state force, Brenner (2004: 4) articulates a 
‘more polycentric, multiscalar, and non-isomorphic configuration of statehood’ and state 
strategy. 
Building on this analysis, then, the state can be regarded as a fundamental participant within 
the process of financialisation, and as actively pursuing strategies of financialisation and 
urban redevelopment to further its own interests and achieve its hyperproductivist objectives 
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at a range of spatial scales. To a very real extent, the boundaries are blurred between the 
state’s strategies of neoliberalisation and its strategies of financialisation: both entail the 
creation of conditions in which hypermobile transnational capital can transcend territorial 
boundaries, enabling production to take place where conditions are most favourable, where 
the international division of labour can most effectively be exploited, and where costly 
mechanisms of wealth redistribution can be avoided. For example, the privatisation of state 
assets is central to the process of neoliberalisation and the reconfiguration of the state itself 
(Harvey, 2005), but it is also a key prerequisite for the transformation of the built 
environment into an asset that can be bought, parcelled up and traded by investors – referred 
to by O’Neill (2013) as the ‘financialisation of infrastructure’. Similarly, institutional rescaling, 
which is a central tenet of the process of neoliberalisation (Brenner, 2004; Boudreau et al., 
2007), is also fundamental to the state’s ability to organise and manipulate financial flows 
(for example through the creation of combined city-regional investment funds – see Section 
6.2.2 and 7.2.1).  
However, the ways in which the neoliberal state seeks to promote its interests in an 
increasingly competitive world have been have undoubtedly evolved and progressed in 
tandem with the emergence of the process of financialisation. 
At the national level, the state facilitates the proliferation of financialisation by ‘eliminating 
capital controls, regulatory stop valves, statutes governing bank activity and impediments to 
unrestrained innovation’ (Pacewicz, 2012: 4; also see Carruthers and Kim, 2011), and takes 
advantage of financialisation by regulating the reproduction of labour through monetary 
policy decisions (Bryan et al, 2009). 
At a more multiscalar geography, strategies of financialisation enable the state to defer 
moments of crisis by securitising anticipated future revenues and using them in the present 
to plug its own budget gaps or sure up local accumulation regimes that are teetering on the 
brink of collapse (Weber, 2010; French et al, 2011), thus creating a more favourable political 
environment by shifting the burden of taxation onto future generations (Farmer, 2013). 
Securitisation also enables individual state entities to engage in what Davidson and Ward 
(2014: 84) term ‘speculative urbanism’ in order to maximise their competitiveness, engender 
political support, and maximise opportunities for tax base expansion and revenue creation. 
The debt-based and risk-laden development strategies that Davidson and Ward describe can 
certainly be viewed as an extension of the entrepreneurial state strategies that initially 
gathered momentum under neoliberalisation (Harvey, 1989; Jessop and Sum, 2000; 
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MacLeod, 2002), but which have been harnessed, refined and augmented through 
financialisation. 
Central to the pursuit of faster economic growth through neo-Keynesian interventions has 
been the (perceived) ability of states to forecast, manage, transfer and even exploit risk 
(Martin et al, 2008; Weber, 2010). Financial innovations such as long-term lease agreements, 
complex project finance arrangements, infrastructure trusts and public-private partnerships 
are all tools through which the state – at a range of spatial scales and institutional forms – 
has attempted to shift risk to other market participants, albeit only partially and sometimes 
unsuccessfully (Ashton et al, 2014; Froud, 2003; Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011). 
Perhaps most critically, in its attempt to negotiate neoliberal capitalist relations, the state 
actively pursues strategies of restructuring, rescaling and – as is detailed in section 2.2.5 – 
reterritorialisation. These processes describe the state’s constant adaptation and mutation in 
form and function in response to the changing socio-economic landscape. For example, in 
an increasingly neoliberal city, Ward (2003: 116) highlights the ‘qualitative shift in the state’s 
role’ that is required for it to engage in a form of ‘entrepreneurial urbanism’ that is necessary 
for it to survive in an increasingly competitive national and global economy. Indeed, rather 
than being something that is ‘naturally occurring’, state restructuring can be regarded as ‘a 
sustained political project’ which is ‘explicitly concerned’ with prioritizing the state’s self-
interests through, for example, ‘normalizing and naturalizing conditions such as free trade, 
flexible labor, public-sector austerity, and low inflation’ (Peck, 2001: 447). 
It is increasingly apparent, then, that the state’s strategies for mediating the terrain of struggle 
we define as the city, must not only be understood in the context of neoliberalisation, but 
also be regarded as bound up in, and articulated through, the process of financialisation. By 
extension – far from the conception that the role of the state is somehow diminished by the 
process of financialisation (O’Brien, 1992) – it is argued here that the state is an active agent 
of financialisation that constantly seeks to harness financial markets, technologies and 
processes to aid its reconfiguration, growth and competitiveness in a turbulent and uncertain 
world. 
 
2.2.3 Power politics: financial elites, local coalitions and the changing scalarity of 
urban governance 
The politics of infrastructure is influenced by the fluidity and variability of legislative change, 
shifting discourses, intense inter-urban and inter-jurisdictional competition, the influence of 
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business-led growth coalitions, and the increasingly privatised form of infrastructure 
provision and finance (Altschuler and Luberoff, 2003; Coutard et al., 2005; Crain and Oakley, 
1995). The financialisation of capital investment, therefore, can be seen as driven forward by 
‘a curious mix’ of class and political interests across multiple spatial scales (see Harvey 1985b: 
146).  
Whilst acknowledging the place-specific nature of local knowledge, inter-firm and inter-
sectoral networks, and the investment and accumulation of capital (Cox and Jonas, 1993), 
capital investment strategies are also influenced by a broader series of structural, multiscalar 
and variegated forces. The attempts of cities to harness increased decision-making and 
financing powers, for instance, are bound up in an amalgamation of local and distinctly 
territorial neoliberal interests (see Stone, 1989; Trench, 2007), but are also shaped by global 
flows of capital and regulated within broader multiscalar systems of governance.  
At first glance, it appears as if the successful deployment of financialised models of capital 
investment is neatly aligned with the interests of the local neoliberal elite. Typically, local 
elites stand to benefit from public capital investments: they are the owners of the assets that 
appreciate in value and the collectors of the revenue streams that might be generated (Chien 
and Gordon, 2008; Cox and Mair, 1988). In a sense, then, innovative financing practices 
exploit the ‘symbiosis’ between investors and the local political elite (Coq-Huelva, 2013: 13) 
by explicitly aiming to accelerate the appreciation in the value of assets owned by local elites 
and thus helping them to maximise profits. As a result, the process of financialisation can be 
regarded as strengthening and reinforcing the regimes of accumulation and modes of 
production that enable local elites to dominate urban space (see Boyer and Durand, 1997; 
Harvey, 1985a). 
There is a very real sense, for example, that governments across all levels are looking 
outwards for investment, policy ideas and comparative benchmarks (Brady et al., 2005; Cox, 
2004; Jones and Ward, 2002) from which they can construct narratives of legitimacy that 
support the project of financialisation. The incessant drive for economic development 
through entrepreneurial mechanisms that generate returns on investment has encouraged 
local policy elites to short circuit the process of innovation by copying quick-fix and off-the-
shelf policy ideas from elsewhere (Peck, 2002). In particular, urban redevelopment ‘models’ 
such as ‘business improvement districts’ and ‘tax increment financing’ have been 
implemented across the globe – albeit in truncated and mutated fashions (Ward, 2006; 2010; 
2012). As a result, local elites can engage in a form of what might be called fast financialisation, 
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which enables them to channel their surplus capital into the built environment, giving them 
opportunities for both capital accumulation and fixing urban crisis. 
However, by wiring cities into financial markets and connecting them to global flows of 
capital, it can also be argued that the process of financialisation enables extra-local actors to 
penetrate urban governance systems and to invade the city’s decision-making apparatus 
(Torrance; 2008), thus threatening conventional urban hierarchies and fragmenting the 
classic urban regime. Indeed, by drawing on neo-Gramscian and regulationist insights (Jessop 
et al., 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999), it is possible to view the emergent global financial 
elite as a ‘hegemonic bloc’ whose power and influence is shaping the development practices 
of cities and their governments. Because investors value liquidity and invest on the basis of 
a return on capital at a particular point of exit or maturity (Theurillat and Crevoisier, 2009), 
there is a possibility that the urban environment could be ‘milked’ by an ultra-mobile financial 
elite. Then, having extracted as much value as possible, investors can sell off their assets in 
order to pursue more productive assets elsewhere, potentially causing the devaluation of local 
assets and thus damaging the interests of local elites (see Samo and Taylora, 1999; Harvey, 
1985b).  
Rather than development strategies being confined to a territorially bounded urban regime, 
then, infrastructure politics can be viewed as ‘simultaneously territorialized at a local scale 
and... engaged with a wide array of interests at wider subnational, national and international 
scales’ (Phelps and Wood, 2006: 508). In sum, it appears that cities and their economic 
futures are precariously positioned in an increasingly complex and multiscalar politics, which 
plays out through the interdependent relationship between local and financial elites. 
 
2.2.4 Financialisation, multiscalar interdependencies and systemic competition 
The increasing use of debt for funding and financing infrastructure projects has meant that 
the state is constantly interacting with financial markets. In the US, for instance, cities that 
issue municipal bonds actively encourage ‘financial market penetration’ into the public sector 
(Weber, 2010: 252). When purchased by financial institutions and other financial actors, 
municipal bonds can then be traded in the global financial system on a ‘secondary market’ 
(Madura, 2011: 154), thus connecting the municipal authority and its sources of revenue with 
financial market processes across the globe. As a result, cities are now subject to ‘the 
heightened risk, uncertainty, and volatility’ of the global financial system (Pike and Pollard, 
2010: 31). 
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The current crisis afflicting cities, their employees and inhabitants has reinforced the notion 
that the process of financialisation is affecting all aspects of economy and society (see 
Langley, 2008). Financialised investment practices expose the networks of social and political 
institutions to a highly influential and yet seemingly distant set of competitive forces and 
relationships. That is, taxpayers and public employees, and their livelihoods and life 
opportunities, are entangled in a mesh of ‘structural’ or ‘systemic’ competition (Jessop, 2000; 
Jessop and Sum, 2000) which reaches throughout and beyond the economic system into a 
‘tissue of supporting, sector-specific and specialized institutions’ (Malecki, 2004: 1104). 
In the context of financialisation, where cities are constantly dismantled, packaged and 
traded, the urban landscape is becoming an asset and developing a set of universally 
comparable financial attributes, such as price, yield and maturity (see Martin et al., 2008). As 
a result, the urban environment and its component parts can be compared against an infinite 
number of other securities traded in the financial system. Crucially, the ability to compare the 
urban environment with an infinite number of other financial assets also puts the urban 
environment in competition with these other assets: 
‘By ‘dismantling’ assets into tradable attributes, the focus shifts from the particularity of the 
asset itself to the universality of its attributes. The effect is to intensify competition (across 
space and time) for the attributes of this asset, with direct ramifications for the asset itself.’ 
(Martin et al., 2008: 126). 
For example, when undertaking a debt issuance for the purpose of investing in infrastructure, 
both the issuing entity (e.g. a city council) and the infrastructure at hand are at the centre of 
a complex web of competitive forces and bargaining relationships. 
First, the debt-issuing city is in competition with other cities also seeking to attract 
investment: a comparably weaker credit rating (established by financial institutions or rating 
agencies) may lead to a higher cost of borrowing. Second, cities are in a series of complex 
and competitive bargaining arrangements with other levels of government as they scramble 
for capital within the confines of their regulatory system. This is best exhibited by the 
unrelenting search of fiscally stressed governments for ways to ‘circumvent’ restrictions on 
local capital investment, for instance by creating special district governments in order to 
evade State-imposed debt limitations (Sbragia, 1996: 9). And third, lenders or bondholders 
(which could be institutional investors, other governmental entities or households) are 
competing to gain the highest possible risk-adjusted returns.  
Crucially, such competitive relations are intensified by the process of financialisation. The 
financialisation of capital investment is creating closer connections and interdependencies 
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between cities, their governments and the financial markets. When a municipality issues debt 
to engage in a financialised financing practice, it enters a complex global network where 
individual investment decisions are measured against an infinite number of other 
possibilities. Competition is not only inter-jurisdictional or intergovernmental, but also 
between municipalities and any other issuer, and between a global set of issuers and investors. 
In fact, the competition is systemic. 
 
2.2.5 Urban reterritorialisation and the financialisation of capital investment 
The financialisation of capital investment has transformative implications for urban 
territoriality and governance. Through financialisation, for instance, cities are becoming more 
connected with extra-local actors and intermediaries and more interdependent with financial 
markets. The connections between cities and financial actors are, to a certain extent, 
‘transversal’ (Jessop and Sum, 2000: 2293). That is, they occur outside of typical scalar 
hierarchies that define urban governance: global capital market participants forge direct 
relationships with municipalities in urban jurisdictions. 
In addition to exposing urban governance systems to new influential and potentially 
disruptive extra-local forces, the financialisation of capital investment also serves to challenge 
the administrative boundaries of cities and to reposition city governments within their 
respective national system of intergovernmental relations. In the US for example, the 
imperative to issue debt to finance new infrastructure projects has led to the creation of new 
special district governments which are able to circumvent debt limitations (Sbragia, 1996). 
Although this process facilitates capital investment, it also profoundly changes the balance 
of territorial relations within urban space, and eventually leads to the fragmentation of urban 
government. 
Far from being a smooth and unidirectional process, however, the changing nature of urban 
governance and territoriality associated with the financialisation of capital investment is part 
of a deeply contested and multi-directional process (Swyngedouw, 1997; Jessop, 1997). In 
the UK, for example, a consequence of the financialisation of capital investment is that sub-
national units of government have intensified their negotiation with other scales of 
government for legislation to be enacted that will enhance their power, capacity to innovate, 
and ability to securitise their built environments (Strickland, 2013). The devolution of 
commercial property tax revenues in the UK provides a fine example (ibid.). Furthermore, 
in order to maximise the potential for acquiring new financing powers, and to maintain their 
fiscal and regulatory control and relational power (see Jonas, 2013), local authorities are 
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attempting to ‘upscale’, forging collaborative links with other local authorities, and seeking 
approval from the central government to create statutory Combined Authorities.  
The financialisation of capital investment, therefore, can be regarded as simultaneously 
fuelling the processes of urban fragmentation, inter-jurisdictional and systemic competition, 
inter-jurisdictional collaboration and a whole series of multiscalar power struggles. Jessop 
and Sum (2000: 2294) use the term ‘glurbanisation’ to illustrate how the process of urban 
development can be intimately linked with a whole range of governmental, market and non-
market processes and participants at multiple spatial scales. However, it is arguable that the 
explanatory power of the term ‘glurbanisation’, is limited by its binary representation of 
connections between the ‘urban’ and the ‘global’. As a result, the term ‘reterritorialisation’ is 
favoured here (see Brenner, 1997, 1999, 2004a, 2004b; Brenner and Theodore, 2002).  
According to Brenner (1999: 431) – who draws on earlier works by Lefebvre (1976a, 1976b, 
1977, 1978) and Harvey (1982, 1985c) – reterritorialisation describes the ‘reconfiguration and 
re-scaling of forms of territorial organisation such as cities and states’. Indeed, Brenner (1998, 
2004a, 2004b) suggests that state power is constantly being ‘rearticulated and reterritorialized’ 
as the state struggles to enhance its interests in a competitive world. Whereas the term 
‘territorialisation’ would be used to describe the emergence of a territorial form and the 
unidirectional journey that led to its creation, the term ‘reterritorialisation’ helps to identify 
and explain the constant processes of destruction and creation, evolution and reinvention, 
negotiation and contestation that occur across time, space and a multiplicity of scales to 
create what might (temporarily) be identified as a territory. 
Reterritorialisation, then, encompasses the notion that the territoriality of cities is being 
constantly redefined as they interact with actors, institutions and governments at multiple 
spatial scales, create new relations, connections and interdependencies: 
‘[The] recurrent dynamic of de- and reterritorialisation has been organised through a 
wide range of scalar configurations, each produced through the intermeshing of urban 
networks and state territorial structures that together constitute a relatively fixed 
geographical infrastructure for each historical round of capitalist expansion. Therefore, 
as capital is restructured during periods of sustained economic crisis, the scale-
configurations upon which it is grounded are likewise reorganised to create a new 
geographical scaffolding for a new wave of capitalist growth’ (Brenner, 1999: 434). 
Arguably, the very survival of capitalism is dependent on the continual ‘[re]production of 
historically specific institutional landscapes’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 354) around 
which spatio-temporal fixes are configured during periods of crisis (Peck and Tickell, 1994).  
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Conceptualising the state’s power as persistent, albeit in new and often uncertain forms, has 
profound implications for understanding the financialisation of infrastructure. Whereas 
other accounts of the financialisation of infrastructure suggest that the traditional role of the 
state in providing infrastructure is being eroded by highly mobile global finance capital, it is 
argued here that the role of the state as a provider of infrastructure is merely being 
rearticulated and reterritorialised.  
 
2.3 The fiscalisation of urban development 
Fiscal stress is severely hampering development and economic growth across cities. The 
landscape of fiscal stress has developed over a long period of public debt accumulation 
caused by continuous growth of public spending in relation to public income generation, a 
process legitimised by the Keynesian assertion that public expenditure is fundamental to 
economic stability (Streeck and Mertens, 2013). Indeed, national economies have become 
structurally indebted as a result of decreasing economic growth rates, growing resistance to 
taxation, and the rise of structural unemployment (Figure 2.2). In both the UK and the US, 
the recession triggered by the global financial crisis of 2008 has intensified the levels of fiscal 
stress experienced across all levels of government and, in particular, has driven the least 
resilient cities towards fiscal crisis. 
 
Figure 2.2: The causes of fiscal crisis 
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Source: Schäfer and Streeck, 2013. 
 
2.3.1 Fiscal crisis and the urbanisation of austerity 
The worsening financial condition of city governments is a troubling but all too apparent 
characteristic of cities in the post-financial crisis era: 
‘Municipalities around the country now face sharply declining revenues and acute fiscal 
distress. Even ‘strong-market’ cities find themselves hampered by declining credit 
ratings and restricted access to financial markets. Resulting capital shortfalls have forced 
officials to take draconian measures: eliminating ‘non-essential’ programs and services, 
cutting municipal employment rolls, indefinitely postponing development projects and 
even declaring bankruptcy. The prospects for urban growth coalitions have radically 
dimmed’ (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011: 477). 
Fiscal stress and crisis are driving profound changes in the nature and scope of government 
and causing governments across all spatial scales to re-assess and alter their everyday 
functions. Crucially, the pressure to bring budgets under control is further encouraging the 
development of entrepreneurial strategies for saving money, which include cutting jobs and 
services, and accelerating the privatisation of service delivery and infrastructure provision. A 
consequence of these entrepreneurial saving strategies is that the socio-economic 
foundations of cities and localities, such as core welfare systems, social programmes, and 
municipal services, are being ripped out. In addition to the effects of the continued and 
deepening unbundling, segmentation and privatisation of infrastructure, then, these 
transformations are posing challenges to the legitimacy and underlying purpose of local 
government.  
Perhaps the most notable implication of the global financial crisis has been the dramatic 
increase in government debt levels across the developed world (see Figure 2.3). Kitson et al. 
(2011) suggest that the timely increase in government debt has been due to the increased 
cost of welfare, rising global commodity prices (and thus inflation), the huge expense of 
bailing out troubled financial institutions and the implementation of quantitative easing. That 
is, fiscal stress, at least at the national level, is a result of a considered response to the collapse 
of global economic and financial markets (Primo Braga and Vincelette, 2011). 
Although seemingly distant from the balance sheets of local governments, the sovereign debt 
crisis – and its knock-on policy implications at the national level – has placed increased 
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pressure on faltering local economies and intensified the shift towards highly uneven 
landscapes of urban development (Martin, 2011; Kitson et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: General government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Adapted from OECD, 2013a. 
 
Peck (2012) argues that fiscal crisis has been pushed down to the local level as supra-local 
governments have sought to minimise their responsibilities and bring their liabilities into line 
with their now substantially reduced resources. A direct implication of the sovereign debt 
crisis, then, has been the urbanisation of austerity, a process which symbolises the continued 
propagation and intensification of the variegated and contradictory force of neoliberalisation 
(see Table 2.3). As a result, it is cities and localities that are bearing the brunt of the fiscal 
crisis. In the UK, for instance, central government has announced £81 billion of cuts in local 
authority spending over a four-year period from 2010 (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 23; HM 
Treasury, 2010b). Similarly, in the US, there has been a reduction of approximately 500,000 
local government jobs between August 2008 and August 2013 as a result of cost saving 
initiatives and spending cuts (Pagano and McFarland, 2013). Although they face similar 
pressures of austerity urbanism, US municipalities are also implicated in the reduction of 
revenue sources under their own jurisdiction such as property, sales and income taxes, which 
are (to varying degrees) generated and retained at the local level. 
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In contrast to perceptions of austerity as a rational and objective response to crisis, Peck 
(2012; also see Peck et al., 2009) argues that austerity is highly political; that is, the discourse 
of austerity – and the subsequent animations of fiscal stress – is enmeshed in a series of 
underlying power struggles, vested interests and political constructions that are designed to 
achieve a set of very particular outcomes (Clarke and Newman, 2012; Posner and 
Sommerfield, 2012). Austerity politics, then, can be seen as ‘reflective of neoliberal 
governance, as catering to elite interests and as particularly detrimental to the poor’ (Lobao 
and Adua, 2011: 420). It is important to recognise, however, that fiscal stress is far from a 
top-down process. Local socio-institutional context and evolutionary economic geographies 
are crucial to understanding the variegated landscape of fiscal crisis (see Skidmore and 
Scorsone, 2011). 
The embodiment and augmentation of neoliberalisation through austerity is particularly 
pertinent as it continues to foster the process of state reterritorialisation as part of the search 
of that elusive spatio-temporal fix. As such, in the context of austerity urbanism, and 
amplified by the continued rollout of neoliberalism, there are huge pressures for cities to 
streamline, innovate and enhance their relational competitiveness. The scene is set, therefore, 
for the intensification of intergovernmental competition, the continuation of competitive 
rescaling and an escalation in the ‘politics of circumvention’ (Sbragia, 1996: 5). 
 
Table 2.3: Austerity Urbanism: a review 
The urbanization 
of neoliberal 
austerity 
Destructive creativity Austerity amplifies creative destruction; the 
project of neoliberalisation accelerates the 
retreat of the welfare state, and inhibits 
equitable development and social 
redistribution. 
Deficit politics Implementation of ‘starve the beast’ tactics. 
The interests of the political elite are protected, 
while broader social interests and related 
services are sidelined. 
Devolved risk Budget cuts are devolved, further hampering 
local governments and compounding local 
economic crises. 
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The ‘extreme 
economy’ of 
austerity 
urbanism 
Leaner local states Public sector job cuts, with amplified 
implications for underperforming areas that 
rely heavily on public sector employment. 
Rollback redux Continued and deepened retrenchment of the 
state. 
Fire-sale privatization Public sector assets and their associated 
revenue streams are sold to the highest bidder 
in order to plug holes in government balance 
sheets. 
Placebo dependency The responsibility of local governments 
increases, while resources decline. This further 
strengthens their dependency on neoliberal 
alternatives to public sector service provision. 
Risk-shifting rationalities The risks and costs of service delivery is passed 
down to the local level and then, where 
possible, dispensed of entirely. 
Tournament financing Increased competition for funding, enhancing 
the power of supra- and extra-local funders. 
Entrepreneurial funding is incentivised. 
Austerity governance Fiscal stress continues to drive organisational 
change and state restructuring. 
Source: Adapted from Peck, 2012: 631-49. 
 
2.3.2 Fiscal stress, austerity and deficit reduction:  constraining the financialisation 
of capital investment? 
The logical expectation is that governments reduce levels of capital investment during 
periods of fiscal stress and deficit reduction. This can be anticipated because capital 
expenditure has negative impacts on public sector indebtedness and places budgets under 
further strain in the short and medium term. As a result, in parallel with the evolution of 
structural deficits in western economies, there has been a consistent decline in levels of public 
sector capital investment (Streeck and Mertens, 2011). In an attempt to regain economic 
competitiveness, improve performance and stimulate growth in a post-crisis landscape, 
however, governments at multiple levels have positioned renewed investment in up-to-date 
and high-performance infrastructure as an essential investment priority. The wide array of 
national, regional and city-level infrastructure plans that have been devised in recent months 
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(for example see HM Treasury and Infrastructure UK, 2011; Department of the Treasury 
and the Council of Economic Advisors, 2012) are testament to the faith placed in what can 
be regarded as a neo-Keynesian response to economic crisis. Indeed, the prevailing narrative 
is one that positions public capital investment as essential to enhancing ‘general social 
advantage’ (Keynes [1935] 2008: 137). 
Pursuing an ambitious strategy of capital investment in a period of low economic growth 
seems reasonable. When low economic growth is combined with an intense period of fiscal 
stress, however, an immediate contradiction becomes apparent: there is no money available 
to initiate the sorts of large-scale programmes of capital investment that are required to 
reinvigorate the economy. In cities in both the UK and the US, increasing levels of fiscal 
stress are cutting off traditional sources of capital and muting the state’s ability to fulfil the 
role of making large-scale capital investments. 
In particular, a lack of available grant funding and the sharp decline in income streams from 
assets and investments, in combination with weaker tax revenues (Chernick et al., 2011; Lutz 
et al., 2011; Pagano and McFarland, 2013), are stifling the ability of governments to invest in 
infrastructure (Jonas et al., 2013; Skidmore and Scorsone, 2011).  
In response, city governments are aspiring for more autonomy and greater decision-making 
capabilities, as well as becoming more entrepreneurial and innovative in designing solutions 
to tap into previously inaccessible sources of capital or to develop new sources of revenue. 
In parallel, the climate of fiscal stress and austerity provides an incentive for local 
governments to pursue new rounds of privatisation, outsourcing and innovation (Peck, 2012) 
aimed at reorganising scarce resources and generating efficiencies in the provision and 
delivery of local public services. Together, these pressures, for example, have been important 
in driving the financialisation of public policy and capital investment in Chicago and beyond: 
‘Fiscal crises and interest in neoliberal policy fixes around the world have spurred an 
interest in TIF, which is in the process of being exported to countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Australia’ (Weber, 2010: 254). 
Widespread fiscal stress, then, can be regarded as a key driver of the financialisation of the 
funding and financing of infrastructure. 
The urge to incentivise privatisation and to drive an agenda of financialisation is particularly 
strong in a context of fiscal crisis because of the ability of financialised investment practices 
to ‘engineer’ investments and overcome challenges such as the debt limitations that 
accompany deficit reduction strategies. For instance, debt can be placed off a public sector 
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balance sheet by using the technology of securitisation (see Cowley and Cummins, 2005; 
English and Guthrie, 2003). 
Debt limitations, which are often difficult to comply with during periods of fiscal stress, can 
also be bypassed through innovations in debt financing. In the US, for instance, cities have 
issued increasing amounts of ‘revenue bonds’ which, unlike ‘general obligation bonds’, do 
not require voter approval and which are not limited by ‘state-enforced debt ceilings’ 
(Leigland, 1995: 145). Revenue bonds also align with the inclination of infrastructure 
privatisation strategies to remove the burden of investment away from the city and the general 
taxpayer, and towards the special purpose district and the user (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011).  
Kirkpatrick and Smith (2011) suggest, in part, that this pursuit of a financialised fix to the 
fiscal stress rests on the interests of a local capitalist elite. Indeed, as Eisenschitz and Gough 
(1996: 441; emphasis in original) point out, ‘neo-Keynesian initiatives actually help neo-liberalism 
better to achieve its professed aims… [and] have internalized some neo-liberal themes’. As such, it appears 
that infrastructure politics and the financialisation of capital investment are immersed in a 
wash of multiscalar, yet territorially embedded, elite neoliberal interests. 
Fiscal crisis, then, can be regarded as a key factor in aligning the traditional Keynesian policies 
(which hold societal advancement and economic growth at their core) with the process of 
neoliberalisation. It is this alignment that creates a space for the emergence of financialised 
investment practices and for the financialisation of capital investment. Crucially, the 
evolution and proliferation of debt-based and speculative financing practices – which bypass 
regulatory limitations and stretch the boundaries of conventional borrowing arrangements – 
has profound implications for the future financial condition of local government and for the 
future sustainability of cities. 
 
2.3.3 Infrastructure, capital investment and the financial condition 
In a system where a government depends on taxes and revenues raised within an individual 
territorial unit (whether locally, regionally or nationally) in order to balance its budget, 
securing the sources of those taxes and revenues and ensuring their continued existence and 
growth into the future becomes of the upmost importance. In many instances, in order to 
achieve this, consistent capital investment is an absolute necessity, because it creates and 
supports essential revenue-generating and taxable assets. Fiscal health, then, which has 
historically been as a pre-requisite of capital investment (although the financialisation of 
capital investment makes fiscal health increasingly irrelevant for investing in infrastructure), 
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also becomes a key objective of such investment. State investment in infrastructure, 
therefore, can be regarded as a form of fiscal ‘instrument’ or ‘stimulus’ (Crain and Oakley, 
1995; Leeper et al., 2010; LaPlante, 2012). So, in instances of fiscal stress, such as the 
contemporary crisis in contemporary government, infrastructure investment makes absolute 
sense; not only is it possible to invest in infrastructure thanks to innovative and financialised 
investment practices, but such investment can also, in and of itself, bring about fiscal stability. 
Problematically, and this is a crucial point, using financialised investment practices to create 
fiscal stability is a contradictory endeavour because of the innately speculative and crisis-
prone tendencies of these practices (Weber, 2010). Regardless of the complexity or 
sophistication of the financial engineering that occurs, financialised models of capital 
investment are speculative by nature; it is the ability to derive capital from uncertain sources of value 
that defines them.  
Hackworth (2007: 25) notes a further contradiction in the creation of financialised or 
circumventive investment vehicles: 
‘[The] desire to achieve “autonomy” (in a non-relational sense) from government has 
undermined municipal autonomy (relationally defined) vis-à-vis the rating agencies. 
Borrowing money to cover expenditures previously dealt with at the federal or state 
level comes with consequences, albeit different ones than those imposed by state 
governments [such as debt limitations]’ (Hackworth, 2007: 25). 
In addition to being crisis-prone at the level of a specific debt issuance or capital investment, 
therefore, the rescaling and reterritorialisation of the state – driven by the search for spatio-
temporal and institutional fixes to fiscal and economic crisis – is making cities increasingly 
reliant on the apparatus of the global financial system. As a result, cities and financial markets 
are becoming progressively interdependent, placing cities more and more at risk of systemic 
financial crises. 
 
2.3.4 The fiscalisation of urban development and the prioritisation of returns on 
investment 
In order to meet political and economic objectives within the constraints of the limited 
financial resources available, governments are beginning to prioritise urban development 
projects that generate new sources of revenue and taxation over those that align with other 
policy objectives. According to LeRoy (2008: 5-6), the prioritisation of revenue-generating 
development projects in the US has its origins in the ‘chronic budget squeezes’ experienced 
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by local governments – perhaps most notably in California – which in turn emerged out of 
a gradual reduction in intergovernmental transfers and a ‘revolt’ against perceived over-
taxation. In combination, as Lewis (2001) suggests, these factors have encouraged 
municipalities to consider new and alternative sources of revenue, and, in particular, to 
attempt to generate income from their urban development activities: 
‘Increasingly sophisticated deals between retail developers and city redevelopment 
agencies are being negotiated, with developers seeking infrastructure improvements and 
other inducements and cities seeking assurance that their enhanced revenue stream will 
outweigh such investments’ (Lewis, 2001: 25). 
The pursuit of fiscally beneficial revenues from urban development projects can be described 
as the fiscalisation of urban development. The term ‘fiscalisation’ was first employed by Misczynski 
(1986) in an analysis of the impacts of Proposition 13 – an item of Californian legislation 
that limits municipalities’ property tax revenues (see Section 6.1.3). Misczynski’s (1986) 
suggestion is that Proposition 13 has triggered an explosion in the pursuit of retail-led 
developments that enable municipalities to tap into new sources of sales tax and thus to 
compensate for the reduction in property tax receipts (also see Chapman, 2008; Lewis, 2001; 
Schafran, 2013; Wassmer, 2002). Specifically, Misczynski (1986) refers to the ‘fiscalization of 
land use’, which, according to Wassmer (2002: 1308; also see Kotin and Peiser, 1997) ‘implies 
that the system of local public finance exerts an influence on local land-use decisions’. 
Despite the attraction of fiscalised development strategies, the ability of municipalities to 
invest in the initial infrastructure and site preparation work that might enable development 
remains a constraint to their implementation. This is especially true in the climate of fiscal 
stress that has reinforced the position of fiscalisation as a primary strategic objective. The 
challenges fiscal stress and economic crisis, therefore, sit directly opposed to the potential 
rewards of pursuing a strategy of fiscalisation. Crucially, this tension can be regarded as 
‘engendering’ what Chapman (2008: 551) calls ‘public finance creativity’. Indeed, Chapman 
(ibid.) lists 17 innovative ‘techniques’ for funding and financing infrastructure – many of 
which are drawn upon in this thesis – that have emerged, in part, due to the fiscal challenges 
faced by municipalities and their resulting desire to manufacture new sources of income. 
Whilst innovative techniques have the potential to overcome the immediate budgetary 
constraints that inhibit capital investment, they nevertheless provide solutions that are often 
premised on a dangerous cocktail of indebtedness and speculation. Also drawing on the 
example of California, Davidson and Ward (2014) suggest that the tension between fiscal 
stress and the fiscalisation agenda has produced a form of ‘speculative urbanism’: 
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‘Cities have had to indulge in ever more risky forms of speculative urbanism, understood 
here as the ways in which cities speculate on future economic growth by borrowing 
against predicted future revenue streams to make this growth more likely… in an age 
where the scope for Californian cities to increase revenues was increasingly constrained, 
they turned to speculative mechanisms in order to generate funds for both local services 
and discretionary spending… the speculative component of this neo-liberalising of 
cities left many of them horribly exposed to the vagaries of the financial and housing 
markets’ (Davidson and Ward, 2014: 84-5, emphasis in original). 
Furthermore, because the developments that have the potential to generate new revenues 
are limited, innovative investment models can only be implemented in areas with a high-
growth potential and, ultimately, where they are ‘needed least’ (LeRoy, 2008: 6). 
Consequently, the geography of fiscalisation is a highly uneven and inequitable one. 
Although fiscalisation could be regarded first and foremost as a Californian process, it is 
possible to contend that – despite its practical and conceptual origins – fiscalisation is a 
process that has begun to emerge in a much broader geographical context that is defined by 
the need to invest in infrastructure, the fiscal constraints to investment, and the need to 
create financial returns and fiscal benefits from the investment itself. For instance, it is 
arguable that there is a more widespread transformation in the nature and purpose of the 
governing entities, which are increasingly developing the characteristics of an investor as they 
move towards strategies of urban development that are underpinned by the mantra of returns 
on investment (Sbragia, 1996: 44-7). 
Similarly, the process of fiscalisation is bound up in what is undoubtedly a widespread sense 
of competition between cities and other territorial jurisdictions that has become increasingly 
evident in the neoliberal era (Chien and Gordon, 2008; Harvey, 1989; Jessop and Sum, 2000; 
Malecki, 2004; MacLeod, 2011). Although the concept of inter-territorial competition is well 
referenced, an explanation of why territorial jurisdictions compete is arguably lacking. Of 
course, there is a need to compete for investment to secure employment and an acceptable 
level of wellbeing for citizens. Nevertheless, the development of a place and the wellbeing 
of its citizens are not part of a ‘competitive’ zero-sum game: over time, a place can become 
less competitive in relation to other places at the same time as its citizens become wealthier 
and better off. Arguably, a more comprehensive understanding of the competitive nature of 
contemporary capitalist development can be developed using the concept of fiscalisation. 
Indeed, through the lens of the fiscalisation of urban development, it becomes evident that 
inter-jurisdictional competition is increasingly driven by the motivation of a governing entity 
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to expand its tax base, to generate new revenue streams, and ultimately to secure sources of 
income that will ensure its own survival. 
First apparent in California, the fiscalisation of urban development is occurring on a much 
wider basis in response to the prospect of persistent budgetary challenges and fiscal stress 
for city governments over the medium to long term. Although infrastructure and 
development projects have the potential to create new sources of income, the already 
challenging fiscal environment means that city authorities are being forced to use more 
innovative, speculative and financialised models of investment. As well as fuelling potentially 
a potentially fragmentary process of inter-urban and inter-jurisdictional competition an 
uneven process, then, fiscalisation can be a risky and at times contradictory fix to fiscal and 
economic crisis, thus posing a threat to future urban development and the fiscal stability of 
urban governments. 
 
2.4 The intensification of ‘Splintering Urbanism’ through 
financialisation 
The concept of ‘unbundling’ is used by Graham and Marvin (2001) to explain the shift away 
from heavily regulated, master-planned and monopolistic infrastructures towards a set of 
deregulated, privatised and segmented infrastructures, made possible by the proliferation of 
technological innovations and new delivery mechanisms. In particular, unbundling has also 
underpinned what O’Neill (2013) terms the financialisation of infrastructure (2.1.3).  
However, Graham and Marvin (2001) also contend that the process of unbundling has 
‘splintering’ implications for the urban environment. For example, while facilitating the 
development of competitive infrastructure markets, the processes of unbundling and 
segmentation have incentivised market actors to concentrate their activities in the sectors, 
spaces and places of most value. As a result, networked infrastructures concentrate around 
‘spaces of seduction’ where services can satisfy the insatiable demand of urban elites and 
upper income groups for high-quality networked services (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 220). 
Simultaneously, lower-income, minority and vulnerable groups are marginalised in the 
competitive marketplace as network infrastructures bypass what Graham and Marvin (ibid.) 
refer to as ‘network ghettos’.  
Drawing both on O’Neill and on Graham and Marvin, this section contends that the 
emergence of financialised investment practices – and financialisation more broadly – is 
intensifying the process of urban splintering. 
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Although the splintering urbanism thesis clearly highlights the significant impact of the major 
transformations that have taken place in infrastructure planning and provision, it arguably 
overemphasises the impacts of the design, quality and geographical distribution of physical 
infrastructure, without giving sufficient attention to the forces being enacted upon the city 
by the unbundling process itself. Indeed, the standardised or universalised quality and 
distribution of infrastructure alone would not alleviate urban fragmentation (Coutard, 2008; 
MacKillop and Boudreau, 2008). Whereas Graham and Marvin (2001) largely attribute urban 
splintering to the uneven provision of networked infrastructures following the collapse of 
the modern infrastructural ideal, it is equally important to analyse the uneven pattern of the 
flows of finance into the urban environment, and to examine the implications of 
financialisation for the quality and durability of the urban environment and, more broadly, 
for urban territoriality. 
The works by Allen and Pryke (2013) and O’Neil (2013), for instance, demonstrate that the 
financialisation of infrastructure, facilitated by this unbundling process, has redefined the 
geographies of value extraction and distribution and, in doing so, has enabled shareholders 
and financial intermediaries to profit at the expense of households.  
This thesis takes up the argument that the growing influence of financial markets, their 
intermediaries and processes, are not only having transformative implications for cities and 
their urban environments, but also that these transformations contribute to urban 
splintering. As the process of financialisation continues to transform capital investment and 
reshape the political economy of infrastructure, then, the city becomes increasingly at risk of 
suffering a splintered and fragmented future. 
 
2.4.1 The geographies of risk and return: the uneven opportunities for financialised 
capital investment 
Risk is commonly defined as an ‘event’ which has a range of ‘well-defined probabilities on 
possible outcomes’ (LeRoy and Signell, 1987: 395). In particular, risk is approached – in 
theory and practice – as something that can be calculated and managed (Power, 2007). A 
classic approach risk management, for instance, is through portfolio diversification 
(Hagermann and Hebb, 2009). Some financial intermediaries, however, go beyond this 
probabilistic dealing of risk, and instead are use their risk calculation and management 
expertise to exploit and profit from the existence of risk. For example: 
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‘Macquarie Bank, and financial services institutions like it, inscribe risk onto an 
infrastructure item by bringing risk into previously or otherwise reasonably certain 
futures. They take infrastructure from a relatively stable operational world and insert it 
into the risk taking world of finance… To Macquarie Bank, risk is not something to be 
mitigated, or eliminated. Rather, it is something to be inscribed as a quality of an 
infrastructure product; something to be steeped into Macquarie Bank’s organizational 
form, its culture and performance metrics; and something to be embraced by the bank’s 
highly skilled young international workforce’ (O’Neill, 2009: 172-4). 
Indeed, it is arguable that the expansion and growing influence of the financial markets as a 
whole has been premised on the process of ‘derivatization’, in which tradable securities, 
measured and valued in terms of risk, are separated from their underlying assets and then 
structured and shifted in order to maximise profit generation (Bryan and Rafferty, 2006; 
Martin et al., 2008). Drawing on Martin et al. (2008), O’Neill (2009) demonstrates that a 
single ‘event’ (or asset) can simultaneously have multiple risk characteristics: that is, in an 
instant, it can be made ‘more or less risky’ according to the way it is structured, shifted, 
portrayed and perceived. 
Perhaps less well theorised than the calculation, management and exploitation of risk, is the 
geography of risk. In a volume edited and contributed to by geographers, entitled ‘Managing 
Financial Risks’ (Clark et al., 2009), it is somewhat surprising to see such a limited attempt 
to conceptualise how the location or spatiality of an ‘event’ or asset affects the risk 
characteristics of that ‘event’ or asset. The exception is Wójcik’s (2009) analysis of the role 
of geographical proximity between investor and company stocks and shares in shaping the 
risk perception of those stocks and shares. In contrast, invaluable insights into how risk is 
shaped by place and space can be found, for instance, in analyses of venture capital 
investment, mortgage lending and foreign direct investment. 
For example, Klagge and Martin (2005: 404) demonstrate that the level of risk associated 
with a particular venture capital investment varies according to the proximity of the venture 
capitalist to their client firm, and, in turn, to the vitality of the investment community with a 
region or city-region. In short, Klagge and Martin (2005) highlight that the risk of investing 
in early stage small and medium sized enterprises varies geographically according to the mix 
of financial institutions and financial infrastructures within a particular place. Aalbers (2005), 
on the other hand, illustrates that areas perceived to be high risk for mortgage lending 
(because of the socioeconomic characteristics of the inhabitants of that area) are ‘redlined’ 
to codify this risk, thus implying that the varying characteristics of place have direct 
implications for the levels of risk associated with investment and mortgage lending. Similarly, 
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according to Buckley et al. (2007; also see World Economic Forum, 2014), the risks for a 
firm engaged in outward direct investment include factors such as the political and 
institutional stability of the investment location, the availability and supply of natural 
resources, and the size and geographical proximity of the host market, all of which can be 
regarded as geographical factors. 
Typically, the risk of investing in urban infrastructure is codified and broken down into a 
variety of categories. In any one infrastructure project, these might include: ‘due diligence 
risk’; ‘governance risk’; ‘regulatory risk’; ‘development risk’; ‘construction risk’; ‘operational 
risk’; ‘demand risk’; ‘revenue risk’; ‘contract and concession design risks’; and ‘financing and 
refinancing risk’ (see AMP Capital, 2013: 6-10; Weber and Alfen, 2010). Importantly, each 
one of these risks has a geographical component. For an investment in a toll bridge, for 
example, ‘demand risk’ is likely to be informed by a range of factors, including the ability of 
potential users to use other roads to complete the same journey; the availability and cost of 
other modes of transportation within the city; the position of the road in relation to business 
activity and commuter patterns in the city; etc. 
For a public sector investor, such as a city government, risk is also defined by the 
infrastructure item’s long-term prospects of tax generation, its ability to bring down the cost 
of other infrastructure and services within the city, and even by its ability to generate social 
and environmental benefits. Again, within these risks, the local urban geography plays a key 
role. Central factors in determining the infrastructure item’s future tax revenue generation 
capacity, for instance, include the vitality of the local property and commercial development 
market, the availability of commercial finance for developers, and the levels of growth in the 
local economy more broadly.  
Given the very geographical nature of risk, a key question emerges as to the ability of city 
governments in underperforming economies, where investment risk is likely to be higher, to 
engage in financialised models of investment that are also innately speculative and risky. 
Therefore, a particular dilemma exists for governments in weaker economic areas: whilst 
they are most in need of generating economic growth and creating jobs through neo-
Keynesian stimuli such as large scale public sector investments in infrastructure, the prospect 
of generating sufficient returns from a debt-based investment in infrastructure is lower than 
in more buoyant economic areas where increases in commercial revenue and tax income are 
more assured. It appears, then, that the search for returns on investment and accelerated 
capital circulation at the heart of processes like securitisation, which can unlock future 
revenue streams and bring forward infrastructure investment, is more challenging in 
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peripheral and underperforming places, where the risk of speculative investment is 
augmented by weak economic growth prospects and low levels of asset value appreciation 
(Strickland, 2013). Private sector investors are also likely to shun the risk of investing in such 
areas, placing an even greater pressure on the public sector to intervene and deliver.  
The inherent variation of financial flows into and between places has direct ramifications for 
uneven capitalist development. Indeed, financialisation ‘clearly has the potential to 
exacerbate unevenness across individuals, social groups, and organizations in space and 
place’ (Pike and Pollard, 2010: 34). Ultimately, the challenge for city governments is to find 
ways of investing in their own urban environment, irrespective of its perceived risk 
characteristics. Importantly, however, financialised models of capital investment do not 
necessarily give city governments the ability to control, manage and exploit risk to ensure 
that the outcome of investment is a favourable one. Indeed, the lack of flexibility in terms 
where and how they invest means that, arguably, city governments’ engagement with risk is 
very different to the likes of Macquarie Bank: rather than risk management and exploitation, 
it is defined (to a greater or lesser degree) by risk taking.  
Indeed, there is an apparent mismatch between city governments, which have little option 
but to hope for the best investment deal to land on their doorstep, and financial 
intermediaries, which can scour the globe to find the best projects to suit their investment 
objectives. For example, the privatisation of infrastructure through long-term lease 
agreements has revealed that even where risks are apparently transferred to the private sector 
(in order for these risks to be managed and exploited), there is also a simultaneous ‘increase 
[in] the exposure of the City’s financial capacity to the risks inherent in global capital markets’ 
(Ashton et al., 2014: 11; also see Farmer, forthcoming). 
 
2.4.2 Revolving funds as creative destruction? An acceleration of capital circulation 
through the built environment 
The physical characteristics of infrastructure mean that it is literally fixed to- and embedded 
in the urban landscape. This fixity has traditionally posed problems for investment in 
infrastructure both new and old. In particular, the challenge is that the built environment, 
itself, is illiquid. Consequently, once an investment has been made, there are limited 
opportunities for exit. The illiquidity and fixity of infrastructure has been key to 
understanding infrastructure investments as ‘sunk costs’, or, in other words, ‘costs that 
cannot easily be recouped or salvaged if the economic atmosphere deteriorates’ (Guasch, 
2004: ix). 
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While the built environment can be a valuable destination for surplus capital, particularly 
during periods of crisis or overaccumulation (see above), its physical embeddedness and 
tradable illiquidity simultaneously provide a barrier to capital circulation and accumulation: 
‘The accumulation process experiences uncomfortable friction when capital (ie “value 
in motion”) is trapped in steel beams and concrete’ (Weber, 2002: 519). 
Without intervention, the value of an investment in infrastructure or real estate can only be 
realized by collecting taxes, fees, rent or other revenues over the lifetime of the asset 
(Morales, 2009). For investors and capitalists, however, such revenues may be either 
insufficient, prone to devaluation, or both. If the built environment is to play a role in the 
acceleration of capital circulation and accumulation, then, the barriers of fixity must 
somehow be overcome.  
A potential solution to this problem can be found in the value of the future built 
environment: if the value of rents and sales in the future built environment are greater than 
those of the present, an incentive is created for investors, developers and governments to 
eradicate the present built environment, making way for the future, and thus creating new 
opportunities for capital accumulation (Weber, 2002). As a result, the desire to overcome the 
‘friction’ of the built environment leads to what Harvey (1985a: 27) – drawing on Schumpeter 
– calls ‘creative destruction’. In essence, creative destruction describes the creation of new 
opportunities for capital accumulation through demolition (destruction) and development 
(creation).   
In the confined space of the city, a logical prerequisite of capturing future value is that the 
old, inefficient and out-dated built environment must first be destroyed. While substantial 
modifications to existing stock are possible, they can be prohibitively expensive and 
inefficient. A more favourable approach is to demolish and rebuild. 
Through the eradication of invaluable historic facades and architectural features, demolition 
in itself can be a destructive and splintering process. However, the negative implications of 
‘destruction’ can be far more widespread. Potential consequences of creative destruction 
include: the ‘[f]ragmentation of urban identities’ (Moulaert et al., 2005: 58); the exclusion of 
communities from the planning process and the abandonment of community values 
(Brenner et al., 2013); the displacement of traditional (working class) neighbourhoods (ibid.) 
and their replacement by select powerful, wealthy and privileged ones (Swyngedouw et al., 
2005); the temporary or permanent loss of jobs or displacement of employment (Moulaert 
et al., 2005); and the ‘erosion of democratic decision-making’ (ibid.: 58). 
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Rather than being a unique characteristic of any particular city, Harvey (1985a) suggests that 
‘creative destruction’ is an inherent process of capitalism. This assertion is verified by Page 
(1999) in an analysis of New York in the 1940s: 
‘The upheavals of Manhattan were not the result of dramatic, isolated natural disasters 
or government sponsored urban renewal projects but rather were necessary episodes in 
the process of capitalist urbanization’ (Page, 1999: 2). 
It is also reinforced by creative destruction’s uneven and temperamental nature: 
‘Capital circulates through the built environment in a dynamic and erratic fashion. At 
various points in its circulation, the built environment is junked, abandoned, destroyed, 
and selectively reconstructed. The physical shells of aging industrial orders may sit 
dormant for decades before being cleared for a new high-tech “campus,” while 
efficiencies near the central business district come down efficiently to be reborn as 
luxury condominiums within a year’ (Weber, 2002: 520-1). 
Crucially, the emergence of financialised form of capitalism is fuelling an intensification in the 
process of urban churn. In particular, the financialisation of infrastructure and capital 
investment have created opportunities for the acceleration creative destruction. The ability 
to package and trade (or securitise) the future value of the urban environment, for instance, 
serves to break down the fixed and illiquid characteristics of land, infrastructure and 
property. Indeed, through financialisation, the build environment is becoming more efficient 
at attracting, storing, and recycling surplus capital.  
On one hand, the intensification of creative destruction is partly attributable to the increasing 
penetration of global flows of hypermobile capital into the built environment. The ability of 
institutional investors to purchase revenue streams of infrastructure items that have been 
dismantled, packaged and securitised, for instance, is a key catalyst in the production and 
reproduction of the built environment. On the other hand, the local state is also active in the 
promotion of creative destruction, justifying programmes of demolition, reconstruction and 
regeneration by contrasting the current presence of ‘blight and obsolesce’ with the potential 
for jobs, growth, productivity and vivacity in the future (Weber, 2002: 520). The proliferation 
of state-led revolving infrastructure funds, which explicitly aim to recycle capital through the 
urban landscape as quickly and efficiently as possible, is symptomatic of the shift towards 
the acceleration of creative destruction. 
Although this acceleration potentially creates new opportunities for job creation and 
economic growth, it could also exacerbate the negative implications of destruction’s 
damaging tendencies. Furthermore, the destabilisation of historically fixed, illiquid and crisis-
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resistant components of the urban environment has potential negative implications for the 
sustainability of the city and the stability of its governing institutions, its capitalist class, and 
its inhabitants at large. 
 
2.4.3 Interdependence in financial markets: raising the prospects of crisis and 
bankruptcy? 
The perception that participants within the global financial markets are distanciated by their 
geographical separation is a fallacy defined by what that Pani and Holman (2013: 1) term 
‘fictitious distance’. Rather than distance creating a degree of insulation from geographically 
isolated events, financial markets forge deep connections and interdependencies between 
market participants around the globe. 
Because of the systemic interconnections and interdependencies between municipalities and 
the financial markets, a crisis in a seemingly distant sphere of the financial system can 
radically impact the ability of municipalities to issue and service debt. During the global 
financial crisis of 2008, the interest rates on municipal bonds were drastically impacted by 
the collapse in the creditworthiness of the underlying bond insurers (or ‘monolines’) 
(Weinstein, 2009). Although, traditionally, monolines have only insured bonds, they have 
more recently diversified into a wide range of sectors. Indeed, the drop in the credit ratings 
of monolines was caused by their over-exposure to ‘riskier activities’ in sectors other than 
municipal bonds, which included practices such as ‘guaranteeing complex structured credit 
products’ like collateralised debt obligations (tradable parcels of debt which has been issued 
against multiple revenue streams from multiple assets) (Crouhy et al., 2008: 89). Although 
these structured products accounted for only 30% of business in the sector, they were ‘hugely 
leveraged’ and had a direct negative impact on the insurance companies’ credit ratings 
(Roberts and Jones 2009: 862). Crucially, the loss of creditworthiness was passed onto all 
other assets that were also underwritten by the monolines, which, of course, included 
municipal bonds. 
The downgrade in 2008 of three major bond insurance companies, Financial Guaranty 
Insurance Company (FGIC), the Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA) and the 
American Municipal Bond Assurance Corporation (AMBAC), had a significant impact on 
the risk premiums of bonds insured by these companies, as well as having a contagious 
impact on the risk premiums of bonds insured by companies that had not experienced a 
downgrade, such as Assured Guaranty Municipal Corporation (Brune and Liu, 2011). The 
significance of the turmoil in the bond insurance sector is illustrated by the fact that, for a 
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period of time, the yields on uninsured municipal bonds actually fell below the yields on 
insured bonds (Bergstresser et al., 2010). That is, investors and credit rating agencies 
perceived insured bonds to be more risky than uninsured bonds. Consequently, the cost for 
municipalities of issuing new debt rose substantially. In turn, the number of bond issuances 
declined and, in 2010, insured bonds made up only 10% of the newly issued bonds on the 
market (Madura, 2011: 155). 
The systemic nature of the interdependencies between financial market participants was 
made even more apparent when FGIC, the insurance company, suspended payments to 
claimants (due to an inability to pay), triggering $1 billion of credit default swaps (Bullock, 
2009). As a result, the financial institutions that had written these derivative contracts were 
also harmed by the troubled insurance sector. 
The collapse of the monolines and city bond ratings during the global financial crisis 
demonstrates that threats to the financial condition of city governments and, therefore, 
potential causes of urban splintering and crisis, can originate from unexpected and 
unforeseen places. As cities forge more intimate links with financial markets, either through 
the pursuit of financialised programmes of capital investment or by inviting global investors 
to buy up their built environment, the levels of systemic interdependence continues to grow. 
The challenge for cities, therefore, is not only to acknowledge the ‘fictitious’ nature of the 
distance between them and the financial markets, but also to build the prospect of exogenous 
and systemic crises into their risk-taking and risk management approaches. 
 
2.5 Funding and financing infrastructure: an analytical framework 
The aim of this Chapter has been to critically analyse the literature that contributes to current 
understandings of how infrastructure is funded and financed, and to develop an analytical 
framework that provides the foundations for the rest of the study. This section reflects on 
the core arguments of the literature review, uses them to guide the study’s primary research 
questions, and crystallises the analytical framework. 
The principal argument of this chapter is that the ways in which infrastructure are funded 
and financed are undergoing a process of transformation, with significant implications for 
urban development, urban governance and the financial condition of the state. This 
argument rests on four key assertions: first, there is a financialisation of the funding and 
financing of infrastructure; second, the financialisation of infrastructure and capital 
investment is fuelling urban reterritorialisation and the transformation of the state; third, the 
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emergence of financialised models of investment is catalysed by fiscal crisis and innately 
linked to the fiscalisation of urban development; and, fourth, the process of financialisation 
is causing the intensification of urban splintering. These four sub-arguments underpin the 
approach taken in this thesis to the analysis of the funding and financing of infrastructure in 
the US and UK. Crucially, it is these arguments – drawn from the literature – that shape the 
research questions and analytical framework.  
 
 
The financialisation of infrastructure and capital investment 
Financial markets and their intermediaries and processes are becoming increasingly 
influential in the global economy. The rise of this process of financialisation can be seen as 
part of the continuous search for the acceleration of capital accumulation within capitalism 
and for a fix to the contemporary economic and fiscal crisis in cities. The unbundling, 
segmentation and privatisation of infrastructure has created opportunities for financial 
markets to penetrate the previously untapped profitability of infrastructure networks, and 
enabled financial institutions to package, value, securitise and trade infrastructure assets with 
potentially transformative implications for the urban landscape. At the same time, however, 
the state continues to play a central role in the funding and financing of infrastructure, albeit 
in a more entrepreneurial than ever before. Although there are some core characteristics of 
the financialisation of infrastructure investment, such as high levels of debt and the 
speculation of future revenue generation, the process of financialisation is place-specific and 
highly uneven. 
Research question 1: How is infrastructure funded and financed in cities in the UK and the US? And to 
what extent are these processes being financialised? 
This question targets the core research subject – the funding and financing of urban 
infrastructure – and provides the foundations from which the other questions can be 
posed. In particular, its emphasis is on the potential variety of funding and financing 
practices utilised in British and American cities, and the possibility that different models 
of investment in a range of different cities will exhibit varying levels of financialisation. 
Indeed, the purpose of this question is to interrogate the specific ways in which 
infrastructure investments are designed, implemented and managed within the unique 
geographical context of each case study city. 
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Urban reterritorialisation and the transformation of the state  
Whilst the state remains a central actor in the funding and financing of infrastructure, it is 
also undergoing a continuous process of restructuring, rescaling and reterritorialisation as it 
seeks to respond to the challenges of urban development that have spawned from the global 
financial and economic crisis and as it develops more innovative and entrepreneurial models 
of capital investment. Issuing debt in order to finance an infrastructure project, for instance, 
forges new interdependencies with financial markets and thus exposes urban governance 
systems to the influence of extra-local actors and financial intermediaries. Furthermore, in 
avoiding the obstacles to issuing debt or to utilising other financial technologies, the 
organisation and structure of governmental entities comes under pressure to adapt and 
change. Crucially, this process of reterritorialisation is multidirectional, in that it can 
simultaneously take the form of inter-jurisdictional collaboration and fragmentation, or 
devolution and centralisation, and, as with the process of financialisation is uneven and place-
dependent. 
Research question 2: What is the role of the state in funding and financing infrastructure? Is this role 
changing? And, if so, what are the implications for the organisation of the state? 
This question identifies that the state’s role in funding and financing infrastructure is 
contested and potentially uncertain in face of the unbundling, segmentation and 
financialisation of infrastructure. In particular, the question asks whether the state – in all 
of its various iterations – still has a role to play in the funding and financing of 
infrastructure, how that role might be changing and how the state might be forced to 
adapt, rescale and restructure accordingly. In the context of what is acknowledged to be a 
variegated system of capitalism, a key focus of this question is on how the state responds 
to the unique challenges of infrastructure investment in different spatio-temporal 
circumstances. 
 
Fiscal crisis and the fiscalisation of urban development 
Governments at multiple levels within the US and the UK are suffering from increased levels 
of fiscal stress. In particular, urban governments have felt the squeeze in the wake of the 
Great Recession as funding cuts have been passed down from higher levels of government 
and local sources of income have dried up. However, it is precisely within this fiscally 
challenging environment that city governments are developing entrepreneurial models of 
infrastructure investment, which allow them to overcome the current scarcity of funds by 
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tapping into future revenues generated through development projects. While the ability to 
generate a return is an essential component of a financialised model of investment (in order 
to service debt), an infrastructure project that creates a financial return could also provide a 
valuable long-term source of income for a governmental entity. Crucially, this potential 
synergy between infrastructure investment and fiscal rewards has encouraged urban 
governments to pursue increasingly fiscalised models of urban development (those designed 
to prioritise financial returns over other strategic objectives). The fiscalisation of urban 
development, however, is an innately speculative process, which has the potential to cause 
new bouts of fiscal crisis and which serves to amplify inter-urban and inter-jurisdictional 
competition.  
Research question 3: Why are fiscally stressed governments investing infrastructure? How is fiscal stress 
causing changes in the way that infrastructure is financed and funded, and with what implications? 
The worsening financial condition of governmental entities is undoubtedly placing a strain 
on traditional funding and financing practices. This question, then, aims to assess the 
extent to which fiscal stress is fuelling the emergence of more entrepreneurial and 
financialised models of investment within the case study cities chosen in this research. 
Furthermore, it opens up the debate as to whether urban governments regard 
infrastructure as a fiscal instrument that might have positive implications for long-term 
financial stability, and whether financialised models of investment might actually present 
a risk to the financial sustainability of governments.  
 
Financialisation and the intensification of urban splintering 
The processes of unbundling, segmentation and privatisation have created new opportunities 
for investors across the globe to tap into the revenues generated by urban infrastructure. As 
these revenues have increasingly been securitised and traded in the financial markets, 
infrastructure has developed into a significant asset class, albeit defined by a complex and 
uneven geography of risk and return. Although the financialisation of infrastructure has 
created opportunities for infrastructure development and private investment often seems to 
align with the objectives and fiscal constraints of governments, the privatised infrastructure 
landscape is fraught with risks and potential costs for governments, users and the broader 
urban environment.  In particular, the acceleration in the circulation of capital through the 
urban environment that defines the financialisation of infrastructure appears to be 
intensifying the processes of creative destruction and urban splintering. 
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Research question 4: To what extent does the financialisation of infrastructure and capital investment have 
splintering implications for cities and the process of urban development? 
This question focuses on how different models of funding and financing infrastructure 
affects urban development and the broader urban environment. Often, pursuing 
financialised models of infrastructure investment seems to be an attractive option for 
governments and investors alike – the public sector can save money while the private 
sector generates profit. However, the financialisation of infrastructure is not always a win-
win situation and can put cities at risk of costly and destructive outcomes. Within each of 
the case study cities, examining the consequences of particular models of infrastructure 
investment sheds light on the circumstances in which models of funding and financing 
infrastructure can have potentially hazardous implications.  
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Chapter 3: A methodology for the study of capital investment 
At the core of this thesis is the comparative dimension between the United States and the 
United Kingdom. This chapter justifies the use of international comparative cases and 
outlines a methodological framework for the research. 
In defining comparisons, it is acknowledged that there are some common traits of 
comparative study, such as the identification of similarities and differences between chosen 
cases. That said, both the definition and practice of comparative research is highly varied and 
contested. As such, this chapter attempts to explain and justify the particular approach to 
comparative research adopted in this research. 
A particular emphasis is placed throughout the chapter on the importance of grounding a 
methodological framework in the theory that drives the research. As a result, the chapter 
makes frequent references to concepts developed in Chapter 2 and, in particular, to the 
research questions outlined in Section 2.5. In addition to making an explicit link between 
theory and methodology, the chapter also argues that researching infrastructure investment 
has potential implications for infrastructure investment in practice. Not only does this research 
contribute towards creating discursive representations and understandings of the funding 
and financing of infrastructure, but it is also implicated in a process of policy transfer and 
mutation (Section 3.1.1).  
Having acknowledged the interconnected nature of comparative research, the chapter makes 
a case for a relational form of comparison, in which the understanding of one comparator 
case study informs and enhances the understanding of another. Arguably, understanding 
cities in relation to one another creates a stronger foundation from which to advance 
conceptual and theoretical insights. 
A substantial portion of this chapter is dedicated to explaining how case studies were chosen 
for this research and to justifying their selection. The chapter discusses the nature of the case 
study itself and asks the question: ‘what is the unit of analysis that is being compared?’ 
Although the possibility of using individual infrastructure projects or specific funding mechanisms 
is discussed, the city is chosen as the unit of comparison. This is justified by the huge influence 
of the contextual specificities within a city that influence both the type of infrastructure 
project and the way in which it is funded and financed.  
Section 3.2.2 is perhaps the most important part of the chapter as it outlines and justifies the 
approach to selecting case study cities. Because the methodology is driven by the theoretical 
insights developed in Chapter 2, the argument is made that the cities should reflect critical or 
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extreme cases which have the potential to challenge existing theory and to develop new and 
improved conceptualisations of the funding and financing of infrastructure. The next 
sections (Section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4) focus on the case study selection process itself.  
Having constructed a comparative framework, the Chapter then turns to the method of 
primary research itself. In keeping with the search for depth and richness of material, a 
qualitative and intensive research strategy is adopted, which is largely based on semi-
structured interviews. Documentary analysis is also used to complement and refine the data 
generated in the semi-structured interviews, although there is no attempt to engage 
specifically in either discourse or content analysis. 
Finally, the chapter presents an illustrated summary of the methodological framework. 
 
3.1 Theorising the research process: towards a framework for 
comparative study 
There are some consistent characteristics that appear to be shared by most comparative 
studies. At a broad level, there is a sense of looking for similarities and differences between 
cases that then provide a basis for enhanced understanding of the subject (Keating 1991; 
Mossberger, 2009; Ragin, 1987; Ward, 2010a, 2010b). More specifically, comparative study 
can illuminate how different objects of study – or variables – ‘work differently in a variety of 
settings’ (Kantor and Savitch, 2005: 135), and can identify the ‘causal relationships’ between 
these variables (Pierre, 2005: 447).  Again, the purpose is to use comparative study to ‘make 
sense’ of the inevitable variety on display and to use these empirical insights to improve 
explanatory models (Pickervance, 1995: 36). 
According to Ward (2010b), the purpose of comparative study is to use empirical 
observations from a range of related objects of study to inform and develop improved 
theoretical and conceptual understandings: 
‘[To compare] means to examine more than one event, object, outcome or process with 
a view to discovering the similarities and/or differences between them. Comparative 
studies share a commitment to describing, explaining and developing theories about 
sociocultural phenomena as they occur in and across social units (cities, groups, regions, 
nations, societies, tribes)’ (Ward, 2010b: 473). 
Comparative analysis, then, has the potential to ground theory in a set of tangible historical 
examples, thus strengthening theory and rendering it less abstract (Abu-Lughod, 1999). At 
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the same time, comparative research increases the geographical reach of a project, enabling 
a wider set of geographical imaginations to influence the formation of concepts and theories 
(Larner and Le Heron, 2002), and providing a greater depth and sophistication of theoretical 
insight.  
However, the method of comparison is contested both conceptually and practically. The 
definition of comparative study provided by Ward (2010a) necessarily highlights the potential 
obstacles and methodological challenges that a researcher might face during comparative 
research. For instance, the challenges of how to choose the events, objects, outcomes, 
processes, cities, groups, nations or societies that will be incorporated into an empirical 
analysis are particularly evident. As McCann and Ward (2012: 49) admit, the framework for 
embarking on comparative study is, to some extent, a mere ‘conceptual point’, as the chosen 
subjects and units of analysis depend on the theoretical and ideological underpinnings of the 
researcher. At the same time, however, the conceptual starting point inevitably shapes the 
entire dynamic and trajectory of the research. As such the researcher’s theoretical 
underpinnings are treated here as the most crucial aspect of the comparative research design, 
are emphasized throughout the design process, and are explicitly attributed as the main driver 
of the choices shaping the methodological and empirical framework. 
 
3.1.1 Comparative urbanisms and the theory-practice nexus 
The theoretical underpinnings of comparative research are especially significant in 
geographical research, which by its very nature seeks to understand a subject according to its 
unique (and comparable) position in time and space. Nowhere is this more pronounced than 
in the field of urban geography, in which theorists constantly use comparisons as a frame of 
reference for measuring, analysing and evaluating aspects of the urban condition. Indeed, it 
can be argued that urban development is increasingly conducted in a comparative context 
(Peck, 2003).  
However, it is not only our understanding of cities that is consistently informed by 
comparative benchmarks. Comparative analysis, for example, can be regarded as both an 
implicit and explicit driver of the actions taken and decisions made by urban policy makers 
(Denters and Mossberger, 2006; Pierre, 2005), and therefore is a key determinant of how 
urban development plays out on the ground. In urban policy, comparative cases are 
unambiguously used as performance benchmarks or deployed as examples of best practice. 
Comparative study, therefore, is tightly linked to the idea that fortunes in one city can be 
improved by the transfer of ideas, innovations and experiences from an unlimited number 
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of other places (Denters and Mossberger, 2006; Sipe et al., 2011). Clearly, then, academic 
comparative research can also be bound up in the processes of policy mobility, transfer and 
mutation (see Jonas and Ward, 2002; McCann, 2011; McCann and Ward, 2011, 2012; Peck 
and Theodore, 2010), particularly when the topic is relevant to policy makers.  
As a result, the presuppositions, discursive representations and narratives that enable the 
researcher to construct, legitimise and justify a comparative empirical framework also 
influence the actual process of urban development. Crucially, not only does the subject of 
comparative research help to shape theoretical understandings, but theoretical 
understandings also influence and shape the process of urban development and the urban 
condition. This is the theory-practice nexus, and it must be acknowledged in the context of 
this research. 
 
3.1.2 Framing a comparative study: linking theoretical and methodological 
frameworks 
Urban research is now ‘an intrinsically comparative field’ (Robinson, 2011: 2), concerned 
primarily with how one city shapes up against another across a range of theoretical and 
empirical indicators. The lack of consistent attempts to recognise, critique or rewire this field 
has led McFarlane (2010) to put forward a number of key questions that should be 
considered by an urban theorist when embarking on a comparative study: 
‘how [do we] define the spatial identification of the city itself and of the wider (urban, 
economic, political) system of which it forms part? In more general terms: how do we 
identify the spatial unit to be compared?... what contextual factors matter most?... what 
are the ramifications of globalization for urban processes, urban networks, and urban 
categories?… how does comparison address local-global dialectics, and how can the 
scope of comparison be delineated?’ (McFarlane, 2010: 731). 
These questions are posed in order to kick-start the (often undervalued) processes of 
reflexive practice and self-criticism, as well as to challenge the ‘inevitability’ of a comparative 
case study (see McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2011). 
In light of McFarlane’s questions, key questions arise for this research: in trying to understand 
the funding and financing of infrastructure, why undertake an international comparison? And 
if so, how should that comparison be designed and conducted?  
The methodology presented in this chapter is aligned with – and informed by – the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. Given the theoretical foundations on which 
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this research is based, an international comparison seems well placed to meet the research 
aims and objectives, and more broadly to address key gaps in both theoretical understandings 
and empirical evidence.  
In particular, an international comparative approach would appear to be a highly relevant 
methodological approach in light of the inherent spatial diversity of the process 
financialisation (French et al., 2011). Furthermore, because financialisation penetrates 
economies at multiple spatial scales, exerting the influence of powerful global financial flows 
upon places – albeit unevenly (Pike and Pollard, 2010), an empirical approach that seeks to 
compare across, between and ‘through’ nations, cities and their intersecting spatial networks 
(see McCann and Ward, 2012) is both salient and appropriate. A core critique of the literature 
on financialisation is that it provides too many ‘generic accounts’ (French et al., 2011: 809) 
and, as such, that there is a lack of fine-grained analyses that engage with the complexity, 
heterogeneity and geographical unevenness of financialisation. An international comparison 
enables a more refined and nuanced understanding of the funding and financing of urban 
infrastructure to be developed and, in doing so, addresses a key gap in the financialisation 
literature. 
In international comparative research, it could be suggested that the national scale becomes 
the primary arena of analysis. However, while the national scale remains important and 
provides a point of reference for which geographical spaces are included and excluded from 
this research, the argument made in Chapter 2 is that the funding and financing of urban 
infrastructure is influenced by processes and systems operating at multiple spatial scales. This 
multiscalar approach is vital if the objective of generating a fine-grained and nuanced 
understanding of financialisation is to be achieved. 
 
3.1.3 International comparative framework: from like-for-like to relational 
comparisons 
The field of urban development, whilst having some notable examples of comparative work 
(Cento Bull and Jones, 2006; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; Fainstein, 2001; Sellers, 2002; 
Sellers and Kwak, 2011), has tended to neglect the comparative dimension of empirical 
research, particularly at an international level (Kantor and Savitch, 2005). In the portion of 
comparative studies that do exist, there is tendency to compare one city against one or a 
number of other cities in a ‘like-for-like’ format. In order to ground these like-for-like 
comparisons of cities in theory, the favoured approach is to adopt a particular theory of ‘the 
city’ and to examine the extent to which the case studies meet the criteria set out by the 
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relevant theoretical framework. In light of the fit (or disconnect) between theory and city, 
reflections are made about the ‘key traits’ of the case studies (Kantor and Savitch, 2005: 136). 
Following this procedure, then, a theoretically informed like-for-like – city-against-city – 
comparison is made. Reflections are also made about the ability of the city-theory to explain 
and analyse urban development and politics across cities more generally (see Figure 3.1). 
Urban regime analyses, for instance, have often been characterised by this approach (e.g. 
DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999; Harding, 1997; Sellers, 
2002).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: A diagram illustrating a theoretically informed like-for-like comparison 
of two cities 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
Using a like-for-like comparative framework, focusing on the key traits of cities and 
measuring them against a particular theory, can lead to a narrow, constrained and one-
dimensional study: this positivist approach can be liken to ‘scoring’ cities against a particular 
theoretical framework before comparing the scores. In no way does this allow for a 
researcher’s understanding of city ‘a’ to inform or improve their understanding of city ‘b’, or 
to enhance the theoretical richness of their subject. 
An alternative approach to comparative urban research is to focus on a set of multiscalar 
processes and systems, which could be used to enable city ‘a’ to be understood in relation to 
city ‘b’ (see Figure 3.2). While undertaking a relational comparison reflects the wider concern 
for a relational ‘turn’ to geography (Amin, 2007; Bathelt and Glücker, 2003; Massey, 2004; 
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Yeung, 2005), it also brings a new dimension to knowledge creation through empirical 
research: 
‘[A] relational comparative approach to the comparison of cities [recognizes] both the 
territorial and the relational histories and geographies that are behind their production 
and (re)production. This means understanding ‘cities’ differently from the way they 
have been theorized in past comparative urban studies. Stressing interconnected 
trajectories – how different cities are implicated in each other’s past, present and future 
– moves us away from searching for similarities and differences between two mutually 
exclusive contexts and instead towards relational comparisons that uses different cities 
to pose questions of one another’ (Ward, 2010a: 480). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: An illustration of a relational comparison between two cities 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
As a result, how any particular city is understood is explicitly impacted by the knowledges, 
discourses and understandings derived from other case studies, helping to create a more 
complex and sophisticated conceptualisation of the urban condition (Ward, 2010a; McCann 
and Ward; 2011, 2012). This research adopts a relational approach specifically in order to 
harness the analytical and explanatory richness that it enables. 
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3.2 Defining case study parameters: the case study selection process 
Three strands of information stand out as particularly central to a research project which 
aims to understand the apparent transformation that is occurring within infrastructure 
funding and financing:  
1. the drivers of investment practices; 
2. the mechanics of funding and financing instruments or mechanisms; 
3. and, the implications of their adoption and implementation. 
The approach to analysing these strands is informed by the literature review in Chapter 2, 
and is ultimately crystallised in the main research questions (see Section 2.5). These questions 
interrogate the following themes: 
 The financialisation of infrastructure and capital investment practices; 
 The role of the state in funding and financing infrastructure and the subsequent 
evolution of the state form;  
 The relationship between the fiscal stress and the funding and financing of 
infrastructure; 
 The potentially splintering, fragmentary, and uneven implications for urban 
development. 
The methods used in this research have been explicitly designed to aid the interrogation of 
these themes and to do so through a particular lens that is shaped by and grounded in the 
academic literature, with the objective of contributing towards an improved 
conceptualisation and theorisation of the funding and financing of infrastructure. 
Accordingly, the four themes that are crystallised in the research questions provide the 
foundations of the methodological approach to this research. Indeed, these themes serve as 
the primary drivers of the decision to undertake comparative international research and form 
the basis of the case study selection process. 
 
3.2.1 The unit of comparison: cities, infrastructure projects or funding mechanisms? 
The first stage of developing a comparative framework is to decide upon the unit of 
comparison. Barnes et al. (2007: 4-17) recall the evolution of the modern methodology, 
illustrating how various units of analysis – including (amongst others) the industrial sector, 
the locality, the institution, the ‘cross-scalar, globalizing network’, the region, the ‘cluster’, 
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and the experience (e.g. of gender or race) – drift in and out of the geographical 
consciousness with the ebb and flow of theoretical and empirical moments, turns, paradigms. 
Whatever the eventual unit of analysis, key to the legitimisation of any of these approaches 
is their relevance to and grounding in the broader theorisation of the subject matter at hand: 
that is, a clear and open ontological and epistemological position (Graham et al., 2010).  
Here, Chapters 1 and 2 produce an interpretation of the world in which infrastructure is 
funded and financed as complex, political, multiscalar, and place-specific. Because of the 
innate complexity of analysing infrastructure investment, and the uniqueness of any one 
funding and financing package, it seems essential to ground this study in the contextual 
specificities of ‘place’ that produce this uniqueness and complexity. While the processes and 
systems that influence the funding and financing of urban infrastructure are undeniably 
multiscalar, they converge at the urban scale, thus making the city a seemingly ideal unit of 
analysis. As a result, the city is adopted as the unit of analysis in the comparative framework 
of this research.  
Particularly notable alternative approaches could include focusing instead on specific funding 
mechanisms or specific infrastructure projects. However, for the purpose of this research, 
comparing specific types of infrastructure projects, such as tram systems or brownfield clean-
up programmes, or comparing specific investment models, such as tax increment financing 
or revolving infrastructure funds, would arguably be too narrow. Whilst this approach would 
open up the possibility of generating useful insights for policymakers and practitioners, the 
danger is that the research outputs become overly descriptive and list-like. Furthermore, in 
trying to explain the variations or similarities of the ways in which (for example) tram projects 
are funded or (for example) revolving infrastructure funds are structured, the analysis would 
quickly begin to draw on a range of place-specific factors, such as the existing institutional 
capacities, funding powers, governance systems, economic geographies and infrastructural 
needs of the city at hand.  
 
3.2.2 The problem of selecting cities: towards ‘critical cases’ 
There are multiple different ways of choosing case study cities to use as the focus of a 
research project. Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that there are two main types of selection technique, 
which in turn can be broken down further into six sub-categories. As illustrated in Table 3.1, 
case studies can be selected either randomly, or specifically according to expectations about 
their information content. 
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‘Random’ selections can be made either by collecting a ‘representative sample’ from a 
population at random, or by using a ‘stratified’ sampling technique in order to tailor a random 
sample to a specific set of criteria (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230).  
By contrast, ‘information-oriented’ selections can be made based on a preconceived idea of 
what information might be obtained through a particular case study. Using this method, 
deciding which case studies to select is dependent (to a certain extent) on the type of 
information that the researcher wants to obtain. According to Flyvbjerg (2006: 230), there 
are four types of case study that could be chosen through information-oriented selection 
techniques: ‘extreme’ or ‘deviant’ cases; ‘maximum variation’ cases; ‘critical’ cases; and 
‘paradigmatic’ cases. However, Flyvbjerg (2006: 233) also maintains that ‘the various 
strategies of selection are not necessarily mutually exclusive’.  
 
Table 3.1: Strategies for the selection of samples and cases 
Type of Selection Purpose 
A. Random selection To avoid systematic biases in the sample. The sample’s size is 
decisive for generalization. 
     1. Random sample To achieve a representative sample that allows for 
generalization for the entire population. 
     2. Stratified sample To generalize for specially selected subgroups within the 
population. 
B. Information-oriented 
selection 
To maximize the utility of information from small samples 
and single cases. Cases are selected on the basis of 
expectations about their information content. 
     1. Extreme/deviant cases To obtain information on unusual cases, which can be 
especially problematic or especially good in a more closely 
defined sense. 
     2. Maximum variation cases To obtain information about the significance of various 
circumstances for case process and outcome (e.g., three to 
four cases that are very different on one dimension: size, form 
of organization, location, budget). 
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     3. Critical cases To achieve information that permits logical deductions of the 
type, “If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all 
(no) cases.” 
     4. Paradigmatic cases To develop a metaphor or establish a school for the domain 
that the case concerns. 
Source: Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230. 
 
As discussed above, this research explicitly aims to interrogate the themes set out in the 
literature review and crystallised in the research questions. It is crucial, then, that the case 
studies that form basis of the empirical and comparative dimension of this study are selected 
based on their ability to challenge existing conceptualisations of financialisation, of the role 
of the state in funding and financing infrastructure, of the relationship between the fiscal 
stress and infrastructure investment, and of splintering urbanism, and to develop new or 
more refined understandings of these issues. Consequently, the case studies for this research 
have been selected using information-oriented techniques. 
Using information-oriented selection means that some characteristics of cities that might be 
considered more important for a stratified sampling technique, such as the size, population, 
gross domestic product per capita, or gross expenditure on infrastructure, are not used as 
key determinants of case study selection in this research.  
Instead, the selection of cities for comparison in this research is based on an expectation of 
how far certain cities could make an important contribution to the way in which the key 
themes of this research are understood, and, therefore, how far they could help to improve 
the way in which the funding and financing of infrastructure is theorised. 
As Flyvbjerg (2006) acknowledges, it is difficult to know precisely whether a particular case 
is ‘critical’, ‘extreme’ or ‘paradigmatic’ prior to undertaking the research itself. In general, 
however, the cases in this study were chosen because they are potentially ‘capable of 
generating new theoretical insights, rather than merely illustrating extant theory claims’, 
which Barnes et al. (2007: 10) suggest is a key feature of the ‘critical’ case. In an analysis of 
the economic geographies of brands and branding, for example, Pike (2013: 328) selects 
Burberry as a ‘critical case’ in order to challenge a particular conceptualisation of geographical 
association. 
The reason that critical or extreme cases enable what is arguably a more advanced, fine-
grained and in-depth theorisation of a particular subject is that they have the potential to 
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‘clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences’, rather than merely 
describing ‘the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur’ – the latter of 
which is a characteristic of random and stratified sampling techniques (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229). 
Inevitably, there are some fairly substantial challenges to undertaking comparative research 
using critical cases. Firstly, there is a danger that they become what Barnes et al. (2007: 10) 
describe as a ‘quick and dirty study’, in which the processes of conceptualisation and 
theorisation are based on a relatively random series of chance observations. Secondly, there 
is the issue of ‘verification bias’, in which the processes of case selection and theorisation 
become circular, while the empirical evidence merely serves to reinforce the researcher’s 
‘preconceived notions’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 234). Thirdly, there is the challenge of actually 
comparing a series of critical cases: the reason for choosing each case might be radically 
different, thus making it difficult to engage in the traditional comparative practice of looking 
for similarities and differences in the behaviour of a selection of variables. 
Dealing with these challenges in turn, this study attempts to avoid a ‘quick and dirty’ 
approach to case study research by creating an extensively considered, self-critical and 
‘reflexive’ methodology (see Longhurst, 2010: 108). Section 3.1.1, for example, explicitly sets 
out the position of this research as bound up in a complex nexus of theory and practice, 
while the introduction to Section 3.2 explicitly acknowledges that the methodology is 
grounded in – and driven by – a particular reading of the existing literature. 
The issue of ‘verification bias’ is a particularly interesting one, especially because this research 
is so explicit about its methodology originating from a series of ‘preconceived notions’ (see 
Flyvbjerg, 2006) derived from a particular interpretation of the literature. In a ‘positivist’ 
approach to research, this acknowledgement might be regarded as compromising the 
‘objectivity’ of the research (see Kitchin and Tate, 2013: 8-25), and therefore as unacceptable. 
Here, however, the idea that the research findings might be generated from preconceived 
notions is accepted as part of a knowledge production process that is ‘situated within the 
beliefs and values of the researcher’ (ibid: 24). This approach is consistent with a growing 
body of geographical research that emphasises an openness to researcher ‘positionality’ 
(Nayak and Jeffrey, 2013: 142). 
Finally, an attempt to address the challenge of comparing a series of critical cases is made 
through the adoption of a relational approach to comparison (see Section 3.1.3). Rather than 
holding a series of independent variables constant across cases and exploring the changing 
nature of a series of dependent variables, the relational approach to this study enables the 
research to be in-depth and ‘intensive’ in each case study city (see Herod and Parker, 2010: 
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67), the observations, analysis and conceptualisations of which can then be used to inform 
understandings across all case study cities. This is not to say that all case study cities will be 
considered to be the same, but rather that each case study will be understood in relation to 
the others. Although there may well be instances where direct comparative statements (for 
example, concerning similarities and differences) can be made about two or more case 
studies, this is not an explicit objective of this research. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Explanation of number of case study cities selected 
Source: Author’s own 
 
Having decided the unit of analysis and the type of city that should be selected (i.e. a critical 
case), a decision must be made about the number of cities chosen as part of the comparative 
framework. Figure 3.3 provides an explanation of how this choice was made in this study. 
The result is a selection of six cities (three from each comparator country), which provides 
an ideal balance between the depth and breadth of research, enabling a qualitative analysis of 
a range of processes to be undertaken, whilst also enabling the analysis to demonstrate the 
variable interaction of these processes with a range of places, and for their uneven 
geographical impacts to be explored and understood. 
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3.2.3 Justifying the US-UK international comparison 
Comparing how infrastructure is funded and financed between two nation-states, the UK 
and the US, is at the heart of this research and, as such, must be justified accordingly. Of 
particular importance to this choice of comparison are: the historical patterns of Anglo-
American policy transfer and learning; the rise of an Anglo-American ‘model’ of funding and 
financing infrastructure; a response to the critique of often Anglo-American-centric 
interpretations of financialisation; and, a response to the issue of comparative research that 
focuses on the ‘usual suspects’ of the UK and the US. 
Arguably, it would be challenging to analyse the funding and financing of infrastructure in 
the UK while refraining from making multiple references to the US, both with respect to 
specific mechanisms, and in terms of the broader models of practicing and conceptualising 
economic development that are evident in its cities and policy-making institutions. Indeed, 
it seems almost impossible to avoid analysing the UK’s infrastructure landscape in relation to 
the US. 
A key reason for the seemingly tight connection between infrastructure funding and 
financing in the UK and the US is the extent to which policy makers and practitioners in the 
UK are explicitly learning from the American strategies for funding and financing 
infrastructure. In particular, this has been exhibited by the emergence of tax increment 
financing in the UK, the US model for which has been digested in bite-sized chunks over a 
period of approximately 15 years since Lord Rogers’ Urban Task Force report in 1999, 
developing slowly through a number of various iterations, such as Local Authority Business 
Growth Incentives (LABGIs), until reaching its present form (Ward, 2012a, 2012b; also see 
Squires and Lord, 2012) which arguably still reflects a conflation between English local 
government finance and the form of TIF used in the US (see Chapter 5).  
Whilst policy transfer has been evident from the US to the UK, then, it is arguable that the 
liberalisation and privatisation of infrastructure was first experimented with in the UK, with 
marketisation and the use of ‘P3s’ (public-private partnerships) emerging later in the US as a 
consequence of a similar form of policy diffusion (Farmer, 2013) 
In addition to such explicit (albeit incomplete) transfers of policy where ‘the very logic of 
policy design has been disembedded from one national context and re-embedded in the 
other’ (Jonas and Ward, 2002: 377), a broader and more ‘superficial transfer of policy ideas’ 
has also occurred between the US and the UK in areas such as welfare reform and urban 
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governance (ibid.). Most recently, the more devolved and decentralised model of urban 
governance in the US has provided fuel for academics, practitioners and policy makers in the 
UK to consider new models of devolved governance, the introduction of new financial 
powers at the local level, and even a transition towards a form of fiscal federalism (inter alia 
see Blick and Jones, 2010; City Growth Commission, 2014; Gregory and Dawber, 2012; 
London Finance Commission, 2013; Symons, 2011; Trench, 2013). Admittedly, the 
American system has not provided the only frame of reference for this debate: other federal 
states such as Canada and Australia also frequently provide points of reference, while the 
referendum for independence in Scotland certainly brought the issue of devolution to centre 
stage.  
A further justification for the focus on the US and the UK in this research is the extent to 
which the process of financialisation is evident both in their economies at large and, more 
specifically, in terms of the ways in which infrastructure is funded and financed. The work 
of Langley (2004, 2007, 2008), for instance, has demonstrated that the UK and the US are 
experiencing a unique and arguably more extreme version of financialisation than anywhere 
else. Of course, when making this justification, care must be taken not to frame 
financialisation as something that is innately ‘Anglo-American’ or that manifests as a 
homogenous process across the UK and US (Brenner et al., 2010; French et al., 2011; van 
der Zwan, 2014). Here, while the presence of some ubiquitous form of ‘Anglo-American’ 
financialisation is not considered to be a justification for the choice of the UK and US as 
comparator countries, the complex and variegated ways in which financialisation plays out 
across the UK and the US certainly provides some degree of justification for selecting these 
countries.  
The importance of UK and the US as reference points in a study about financialisation is 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. Arguably the UK and the US are in the vanguard of the process of 
financialisation, both in terms of the financialisation of infrastructure, public policy and 
capital investment, and in terms of the dominance of their respective global financial centres 
(New York and London). Given the focus on the process of financialisation within this 
thesis, the US and the UK seem logical choices – in contrast to other possible comparator 
countries, such as Sweden or Germany, which exhibit lower levels of financialisation 
throughout their economies. 
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Figure 3.4: A spectrum of financialisation with the US and UK in the vanguard 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
 
Perhaps the most common critique of comparisons between the UK and the US is their 
narrow scope and tendency towards Anglo-American-centrism (Kantor and Savitch, 3005: 
Lees, 2012; Pollard et al., 2011; Robinson, 2011). Lees (2012: 167), for instance, argues that 
countries like the US and UK have become the ‘usual suspects’ in comparative urban 
research and that contemporary geographical discourse should be informed by a much 
broader range of empirical and comparative evidence.  
Although this is unquestionably a valid critique, Lees (2012: 167) openly admits that engaging 
in a more diverse form comparison, which might include cases from across the global North 
and global South, would very often entail ‘formulating a postcolonial programme of 
research’, which in itself is problematic. Whilst proponents of this agenda acknowledge that 
postcolonial research requires the utmost reflexivity – as is oozed in bundles by the likes of 
Jazeel and McFarlane (2007; 2010) – there is seldom any sense of acceptance that the role of 
the Westerner/Northerner/[insert other social constructs of human groupings] should be 
more passive in allowing the global South to research itself and to enable its researchers to 
provide ‘us’ with the conceptual and theoretical tools to understand it. Lees’ (2012) critique 
fails to address the call from Morse et al. (2002: 15) to create pragmatic solutions to the issue 
 89 
of positionality during the research process rather than just acknowledging it ‘post hoc’, and 
as a result, although insightful, seems somewhat hollow. 
Whilst it is clear that automatically reverting to researching the ‘usual suspects’ remains 
problematic, automatically reverting to researching the ‘other’/the ‘unusual’/the ‘exotic’/the 
‘under researched’ is equally fraught with contradiction: indeed, British and American 
researchers must not ignore the ‘limits of [their] own Anglo-American cultural and linguistic 
reach’ (Barnes et al., 2007: 3, emphasis added). 
It appears, then, that perhaps the most important task in the process case selection is for a 
researcher to be true to and consistent with their (self-perceived) positionality and their 
epistemological, conceptual and theoretical roots. 
 
3.2.4 The city selection process 
As part of the UK-US comparison, this research analyses six ‘critical cases’ (see above), which 
include Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield in the UK and Buffalo, NY, Chicago, IL and 
Stockton, CA in the US. The incorporation of each case study in the comparative framework 
can be justified by the case’s potential ability to provide unique and invaluable insights into 
the ways in which infrastructure is funded and financed and, perhaps more importantly, the 
ways in which it can be conceptualised, theorised and understood. Indeed, the choice of case 
study cities is determined to a significant extent by the underlying theoretical framework.  
Although the selection process for cities in the UK and cities in the US is slightly different 
(as a result of large differences in the scale and number of cities between the two nations), 
all of the cities are chosen because they meet specific criteria relating to key themes within 
this research.  
 
Table 3.2 shows how the cities of Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield were selected from 
England’s eight ‘Core Cities’ according to three key criteria:  
1. The utilisation of innovative funding and financing mechanisms for infrastructure 
investment; 
2. Evidence of multilevel governance arrangements within the city region; 
3. Evidence of local authority budget cuts and potential future fiscal stress. 
A score was attributed to each city depending on its alignment with these criteria. 
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Table 3.2: Selection of UK cities 
City Selection Criteria Description Score Total 
Birmingham Innovative funding 
and financing 
None 0 
2 
Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
Greater Birmingham and Solihull LEP 1 
Local authority cuts £166.18 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
1 
Bristol Innovative funding 
and financing 
None 0 
2 
Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
West of England LEP 1 
Local authority cuts £61.50 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
1 
Leeds Innovative funding 
and financing 
None 0 
2 
Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
Leeds LEP and West Yorkshire 
Combined Authority 
2 
Local authority cuts £81.43 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
0 
Liverpool Innovative funding 
and financing 
None 0 
3 
Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
Liverpool Local Enterprise Partnership 1 
Local authority cuts £252.45 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
2 
Manchester Innovative funding 
and financing 
First UK city to utilise an ‘Earn Back’ 1 
4 
Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority 
and LEP 
2 
Local authority cuts £209.96 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
1 
Newcastle Innovative funding 
and financing 
Tax increment financing 1 
5 
Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
NewcastleGateshead, the North East 
Combined Authority and LEP 
3 
Local authority cuts £162.09 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
1 
Nottingham Innovative funding 
and financing 
Tax increment financing 1 
3 
Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
D2N2 LEP 1 
Local authority cuts £158.35 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
1 
Sheffield Innovative funding 
and financing 
Tax increment financing 1 
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Multilevel 
governance 
arrangements 
Sheffield City Region LEP and Combined 
Authority 
2 4 
Local authority cuts £139.57 per person (2010-11 to 2012-13 
combined)  
1 
Source: The Guardian, 2012; Marlow 2012; Pike and O’Brien, 2014. 
 
 
*Calculated using a Fiscal Stress Score based on a composite index calculated using 8 separate variables (see Eucalitto, 2012; 
Governing the States and Localities, 2012; Maciag, 2012; Peck, 2013): Top 5 indebted states; 5 worst aggregated pension 
fund ratios; A municipal bankruptcy filing within the state since 2010; Across the board state spending cuts; Targeted state 
spending cuts; Reorganisation of government agencies within the state; The state has undertaken recent privatisation 
measures; The state has made reductions in aid to localities.  
Figure 3.5: Selection of US cities 
Sources: Governing the States and Localities, 2012; Tax Foundation, 2007; US Census Bureau, 2012. 
 
In the case of the US, the city selection process was necessarily different given the huge 
geographical variation across all 50 states and single federal district. As a result, it is necessary 
to narrow down the number of state territories, and then select appropriate cities. Because 
the author had limited pre-existing knowledge about the use of financialised investment 
practices in the US on a state-by-state or city-by-city basis, a more quantifiable measure – 
fiscal stress (also a key focus of this thesis) – was used to select first states and then cities. 
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Figure 3.5 illustrates how the cities of Buffalo, Chicago and Stockton were chosen, using 
four key criteria: 
 Phase 1: Most fiscally stressed states; 
 Phase 2: Highest level of level of state and local debt (combined) per capita; 
 Phase 3: Cities in these States with of population between 2,800,000 and 242,000 
(this range is informed by the population of the chosen UK cities); 
 Phase 4: Cities that have filed for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy. 
Each of these criteria was used as a filtering tool, leading to the selection of a city at either 
phase 3 or phase 4. 
In light of the literature review provided in Chapter 2 and the resultant theoretical framework 
that is crystallised in Section 2.5, the key themes that have guided the choice of case study 
city include: 
 The ways in which infrastructure is funded and financed within the city; 
 The ways in which the city is governed; 
 The financial condition of the city’s governing institutions and the broader fiscal 
environment. 
Taking each theme in turn, then, the remainder of this section attempts to further reinforce 
the justification for the selection of each case study city. 
 
3.2.4.1 The ways in which infrastructure is funded and financed within the city 
A key contention made in Chapter 2 is that the funding and financing of infrastructure is 
becoming financialised (albeit to different extents in different places). In selecting the case 
study cities, then, it was essential that some of the cities clearly exhibited the use of 
financialised investment practices.  
Chicago, which has been the focus of other research into the funding and financing of 
infrastructure (see Ashton, et al., 2014; Farmer, forthcoming; Weber, 2010), is arguably in 
the vanguard of this process of financialisation. For example, the City of Chicago has 167 
separate tax increment financing (TIF) districts (City of Chicago, 2014a); it has engaged in 
multiple long-term leases of infrastructure assets (worth over $3.5 billion in total), including 
the Chicago Skyway, the city’s parking meters, and parking garages (Ashton et al., 2014; Civic 
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Federation, 2013); and, it is home to the Chicago Infrastructure Trust, America’s first city-
level infrastructure trust (Ruthhart, 2014). 
A range of financialised investment practices have also been used in Stockton. In contrast to 
Chicago, however, which seems to be leading the way in terms of risk calculation, 
management and exploitation, Stockton has arguably engaged in a more uncertain and 
speculative model of funding and financing its urban infrastructure (Section 5.1.3). Indeed, 
Stockton’s development boom in the early 2000s was facilitated by the extensive use of 
‘redevelopment’ and the roll out of the ‘lease-out-lease-back’ financing model (US 
Bankruptcy Court, 2013a). At the time of the subprime crisis in 2007-8 the City of Stockton 
had accumulated hundreds of millions of dollars of debt from engaging in these kinds of 
mechanisms (City of Stockton, 2012a).  
Although Buffalo’s use of explicitly financialised investment practices has historically been 
quite low, it perhaps provides an avenue for challenging the ‘inevitability’ of the emergence 
of financialised infrastructure investment practices in a relatively devolved system of urban 
governance, in which the municipality is emerging from a period of fiscal stress. Thus, 
Buffalo, which attracts a large portion of its infrastructure funding from the State of New 
York (for example, see BUDC, 2013; ECIDA, 2011), can potentially serve as an example of 
an alternative approach to funding and financing infrastructure. 
In Sheffield, Newcastle and Manchester there are signs of an increasing interaction with and 
use of financialised investment practices. Whereas Newcastle and Sheffield were two of only 
three cities given powers to undertake TIF in the first phase of ‘City Deals’ in the UK (the 
other city being Nottingham) (see HM Government, 2012; Marlow, 2012; Pike and O’Brien, 
2014), the Greater Manchester Combined Authority negotiated a unique agreement to 
develop an ‘Earn Back’ scheme, a model of investment that involves speculative borrowing 
against future increases in economic growth (Section 6.2.3). Although the process of 
financialisation is arguably more historically entrenched in the American cities like Chicago, 
all three English cities provide excellent cases for illustrating how the emergent process of 
financialisation is being negotiated in a contemporary context. 
 
3.2.4.2 The ways in which the city is governed 
The next stage of case study selection involves examining possible or actual changes, 
advances or innovations in urban systems of governance, reflecting the process of 
reterritorialisation. Importantly, these systems of governance have a considerable role to play 
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in the decision-making process regarding how urban development and infrastructure is 
funded and financed. 
Newcastle has experienced a range of innovations in governance in recent years, which has 
influenced the ways in which infrastructure investment takes place with its territorial 
confines. For instance, Newcastle City Council has formed a unique partnership with 
Gateshead Council, which has provided the institutional foundations from which the City 
Council launched its City Deal negotiations and from which it has planned its Accelerated 
Development Zone (Newcastle City Council, Gateshead Council and PwC, 2011). The 
system of governance within Newcastle has undergone further changes in recent years with 
the formation of the North East Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) in 2011 (HM Treasury, 
2011) and the creation of the North East Combined Authority in May 2014 (HM 
Government, 2014).  
In a similar vein, the system of governance in Manchester has undergone a period of 
transition, especially since 2010. Building on a history of city-regional collaboration and 
transport investment, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, formed in 2011, has 
begun to play an increasingly significant role in shaping the ways in which infrastructure is 
funded and financed within the city-region (Section 6.2.3). The process of reterritorialisation 
has also been particularly evident in Sheffield with the formation of the Sheffield City Region 
LEP and The Sheffield City Region Combined Authority. Understanding how these complex 
yet relatively rapid changes in urban governance have unfolded and are bound up in the 
evolution of new models of infrastructure investment is a key part of this study.  
Like the English cities, the cities of Buffalo, Chicago and Stockton also provide examples of 
systems of urban governance that are both highly complex and changeable. For example, 
according to World Business Chicago (WBC, 2012: 33), the Chicago metropolitan region is 
governed by over 1,700 separate entities (WBC, 2012: 33), with new special purpose 
governments being formed (and others being dissolved) on a regular basis. Indeed, the State 
of Illinois signed House Bill 5785 into law in August 2014 with the specific objective of 
reducing the number of local governments in the State (CMAP, 2014). A similarly contested 
process of reterritorialisation is taking place in Buffalo as municipalities have sought to avoid 
State debt limitations through the formation of special districts (Section 6.1.2; also see 
Sbragia, 1996).  
The system of urban governance in Stockton has undergone a rapid period of change as the 
City has filed for bankruptcy, leaving decisions about Stockton’s future in the hands of a 
federal judge presiding over a myriad of highly divergent financial interests (Sections 6.1.3 
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and 7.2.3). At the same time, the dissolution of the Redevelopment Agencies by the State of 
California has created a further dimension to the reterritorialisation of Stockton, with further 
implications for the ability of the city government to invest in infrastructure. 
 
3.2.4.3 The financial condition of the city’s governing institutions and the broader 
fiscal environment 
Section 2.3 argues that the financial condition of a city’s governing entities is a key 
determinant of the way in which infrastructure is funded and financed. This claim is extended 
and elaborated in Chapter 6, which especially emphasises the role of fiscal stress in instigating 
more competitive, speculative and financialised models of infrastructure investment. 
In 2014, although the City of Chicago had recently experienced a modest fiscal recovery, its 
Corporate Fund deficit was still $339 million. Rather than continue to fall, its deficit is 
expected to rise to just under $1 billion by 2015. In addition to a growing deficit, the City 
has more than $19 billion of unfunded pension liabilities, placing it on the verge of a ‘severe 
pension funding crisis’ (Civic Federation, 2013: 9). Other fiscal problems include growing 
long-term liabilities, a high bonded debt burden and a reliance on the use of ‘one-time 
revenue sources’ (ibid.: 10-11). Chicago’s credit rating has been downgraded by the major 
rating agencies in line with the City’s apparently worsening financial condition (Marois and 
Jones, 2013). 
The City of Buffalo’s financial condition has generally improved since 2003, the year in which 
the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority was created by the State of New York to control the 
City’s financial operations. This improvement is reflected in the City’s general obligation 
bond credit rating, which increased from Baa3 in 2003 to A1 in 2012 (BFSA, 2013). An 
illustration of the City’s improving financial condition is the reduction in the proportion of 
its constitutional taxing limit from a peak of 92% in 2007 to 70.3% in 2013 (DiNapoli, 2014). 
Despite these improvements, the City is still very dependent on grants from the State of New 
York: State aid made up 38.8% of the City of Buffalo’s revenue in 2012, and has grown at 
an average rate of 4.8% per year since 2002. This makes the city vulnerable to State-led 
funding cuts. Furthermore, the City had $626.2 million of outstanding debt at the end of 
2012, and, despite recent increases in State aid, the available general fund balance has 
decreased from $113.5 million in 2008 to $30.5 million in 2012 (DiNapoli, 2014). The Buffalo 
Fiscal Stability Authority (BFSA) has provided warnings about a further reduction of the 
general fund balance in future and suggests that the City, in its latest four year financial plan, 
has overestimated some sources of revenue such as grants from the State of New York 
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(which are forecast to fall in real terms), while underestimating some expenditure 
requirements, such as health insurance payments, police and fire service costs (BFSA, 2013). 
Stockton is the most fiscally stressed City of the American case studies, having filed for 
bankruptcy in 2012 (Sections 4.1.3.3, 6.1.3, 7.2.3). As such, Stockton arguably represents a 
‘critical’ or ‘extreme’ case that can inform and refine the contemporary theorisation of the 
relationship between fiscal stress, financialisation, the funding and financing of 
infrastructure. 
In the UK, cuts in grant funding have had a significant impact on the ability of local 
authorities to engage in traditional models of infrastructure funding and financing, and 
arguably have thus stimulated the adoption of more innovative or financialised models of 
infrastructure investment. Table 3.3 shows the combined cuts per person for Manchester, 
Newcastle and Sheffield between 2010-11 and 2014-15, illustrating that all three councils are 
facing substantial fiscal pressures. 
 
Table 3.3: Government Cuts in Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield 
City Government Cuts per Person (by local authority 
2010-11 to 2014-15 combined) 
Manchester £284.34 
Newcastle £217.96 
Sheffield £198.47 
Source: Butler, 2013. 
 
Between 2013 and 2016, Newcastle City Council will make £100m in cuts in order to balance 
its budget (Newcastle City Council, 2013a: 9), placing the Council under increasing levels of 
fiscal stress and squeezing its service delivery capabilities.  Furthermore, as part of these cuts, 
there will be a reduction in the number of full-time equivalents by up to 1,320 posts (ibid.). 
Over the same timeframe, the central government’s funding contribution to Sheffield City 
Council will have declined by 50% (Sheffield City Council, 2014a). According to the Council, 
Sheffield has suffered from ‘some of the hardest cuts nationally’ with total government cuts 
of £238 million (Sheffield City Council, 2014b). Like Newcastle City Council, Sheffield City 
Council is simultaneously faced with budget cuts and increasing cost and demand for services 
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(for example, the Council highlights adult and social care and children’s social care as one 
key area of cost increases), which will compound the current sense of fiscal stress (Sheffield 
City Council, 2014a). 
Manchester City Council has made £170 million of savings in 2011/12 and 2012/13, £40 
million in 2013/14 and plans to make a further £100 million of cuts between 2015/16 and 
2016/17 (Manchester City Council, 2013: 25). Combined with the increasing costs of services 
such as waste disposal and transport, these ‘savings’ have placed pressure on the budgets of 
the Council’s directorates and has caused the Council to instigate a ‘radical programme of 
public service reform’ (ibid: 5). 
 
3.3 The method of research: collecting and analysing data 
Semi-structured interviews comprised the main method of primary research used in this 
study. Interview data was also supplemented by an analysis of primary and secondary 
documentary sources, which enabled a more accurate and precise understanding of case 
study material to be developed. This section explains, analyses and justifies the adoption of 
these research methods.  
 
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews: an intensive and qualitative method 
This research adopts an approach to data collection that is largely ‘intensive’ and ‘qualitative’.  
Intensive research typically focuses on ‘a single or small number of case studies with the 
maximum amount of detail’ (Clifford et al., 2010: 11) and enables the researcher to develop 
a ‘thick description’ of ‘conceptually important’ issues (Curtis et al., 2000: 1003). Qualitative 
research is compatible with an intensive research design because it can be used to develop 
what might be considered a higher level of ‘depth, richness and understanding’ than 
quantitative approaches which utilise techniques such as mathematical modelling and 
statistical analysis in order to develop narratives of factors such as ‘statistical 
representativeness’ (Clifford et al., 2010: 5-9).  
While quantitative methods are an important part of geographical research (Crang, 2005; 
Thrift, 2000), and can produce the sort of ‘evidence’ demanded by policymakers and 
practitioners (Clark, 1998), qualitative methods bring existing knowledge into question 
(Latour, 1993; Powers, 2007) and are thus fundamentally important for developing 
conceptual and theoretical understandings of the funding and financing of infrastructure. 
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According to Hughes (1999: 364), for example, qualitative and intensive research has the 
potential to ‘recognize’ and ‘break down’ dominant metanarratives and ‘replace’ them with 
more nuanced and fine-grained understandings – a key aim of this research with respect to 
the concept of financialisation. 
There is a range of options for conducting qualitative and intensive data collection and 
analysis, including techniques such as ethnographies, participant observation, visual 
methodologies, interviews and focus groups. Here, semi-structured interviews, which can be 
especially useful for drawing out the complexity and ambiguity of the research subject 
(Schoenberger, 1991), comprised the main body qualitative primary research.  
According to Longhurst (2010: 104), an interview is a form of ‘verbal interchange’, in which 
the interviewer attempts to ‘elicit information’ through a discussion with a person who has 
agreed to participate in the research. Semi-structured interviews use a set of pre-determined 
yet flexible ‘content-focused’ questions (Dunn, 2000: 61, emphasis in original). In particular, the 
flexibility of semi-structured interviews has proven to be crucial in this research: it enabled 
the questions to concentrate more on the interviewee’s area of expertise, which often became 
apparent throughout the interview; it allowed the topic of conversation to flow into areas 
that had previously not been considered by the researcher; and, it promoted what Crang 
(2005: 227) terms the ‘coconstruction’ of knowledge, in which the interviewee was able to 
make genuine contributions to the way in which the topics of research were framed, 
understood, analysed, conceptualised and even theorised. 
Most interviews conducted for the purpose of this research were with individuals, although 
a number of interviews took place with more than one participant, reaching up to five 
interviewees in some instances. In interviews that involved more than one participant, the 
interview was led by the researcher and took the form of boardroom-style discussion. These 
larger interviews cannot be regarded as ‘focus groups’ in the sense that, in a focus group, the 
researcher typically plays a ‘non-directive’ facilitator role, and the group usually comprises of 
six or more participants (Longhurst, 2010: 120). 
In over one hundred interviews, this research targeted a variety interview subjects, such as 
policymakers, lawyers, finance professionals, academics and a range of other actors. A full 
list is displayed in Appendix 1. A broad range of interview respondents enables a wide variety 
of views to be captured, helps to piece together key stories and narratives, and yet also 
ensures that peripheral discourses and opinions are also introduced into the analysis (Weiss, 
1994), thus facilitating a deeper and richer analysis of the subject (Kelly and Olds, 2007). 
Although the majority of actors interviewed for could be referred to as ‘elites’ (Hughes, 1999: 
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365), who typically have a ‘disproportionately high influence’ over the research subject at 
hand (see Pierce, 2008: 119), it is perhaps inappropriate to assume that the same relationship 
existing between the researcher and the interviewee across over a hundred interviews. 
 
3.3.2 Analysis of documents and accounts 
In an overview of using documents as sources of data, Silverman (2000: 128) asserts that 
textual analysis is concerned with understanding ‘the process through which texts depict 
‘reality’’. Such an approach suggests that documentary analysis typically involves practices 
such as discourse analysis and deconstruction (e.g. Foucault, 1979; Evans, 1991), techniques 
which can certainly be useful for problematising meta-narratives and reconceptualising 
current understandings, and, therefore, which could serve to complement semi-structured 
interviews.  
Specifically, this research draws on the analysis of policy documents and public accounts, 
legal transcripts and legislation, newspapers, specialist journals and magazines, and a range 
of other commercial documents and sources. These sources are used to access published 
data, strategic statements, and official analysis that can be used to refine and enhance the 
evidence base created through semi-structured interviews. Although this study does not 
explicitly attempt any form of discourse analysis, it is useful to be aware of the provenance 
of the document at hand in order to contextualise and bring meaning to any statements the 
document makes or any data it portrays.  
Whilst a distinction can be made between primary documents, which are ‘eye-witness accounts’ 
(Mogalakwe, 2006: 222) that are created ‘at the time of occurrence of the event’ (Taylor et 
al., 2008: 115) such as letters, diaries, biographies and official documents, and secondary 
documents, which are compiled at arms-length from a range of other sources and documents 
(Bailey, 1994; Taylor et al., 2008), the documents drawn upon in this study arguably represent 
a combination of the two.  
Ultimately, having been guided by the interview material, the objective of using documentary 
analysis is to ensure that aspects of the case study examples, such as the amount of money 
invested in a particular infrastructure project, or the way in which a specific funding 
mechanism functions, are conveyed in the most precise and accurate manner possible. Whilst 
it is assumed, then, that there is some degree of ‘fact’ conveyed in these documents, it is also 
important to recognise that such a document may be selective in its presentation of 
information and certainly subjective in the way in which this information is delivered as part 
 100 
of a message or narrative (Bryman, 2012). Importantly, this research does not attempt to 
undertake ‘content analysis’, described by Guthrie et al. (2004: 287) as ‘codifying qualitative 
and quantitative information [contained in official documents such as annual reports] into 
pre-defined categories in order to derive patterns in the presentation and reporting of 
information’. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks: outlining a methodological framework 
The objective of this Chapter has been to explain and justify the methodology used in this 
research. Crucially, the adopted methodological framework (Table 3.4) is a product of the 
conceptual and theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. 
Table 3.4: Methodological Framework 
Component of 
Methodology 
Methodological Approach 
Theoretical 
Framework 
Financialisation Reterritorialisation Fiscal Stress 
Splintering 
Urbanism 
Type of 
Comparison 
Relational 
Comparator 
Countries 
United States United Kingdom 
Unit of 
Analysis 
City 
Type of Case Critical/Extreme 
Case Study 
Cities 
Buffalo Chicago Stockton Manchester Newcastle Sheffield 
Method of 
Research 
Semi-Structured Interviews Documentary Analysis 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
Whilst the identification and analysis of possible alternative methodological approaches is 
necessarily limited by the space available, the Chapter has attempted to substantiate the 
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methodological choices in relation to alternatives where possible and has sought to respond 
to the most notable and relevant critiques of the approach adopted here. 
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Chapter 4: Contextualising capital investment in the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the spatial and temporal factors that shape how 
infrastructure is funded and financed. The chapter analyses the multiscalar political and 
economic systems in which methods of capital investment develop and evolve and, in so 
doing, contextualises the financialisation of capital investment and locates the 
transformations in the funding and financing of infrastructure. 
In order to understand the rise of financialised investment practices for urban infrastructure, 
it is essential to place the city within its respective national and subnational setting. The ability 
of a city to fund and finance its own infrastructure is highly variable and depends on the 
city’s political, economic and fiscal status, as well as its relationship with a complex and 
multiscalar assortment of other territories and their relevant institutional, organisational and 
regulatory components.  
This chapter seeks to provide a concise description of the six case study cities that are 
examined in this research (Buffalo, New York, Chicago, Illinois and Stockton, California in 
the US and Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield in the UK) and an analysis of their 
respective geographical contexts. Whilst the objective of the chapter is to demonstrate how 
a fine-grained analysis is essential for developing readings of the financialisation of 
infrastructure and capital investment, the broader political economy in which the case study 
cities are positioned also remains crucial. 
The chapter is split into two main sections. First, it analyses the American city, places it 
within a federal system of government, develops an understanding of intergovernmental 
relations, and examines the implications for funding and financing infrastructure within the 
three American case studies. Second, it analyses the English city, discusses its relationship 
with central government and its position within a union state, and evaluates the effects of 
this system of governance on the funding and financing of infrastructure within the study’s 
three British cases. 
 
4.1 Federalism, fiscal relations and the autonomous American city? 
The United States of America is a federalist state, in which there is a ‘division of sovereignty 
between [provincial] state and national governments’ (Winthrop, 1976: 93). Although 
federalism enables a substantial degree of autonomy over capital investment strategies to be 
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held at various subnational levels, it is also defined by inter-territorial dependency, which 
means that subnational decisions are implicated in a broader framework of 
intergovernmental relations (Elazar, 1998). 
 
4.1.1 How autonomous is the American city? 
A key objective of federalism is to maximise political involvement in the system, which can 
be accomplished by giving increased control to local governments (Elazar, 1998). It is to be 
expected, therefore, that city and local governments in the US have more power and 
autonomy than their counterparts in other national systems of government, and thus more 
flexibility in how they fund and finance infrastructure.  
One of the most influential features of federalism for the purpose of capital investment is 
the division of fiscal sovereignty between the American states: 
‘Virtually all of the distinguishable characteristics of political federalism imply limits on 
the central government’s ability to regulate the fiscal activities of provinces… [T]he 
expenditure autonomy of the provinces [is] generally protected by the constitution… 
[and the] constituent units in federations have greater independent access to various 
forms of deficit finance than local governments in unitary systems’ (Rodden, 2006: 97). 
As a result, in the US, it is the states that have the ‘power of the purse’ (ibid.). The ability of 
subnational governments to control their own fiscal affairs, however, is fraught with 
contradictions and perverse incentives. Rodden (2006), for example, notes that the powerful 
territorial interests of the States, alongside the absence of common interests across national 
voters, undermine the prospect of subnational fiscal discipline: in short, powerful 
subnational interests can persuade federal government to bail out States in times of fiscal 
crisis (Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013). Indeed, in the US, the strongest incentive for States to 
manage their budgets responsibly is actually the prospect of penalisation by lenders in the 
capital markets (Sbragia, 1996, 2010). 
The fiscal sovereignty enjoyed by States in the US has important implications for the cities 
and other subnational entities contained within their boundaries. In the US, local 
governments are defined as ‘creatures of the state’ as codified by Judge Dillon at the Iowa 
Supreme Court in 1868 (Williams, 1986: 149), and are certainly not miniature federal 
provinces within the borders of the State.  
Local autonomy can be measured against the possession of two primary powers: ‘initiation’ 
(the ability to take any particular action); and, ‘immunity’ (protection from the influence or 
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involvement of higher tiers of state) (Clark, 1984: 198-9). Traditionally, local governments in 
the US have very little of either power, as Dillon’s judgement expressively illustrates:  
‘Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly 
from, the [State] legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they 
cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and 
control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, 
by a single act… sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations of the state, 
and the corporations could not prevent it. We know no limitation on this right so far as 
the corporations themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants 
at will of the legislature’ (Dillon, cited in Elazar, 1998: 44). 
According to a report by the Brookings Institution, Dillon’s rule is effective in 39 American 
States (Richardson et al., 2003). However, a significant number of cities across a wide range 
of American States have been granted ‘home rule’ powers, which provide cities with the 
ability to initiate actions regarding local affairs without influence from the State, although the 
powers are still conveyed to home rule cities by the State (Clark, 1984). As a result, even in 
home rule cities, ‘the state government still retains significant control over the city’s fiscal 
policy choices’ (Fuchs, 1992: 180).  
 
4.1.2 Fiscal federalism, mandates and budget constraints 
Fiscal federalism is a ‘framework for the assignment of functions to different levels of 
government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions’ (Oates, 
1999: 1121). Primarily, fiscal federalism represents an approach to the ‘tax assignment 
problem’, which addresses the sources of revenue available to subnational governments 
(McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 2000: 2). Although the American States are not federations 
in their own right, fiscal federalism has come to describe the decisions made by the State 
legislatures concerning the balance of State-local revenue and expenditure (as well as the 
relationship between the federal government and the States).  
Whilst the federal and State governments share ‘concurrent’ borrowing and taxation powers 
according to the US Constitution (Grant, 1991: 263), local governments are granted these 
powers by their State. States ‘regulate what kinds of taxes may be imposed, maximum levels 
of taxation and debt, and what kinds of borrowing may occur’ (Stonecash, 1998: 75).  
Restrictions placed on levels of indebtedness and taxation are codified in the form of 
‘mandates’, which also include obligations for local governments to perform certain 
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functions or deliver certain services (Fuchs, 1992; Stonecash, 1998). States, therefore, place 
service delivery obligations on local governments, while controlling their ability to generate 
revenue (such as taxation) and limiting their borrowing capacity. 
Whereas States (solely) experience fiscal regulation by the capital markets, local governments 
in the US are (also) regulated by a series of hard budget constraints imposed by their State. 
Hard budget constraints require that ‘subnational governments bear the full financial 
consequences of their policy decisions, so that they cannot spend beyond their means’ 
(Weingast, 2009: 281). Ultimately, hard budget constraints represent a commitment from 
higher tiers of government to refrain from bailing out local and city governments, affecting 
levels of local autonomy and making local governments absolutely reliant on their pre-
defined sources of revenue when funding infrastructure.  
For American cities, then, making capital investments depends on a series of 
intergovernmental relations as defined under the umbrella of fiscal federalism. 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations impact the ability of cities to collect, retain and determine 
particular revenue streams (such as income tax, property tax and sales tax), raise debt, and 
prioritise various service provision and capital investment strategies. Crucially, fiscal and 
strategic agility are highly variable both within and between States and amongst the multitude 
of overlapping jurisdictions that create the American federal mosaic.  
 
4.1.3 Contextualising the American cases 
The variation in funding and financing infrastructure across cities in the US becomes evident 
throughout Chapters 5-8. Here, the objective is to shed some light on the three chosen 
American case study cities (Figure 4.1) and draw attention to the specificities of place that 
might determine how infrastructure is funded and financed. 
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Figure 4.1: A map of the United States showing Buffalo, Chicago and Stockton 
Source: Adapted from Wikimedia Commons©. 
 
4.1.3.1 Buffalo, New York: industrial decline and tax base suburbanization 
Buffalo is the urban core of the Buffalo-Niagara Falls Metropolitan Statistical Area, a city-
region located within the “Golden Horseshoe” region of North America, which stretches 
from Toronto in Canada, across to Niagara Falls, and to Rochester in Western New York 
(City of Buffalo, 2006). Today, the city of Buffalo has a population of 259,384 (US Census 
Bureau, 2012a), under half of its population in 1950, is the third poorest city in the US with 
a population of over 250,000, and is the country’s 6th most segregated city (Burney, 2012). 
Indeed, since the assassination of President McKinley in 1901, the ‘Queen City’ has been on 
a turbulent journey characterised by industrial decline, depopulation and economic and fiscal 
instability. 
In the early 20th Century, Buffalo was home to thriving steel, auto, grain, lumber, chemical 
and railroad industries, which blossomed in no small part due to the city’s location on a trade 
route from the grain fields of the Midwest to the Eastern Seaboard. Although the painful 
process of deindustrialisation began in earnest after the Second World War, there were 
indications of instability and uncertainty in the city’s industrial base as early as 1908 when 
Lackawanna Steel posted a loss only four years after massive investments in its Buffalo 
 107 
operations, which included 6 open-hearth blast furnaces, a ship canal and a series of railroad 
tracks (Goldman, 2007). 
Between 1970 and 1984, in the midst of its industrial crisis, Buffalo lost approximately 70,000 
jobs in steel and its related industries (Dillaway, 2006: 30-37), a trend which continued until 
the end of the Millennium (Figure 4.2). At the same time, the city was leaking population; 
both suburbanisation and structural migration from the Rustbelt in the North East and 
Midwest to the Sunbelt in the South contributed to the hollowing-out of Buffalo’s urban 
core (Figure 4.3). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Percentage decline in manufacturing employment: New York-New Jersey 
Metro Areas and their key industries, 1969-99 
Source: Bram and Anderson, 2001: 4. 
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Figure 4.3: Suburbanisation and population decline in Buffalo 
Source: City of Buffalo, 2006. 
 
In 1971, in an attempt to respond to its faltering economy, the city’s government (‘City of 
Buffalo’) implemented the Wallace-McHarg Plan (Goldman, 2007), continuing the tradition 
– since Joseph Ellicott’s initial radial street plan in 1804 (City of Buffalo, 2006) – of structured 
urban planning. Rather than revitalise Buffalo’s urban core, however, the Plan (and those 
that succeeded it) carved up the city with expressways, parking lots and a poorly designed 
and underfunded rapid transit system, reinforcing the patterns of suburbanisation, racial 
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segregation and wealth polarisation that still characterise the city. The dominance of elite 
interests in Buffalo, often at the expense of equitable and inclusive development, is a 
reflection of its ‘strong mayor-council form of government… [in which] the mayor and 
council exercise significant authority over city affairs’ (Kraus, 2004a: 486; also see Kraus, 
2004b). 
The flow of public funds into regeneration projects from both the City and the State of New 
York – through programmes such as Urban Development Action Grants (Green, 1991: 372) 
– has done little but fuel the destruction of Buffalo’s historic streetscapes and its functionality 
as a commercial hub: the central business district in ‘downtown’ has become vacated by all 
but a few heavily subsidised companies and those who had a finger in the redevelopment pie 
(Dillaway, 2006). 
While Buffalo’s core rots, its tax base has plummeted, and, as a result, the City has been 
forced to initiate a painful process of retrenchment, cutting services and jobs (Greer et al., 
2007). Buffalo’s hollowed out core and dilapidate tax-base – a product of industrial decline 
on one hand, and poorly conceived urban plans and public sector investments on the other 
– makes the City highly dependent on funding from the State of New York and limits the 
City’s ability to initiate infrastructure projects that might stimulate economic growth and 
competitiveness. 
 
4.1.3.2 Chicago, Illinois: machine politics, fragmentation and an imminent fiscal 
crisis? 
The Chicago metropolitan region is the third biggest city-region in the United States with a 
population of just under 10 million people and a gross regional product (GRP) of $500billion 
per year (WBC, 2012: 2). It has a broad economic base (see Figure 4.4) and is a global 
financial hub, considered to be home to the world’s leading derivate exchange (Olson, 2010). 
Yet it is a highly fragmented city-region; the metropolitan region spans the States of Illinois 
(where 90% of the population live), Wisconsin (2%) and Indiana (8%) (OECD, 2012b: 17) 
and is made up of 14 counties which contain a total of 1,723 units of government (WBC, 
2012: 33). 
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Figure 4.4: Chicago's top asset sectors in 2010 
Source: WCB, 2012: 18. 
 
Despite the potential for conflict and instability across the region’s colossal and vastly 
complex system of government, the City of Chicago has largely exhibited stability and 
cohesion in recent history; Richard, J. Daley was Mayor for 21 years between 1955 and 1976, 
and, after a short period of volatility, his son Richard M. Daley served as Mayor for 22 years 
before the current Mayor, Rahm Emmanuel, was elected in 2011 (Green and Holli, 2013). 
This stability, in part, can be attributed to Chicago’s ‘well-oiled Democratic political 
machine,’ characterised by a ‘resurgent neoclientelism’ which preserves the interests of the 
city’s economic and political elites (Sites, 2012: 2584-5). Problematically, the neoliberal 
machine has reinforced distinctive patterns of social, political and racial exclusion and created 
divisions that compound Chicago’s fragmented appearance (ibid.). For example, during the 
peak of the recent economic crisis, the unemployment rate for black Chicagoans, historically 
concentrated in the city’s South Side (Pattillo, 2007), was four times higher than that of 
whites (OECD, 2012b: 20). 
In addition, whilst the city’s stable and prolonged governance regimes were championed for 
their ability to maintain Chicago’s fiscal health (Fuchs, 1992), Rahm Emmanuel pointed to a 
‘structural problem’ in the City’s budget (Huffington Post, 2011; Civic Federation, 2010). As 
Figure 4.5 illustrates, although the City’s budget deficit has been reduced from $654 million 
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in financial year (FY) 2011 to $339 million in FY 2014, the Corporate Fund deficit is expected 
to rise further to just under $1 billion by 2015, causing rating agencies to downgrade the 
City’s debt (Marois and Jones, 2013). The City also faces a ‘severe pension funding crisis’ 
with $19.8 billion of unfunded liabilities and a funded ratio well below the generally accepted 
80% level in two of its four funds in FY 2012 (Civic Federation, 2013: 9).  
 
 
Figure 4.5: City of Chicago Budget Gaps: FY2003-FY2016 (in $ millions) 
Source: Civic Federation, 2013: 24. 
 
In addition to Chicago’s fiscal troubles, the city’s transport infrastructure is struggling to keep 
pace with urban sprawl; only 24% of jobs across the metropolitan region can be accessed by 
public transport in under an hour and a half (WBC, 2012: 31). As a result, infrastructure 
investment is regarded by its main planning organisation as a crucial strategic priority 
(CMAP, 2010). 
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Figure 4.6: Chicago's tax increment financing districts (in shaded areas) 
Source: City of Chicago, 2013. 
 
Chicago presents a unique set of challenges and opportunities for funding and financing 
infrastructure. Whilst the City’s financial condition is problematic for creating a sustainable 
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long-term programme of capital investment, Chicago’s economic vitality and size give the 
City an invaluable source of revenue generation and tax base growth. In particular, this has 
facilitated its extensive use of tax increment financing (Figure 4.6), explored in more detail 
in Chapter 5. However, the continued isolation of development projects in geographically 
confined and institutionally separate special districts, and the particularities of Chicago’s 
regime politics, have the potential to generate further fragmentation, splintering and fiscal 
stress. 
 
4.1.3.3 Stockton, California: boom, bust and bankruptcy 
Until 2007, Stockton was perhaps best known for being located 83 miles east of the San 
Francisco Bay Area and 40 miles south of Sacramento: alongside the rich agricultural 
tradition of the Central Valley and the city’s heritage as an inland port and manufacturing 
centre, its location within commuting range of the Bay Area had been key to the city’s identity 
(see City of Stockton, 2007).  
In the late 1990s, under pressure to act as a source of relief from the Bay Area’s stifling 
property prices, Stockton’s housing market began to gather momentum and, by the turn of 
the Millennium, was booming. However, by mid 2007, as the subprime crisis unravelled 
across California (see Glasgow et al., 2012), it was clear that Stockton had been experiencing 
a housing bubble of epic proportions. From their peak in 2006 to their low in the depths of 
economic crisis in 2009, median house prices fell by $283,000 (see Figure 4.7 – although 
some sources suggest a greater shift), with unimagined consequences for the city and its 
residents. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Median sales price of all properties in Stockton, CA, 2000-2013 
Source: Trulia, 2013. 
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At the start of FY2012, the City of Stockton had $26 million unpaid obligations (City of 
Stockton, 2013a: a-10) and thus was ‘generally not paying its debts as they become due’ (US 
Code, 11, 1, § 101). In June 2012, it filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 9 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code (City of Stockton, 2012a). The City simply didn’t have the 
funds to meet its obligations including debt payments, retiree pension and healthcare 
benefits, and its payroll. In April 2013, the bankruptcy filing was approved by the US 
Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division.  
The housing crash destroyed Stockton’s tax base, which had been underpinned by growth in 
property and sales tax revenues – in 2007 they made up a combined total of 43.1% of its 
revenues (City of Stockton, 2007: 5) – rendering the City insolvent. In Judge Klein’s 
testament, he describes that: 
‘Stockton was ground zero for subprime mortgages… Property tax revenues, sales tax 
revenues and other public revenues, characteristics of a functioning local economy… 
had plummeted. For example, the sales tax revenue declined from $47 million in fiscal 
year 2006, to $32.7 million in fiscal year 2010’ (US Bankruptcy Court, 2013b). 
Whilst filing for bankruptcy can seem like a technocratic process confined to the inner walls 
of a courtroom, the realities of fiscal crisis have been damaging for Stockton’s inhabitants, 
compounding the consequences of the housing crash and ensuing recession. For example, 
the unemployment rate rocketed from 6.3% in October 2006 to 18.7% in January 2011 (US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2013). Furthermore, crime rates have increased dramatically; 
although Stockton’s historically high homicide rate reached an all time low in 2008, it spiked 
thereafter up to 71 homicides in 2012, a trend which correlates with cuts to police services 
(City of Stockton, 2013b). 
Stockton’s ability to invest in infrastructure has also been drastically affected. Its bond ratings 
have fallen across the major three rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) 
and, although it is technically possible for a municipality to obtain credit during bankruptcy, 
the City is no longer in a position to issue debt. Instead, according to the City’s ‘Pendency 
Plan’, part of the bankruptcy restructuring process, the City will make $22.5 million in 
reductions to creditors and retirees in FY2013-14, in addition to the $26 million made in 
FY2012-13 (City of Stockton, 2013a). These cuts have also affected the City’s ability to invest 
in infrastructure. For example, the 2012-17 Capital Improvement Program is only 0.08% 
funded by the City’s General Fund (City of Stockton, 2012b). 
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4.2 The United Kingdom, the ‘English Question’ and the dominance of 
the centre 
Whereas the American polity is defined by the Constitution adopted in 1787 at Philadelphia, 
the polity of Britain is – by comparison – distinctly unscripted. Despite acts of devolution 
under New Labour from 1997 onwards, such as the creation of National Assemblies in 
Ireland and Wales, the formation of a devolved parliament in Scotland, and the referendum 
on Scottish independence in September 2014, the United Kingdom remains a ‘union state’ 
(Tomaney, 2000). England, which is home to all three British case studies examined in this 
research, continues to be characterised by a heavily centralised system of government.  
Nevertheless, the growing sense of polycentrism across the wider United Kingdom has led 
to a re-examination of how England is governed, causing the ‘English question’ to resurface 
(Pike and Tomaney, 2009: 22). As such, the ability of cities in England to determine their 
own futures, initiate strategic decisions, and, thus, to meet their capital investment 
requirements with locally generated solutions, continues to be a persistent issue of debate, 
negotiation and contestation. 
 
4.2.1 To devolve, or not to devolve? 
Just as in the US, local government in England is ‘creature’ of the state (although this refers 
to the nation-state, England, rather than the provincial States of the US) (Sullivan et al., 2004: 
245). Cities in England, however, have little or no opportunity to acquire powers equivalent 
to those conveyed to American cities through ‘home rule’. That said, recently negotiated ‘City 
Deals’, discussed in more detail below, are perhaps an indication that the current English 
government is prepared to formally devolve city powers on a case by case basis (Pike et al., 
2013), resembling the negotiation process used to determine home rule or ‘charter city’ 
legislation in the American States. 
Nevertheless, the autonomy of English subnational units of government remains extremely 
limited. Not only do subnational governments have little immunity from the involvement of 
the centre, but also – in spite of a series of legislative changes – there are considerable 
restrictions on their powers of initiation (see Clark, 1984). Indeed, the necessary 
authorisation and approval of local government action by central government is one of 
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England’s ‘fundamental territorial principles’ (Burch and Holiday, 1993: 31). This appears to 
be the case even after the Localism Act of 2011 (Jones and Stewart, 2012).  
In fact, for England, the measures of devolution described above are more accurately 
depicted as changes in resource allocation and procedural administration. For instance, there 
is very little in the Localism Act, including the ‘general power of competence’, that genuinely 
enhances local government powers of ‘initiation’. This is illustrated by the need for City Deals 
to act as clarification of specific city ‘powers’ for funding and financing infrastructure. The 
‘immunity’ of local governments has also been questioned during waves of centrally imposed 
funding cuts (Figure 4.8), which, in reality, are having a destructive impact on local authorities 
(Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012) and are inhibiting capital investment. 
 
 
Note: Includes Non-domestic rate payments/Revenue Support Grant; Neighbourhood renewal fund; PFI 
special grant; LA business growth incentive scheme; and, Other. 
Figure 4.8: Department for Communities and Local Government grants for local 
government in England, 2008-09 to 2014-15 
Source: HM Treasury, 2013b: 91. 
 
The principal source of tension in England is that whilst local autonomy is desirable (to 
expand the scope, influence, and legitimacy of local government), the redistributive 
mechanisms of the current centralised state provide a form of insurance to local authorities, 
which, for the majority, would be harmful to relinquish. Local authorities in the UK, for 
instance, have evolved in a system where central government grants can account for up to 
75 percent of their income (Schmuecker and Woods, 2011: 41): traditionally, even local forms 
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of taxation have been ‘collected by local authorities and remitted to central government for 
redistribution according to a centrally determined formula’ (Convery, 2006: 325). 
In order to incentivise infrastructure investment and local economic development, the Local 
Government Finance Act (2012) enabled local authorities to retain 50% of Non-Domestic 
Rates (NDRs or ‘business rates’) generated within their area (see Section 6.2.1). While the 
traditional formula grant system has been riddled with debates of (un)fairness 
(underperforming economies are viewed as under-resourced by the formula (Schmuecker 
and Woods, 2011) whereas net contributors are regarded as having their growth ‘equalised 
away’ (Lyons, 2006: 318)), the partial localisation of business rates has caused further 
malcontent, as it could act to intensify spatial disparities despite a complex system of ‘resets’ 
and ‘safety nets’ (DCLG, 2013a: 3; House of Commons, 2011). 
 
4.2.2 Grants, taxation and prudential borrowing 
In the UK, central government grants are crucial for local authorities to be able to balance 
their budgets and fund capital expenditure (Figure 4.9). This is significant because it means 
that central government can control the amount and nature of local government expenditure. 
The majority of intergovernmental transfers received by local authorities in England are 
‘hypothecated’ (that is, dedicated for a specific purpose with specific conditions attached) 
(see Wilkinson, 1994). Amongst a complex array of grant structures, a key distinction is made 
between ‘Supported Capital Expenditure (Capital Grant)’ – which must be used for the 
creation or improvement of tangible fixed assets – and ‘Supported Capital Expenditure 
(Revenue)’ – which must be used for functions such as supporting debt interest payments. 
Not only do grants have limited applications, therefore, but they are also subject to change. 
In response to what is effectively a sovereign debt crisis, grants to local authorities have 
decreased markedly (see Figure 4.8), creating fiscal distress in localities across England. 
 118 
 
Figure 4.9: Sources of funding for local authority capital expenditure in England 
2013-14 
Source: Adapted from DCLG, 2013b. 
 
A key reason that central government grants are so dominant in providing funding for local 
capital expenditure is that local authorities in England have very limited powers of taxation 
– especially when compared with subnational governments in other countries (see Figures 
4.10 and 4.11). At present, local authorities only have access to receipts from Council Tax (a 
tax on residential property) and 50% of Non-Domestic Rates (a tax on commercial property). 
All other forms of taxation, such as Value Added Tax (VAT) and Corporation Tax, are 
remitted to central government alone. Indeed, the dominance of central government over 
the system of local taxation, and the subsequent inability of local governments in England 
to levy new taxes or set the rate of taxation, is a significant constraint to generating sources 
of revenue for capital investment. 
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Note: CIT = corporate income tax, PIT = personal income taxes, GBR = Great Britain. 
Figure 4.10: International comparison of sub-central autonomous taxes as a 
percentage of total sub-central government revenue, 2009 
Source: Blöchliger and Pinero-Campos, 2013: 83. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Sub-central tax revenue in the UK and US as a percentage of total tax 
revenue, 2008 
Source: Adapted from OECD, 2013b. 
 
Local authorities in England can engage in self-financed expenditure, and, in principle, there 
is no upper limit to the amount that local authorities can borrow: 
‘Local authorities, provided they can service debt themselves, may now borrow up to a 
level that they calculate they can afford’ (Wilson and Game, 2011: 210).  
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However, there are a series of conditions that closely regulate local authority borrowing in 
practice. For instance, borrowing must conform to the Prudential Code. Components of the 
prudential framework include debt levels, revenue sources, and other capital expenditure and 
financing requirements (CIPFA, 2013). Local authorities are also encouraged to consider 
financial, legal, economic and social implications of their borrowing (ibid.). 
Furthermore, when engaging in debt-finance, local authorities typically borrow from the 
Public Works Loan Board (PWLB), part of the United Kingdom’s Debt Management Office. 
This is because the interest rates on PWLB debt, which are determined by the price at which 
UK Treasury Gilts trade, as well as the lending strategy of HM Treasury, are lower than those 
offered in the market. So, although there are no regulations explicitly preventing localities 
issuing municipal bonds, the monopoly of the PWLB ensures that there is no active 
municipal bond market in the UK (Symons, 2011). In sum, it is ultimately central government 
that dictates levels of borrowing for capital investment in England.  
 
4.2.3 Contextualising the English cases 
 
Figure 4.12: A map of the United Kingdom showing Manchester, Newcastle upon 
Tyne and Sheffield 
Source: Adapted from Google©. 
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The geographies of capital investment in the UK are complex and highly varied. England, in 
particular, is characterised as a strongly centralised state, whose central government currently 
maintains a contradictory agenda of devolution and central control. This section turns to the 
chosen English case study cities (Figure 4.12) and provides an overview of the factors that 
shape capital investment within their specific contexts.  
 
4.2.3.1 Manchester: Americanisation in the North West? 
Located in the North West of England, Manchester is a city with a population of just over 
500,000 (Manchester City Council, 2012). Perhaps most important to the city’s contemporary 
identity is its location within the Greater Manchester City Region, an area with a total 
population of approximately 3.2 million (MIER, 2009), which incorporates Bury, Bolton, 
Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford and Wigan. 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Employment rates for 16-64s in Manchester, Greater Manchester the 
North West and England, 2004-2011 
Source: Manchester City Council, 2012: 52. 
 
Since the rapid process of urbanisation that accompanied the city’s cotton textile boom in 
the early 19th Century (Dicken, 2002), Manchester, the world’s industrial pioneer, has been 
an image of tension and contradiction. Whereas the wealth generated during the industrial 
period was starkly juxtaposed with widespread squalor and paucity, the prosperity of 
contemporary post-industrial renaissance Manchester is set against persistent unemployment 
(Figure 4.13), social exclusion and neighbourhood inequality (Figure 4.14) (also see Herd and 
Patterson 2002; Mellor, 2002). 
 122 
Nevertheless, there has historically been a substantial degree of collaboration between the 
boroughs of Greater Manchester, evolving in part through the formation of institutions like 
Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA). In April 2011, the region was 
formally recognised as a territorial entity with the creation of the UK’s first statutory 
combined authority, Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA), which has since 
reinforced (Greater) Manchester’s reputation as a hub of innovative policymaking (see 
Quilley, 2002). 
Although Manchester’s city-regional space is perceived as key to its economic fortunes, a 
footnote to the introduction of the Manchester Independent Economic Review illustrates 
that it is also a source of confusion and potential contestation: 
‘Exactly what the term “Manchester” refers to is a point of discussion. We use it, as well 
as the term “Manchester City Region” and “MCR”, to refer loosely to the Manchester 
City Region, unless otherwise indicated. We also sometimes talk about MCR as a 
“region” and the “city”’ (MIER, 2009: 6). 
Whilst this may seem a definitional point, much of Manchester’s economic revival is framed 
as regional in form and origin. Provided that its success continues, the ‘ambiguous’ 
institutional geography of Manchester (Peck and Ward, 2002: 15) is likely to remain 
unchallenged. Indeed, the creation of GMCA affirms the primacy of a dual system, where 
local governments exert authority at both local and city-regional levels. Nevertheless, if 
economic or financial conditions deteriorate, the intricate system of governance could be a 
source of conflict and fragmentation, giving rise to difficult questions of responsibility and 
accountability. Even in a pre-GMCA landscape, Peck and Ward (2002) suggest that: 
‘[Manchester risks becoming] an increasingly ‘Americanised’ city: economic and social 
polarisation will have become perversely underwritten by a set of policies which 
effectively legitimate the transfer of funds from social safety-net programmes into the 
subsidisation of speculative accumulation, zero-sum competition and middle class 
consumption’ (Peck and Ward, 2002: 7-8). 
However, for a time at least, the formation of a statutory city-regional institution, the GMCA, 
has created significant opportunities for increasing levels of capital investment in 
Manchester. Not only do GMCA and its parallel regional transport body, Transport for 
Greater Manchester (TfGM), have access to a pool of funds from the city-region’s 10 
boroughs, but they have also developed a stronger base from which to negotiate and bargain 
with central government for more resource and autonomy. 
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Figure 4.14: Average terraced property prices in Manchester by ward, 2011 
Source: Manchester City Council, 2012: 95. 
4.2.3.2 Newcastle upon Tyne: in search of a new institutional and infrastructural fix? 
With a population of just 279,092 (Newcastle City Council, 2013b: 30), Newcastle upon Tyne 
is a modest-sized city located in the North East of England. Along with the rest of North 
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East, Newcastle experienced an extensive and painful process of deindustrialisation during 
the 20th Century, as the closure of coalmines, shipyards and other centres of industrial 
activity led to a prolonged period of low economic growth and high levels of unemployment 
(Tomaney et al., 1999; Power and Mumford, 1999).  
Towards the end of the 20th Century, Newcastle emerged as a ‘post-industrial’ city (Byrne 
2002: 279), characterised by service sector growth (most notably in the financial services 
industry through the rise of Northern Rock), a successful higher education sector, cultural 
industries and the evolution of an embryonic knowledge-based economy (Comunian, 2011; 
Dawley et al., 2012; Hudson, 2011). Its rejuvenation, however, has been temporary, unstable 
and incomplete. In addition to attracting landmark inward investments, the city has been at 
the sharp-end of branch plant disinvestment (Dawley, 2013; Pike, 2005). Furthermore, the 
collapse of Northern Rock in 2007, at the start of the global financial crisis, is telling of the 
persistent vulnerability of the city to global economic change and periodic exogenous shocks 
(Dawley et al., 2012). 
 
 
Note: Years 2010-11 and 2011-12 represent an average floor space per year developed between 2010-12. 
Figure 4.15: Amount of new floor space (sq. m.) developed for employment in 
Newcastle 2005-12 
Source: Adapted from Newcastle City Council, 2013b: 21. 
 
Although some areas of Newcastle’s economy have been relatively resilient to the recent 
global economic crisis, such as its exporting industries – the city-region was the only area in 
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England to record a trade surplus of goods in 2011 and 2012 (NELEP, 2013: 6) – other 
sectors, such as regeneration and development, continue to be characterised by volatility and 
uncertainty (see Figure 4.15). Furthermore, Newcastle remains particularly reliant on the 
public sector for both employment and capital investment (Strickland, 2013), even relative 
to other urban centres within the ‘public sector region’ that is the North East (Table 4.1; also 
see Dawley et al., 2012; Mason and Pierrakis, 2011). 
 
Table 4.1: Ratio of private to public sector employment in Newcastle, 
Middleborough and Sunderland 
City Private sector 
employment 2011 
Public sector 
employment 
2011 
Ratio of private 
to public sector 
employment 2011 
Newcastle 254,100 130,000 2 
Middlesbrough 119,200 61,100 2 
Sunderland 80,400 35,600 2.3 
Great Britain 20,293,100 7,472,000 2.7 
Source: Centre for Cities, 2013. 
 
Newcastle presents particular challenges for capital investment. Not only does the North 
East of England historically attract low levels of private sector investment (Mason and 
Harrison, 2002; Klagge and Martin, 2005), but it also suffers from low levels of growth in 
key sectors that might make public sector investment in infrastructure more challenging than 
elsewhere. During periods of growth, the property values in the North East tend to grow 
more slowly than in other regions, while during periods of recession, property values are 
prone to deeper and more prolonged declines (ONS, 2013). 
According to the OECD (2006b: 12), Newcastle is the core of a city-region with a population 
of approximately 1.6 million. The geography of the city-region is reflected in the 
administrative boundaries of the newly formed North East Local Enterprise Partnership and 
Combined Authority, which both incorporate Durham, Gateshead, Newcastle, North 
Tyneside, Northumberland, South Tyneside and Sunderland (LA7, 2013).  
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Yet, Newcastle’s position within the city-region is subject to contestation. The region can be 
viewed as ‘bi-polar’; that is, underpinned by two competing urban cores, one in 
NewcastleGateshead, and the other in Sunderland (Shaw and Greenhalgh, 2010: 466). 
Furthermore, the governance of broader North East, once shaped by the regional 
development strategies of the RDA, One North East, has effectively been split in two by the 
creation of two north-eastern LEPs; the North East LEP and Tees Valley Unlimited (Shaw 
and Robinson, 2012). The result is a melting pot of competing and overlapping institutions 
within the Newcastle City Region, a situation that has the potential to generate political 
divisions and inhibit investment in infrastructure. 
 
4.2.3.3 Sheffield: local resistance, corporate partnership and the challenges of 
entrepreneurialism 
Sheffield is located in South Yorkshire, at the confluence of the resource-rich valleys of the 
Don and the Sheaf. Like Manchester and Newcastle, contemporary policy discourse has 
position Sheffield at the heart of a vibrant functional economic area, a city-region which 
includes Barnsley, Chesterfield, Doncaster and Rotherham. However, the construction of 
the Sheffield City Region (SCR) is taking place against a backdrop of intra-regional and inter-
jurisdictional competition and rivalry (Gore and Fothergill, 2007; Herrschel and Newman, 
2013). Whilst a Combined Authority is being planned for the city-region, there remain 
historically entrenched challenges for developing an inclusive and cooperative system of 
governance within SCR (Marlow, 2013). 
In contrast to those in other industrialising cities in the UK in the 19th Century, the 
industrialists of Sheffield are accused to have ‘lacked the entrepreneurial spirit of ‘modern’ 
capitalism’ (Mollona, 2009: 6). Indeed, the relationship in Sheffield between the pursuit of 
entrepreneurialism on the one hand, and the advancement of social cohesion and equitable 
growth on the other hand has been precarious and finely balanced over time, with significant 
implications for the city’s development and success. 
Sheffield’s steel industry underwent an intense period of transition and restructuring over a 
20 year period from when the British steel industry was nationalised in 1967 to the early 
1980s when economic crisis, transitions in the global steel industry, and the Thatcher 
Government’s policies of privatisation and rationalisation combined to devastate the steel 
makers, cutlers, forgers, blacksmiths and toolmakers of Sheffield (ibid.). 
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The decline of the steel industry generated huge challenges for Sheffield; in 1986, for 
example, the rate of unemployment reached over 16% (Henneberry, 1995: 169). During this 
period of decline, Sheffield City Council attempted to combat Thatcher’s neoliberalism by 
adopting a radical left wing approach to local policymaking, and framing economic crisis as 
a product of central government policy (Digaetano and Lawless, 1999). Despite an ambition 
to foster ‘the production of socially useful goods in democratically controlled organizations’ 
(ibid.: 565), the City Council’s radical stance has given Sheffield an enduring reputation for 
being ‘anti-business’ (Syed, 1990). 
Yet, it was actually between 1986 and 1996, in a less radicalised Sheffield, that the city’s 
inevitable industrial decline transformed into post-industrial panic; in September 1990, 
Meadowhall shopping centre opened just 3 miles from the city centre, decimating a large 
portion of the city centre’s fragile retail offer (Hennerberry, 1995: 169); in 1991, Sheffield 
hosted the World Student Games (WSG), which failed to attract private sector investment 
and left Sheffield City Council with a painful debt burden (Dabinett and Ramsden, 1999: 
169); and, between 1994 and 1995 the city completed the construction of the South 
Yorkshire Supertram, a light rail system, which had a ‘negligible effect on development’ at 
huge public expense (Lawless and Gore, 1999: 535). 
On reflection, the shift from socialism to entrepreneurialism in Sheffield – or as Digaetano 
and Lawless (1999: 566) prefer, the ‘regime shift from social reform managerialism to 
progrowth corporatism’ – can actually be regarded as the source of unsustainable rounds of 
public-private investment, from which the hollowed-out city centre is still trying to recover, 
and for which the city is still making stifling debt repayments (Sheffield City Council, 2010). 
In addition, while these investments have generated some opportunities for job creation and 
wealth generation, Sheffield is still characterised by high levels of inequality, for example with 
many residents suffering from ‘low pay, long hours or pervasive job insecurity’ (Sheffield 
First, 2013: 6).  
 
4.3 Concluding remarks: acknowledging the unique geographies of 
infrastructure investment in the UK and the US 
Using a multiscalar approach that focuses on national, regional and local geographies, this 
chapter has attempted to outline some of the principle factors that might determine the ways 
in which infrastructure is funded and financed within the case study cities. Although each 
infrastructure project uses a funding and financing mechanism that is in some way bespoke, 
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the spatial context in which an infrastructure project is set can significantly influence the 
ways in which it is funded and financed. As such, funding and financing mechanisms 
developed within any one place tend to share common features and characteristics. 
For example, American municipalities have a far wider range of available taxation options 
and therefore a greater access to local sources of funding than English local authorities 
(although State legislation and the need for voter approval often present obstacles to raising 
funds through direct taxation). American municipalities also have more opportunity to adopt 
debt-based models of investment, because they have access to a sophisticated capital market, 
although, once again, levels of indebtedness are also regulated by State legislatures. 
Whilst grants and intergovernmental transfers play a relatively minor role in the US, central 
government grants have traditionally be a key source of infrastructure investment in the UK. 
However, the quantity of grant funding has been in decline in the UK, particularly since the 
financial crisis of 2008, providing significant challenges for local capital investment. 
Furthermore, despite the emergence of initiatives to devolve more powers to localities that 
could enable local governments to tap into local sources of funding, infrastructure 
investment in the UK is still very much controlled by HM Treasury and central government. 
Despite the shared characteristics between places within broad overarching national 
frameworks, there is undoubtedly a huge degree of variation in the funding and financing of 
infrastructure, both between different places and for different types of infrastructure. In the 
following chapters, this thesis attempts to draw on the case studies that have been introduced 
here in order to develop a more fine-grained and nuanced understanding of infrastructure 
investment and its financialisation.  
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Chapter 5: The financialisation of the funding and financing of 
infrastructure in the UK and the US 
The objective of this chapter is to further develop the arguments made in Chapter 2 that 
infrastructure is being funded and financed in increasingly financialised ways. In particular, 
the chapter seeks to provide empirical evidence of the financialisation of urban infrastructure 
by drawing on primary research undertaken in Chicago, Buffalo and Stockton in the US and 
in Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield in the UK. 
Although there is evidence of a transition towards more financialised models of funding and 
financing infrastructure, the extent to which any individual investment displays 
characteristics of financialisation (e.g. see Table 2.2) varies between and within case study 
cities. As a result, a key component of the argument presented in this chapter is that the 
pervasiveness and potency of financialisation changes between places and over time, and that 
the funding and financing of infrastructure is influenced by the specificities of a particular 
place, such as its regulatory, socio-institutional, political and economic context. 
This chapter is structured into two further sections. First, the chapter examines the 
geographies of financialisation in the context of the funding and financing of infrastructure 
in the US. This section engages with case study material from Chicago and, with a specific 
focus on tax increment financing (TIF), illustrates how the process of securitisation and 
financial engineering can create new opportunities for infrastructure investment, whilst 
presenting a series of new risks and potential costs. This argument is extended through an 
analysis of Buffalo and Stockton, two cities which both present unique approaches to 
investing in infrastructure, and which serve to illustrate the highly variegated nature of 
financialisation and its implications.  
The second section draws on the case studies of Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield to 
examine the evidence of the financialisation of infrastructure investment in the UK. All three 
cases exhibit some form of financialisation, the exact nature of which is shaped by the unique 
economic geography and institutional make up of the city. The Manchester example 
demonstrates how financialisation presents opportunities for city governments to invest in 
infrastructure in a way that is more commercial than was previously possible. Through an 
examination of TIF in Newcastle and Sheffield, the chapter demonstrates that governments 
in more underperforming and peripheral locations face a dilemma whereby their intervention 
through infrastructure investment is more important than in places with a ready stream of 
private funding and financing, but that it is also associated with a greater degree of risk and 
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uncertainty. To conclude, the chapter reflects on the nature of infrastructure investment 
within each case study city, and suggests how this might inform a more refined and 
sophisticated understanding of the process of financialisation. 
 
5.1 The variegated geographies of infrastructure investment in the US 
Investing in core urban infrastructure is becoming an increasingly important policy response 
as cities across the US suffer from stagnant growth and declining economic competitiveness 
and their governing institutions face a shrinking supply of tax receipts and growing budgetary 
woes. As outlined in Chapter 4, the specific challenges facing America’s cities are hugely 
variable, underpinned by their highly diverse social, political and economic geographies. 
Nevertheless, the ambition to invest in infrastructure and the need to do so in a way that 
temporarily nullifies the prevailing fiscal crisis is a commonly held and standout feature. 
In combination with the pressing need to address economic underperformance, the current 
climate of austerity has created a breeding ground for the use of more innovative, 
entrepreneurial and financialised practices for funding and financing infrastructure. Crucially, 
however, the specific funding and financing practices adopted by municipal governments are 
shaped by a wide range of factors, such as institutional configuration, intergovernmental 
relationships and legislative constraints, that are unique to any one city. 
This section examines how infrastructure is funded and financed in Chicago, IL, Buffalo, 
NY and Stockton, CA, and demonstrates how the process of financialisation is shaping 
infrastructure investment practices in different ways across the US. In particular, it examines 
the variable capabilities of city governments to intercept and engineer financial flows, and 
demonstrates how the potential rewards of engaging in financialised funding and financing 
practices must be weighed against the potentially augmented risks and costs of a more 
speculative form of urban development. 
 
5.1.1 ‘The only game in town’: tax increment financing in Chicago, Illinois 
A key challenge for policymakers is the question of how to retain value from infrastructure 
investment. Being able to codify the otherwise abstract societal and economic benefits of 
infrastructure investment is vital for bringing forward investment proposals that might 
otherwise be fraught with political difficulties. In particular, the ability to capture the financial 
and economic value of infrastructure investment, for example through commercial revenues 
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or taxation income, means that large infrastructure projects can be readily funded and 
financed. Indeed, innovation in a range of value capture mechanisms has made it possible to 
harness the future value generated by an item of infrastructure and to use this value to finance 
initial upfront investments. However, the process of securitisation at the heart of value 
capture mechanisms also makes these forms of investment highly risky, speculative and 
financialised. 
Value capture mechanisms play a central role in facilitating infrastructure investment in 
Chicago. The primary value capture mechanism used by the city’s government (‘the City of 
Chicago’, or ‘the City’) is TIF, although special assessment districts are also used. For the 
year ending in December 2009 (the last available data), Chicago had 167 operating TIF 
districts (City of Chicago, 2014a). One interviewee from the City maintained that ‘[i]n 
Chicago’s case, there is no other source of funding for projects’ (Author’s interview, Project 
Manager, municipal authority, 2012). 
The way that value capture mechanisms are used in Chicago varies across the city and 
depends on the size, type and location of development, its commercial vitality, the actors 
involved, and the other funding streams available to both the city and the development itself. 
As a result, the extent to which value capture forms part of a financialised investment practice 
is highly variable within the city. That said, some of TIF’s definitive features, such as the 
issuance of bonds or notes, the calculation of future tax or special assessment revenues and 
the securitisation of those revenues – which make TIF innately ‘speculative’ (Weber, 2010: 
269) – remain largely consistent throughout the city’s TIF districts. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the basic principles of TIF, and helps describe how TIF is practiced in 
Chicago. In essence, future tax receipts generated by an uplift in property values within the 
TIF district (which occurs as a result of a new development) are borrowed against and used 
to make the initial investment in the same development. 
In Chicago, TIF is guided by the Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (65 ILCS 
5/11-74.4-3) of the State of Illinois. This legislation enables municipalities in the State to 
borrow against future increases in property taxes, sales taxes or utility taxes. It also stress that 
addressing ‘blight’ is a prerequisite of TIF, and that development would not be forthcoming 
‘but for’ the use of TIF. 
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Figure 5.1: A schematic diagram of tax increment financing in Chicago 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
In the traditional model of TIF, a municipality would issue ‘general obligation bonds’ (GO 
bonds) or ‘TIF revenue bonds’ against the future tax increment in order to front-fund 
infrastructure and development. When using GO TIF bonds, the municipality is on the hook 
if sufficient tax increment fails to materialise. When using revenue bonds, the City’s general 
fund would be insulated from this risk, but the City may be exposed to some additional costs, 
especially if the project collapsed at an early stage. In Chicago, however, in order to avoid 
assuming construction and development risk by issuing bonds to finance the scheme, the 
City typically issues notes to the developer only after certain preconditions or development 
landmarks have been met: 
‘It’s not too frequent that we would give any kind of cash payment before completion… 
we generally don’t issue notes until a project is complete… the construction risk, 90% 
of the time, is not on us… We generally don’t absorb any construction risk. 
Occasionally you do have a situation, in an older TIF where you might have some sort 
of payment-to-closing to reimburse somebody for land acquisition.  We can’t disperse 
funds until they’ve actually incurred TIF-eligible costs. We’re pretty strict about that 
here... If we give funds at closing, it’s usually to reimburse somebody for land 
acquisition, or previous infrastructure costs’ (Author’s interview, Project Manager, 
municipal authority, 2012). 
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Figure 5.2: Percentage change in tax revenue for Chicago tax increment financing 
districts from FY2011 to FY2012 
Source: Orr, 2013: 6.  
 
Percent	change	in	Tax	
Revenue	2011-12	
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By delaying the issuance of notes – which may themselves be ‘bonded-out’ (refinanced) at a 
later date – it can be argued that the City of Chicago takes a relatively risk-averse approach 
to TIF. Indeed, when using notes to finance a scheme, the initial uplift in property values, 
sales volumes or utility usage, is generated by upfront private sector investment and 
commercial development.  
For the City, by entering at a later stage, there is less risk that the development will not be 
completed, more certainty over the calculations of future incremental revenues, and a higher 
chance that debt will be serviced in advance of the 23-year scheme limit. In an economic 
climate where a large proportion of TIF districts are suffering from negative percent changes 
in tax revenue (see Figure 5.2), being able to minimise risk is crucial for the City. 
The typical risk position occupied by the City, then, suggests that TIF is not as speculative 
or financialised as it might at first appear.  
However, even when the City of Chicago uses notes instead of bonds to finance the 
development within a TIF district, the practice of TIF retains core elements of 
financialisation. This point can be illustrated by examining the note issuance process in more 
detail.  
Pieces of the notes issued by the City, called ‘certificates of participation,’ (COPs) may be 
bought, packaged and sold by an investment bank on behalf of the developer(s) to other 
investors: 
‘…we will buy or package the bonds or the notes that result from TIF to bring money 
to the table for the developer…’ (Author’s interview Managing Director, international 
investment bank, 2012). 
Although notes are usually issued to compensate a developer after the completion of certain 
development objectives, the City can use COPs to help channel finance into the development 
and its infrastructure upfront: 
‘[The City] will issue the note prior to completion and then private investors or 
institutional investors will purchase pieces of that note, called certificates of 
participation. So they will effectively front-fund a proportion of the project and then 
when the project is complete and actually generating tax increment, those notes are then 
repaid with the tax increment’ (Author’s interview, Project Manager, municipal 
authority, 2012). 
For example, the City of Chicago is using $15million in TIF notes and a TIF loan in order 
to finance a development project called ‘Shops and Lofts at 47,’ which is located within the 
 135 
43rd Street/Cottage Grove TIF district in the middle of the historic yet largely impoverished 
Bronzeville neighbourhood on the South Side of Chicago. In this instance, COPs are being 
used because of the higher risk of developing in Bronzeville, an area with low growth 
potential, and due to the associated higher costs of finance for the developer. 
‘So the way [the developers] get the money up front, is they will go to a bank, in this 
case to JP Morgan, and say “Would you consider lending against this future stream of 
tax coming? We don’t have it now, but it’s coming.” Then the bank will do its due 
diligence, and if it feels comfortable it will fund it... So, the money comes from a bank, 
up front. It will be repaid over the estimated life of that TIF. The money does not come 
from the government. It comes from the private sector, and then it’s repaid with tax as 
the taxes start to increase’ (Author’s interview, Project Manager, federal development 
agency, 2012). 
Even though this method of investment uses future tax receipts as the source of funding, it 
is low risk for the City of Chicago: the developer services the debt, while the City has ‘no 
obligation to pay principle and interest’ on the COPs (Moody’s Investors Service, 2013a): 
‘If they never build the project and they don’t generate [any tax increment], then we’re 
not really on the hook’ (Author’s interview, Project Manager, municipal authority, 
2012). 
Indeed, the Redevelopment Agreements that codify these deals state that the developer ‘is 
obligated to pay principal and interest on the certificates’ (Moody’s Investors Service, 2013a).  
Although the process of issuing TIF notes reduces some risks for the City in a project’s 
construction phase, the less risky TIF schemes do seem to take on other tones of 
financialisation. For instance, the process of marketing and selling COPs requires and 
investment bank to structure the deal, brings capital markets to the centre of the financing 
process, and exposes the development scheme to the logic and calculative frameworks of the 
credit rating agencies (although, of course, some of these characteristics would also define a 
bond issuance). 
In addition, the viability of this less risky form of TIF is potentially limited. Firstly, this is 
because there is no legal obligation for the City to actually make TIF revenues available to 
the developer, which the developer needs to make repayments to the COP holders. This 
might occur if the development failed to generate a sufficient tax increment, or if the City 
directed the TIF revenues elsewhere due to other fiscal pressures. According to the rating 
agency Moody’s, Chicago’s falling GO credit rating and recent history of missed payments 
make non-payment on COPs a realistic possibility (ibid.). Crucially, from a technical 
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perspective, the ‘[f]ailure of the city to pay [the developer with TIF revenues]… would not 
constitute a default on the COPs’, a realisation that has led to the downgrading of the 
Fullerton/Milwaukee COPs by Moody’s from Baa1 to Baa3 in November 2013 (Moody’s 
Investors Service, 2013a). Secondly, in areas of the Chicago where commercial development 
is less viable, developers – and the investors that purchase the COPs – may be unwilling to 
take the development and valuation risk required. That said, the example of Shops and Lofts 
at 47 shows that TIF notes and COPs can be an effective financing tool even in some of the 
most adverse areas of the city. 
 
5.1.2 The persistence of redistributive State and federal grants in Buffalo, New York 
Buffalo provides an example of how traditional mechanisms, such as redistributive grants, 
continue to be used to fund and finance infrastructure. In particular, the Buffalo case serves 
to highlight that the mobilisation of financialised investment practices is not uniform, and 
that expressions of financialisation vary hugely across time and space. 
The extent to which infrastructure projects in Buffalo can be funded and financed in 
financialised ways is primarily limited by the low levels of vitality within the city’s economy. 
In particular, the depressed property market means that speculative models of investment, 
requiring increases in tax revenues or commercial income, are largely unworkable. The 
municipality (the ‘City of Buffalo’, or the ‘City’) is also restricted in terms of the levels of 
debt it can issue to invest in infrastructure. Although most cities in the US have some form 
of State-imposed debt limitation, the City of Buffalo is restricted to issuing a mere $20 million 
of bonds per year, and is closely monitored by the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority, which 
has maintained oversight of the City’s finances since it entered fiscal crisis in 2003. 
As a result, the delivery and development of infrastructure in Buffalo is dependent, to a 
significant extent, on State and federal funds: 
‘There is a significant amount [of investment] that is leveraged from State and Federal 
resources. It is competitive grants at times, but also organised through our Metropolitan 
Planning Organisation, called the Greater Buffalo Niagara Regional Transportation 
Council... Our bonding capacity is very limited in the City – it’s under £20million at this 
point in time annually… Private investment makes up 2-3% of the overall pot’ 
(Author’s interview, Executive Director of the Office of Strategic Planning, municipal 
authority, 2013). 
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The City of Buffalo’s infrastructure investment strategy, then, does not appear to be 
premised on speculative investments or revolving funds. Nevertheless, being dependent on 
State and federal grants also has its drawbacks and uncertainties. In particular, State and 
federal fiscal consolidation since the global financial crisis has temporarily limited the flow 
of grants to Buffalo, forcing the City to be more selective and innovative in terms of its use 
of grant funding. Indeed, examples such as the Buffalo Lakeside Commerce Park (BLCP) 
illustrate that infrastructure projects are being funded and financed through a complex set of 
arrangements that have the hallmarks of traditional grant programmes, but with an 
entrepreneurial twist. 
The BLCP is located on the site of the former Hanna Steel Plant on the south side of Buffalo. 
The site is part of the South Buffalo Brownfield Opportunity Area (BOA), a State-designated 
brownfield site that is eligible for particular State funds, and has received up to $30 million 
of investment from a range of sources, including from New York State, Erie County, the 
City of Buffalo and National Grid, which have been used to conduct environmental cleanup 
and site preparation, and to fund the construction of road and utility infrastructure (BUDC, 
2012). 
Not only is the site located within an underperforming and peripheral urban area, but it is 
littered with relics of its industrial past, including four blast furnaces, which make it an 
extremely challenging and costly site for development. As a result, the flow of capital into 
the site has merely been drip-fed over a period of over 15 years. The first funding for the site 
came through New York State’s Clean Air/Clean Water Bond Fund in 1996. 
‘Up until that time no one was touching these brownfields and there was no funding 
available. No one wanted to touch them. But this was a huge piece of property that 
wasn’t generating any taxes. So the State of New York came up with a programme, 
where the State would provide 75% of the allowable costs for an assessment and 
cleanup programme and the City would supply the other 25%... It was later refined in 
2001 that the State would pay 90% of the allowable costs’ (Author’s interview, 
Environmental Engineer, municipal authority, 2013). 
Grant funds from the state, in addition to a small portion of self-financed expenditure on 
behalf of the City government, then, were essential for the initial infrastructure works on the 
site. Since 2001, however, the site has also been able to take advantage of tax credits from 
New York State’s Brownfield Cleanup Program: whilst the BLCP therefore remains 
underpinned by State funding, these tax credits have enabled private financing to be injected 
into the scheme and for elements of the scheme to take on a more commercial edge. 
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In addition to these sources of State funding, Buffalo Urban Development Corporation 
(BUDC), which owns the BCLP site, and Erie County Industrial Development Agency 
(ECIDA) have developed an innovative Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) model to fund 
infrastructure at BLCP: 
‘We have a fund called the Buffalo Brownfield Redevelopment Fund, which helped us 
with our infrastructure costs… It is a form of tax increment financing (TIF). In New 
York State, the authorising legislation for TIF is flawed: it has never actually been done. 
We have a backdoor way of doing it where we provide a company with a tax abatement. 
That company makes a payment in lieu of taxes to ECIDA. Some of their taxes get 
abated and a portion of it goes back to the City and the County. We have an agreement 
with the City and the County that we share some of the taxes that they would normally 
receive. We then put that money into a fund, which we use to help with improvements. 
For instance, we used funds from that to upgrade a pump station for sanitary sewer 
works. We have now completed all of the infrastructure at Buffalo Lakeside Commerce 
Park, so are looking to use the fund to invest in other brownfields across Buffalo… It’s 
not a revolving fund. We use the money for capital: we’re not lending the money out, 
so it doesn’t come back. It is revolving to a certain extent, because we can generate 
revenue when we sell land’ (Author’s interview, Vice President, development agency, 
2013) 
Crucially, the PILOT model used at BLCP is different from TIF (see below) because it 
doesn’t depend on the generation of uncertain future property taxes: 
‘It’s not speculative: once there is a project, you calculate what the assessment is, take 
it, and then you can bond out based upon a project that’s already in place’ (Author’s 
interview, Regional Development Specialist, development agency and chamber of 
commerce, 2013). 
Despite the purported lack of speculation at the heart of the BLCP PILOT scheme, the 
model used resembles a somewhat entrepreneurial manipulation of the traditional tax 
abatement tool. Furthermore, whilst the PILOT model may not explicitly emulate the same 
financialised characteristics of funding mechanisms used in Chicago, there is nevertheless a 
subliminal emphasis on revenue generation and tax base maximisation.  
Although the challenging fiscal and economic environment in Buffalo has restricted the city’s 
governing institutions from explicitly pursuing speculative investment practices that require 
high levels of revenue generation and asset value appreciation, this challenging environment 
is simultaneously placing pressure on traditional sources of funding, such as grants from the 
State of New York, and thus stimulating a more innovative and entrepreneurial approach to 
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securing and utilising these funds. What appears to be constraining the financialisation of the 
funding and financing of infrastructure in Buffalo, then, rather than a lack of capacity, 
innovation or entrepreneurialism in its governing institutions, is primarily the city’s economic 
and geographical characteristics. 
 
5.1.3 Arena bonds and leasebacks in Stockton, CA: the redevelopment of Stockton 
Events Center 
In California, the term ‘redevelopment’ is used to describe development activities undertaken 
by Redevelopment Agencies, primarily through the use of a mechanism akin to TIF. A 
Redevelopment Agency is a sub-entity of a city or county and has its own territory that 
overlaps with that of the city or county government (California Health and Safety Code, § 
33120). 
Although the Redevelopment Agencies have recently been dissolved by the State of 
California (see Chapter 6), this section attempts to interrogate the ways that redevelopment 
was used to fund and finance infrastructure and urban development projects in Stockton in 
the years preceding dissolution. Crucially, analysing the historic practices of infrastructure 
investment in Stockton exposes the extent and nature of the speculative urbanism that has 
been fundamental to the City’s demise. 
Whereupon a Redevelopment Agency exists, it obtains a share of any incremental property 
taxes within its defined territory, which enables it to engage in what is effectively TIF: 
‘…the levied taxes each year in excess of [the property tax baseline] shall be allocated 
to… the redevelopment agency to pay the principal of and interest on loans, moneys 
advanced to, or indebtedness… incurred by the redevelopment agency to finance or 
refinance… the redevelopment project’ (California Health and Safety Code, § 33670, 
b). 
Outside of Redevelopment Areas, it far more difficult for Californian cities to engage in TIF-
like financing arrangements. Importantly, Redevelopment Agencies have the ability to issue 
debt without voter approval, and so are presented with a unique opportunity to engage in 
speculative debt-driven development: 
‘Redevelopment Agencies could issue debt without the vote of the people. In California, 
our constitution really limits the ability of governmental entities to issue debt without 
voter approval. Redevelopment Agencies were one of those that could issue without a 
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lot of requirements’ (Author’s interview, Director, department of the State of California, 
2013). 
In 2004, Stockton was experiencing a demographic and economic boom. In order to keep 
pace with the city’s expansion and to ensure that Stockton’s residents could benefit from the 
city’s growth, the municipality (the ‘City of Stockton’ or ‘City’) and its partner organisation, 
the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Stockton (the ‘Redevelopment Agency’), were 
embarking on a strategy to regenerate the city centre, create jobs and enhance the city’s 
cultural and recreational offer.  
At the core of this strategy was the Stockton Events Center project. The project included a 
12000-capacity arena (the ‘Stockton Arena’), a 5000-capacity baseball stadium (‘Banner 
Island Ballpark’), a 180-room hotel, a 600-space car park and 60,000 square feet of retail 
space. Crucially, the site for the project, a 640-acre brownfield site on the northern bank of 
McLeod Lake in downtown Stockton, was located within a redevelopment area called the 
West End Urban Renewal Project No. 1 Redevelopment Area. The ability to utilise TIF 
underpinned the project’s viability, and meant that the Events Center project aligned 
perfectly with the prospect of tax base expansion and enhancing Stockton’s competitiveness. 
In March 2004, the Redevelopment Agency issued $47 million of revenue bonds (‘Arena 
Bonds’) in order to finance the Stockton Arena project and to invest in site preparation 
activities, such as demolition, soil remediation and removal, grading, street improvements, 
and the installation of gas, electrical and drainage infrastructure. In addition, in June 2004, 
the Stockton Public Financing Authority (a partnership between the City the Redevelopment 
Agency) issued $32.8 million of lease revenue bonds (‘Parking Bonds’) to finance three 
parking garages, one of which was the Stockton Events Center Parking Structure. Far from 
being vanilla bond issuances, the Arena Bonds and Parking Bonds relied on complicated 
financial engineering and highly financialised mechanisms to generate the revenues needed 
to enable the Redevelopment Agency and the Financing Authority to service the debt. 
The Arena Bonds had two dedicated revenue streams. First, a lease agreement between the 
City and the Redevelopment Agency provided revenues to the Redevelopment Agency in 
the form of semi-annual rental payments from the City. The City (the owner of the Arena) 
leased the Arena to the Redevelopment Agency for a maximum of 55 years for the sum of 
$1 (referred to as the ‘lease out’). The Redevelopment Agency then leased the Arena back to 
the City for the same period but for a total sum which now stands at $74,503,547 to be paid 
in semi-annual instalments (the ‘lease back’). Second, the retail and hotel components of the 
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redevelopment area were expected to generate incremental property tax revenues that could 
be retained by the Redevelopment Agency and used for debt service.  
Whilst the two revenue streams are completely separate, they nevertheless work together (a) 
to reduce the cost of debt for the Redevelopment Agency (the bond issuer) and (b) to reduce 
the cost of developing the Arena for the City. 
To elaborate, the semi-annual rental payments (as stipulated in the lease), which are backed 
by the City’s General Fund, help to de-risk the TIF revenues (which by their very nature are 
relatively uncertain) and therefore help to reduce the cost of debt for the Redevelopment 
Agency. The ultimate objective, however, is to use TIF revenues to pay for as much of the 
development as possible. Indeed, in theory, if sufficient TIF revenues are retained by the 
Redevelopment Agency, the City does not need to pay a single dollar of rent. In short, in an 
ideal situation, the City gets a free Arena and the Redevelopment Agency’s cost of debt is 
reduced by the City’s covenant. 
Clearly, combining a ‘lease-out-lease-back’ model and a TIF model makes for a highly 
financialised financing practice. Not only does it involve speculating on uncertain future 
property tax revenues, but it also creates financial value through the lease arrangement (in 
the form of rental payments) where there is actually very little productive value being created. 
Arguably, the lease-out-lease-back model merely shifts capital around in order to create the 
appearance that there is a genuine revenue stream being created: 
‘It is clear to me that some cities were using that RDA money as a ‘slush fund’. You 
know, moving chequers around the board’ (Author’s interview, Chief Executive 
Officer, investment management firm, 2013). 
The Parking Bonds were financed using a similar structure ‘lease-out-lease-back’ model. In 
fact, this model was rolled out across Stockton and used for further projects led by the City 
including: the Stewart/Eberhardt Building and the adjacent parking facility; the Office 
Building at 400 East Main Street; three fire stations; the City’s Main Police Facility; the Maya 
Angelou Southeast Branch Library; Oak Park; the Van Buskirk Golf Course; and the 
Swenson Golf Course.  
Since the advent of the subprime crisis, the City has defaulted on its lease payments for the 
parking schemes and, as part of its bankruptcy adjustment plan, is also in default on lease 
payments for Oak Park, the golf courses, and the Office Building at 400 East Main Street 
(US Bankruptcy Court, 2013c). While the defaults on lease payments did not cause the City 
to make a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing and, for the most part, are merely part of the 
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restructuring process that was triggered by bankruptcy, the bonds issued on the back of these 
leases certainly contributed to the City’s structural over-indebtedness that made it so 
vulnerable to fiscal crisis. 
The City has also entered into a period of forbearance on its lease payments for the Arena 
and has been forced to draw up an amended payment schedule. Worryingly, the Event 
Center’s retail space remains largely empty: 
‘The idea was that the ground floor of the parking garage, which is in between the Arena 
and the Ballpark, would become a hub for retail or restaurants. Well, that hasn’t 
happened…’ (Author’s interview, Chief Executive Officer, local business improvement 
district, 2013). 
As a result, the prospect of TIF revenues being able to service a substantial portion of the 
Arena Bonds is limited. Consequently, the City will be forced to make up the shortfall using 
its lease payments. In essence, the cost of servicing the Arena Bonds is likely to fall on the 
City in spite of the amended payment arrangements. 
The ability and willingness to use financialised models of investment so extensively is 
indicative of the prevailing political discourse in Stockton in the years preceding the subprime 
crisis of 2007-8. Indeed, the Stockton Events Center case provides an example of neoliberal 
urban development in full swing. Whilst Stockton’s use of redevelopment illustrates the 
ability of financialised investment practices to create value and unlock developments, it also 
substantiates the claim made above that there are perils of engaging in what Davidson and 
Ward (2014: 82) term ‘speculative urbanism’. Uncertain future revenue streams, which were 
tapped into through both TIF and ‘lease-out-lease-back’ arrangements, formed the 
foundations of Stockton’s urban development strategy. The subprime crisis would soon 
demonstrate that these foundations – and the systemic over-indebtedness that they created 
– were hugely vulnerable to collapse. 
 
5.2 Towards a financialised landscape of infrastructure investment in the 
UK? 
As is emphasised in Chapter 2, public sector capital investment continues to underpin the 
construction, delivery, operation and maintenance of infrastructure, despite the processes of 
segmentation, unbundling and privatisation that are transforming the nature and function of 
infrastructure. Yet, the process of capital investment is changing, as governments move away 
from traditional models of funding and financing, towards more financialised models that 
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prioritise generating returns on investment and, crucially, that are premised on the ability to 
securitise or capture future sources of revenue. Through these more financialised investment 
practices, upfront investment in infrastructure becomes possible even in times of fiscal stress 
and crisis, and thus facilitates the much sought-after neo-Keynesian infrastructural fix. 
In the UK, however, the transition from traditional forms of infrastructure investment 
towards the use of financialised investment practices is partial and geographically uneven. In 
some instances, local governments are becoming increasingly entrepreneurial and taking on 
the characteristics of a financial intermediary by making investment decisions on a 
commercial or performance-driven basis. The Manchester example below, for instance, 
demonstrates how Manchester’s governing institutions are beginning to favour investment 
packages that stimulate as much asset value appreciation and revenue generation as possible, 
so that they can become self-funding and even generate surplus capital that can be reinvested 
into the built environment. 
However, for infrastructure projects that have no obvious revenue-generating capacity or 
that are situated within an underperforming economic area, it may not be possible to 
successfully implement the mechanisms of securitisation or value capture that Manchester’s 
revolving funds depend on, thus providing an obstacle to the adoption of financialised 
investment practices. Indeed, the case studies of Sheffield and Newcastle demonstrate that 
where asset value appreciation and commercial revenue generation opportunities are limited, 
more innovative and entrepreneurial models of investment can be difficult to deliver and can 
create excess levels of risk for the public sector. 
 
5.2.1 Capital investment in Manchester: from City Council to Investment Bank plc? 
The approach to infrastructure investment being taken forward by Manchester City Council 
is illustrative of the transition towards the use of a more financialised set of investment 
practices. In particular, rather than merely acting as a local distributor of central government 
funds, as councils may have done in the past, Manchester City Council is pursuing a series 
of innovative and entrepreneurial financing models that either enable the Council to invest 
its own capital to fund revenue-generating infrastructure and development projects, or that 
utilise grant funds to initiate locally controlled revolving investment platforms: 
‘We have moved away from a grant-based model. The whole premise of our suite of 
funds is to recycle (whether that’s through debt or equity)… That’s the big shift that 
we’ve seen’ (Author’s interview, Head of Finance, metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
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The advantage of a revolving (or recycling) fund is that a single allocation of capital, used to 
fund an initial item of infrastructure, can, over time, provide revenues back to the City 
Council, which, in turn, can be reinvested into more projects. In theory, there is no limit to 
the number of times an initial allocation of capital can be recycled back into the urban 
landscape. 
The practice of repeatedly recycling capital through the urban landscape is fundamentally a 
financialised one. First, it can be equated to a strategy that aims to accelerate the circulation 
(and accumulation) of capital: the quicker and more efficiently a fund revolves, the more that 
infrastructure can be invested in over time. Second, it demands that the function of the 
infrastructure, first and foremost, is to provide a return on investment, which surpasses the 
need to fulfil a broader socio-economic purpose. Third, and related, it excludes infrastructure 
that cannot generate returns on investment, but that might provide significant benefit to the 
population. Fourth, the strategy of the Council or other public sector body, and the skillset 
of its employees, evolves to replicate those of a financial intermediary: 
‘I don’t think we’re every going to quite be a Barclays Capital… we’re never going to be 
that far towards a bank… but our commercial skillset, in terms of being able to analyse 
financials and talk through a business plan, is an area that we’ve tried to strengthen... 
recognising the need for more of this type of work rather than the traditional grant-led 
models’ (Author’s interview, Head of Finance, metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
The approach taken by Manchester and, more specifically, by the Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority, is encapsulated in the Greater Manchester Strategic Investment 
Framework. Its mission statement is: 
‘…[to use] public sector funding in an investment capacity wherever possible, so that 
returns can be reinvested into future projects. Based on the short-term pipeline, this 
would provide scope to reinvest the same £1 of public funding, up to three times in a 
decade’ (GMCA, 2012: 10-11). 
Whilst the emphasis on recycling capital is undeniable, it would be an oversimplification to 
suggest that returns on investment are the only force driving policy and strategy within 
Manchester City Council and Greater Manchester. According to the City Council, the 
purpose of investing in infrastructure is to create economic growth (which they measure as 
‘Gross Value Added’ (GVA)) and, more specifically, to create jobs: 
‘Our investment policy is driven by GVA growth and the belief that Greater Manchester 
is generally quite a deprived area... The view is that growth in jobs and getting people 
into employment is the way to improve the overall lot of the people of Greater 
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Manchester... So I think, in itself, that’s the end that we’re aiming at… Growing the 
revenue base is fairly incidental... Our infrastructure and investment strategy is about 
generating jobs – and better jobs’ (Author’s interview, City Treasurer, metropolitan 
borough council, and Treasurer, combined authority, 2013). 
The suggestion that revolving investment programmes can lead to job creation implies that 
there is a positive correlation between levels of infrastructure investment and employment. 
Although there is evidence to support such a hypothesis (Aschauer, 1989; Demetriades and 
Mamuneas, 2000), it is limited and widely disputed (Cadot et al., 2006; Gramlich, 1994; 
Straub, 2008). Manchester’s investment strategy also implies that infrastructure that generates 
a return on investment can efficiently deliver job creation. This inference is equally 
contestable.  
In practice, job creation and returns on investment are lumped together as if a correlation 
between the two is inevitable, providing a muddled justification for the growing use of 
revolving funds, whilst normalising the intensification of the financialisation of Manchester’s 
suite of funds. This process is exhibited in three examples in particular. 
 
1. The North West Evergreen Fund 
The North West Evergreen Fund is an infrastructure and commercial property investment 
fund run in partnership by 16 local authorities in Greater Manchester, Cumbria, Cheshire 
and Lancashire, and managed by CBRE, a specialist property investment advisory firm. It 
combines local authority investment with investment from the Homes and Communities 
Agency (HCA) and the EU in the form of European Regional Development Funding 
(ERDF) and Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA). 
The fund aims to invest in infrastructure and property on a commercial basis, providing 
returns for the stakeholders: 
‘It started out on a mezzanine/debt start basis, because the hypothesis was that the 
banks weren’t lending in that space and this was a good way of filling that gap and 
keeping development going’ (Author’s interview, Head of Finance, metropolitan 
borough council, 2013). 
In addition to fulfilling the role of an unadulterated investment fund, the North West 
Evergreen Fund has been issued a ‘state aid notification’, which means it has the ability to 
provide capital to worthy developments on a non-competitive basis: ‘sub commercial debt 
and equity [can] be provided where certain conditions and requirements are met’ (NWELP, 
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2009: 3). Although this provides a certain amount of flexibility regarding where investments 
are made – helping to maximise objectives like job creation – the entire funding package 
(which may include aspects of grant funding, such as ERDF) still needs to generate a return. 
 
2. Manchester City Council Capital Fund 
Manchester City Council’s Capital Fund is comprised of surplus Council revenues, which are 
used ‘to fund revenue contributions to major capital schemes’ (Manchester City Council, 
2011: 98). In effect, it acts like the Council’s own investment fund, and can be used to invest 
in a wide range of programmes, including infrastructure and development: 
‘…the pre-cursor of [the Capital Fund] funded the Commonwealth Games Stadium, 
which is now Manchester City Football Club’s home. We’ve leased that to them for 250 
years, so we get an income stream off that… We bought out private sector and other 
districts from Manchester Central (the conference centre) in 2005 [where we] invested 
£28 million. We own it through a series of funding companies which we’ve partly 
funded through equity investment and partly through loan investment… We are 
developing a new arts centre on First Street and, again, that’s underpinned by this sort 
of funding mechanism’ (Author’s interview, City Treasurer, metropolitan borough 
council, and Treasurer, combined authority, 2013). 
By acting as the Council’s quasi investment banking arm, the Capital Fund supports and 
facilitates the generation of financial returns through infrastructure investment. In particular, 
by providing a channel through which surplus revenue can flow into further infrastructure 
and development projects, it lubricates the revolving fund machine. 
 
3. Manchester Airport and the Stansted Airport venture 
Manchester Airport is one of the 24 Enterprise Zones (EZs) in England. Its purpose is to 
stimulate inward investment by providing benefits to businesses such as discounted Non-
Domestic Rates (NDRs) worth up to £275,000. As part of the EZ arrangements, the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority can retain 100% of the business rates over 25 years to 
facilitate further infrastructure investment and development within the EZ and across 
Greater Manchester. The airport is also a commercial venture by Manchester City Council, 
which owns 55%, and the other boroughs of Greater Manchester, which own 45% between 
them, providing with returns in the form of dividends. 
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In order to enhance and de-risk the revenue stream provided by Manchester Airport, 
Manchester City Council embarked on a growth strategy to acquire another airport: 
‘We initially bid for Gatwick and didn’t win, but we more recently bid for, and won, 
Stansted. BAA sold it. To enable us to make that purchase, we had to bring in a private 
sector partner as an equal within the airport group. So, IFM, which is an Australian 
pension fund, or fund of funds, are an equal partner in that to the City Council [both 
own 36.5%], with the district councils being the minority shareholders [owning the 
remaining 27%]’ (Author’s interview, City Treasurer, metropolitan borough council, 
and Treasurer, combined authority, 2013). 
Entering a joint venture with an Australian investment fund in order to purchase an 
infrastructure asset located 200 miles outside of Manchester, is a clear indication of the 
intention of Manchester City Council to commercialise its infrastructure investment strategy. 
This case also provides evidence that financialised investment practices are implicated in a 
changing model of local government, as local authorities innovate and expand their activities 
in search of competitiveness. 
The shift away from traditional models of capital investment, such as the allocation of 
centrally distributed grant funds, towards models where investments require financial returns 
to be delivered by an item of infrastructure is symbolic of the broader transition that defines 
the funding and financing of infrastructure. In particular, the investment practices used in 
Manchester prioritise the recycling of capital into – and through – the urban environment. 
This transforms infrastructure from a physical component of the city into a financial asset 
defined by risk and return, and increases the opportunities for yield-seeking surplus capital 
to find refuge in the urban landscape. As part of this process, the city becomes a vehicle for 
the acceleration of capital circulation, fundamentally altering the values and objectives of the 
city’s governing entity, and placing the urban environment at risk of creative destruction and, 
ultimately, a crisis of overaccumulation. 
 
5.2.2 New kid on the block: tax increment financing in Newcastle upon Tyne 
The opportunity to engage in TIF in the UK has emerged far more recently than in the US, 
where it is an established financing mechanism in most States. There is little doubt that the 
idea of TIF has diffused to the UK from the US, a process that has been encouraged by 
active policy learning (Ward, 2012a, 2012b).  
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Although transfer to the UK was initially limited, the prospect of using TIF to reinvigorate 
underperforming cities – which had previously been constrained by the shackles of a highly 
centralist system – has catalysed the adoption of enabling legislation since the global financial 
crisis, and has fuelled the ambitions of local authorities to adopt this financing mechanism. 
Indeed, both Newcastle City Council and Sheffield City Council (Section 5.2.3) have been 
explicitly granted the ability to engage in TIF through the City Deal process (Chapter 6), 
which has the potential to generate some invaluable investment in infrastructure.  
The model of TIF pursued by Newcastle is fundamentally different to the model(s) used by 
the City of Chicago. 
Firstly, Newcastle only has a single district, in contrast to the 167 currently operating in 
Chicago. In Newcastle, the TIF district covers four separate sites (Figure 5.3) and requires 
£187 million of infrastructure improvements.  
Secondly, the funding sources and financing mechanisms vary substantially. Whereas the City 
of Chicago has the opportunity to borrow against future property tax, sales tax and utility 
tax, Newcastle is only able to borrow against future Non-Domestic Rates (NDRs or ‘business 
rates’). It is important to note that NDRs are set according to the ‘rateable value’ of 
commercial property (only), which is set by the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) according 
to the property’s rental value (see Section 6.2.1), whereas in Chicago, property tax is linked to 
property value across both residential and commercial uses. 
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Figure 5.3: NewcastleGateshead Urban Core Spatial Strategy and Accelerated 
Development Zone 
Source: Gateshead Council and Newcastle City Council, 2013: 40. 
 
Furthermore, the funding for TIF in the UK has been ‘allocated’ by HM Treasury. That is 
not to say that Newcastle City Council will receive a traditional grant, but, instead, that it has 
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been ‘permitted’ to borrow against £92 million of future NDR receipts (HM Government, 
2012: 15-19). Crucially, TIF allows Newcastle City Council to retain 100% of future NDR 
income within the 25-year life of the district, whereas under conventional arrangements, local 
authorities only retain 50% of NDR income – the other 50% goes back to central 
government for redistribution according need. As with the Chicago model, the funding 
source can be eventually traced back to the local tax base. However, Newcastle City Council 
is being explicitly granted permission to access a portion of their local tax base that would 
typically be retained by the centre. In effect, then, TIF in the UK could indeed be regarded 
as a ‘hybrid’ form of grant. 
Like in Chicago, the model of TIF adopted by Newcastle City Council is underpinned by 
debt finance. In contrast to Chicago, however, Newcastle City Council is financing its 
interventions through public sector debt obtained from the Public Works Loan Board 
(PWLB), an arm of the UK Government’s Debt Management Office. Typically, it is cheaper 
and more flexible for local authorities to borrow from the PWLB than from the markets (e.g. 
by issuing bonds): 
‘[The PWLB] is a relatively cheap way of getting funds… the interest rates are 
particularly advantageous at this present point in time. The actual arrangement costs are 
almost negligible, in contrast to bonds which have quite a high legal costs associate with 
securing the money. PWLB is also hugely flexible in terms of the funding source… If I 
wanted to borrow something today, I would be on the phone tomorrow to the PWLB 
and we’d have it in our bank by Wednesday, at minimal transaction costs: just a few 
thousand pounds. It’s instantaneous’ (Author’s interview, Director of Finance and 
Resources, metropolitan borough council, 2012).  
The third, and perhaps most significant difference between TIF in Chicago and the model 
of TIF used by Newcastle is the level of risk assumed by the local authority. In Chicago, 
instruments such as ‘TIF notes’ and ‘certificates of participation’ enable the City to stimulate 
development whilst transferring as much risk as possible to the private developers and 
financiers. In contrast, the use of TIF by Newcastle City Council is an explicit attempt to 
take the development and construction risk away from the private sector in order to enhance 
viability and to deliver upfront investment in infrastructure and site preparation. In short, in 
Newcastle’s TIFs, the local authority defrays the infrastructure and development costs up 
front, whereas, in Chicago, these costs are defrayed by the private sector alongside the 
support of the municipality.  
For example, Newcastle City Council struck a deal to purchase land in the Stephenson 
Quarter to help the developer service its bank loan, before providing a £15 million 
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mezzanine finance loan to complete the funding package for a hotel on the site. The Council 
has also taken a non-occupational lease on 35,000 square feet of office and car parking space 
and, thus, has ‘basically guaranteed the rent’ for the development. 
The need for Newcastle City Council to intervene in the Stephenson Quarter is illustrative 
of the broader challenge facing city governments in underperforming city-regional 
economies when attempting to stimulate jobs and growth through infrastructure investment. 
Not only are public sector interventions more important in cities like Newcastle, due to the 
lack of available sources of private funding and financing, but also the risks inherent in such 
public interventions are greater than they would be in more buoyant economic geographies. 
This dichotomy between risk and reward is prevalent across financial markets and is 
exploited by financial institutions seeking a home for their yield-bearing capital. However, 
when viewed in the context of urban policymaking, this dichotomy poses some very difficult 
questions of governing institutions, a theme which is explored further in the Sheffield case 
below. 
 
5.2.3 Unlocking development or undermining stability: managing the risks of tax 
increment financing in Sheffield  
The key challenge for local authorities in the UK appears to be stimulating economic 
development through infrastructure investment without overexposing themselves to risk. 
When examining how TIF is practiced in Chicago, the City is able to maintain a relatively 
risk-free position. By contrast, in Newcastle, the local authority appears to have taken on a 
substantial degree of risk due to the lower levels of demand and the lack of alternative 
funding sources to defray the upfront cost of essential supporting infrastructure. Sheffield’s 
tax increment financing scheme, which is analysed in this section, exhibits similar 
characteristics to that of Newcastle’s. In particular, the lack of alternative sources of 
infrastructure funding and the uncertainty around demand for completed units in new 
developments, factors shaped by Sheffield’s economic geography and position within a 
highly centralised yet cost-cutting state, is placing pressure on Sheffield City Council to 
intervene in ways which are both costly and entail a substantial level of risk. 
 Like Newcastle City Council, Sheffield City Council has a single district each, which covers 
the New Development District (know as ‘Sevenstones’ or the ‘New Retail Quarter’) 
(Sheffield City Council, 2013). Whereas Newcastle City Council can undertake up to £92 
million of debt-based investment premised on the future generation of TIF revenues, 
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Sheffield has only been permitted by Central Government to borrow against £33 million of 
future NDR receipts (HM Government, 2012: 15-19). 
One of the underlying driver’s behind Sheffield’s New Development District is the Council’s 
strategic objective to rebalance the city-region’s economy by encouraging the agglomeration 
of economic activity in the city centre, and in particular the rejuvenation of a waning retail 
sector that had been badly damaged by the dominance of the creation of the out-of-town 
shopping centre, Meadowhall (Sheffield City Council, 2007). TIF presents the City Council 
with an opportunity to channel investment into core urban infrastructure and to create a new 
path for city-centre development. However, as noted above, in order for a TIF scheme to 
be successful, a certain level of rateable value growth (and associated tax base growth) is 
required. Insufficient tax base growth creates a funding gap and an obstacle to timely debt 
service. Within the context of Sheffield’s hollowed out core, there are opportunities for 
growth in rateable values, but there is also a risk that costly enabling infrastructure will have 
little impact on market demand for city-centre retail and office development. Crucially, in 
the case of Sheffield, this risk falls on the shoulders of the public sector, and – more 
specifically, Sheffield City Council: 
‘[TIF] requires [Sheffield City Council] to borrow and incur costs in the period before 
the rate income [or tax increment] starts. It would potentially be heavy costs – several 
million pounds in financing costs, which when our budget is being cut to the extent that 
it is, can we afford it? Then there’s a question about how much risk we take. Yes, there 
is a scheme and it may deliver business rates and we may be able to nail it down, but we 
have to take that risk on future business rates. The TIF tool works because it gives us 
an opportunity, but [the City Council] is still required to take that risk’ (Author’s 
interview, Director of Finance, metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
Even though TIF appears to be more financialised in Chicago, because of the City of 
Chicago’s use of bonds, notes, COPs and all the associated financial engineering and 
calculation, Sheffield City Council is actually assuming more risk by bringing the process of 
speculation in house. In addition to using future TIF receipts to create development viability, 
Sheffield City Council is taking further steps to underpin aspects of the New Retail Quarter 
development, which compounds its high-risk position. 
For example, the Council is providing the developer of St Paul’s Place with a purchase 
guarantee if the building cannot be let or sold: 
‘If [the developer] cannot let that building, we will take it off them at a bottom price. 
We are quite confident that they will get a better offer than that, so that we won’t have 
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to take up the offer. If we do [purchase the building], then we get a bargain, but crucially, 
it puts a floor in their risk. So we are a pre-let of last resort. There is a risk to the Council 
but not much of a risk, because we get the asset, and we’re pretty confident we would 
let it at some point... Of course, we also get the business rate from that building as well’ 
(Author’s interview, City Development Manager, metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
It is tempting to concede that a greater degree of public sector risk taking is unavoidable in 
Sheffield in contrast to places like Chicago, due its smaller size, weaker economy, less 
buoyant property market, smaller tax base and the constraints to local financial innovation 
imposed by central government.  
These are valid points. For instance, Sheffield’s New Retail Quarter TIF scheme has been 
shrouded in uncertainty since Hammerson, the lead developer, walked away from the project 
in July 2013, citing the need to focus instead on schemes within its portfolio ‘which offer the 
most attractive returns over the medium to long term’ (Hammerson, 2013: 8). Indeed, the 
project is struggling to stack up despite extensive government support which includes the 
City Council’s TIF, the purchase guarantee, additional government grants, and investment 
from Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA) fund: 
‘[In addition to TIF and our purchase guarantee], there’s grant going in there, and 
potentially our JESSICA fund… So it’s taking in effect four public sector interventions 
just to get one building built’ (Author’s interview, Strategic Development and Funding 
Manager, metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
Nevertheless, there are areas in Chicago, such as Bronzeville in the South Side of the city, 
which provide equally challenging development environments. Nevertheless, the City of 
Chicago, through issuing TIF notes (and COPs) rather than bonds, manages to maintain a 
relatively risk averse position. The city of Chicago also mitigates risk by: 
1. Breaking up large pieces of land up into smaller TIF districts and funding them 
separately; 
2. Using TIF revenue flexibly – revenue can be taken from a successful TIF district and 
channelled into an adjacent district that is a) struggling or b) in the early stages of and 
does not yet have access to a flow of tax increment; 
3. Refinancing notes with bonds to reduce interest costs. 
Without a similarly sophisticated risk analysis strategy to match their increasingly 
financialised investment strategies, local authorities in the UK could quickly find themselves 
on a slippery slope towards over-indebtedness and crisis in the same way that happened in 
Stockton, CA. 
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To illustrate hypothetically: 
 If a purchase guarantee arrangement is made and a development is completed and 
but cannot be let, then the salient Council would be forced to purchase the building 
(which, by definition, is almost impossible to let or re-sell).  
 The (empty) development would fail to generate any rental income. 
 It would also fail to generate any incremental NDRs, and so the Council would 
struggle to service the TIF debt.  
 The development would also cost money to maintain. 
 Where a loan/mezzanine finance arrangement had been made with the developer (as 
in the Stephenson Quarter of Newcastle), it is possible that the developer might 
default on debt payments (particularly if they have a broader portfolio of failing 
developments). 
 Indeed, it appears that if one aspect of the development fails, the city could suffer 
on a number of fronts. 
The use of TIF by localities in the UK and US is indicative of the financialisation capital 
investment. There are, however, key geographical differences in terms of how TIF is 
practiced between different places. At first sight, TIF appears to be more financialised in 
Chicago because it used more frequently, it incorporates more financial engineering, and it 
is more closely linked with the capital markets and the financial market apparatus. But, on 
closer inspection, the use of financial engineering and sophisticated risk management 
techniques consistently enables the City of Chicago to effectively monitor and transfer risk. 
Whilst this does not warrant a call for cities to blindly pursue financial engineering or to 
maximise the complexity of their financing arrangements (such an approach placed Stockton 
at the mercy of the subprime crisis), it serves to illustrate that financialisation is not an 
overpowering behemoth that wreaks destruction wherever it goes. Instead, financialisation 
can be regarded as a process that, when embraced using a refined and considered approach, 
can be managed and moulded to facilitate sustainable programmes of capital investment and 
urban development. 
 
5.3 Concluding remarks: the financialisation of capital investment 
The ways in which urban infrastructure projects are being funded and financed is undergoing 
a process of transformation – described here as the process of financialisation. Indeed, the 
extension and penetration of the process of financialisation appears to be an underlying 
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driver of the emergence of a series of investment practices which are increasingly dependent 
on financial technologies, markets and intermediaries, which prioritise profits and returns on 
investment, and which require public sector indebtedness and risk taking. That being so, this 
chapter has also emphasised that financialisation is highly context specific and uneven, and 
that attempting to understand this process requires a fine-grained and nuanced approach. 
In the US, in order to invest in infrastructure, cities must navigate the capital markets and 
find the most favourable credit ratings and interest rates. Buffalo provides an example of the 
challenges of this system for a city government operating in the context of a peripheral and 
underperforming economy. Not only does the City of Buffalo have to contend with the 
burdens of indebtedness and market regulation, but, crucially, it is limited in its ability to 
securitise future value increases due to the low levels of economic growth and asset value 
appreciation in the city. Most importantly, the Buffalo example provides evidence that the 
financialisation of infrastructure investment is both partial and uneven. 
In contrast to Buffalo, Manchester, which has historically been more dependent on 
redistributive funding mechanisms such as grants from the UK’s central government, is 
pursuing an investment strategy premised on future growth and value creation. Manchester’s 
urban development strategy prioritises the recycling of capital through infrastructure and the 
built environment, and positions infrastructure as a vehicle for capital accumulation. 
A similar approach was also refined by the City of Stockton and the Stockton Redevelopment 
Agency in the early 2000s, as the City sought to fund and finance infrastructure through 
complex TIF and lease-out-lease-back arrangements in which the infrastructure would 
ultimately pay for itself. Whereas the Manchester example exhibits the ability of financialised 
investment practices to stimulate the acceleration of capital circulation and create productive 
outcomes, the Stockton example suggests that such an approach is also prone to 
overaccumulation and crisis. 
Chicago’s relatively buoyant economy has enabled it to roll out financialised models of 
funding and financing infrastructure across the city. The securitisation mechanism at the 
heart of TIF, for example, enables the City of Chicago to capture the future value of its urban 
landscape and use this value to make initial investments in infrastructure. Whilst this model 
is also pursued by governments in Newcastle and Sheffield, the Chicago case demonstrates 
a more sophisticated engagement with financialisation and a more refined approach to risk 
management. Indeed, the comparative analysis between these cities suggests – in contrast to 
the majority of literature on financialisation – that financialisation is not an overpowering 
and all-destroying behemoth, but rather it is a process that, when engaged with in an 
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intelligent and strategic way, can support productive economic development. Such an 
analysis represents a significant and empirically-informed contribution the financialisation 
literature. 
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Chapter 6: Fiscal stress, infrastructure investment and 
reterritorialisation 
Building on the arguments presented in Chapter 5, this chapter argues that financialised 
investment practices are emerging in conditions of fiscal stress, and that, in turn, the cocktail 
of fiscal stress and financialisation is fuelling a process of urban reterritorialisation. 
In spite of the harsh realities of budgetary pressures, city governments have been able to 
generate capital for infrastructure investment by adopting financialised investment practices. 
Not only has financialisation offered governing entities the prospect of job creation and 
economic revival, but it has also created new the opportunities for investing in infrastructure 
that could potentially drag a city out of fiscal crisis. 
However, fiscally stressed governments face a number of challenges when attempting to use 
financialised investment practices. For example, they may be restricted from borrowing due 
to limits imposed by higher levels of government, or limited in their ability to generate new 
sources of revenue, such as taxation. Furthermore, in a neoliberal political economy, they 
face fierce competition for resources and potential future revenues from other cities and 
municipalities as well as from other governments at the regional (e.g. State) and national 
levels. In order to overcome these challenges, this chapter contends, city governments have 
undergone a process of adaptation, evolution and reterritorialisation.  
Importantly, just as the fiscal challenges and infrastructure investment requirements are 
different across the case study cities, the process of reterritorialisation also appears to be 
heterogeneous. 
In the US, in the context of a diverse yet more devolved system of government, the pressures 
to generate revenues and expand tax bases through financialised infrastructure investments 
are causing an intensification in the levels of inter-urban and inter-jurisdictional and systemic 
competition. Indeed, sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 illustrate how financialised investment 
practices facilitate and encourage municipalities in the US to adopt infrastructure investment 
strategies that are premised on generating fiscal benefits and financial rewards (referred to as 
‘the fiscalisation of urban development’), and that this process of fiscalisation is at the heart of 
a wave of speculative urbanism and reterritorialisation.  
In the context of a highly centralised state in the UK, the emergence of financialised 
investment practices and the suggestion that they are best controlled at the local level is 
driving a process of change in centre-local relations. Section 6.2 argues that whilst local 
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governments in the UK are pursuing a devolved set of powers that will enable them to utilise 
financialised investment practices to invest in infrastructure, devolution also threatens the 
integrity of the UK’s redistributive system of taxation, putting cities with an underperforming 
tax base at risk of further fiscal stress and economic stagnation. In response to the challenges 
of fiscal stress and the contradictory nature of devolution, the city-region is appears to be 
emerging as a challenge to the centre-local relations that have traditionally shaped the UK’s 
capital investment landscape. 
 
6.1 Urban governance and the financialisation of infrastructure 
investment in the US 
The Cities of Chicago, Stockton and Buffalo have all recently undergone, or are currently 
undergoing, severe periods of fiscal stress and crisis. Not only has investment in 
infrastructure been especially challenging as a result, but it has also become increasingly 
important for it to generate a financial return or be fiscally beneficial. In a system of 
government where fiscal independence is essential, the fierce competition for fiscal returns 
from infrastructure is causing some cities to evolve and adapt while forcing others into 
financial ruin. 
 
6.1.1 Fiscal stress, the fiscalisation of urban development and inter-jurisdictional 
competition in Chicago, IL 
A key feature of financialised investment practices is the need to generate return on 
investment, which is required for servicing debt and ultimately defraying the cost of the 
infrastructure at hand. Such a return, whether in the form of commercial revenues or taxation 
receipts, can hugely influence the ability of a municipality to make further capital 
investments, expand and improve its programme of urban development, and become more 
powerful in relation to other governmental entities.  
It is not uncommon for municipalities and their agencies in the US to justify large-scale 
public expenditure on infrastructure by citing future benefits to the city in the form of jobs 
and economic growth. But, in reality, their motivation is far more complex. In Chicago, for 
example, in addition to enhancing the socio-economic well-being of its citizens, it is clear 
that the city government (the City of Chicago) derives fiscal benefits and financial rewards 
by pursuing a capital-intensive programme of urban development: 
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‘Municipalities, in their endeavour to promote economic development, are very much 
concerned about what the economic development enterprise does to provide a resource 
base to the city so that it can continue to provide services… If an economic 
development initiative enhances employment, it also needs to make a [financial] return’ 
(Author’s interview, Dean, university department specialising in public administration, 
2012). 
The relative importance of generating financial returns from infrastructure investment varies 
depending on the fiscal health of the government at hand. For example, a more fiscally sound 
municipality will be less dependent on receiving additional revenues from infrastructure, 
whereas additional receipts from capital investments might be absolutely essential for a 
fiscally stressed municipality that is struggling to balance its budget. The City of Chicago 
could be considered as the latter. 
According to the Civic Federation (2013: 9-23), there are five ‘critical financial issues’ facing 
the City of Chicago, all of which signal a ‘pending fiscal crisis’: 
1. The City is at risk of being unable to fund its retirement systems into the future. In 
2012, the City’s total unfunded liabilities were $19.8 billion, and have increased by 
265% since 2002. 
2. The City’s Corporate Fund deficit is anticipated to reach $1 billion by 2015, growing 
to $1.2 billion in 2016. The widening deficit is largely attributable to the increase in 
statutory pension contributions that the City will have to make. 
3. The persistent gap between revenues and annual expenditures have been ignored by 
the City and temporarily patched up through the use of one-time revenue sources. 
4. The City’s total long-term obligations continue to increase. Between 2008 and 2012 
they increased by 49% ($5.4 billion). 
5. The City is suffering from over-indebtedness. Its bonded debt burden rose by 66% 
($3.1 billion) between 2003 and 2012.  
It is possible that revenues generated from infrastructure and other capital investments could 
provide a solution – if only partial – to the City’s immanent crisis. For instance, the City of 
Chicago has proposed to allocate $30.3 million in ‘TIF surplus and recapture’ in order to 
close a budget deficit of $339 million in financial year 2014 (ibid.: 4). Indeed, through 
practices like TIF, which create and capture of new sources of revenue, infrastructure 
investment can begin to be mobilised as a strategy for fiscal recovery. In fiscally stressed 
cities like Chicago, the potential for mechanisms like TIF to deliver fiscal rewards arguably 
catalyses the search for new and innovative ways of investing in infrastructure, placing a 
premium on financialised development.  
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In sum, given the City of Chicago’s persistent Corporate Fund deficit, its growing long-term 
obligations and bonded debt burden, and given its ability to access and implement 
mechanisms like TIF, it appears that the City is incentivised to tailor its capital investment 
strategy towards programmes that would explicitly aim to generate financial returns. This 
strategic prioritisation of financial returns through capital investment can be described as the 
fiscalisation of urban development. 
It is important to emphasise that, in the case of Chicago, the fiscalisation of urban 
development is underpinned and made possible by the emergence of financialised 
investment practices. For example, through the use of technologies like securitisation, the 
City of Chicago can capture the future proceeds of an investment and use these proceeds to 
defray the initial upfront costs of infrastructure and development. Furthermore, because 
financialised investment practices enable future revenue streams to be securitised, the City 
does not have to be fiscally healthy to engage in capital investment. On the contrary, as the 
City of Chicago endures a period of fiscal stress, financialised investment practices provide 
a rare opportunity to invest in infrastructure. Rather than being forced to roll back capital 
investment programmes in the face of structural deficit, spiralling obligations, and declining 
revenues, therefore, the City can issue debt against anticipated future growth in order to raise 
investment capital for use in revenue-generating projects. In addition to capturing sufficient 
revenue to meet the upfront costs of an infrastructure project, some infrastructure schemes 
might generate surplus capital, which either could be recycled back into further infrastructure 
projects or, critically, which could be used to fix budgetary shortfalls and stave off fiscal 
crisis. In short, financialised investment practices enable the process of fiscalisation to become a 
reality in Chicago. 
The fiscalisation of urban development, however, is a classic spatio-temporal fix in that it is 
riddled with contradictions. For example, it encourages governments to adopt a debt-based 
regime of capital investment, creates a mountain of debt that relies on uncertain future 
revenue streams for repayment, and, renders cities increasingly vulnerable to crisis (see the 
Stockton example below). The contradictory nature of fiscalisation also places a strain on the 
territorial integrity of a city, and creates an environment of intense inter-jurisdictional 
competition.  
Financialised investment practices help transform redundant and tax-poor parts of the urban 
environment into shovel-ready sites that, crucially, need to attract commercial development 
and inward investment if they are to generate sufficient returns on investment to both fund 
the scheme and create a pool of surplus capital. Out-competing rival neighbouring territories 
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for inward investment is essential for servicing the debt used to finance an initial investment 
and to generate surplus revenues to feed back into a municipality’s budget. As a result, the 
combination of financialised capital investment and the related fiscalisation of urban 
development have arguably served to intensify inter-urban and inter-jurisdictional 
competition. 
When considering the impact of fiscalisation on inter-jurisdictional competition in Chicago, 
it is essential to take into account Chicago’s highly fragmented system of governance (see 
Merk, 2014). Indeed, the wider Chicago metropolitan region is governed by approximately 
1,700 governmental entities (WBC, 2012: 33), a product of a complex evolution in 
intergovernmental and territorial relations (such as the process of suburbanisation, the 
emergence of unincorporated settlements around the urban fringe, and the evolution of the 
‘home rule’ movement (see Foster, 1997)). Specifically, Merk (2014: 6) points to ‘historic 
city-suburban hostility’ (also see Lindstrom, 2010) and to the limits on municipal 
indebtedness and taxation imposed by the State of Illinois as key explanations for Chicago’s 
extensive governmental fragmentation (these contentions will be analysed in more detail in 
the case of Buffalo in 6.1.2). 
Although the fragmented system of urban governance in Chicago is bound to create 
competition amongst municipalities for creating the most favourable package of taxes and 
public goods in order to attract businesses and residents (Tiebout, 1956), governmental 
fragmentation is not the only driver of inter-jurisdictional competition across the 
metropolitan region. Indeed, in the case of Chicago, the fiscalisation of urban development 
– and the financialisation of capital investment that enables it – appears to have intensified 
the sense of competitiveness between governmental entities. 
Crucially, beyond just competing for businesses and residents, governmental entities in 
Chicago are competing for tax dollars: 
‘Every municipality wants the biggest [supermarket] around… [and] all that sales tax’ 
(Author’s interview Chief of Staff, regional planning agency, 2012). 
In such a hyper-competitive fiscal environment, it is arguable that Chicago’s fragmented 
system of governance becomes reinforced, paving the way for an even stronger logic of 
fiscalisation and competition. Infrastructure investment, facilitated by financialised 
investment practices, has been a key driver of this process. 
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6.1.2 Fiscal federalism, circumvention and the governance of capital investment in 
Buffalo, NY 
Not only do financialised investment practices cause the fragmentation of governance within 
American cities, but they also create tensions between city and State governments. The cycle 
of indebtedness and revenue generation fuelled by financialised investment practices creates 
an incentive across multiple levels of government to increase the volumes of debt and to 
increase tax revenues (either by expanding the tax base or by raising tax rates) in order to 
support new issuances. 
Cities are explicitly restricted by State legislation from increasing tax rates and increasing their 
level of indebtedness beyond certain specified limits (Chapter 4). Indeed, States have the 
power to impose fiscal stress upon cities and to limit their ability to raise funds to invest in 
infrastructure and urban development, which, in turn, constrains in their ability to stimulate 
job creation and economic growth. 
By creating new ‘special-purpose’ governments, however, municipalities can evade or 
circumvent State legislation (c.f. Sbragia, 1996). Special-purpose entities can deliver services or 
finance capital improvements by levying new taxes or assessments (which are typically not 
regulated by the same State legislations that limit City taxation), and by issuing debt that 
remains off the City’s balance sheet. The transferal of the City’s revenue-raising and debt-
service responsibilities to special districts, therefore, alleviates pressure on the City’s budget, 
and serves as a spatio-temporal fix to fiscal stress. Crucially, the circumvention of State-imposed 
constraints can also generate the required conditions for engaging in financialised investment 
practices and therefore respond to the needs of urban development and economic growth. 
An incentive for governing entities to pursue the fragmentation of urban governance, and to 
drive the process of reterritorialisation, is thereby created. 
In Buffalo, NY, the existence of competition between State and local government has 
become particularly apparent since an initial period of fiscal stress in the early 2000s. 
Buffalo’s fiscal crisis came after over half a century of deindustrialisation, decline and 
suburbanisation (Chapter 4), processes which hollowed-out Buffalo’s urban core and 
devastated the City’s tax base. 
Buffalo’s shrinking tax base was problematic because the City could neither afford to make 
new capital investments, nor maintain existing infrastructures, nor fund the services that it 
had committed to historically when underpinned by a far stronger tax base. In order to 
continue funding these things, and avoid fiscal crisis, the City would need to issue more debt 
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or raise taxes, or both. But, State restrictions prevented the City from taking such steps, 
sending the City spiralling towards fiscal crisis: 
‘[In 2003], the real problem for Buffalo was that it was getting to its statutory limit for 
raising taxes and was also reaching its bonding limit. Those bonding and taxing limits 
are set by the State. [The City of Buffalo] couldn’t go into the bond market, and couldn’t 
raise taxes’ (Author’s interview, Director, corporation of the State of New York, 2013). 
The State declined to come to Buffalo’s aid, rendering fiscal crisis unavoidable, which in turn 
led the State of New York to impose a fiscal control board – the Buffalo Fiscal Stability 
Authority (BFSA) – upon the City. 
The BFSA imposed sanctions on the level of debt the city could issue, limiting debt issuances 
to $20 million per year and forcing all issuances to be undertaken by the BFSA itself. Tax 
revenues were also channelled through the BFSA in order to ensure accurate and timely 
repayment of debt obligations. 
By imposing the BFSA in 2003, rather than allowing further taxation or indebtedness, the 
State of New York was arguably seeking to reinforce the hard budget constraints that 
maintain the fiscal discipline of its cities, as well as to promote competitiveness within the 
State’s system of taxation and market-preserving fiscal federalism.  
Although the BFSA is still in place, it now only functions in an advisory capacity. 
Nevertheless, the City of Buffalo is once again at risk of enduring significant fiscal stress, 
with concerns growing about its weakening general fund balance and tax base (see 3.2.4.3).  
Indeed, elements of elements of (vertical) competition between the City and the State for tax 
income and fiscal manoeuvrability are beginning to resurface alongside an intensification in 
the fiscalisation of urban development and inter-jurisdictional (horizontal) competition 
between municipalities in the Buffalo city-region. 
Importantly, the City of Buffalo is in a weaker position to compete than many of its 
surrounding suburbs and towns. According to the Amherst Industrial Development Agency 
(AIDA), for instance, the town of Amherst has grown from accommodating 37,000 jobs in 
1980 to over 104,000 jobs today, which equates to approximately 80% of job growth within 
the entire city-region (AIDA, 2014). Indeed, the economic and fiscal strength of suburbs like 
Amherst put Buffalo at further risk of depopulation, tax base degradation and long-term 
fiscal instability.  
For a number of reasons, though, Buffalo’s current capital investment and service delivery 
needs are still being met, in spite of the looming fiscal troubles at City Hall. Firstly, since the 
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implementation of the BFSA, the City of Buffalo has developed some headroom in its budget 
and now operates at approximately 60% of its bonding capacity, giving it some flexibility to 
make new investments in infrastructure and services. Secondly, Buffalo’s infrastructure is 
supported by a wide range of special district entities, which can operate, maintain and invest 
in key urban infrastructure, keeping debt off the City’s balance sheet and relieving pressure 
from its debt and taxation limits. 
Indeed, there has been a proliferation of special districts in Erie County and the Buffalo city-
region in recent years. In 2004, According to the Office of the New York State Comptroller 
(2007), there were a total of 939 special districts within Erie County. This has since risen to 
1,044 in 2014 (Poloncarz, 2014). Notably, as Table 6.1 shows, a large proportion of these 
districts are dedicated to infrastructure such as drainage, lighting, sewer and water.  
 
Table 6.1: Special districts in Erie County by type, 2004 
Drainage Fire 
Protection 
Lighting Park Refuse and 
Garbage 
Sewer Water Other Total Town 
Special 
Districts 
144 43 427 3 23 119 143 37 939 
Source: Adapted from Office of the New York State Comptroller, 2007. 
 
Not only do special districts play a crucial role in underpinning infrastructure delivery in Erie 
County and the Buffalo city-region, but they also generate a substantial portion of total 
municipal revenue (Table 6.2) and, more specifically, property tax income (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.2: Special district revenues as a percentage of town revenues in Erie 
County, 2004 
Households Total Revenues Total Revenues per 
Household 
Special District 
Revenues as a 
Percentage of Town 
Revenues 
Town wide Special 
Districts 
Town wide Special 
Districts 
242,512 $443,956,795 $141,973,308 $1,831 $585 32.0% 
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Source: Adapted from Office of the New York State Comptroller, 2007. 
 
Table 6.3: Average property taxes and assessments per household for town wide vs. 
special district wide services in Erie County, 2004 
Households Property Taxes and 
Assessments 
Property Taxes and 
Assessments per 
Household 
Special District 
Property Taxes and 
Assessments as a 
Percent of Town 
Total 
Town wide Special 
Districts 
Town wide Special 
Districts 
242,512 $244,737,778 $102,184,549 $1,009 $421 41.80% 
Source: Adapted from Office of the New York State Comptroller, 2007. 
 
As an illustration of the importance of special districts as a platform for infrastructure 
investment in Buffalo, the Buffalo Sewer Authority (BSA) plans to make $20,505,000 in 
capital investments between 2012-13 and 2017-18 (BSA, 2013: 3). In order to fund capital 
improvements, such as treatment plant rehabilitation projects, the installation of storm 
sewers, and the maintenance of the current sewer network, the BSA can draw on reserve 
funds, issue bonds or use the proceeds of lease sales (ibid.). Special districts like the BSA 
help to maintain levels of infrastructure investment in Buffalo while taking the financing 
challenges away from the City of Buffalo and enabling the City to stay within its taxation and 
debt allowances. In 2012-13, for instance, the BSA’s ‘annual sewer rent’ equated to an 
additional property tax levy of $1.7 per $1,000 of the assessed valuation of properties within 
Buffalo (ibid: 17), thus making a significant addition to the total property tax take that can 
be used for capital investment in Buffalo. Crucially, then, by using special districts to finance 
infrastructure through debt issuances and to tap into additional sources of taxation, the City 
of Buffalo is able to circumvent State legislation and maintain an acceptable level of capital 
investment without putting itself at risk of further fiscal stress.  
Although the State of New York permits district creation for a limited range of specified 
purposes (New York Code, 12, §190), the State is beginning to recognise the decreasing 
control it has over issues such as municipal taxation and indebtedness as a result of the 
proliferation of special districts and the circumvention of its legislation. In early 2014, as part 
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of a scheme to freeze and cut property taxes across the State, the Governor of New York 
State, Andrew Cuomo, proposed to limit special district creation (Precious, 2014).  
Governor Cuomo’s intended tax reforms can be regarded as a State response to 
circumvention. Indeed, the reforms demonstrate that changes in urban governance do not 
only reflect local capital investment requirements and the ambitions of local governments to 
compete fiscally, but also are part of a process of urban reterritorialisation influenced by 
governments at multiple spatial scales. 
 
6.1.3 From fiscalisation to bankruptcy: financing infrastructure and the 
reterritorialisation of Stockton, CA 
In Stockton, California, changes in public finance and infrastructure investment have had – 
and continue to have – direct and profound implications for the city’s governance and 
territoriality. Indeed, both fiscalisation and financialisation combined in Stockton to create a 
form of speculative urbanism that caused the municipal government to plummet into fiscal 
crisis and bankruptcy. This section draws on the case of Stockton to illustrate that 
financialised investment practices support the process of fiscalisation, and provides evidence 
to support the argument that the intensification of both financialisation and fiscalisation 
creates a powerful sense of competition – horizontally between jurisdictions for tax base 
expansion, vertically between different levels of government, and systemically between 
capital market participants – which, in turn, fuels a highly complex, contested and volatile 
process of reterritorialisation. 
 
6.1.3.1 Proposition 13: the origins of fiscalisation and the intensification of inter-urban 
competition in California 
In 1978, the State of California passed an amendment called the ‘People’s Initiative to Limit 
Property Taxation’, otherwise known as Proposition 13 (‘Prop 13’). By cutting property taxes 
down to 1% of the property’s sale price, and by limiting the annual growth of property taxes 
to 2%, Prop 13 drastically reduced and then capped perhaps the most important revenue 
raising tool for municipalities in the State of California (although property tax is still the 
largest source of tax revenue for local governments in California (Figure 6.1)). 
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Figure 6.1: Major sources of revenue for State and local governments in California 
Source: LAO, 2012a: 17. 
 
To be clear, although Prop 13 was a State initiative, Californian property tax ‘remains within 
the county in which it is collected and is used exclusively by local governments’ (LAO, 2012a: 
5). The share of property tax within any particular county is then distributed between the 
county government, the municipalities, the school districts and any other eligible districts 
within the county (Chapman, 1998). The motivation for Prop 13 was to create a more tax-
friendly environment for residents and businesses in California and, thus, to enhance 
California’s competitiveness in relation to other States.  
Most importantly, by reducing and limiting a large portion of municipal income, Prop 13 
immediately put pressure on the financial condition of municipalities. Indeed, Prop 13 cut 
the property tax revenues of municipalities in California by over $6 billion (Chapman, 1998: 
3). 
The policy responses available to municipalities in light of this reduction in revenues were 
limited. Municipalities could either streamline their services and consolidate their workforce 
– a huge political challenge – or prioritise interventions geared towards tax base expansion 
and revenue generation. In short, municipalities were forced to search for ways to generate 
fiscal and financial rewards from capital investments. This fiscalisation of urban development 
in California played out in a number of different ways. 
Firstly, large urban municipalities were incentivised to expand through the annexation of 
surrounding territories. Because Prop 13 starved municipal governments of property tax 
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revenues, municipalities were encouraged to annex more territory and, with it, new sources 
of property tax. The legacy of Prop 13, then, was to create a fiscal incentive for 
reterritorialisation. This legacy of fiscalisation has endured: between 2005 and 2010, for 
instance, 2446.17 acres of land under the jurisdiction of San Joaquin County was 
incorporated into the City of Stockton, including Northbrook-Elkhorn, Crystal Bay and 
Sanctuary (SJLAFC, 2011: 48).  
Secondly, by capping property tax, Prop 13 caused municipalities to become more dependent 
on other sources of income, most notably sales tax. As such, municipalities sought to 
incentivise developments that would attract inward investment and produce high levels of 
sales tax, and so devised strategies to poach tax-generating businesses from other 
municipalities. Prop 13’s focus on limiting municipal property tax receipts induced a specific 
form of fiscalisation in which inter-jurisdictional competition intensified as cities increasingly 
pursued retail-led development strategies and related programmes of capital investment.  
Thirdly, Prop 13 triggered the re-birth of ‘redevelopment’ (see Chapter 5). Although 
Redevelopment Agencies had been in existence since 1945, the advent of Prop 13 provided 
an added incentive to take advantage of their TIF capabilities. Indeed, it was the ability of 
the Redevelopment Agencies to engage in financialised investment practices that 
underpinned the emergent process of fiscalisation and caused a transformation in ‘the 
business of urban governance’ in Californian cities like Stockton (Davidson and Ward, 2014: 
89). Because TIF channelled 100% of incremental property taxes back to the Redevelopment 
Agency, higher levels of redevelopment resulted in a reduced amount of property tax leakage 
to other governmental districts (such as school districts and other municipalities within the 
county) and, as such, enabled a greater proportion of total property tax take to be retained 
within the city’s limits. Furthermore, the financialised characteristics of TIF enabled future 
tax receipts to be accessed in advance of their creation, thus mitigating the fiscal pressures 
and constraints on capital investment imposed by Prop 13. 
As a powerful incentive to unlock retail-led commercial development through speculative 
investments in infrastructure, Prop 13 set the scene for an intensification in competition 
between jurisdictions for tax base expansion, a contested process of urban reterritorialisation, 
and future fiscal disaster. 
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6.1.3.2 From subprime crisis to bankruptcy: questioning the resilience of a fiscal 
regime of accumulation 
Prior to the onset of the subprime crisis in 2007, Stockton had implemented a capital 
investment programme that included multiple infrastructure and development projects 
financed using a complex series of hybrid TIF and ‘lease-out-lease-back’ arrangements 
between the City and other public agencies (see Chapter 5). In turn, these financialised 
arrangements underpinned an urban development strategy focused on enhancing the City of 
Stockton’s relative fiscal capacity in relation to other cities and municipalities.  As the 
subprime crisis and the ensuing global financial crisis unravelled, however, it became clear 
that City’s efforts to maximise its competitiveness and enhance its revenue generation 
capabilities made it vulnerable to collapse and ultimately forced it to declare bankruptcy: 
‘The City of Stockton, like many other cities, also embarked on an aggressive growth 
programme of urban renewal… They mistakenly assumed that the bubble would 
continue to grow forever and never burst, but of course it did, because it always does. 
If you layer on top of that the incredibly generous post-retirement health benefits and 
pre-retirement benefits that the City gave away and the post-retirement pension benefits 
through the CalPERS system, you just have a system that sooner or later is going to 
implode’ (Author’s interview, Partner, international law firm, 2013). 
During the subprime crisis, the combination of plummeting house prices and growing rates 
of unemployment (see Chapter 4) resulted in a swath of home foreclosures in Stockton. In 
2011, 5.4% of Stockton’s housing units had entered foreclosure, the second highest rate in 
the US (Centre for Responsible Lending, 2012: 1). For the City of Stockton, the housing 
crisis quickly became a fiscal crisis. The City’s tax base, which had been underpinned rapid 
growth in property values and sales volumes, collapsed: 
‘People were walking away from their homes because they could no longer afford to 
live there. So things such as property tax water bills, sewer bills and utility bills were not 
being paid. Additionally, the City is generating no sales tax revenues, because people 
aren’t shopping in the area where they were once living’ (Author’s interview, Partner, 
local law firm, 2013). 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the drastic impact of the crisis on the City’s property, sales and use tax 
receipts. In particular, the drop in the more volatile sales and use tax income from 
$52,004,000 in 2005-6 to $34,613,363 in 2009-10 placed an enormous pressure on Stockton’s 
finances. 
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Figure 6.2: City of Stockton property tax and sales and use tax receipts 1991-2010 
Source: Adapted from California State Controller, 2012. 
 
Although the drop in revenues was particularly severe in Stockton, the ‘foreclosure crisis’ 
caused great damage to a vast range of cities across California and the wider United States 
(Crump et al., 2008). Yet, in the aftermath of the crisis, the level of fiscal stress in Stockton 
seemed to be disproportionately high. Indeed, there were three key factors that put an 
additional strain on Stockton’s budget and amplified the effects of the foreclosure crisis. 
First, prior to the crisis, the City of Stockton had undertaken a series of debt issuances in 
order to undertake capital improvements (see Chapter 5) and to enable it to meet its pension 
liabilities (Table 6.4). Crucially, with the exception of the 2007 pension obligation bonds, 
Stockton’s debt pile was built upon the desire to enhance the City’s competitiveness through 
revenue-generating developments – made possible by the speculative practices of 
redevelopment. Unfortunately for Stockton, as Davidson and Ward (2014: 85) argue with 
reference to a range of crisis-stricken cities across California, it is now evident that ‘the 
speculative component of this neo-liberalising of cities left many of them horribly exposed 
to the vagaries of the financial and housing markets’. The key point is that Stockton’s crisis 
is not due to the failure of any one investment or individual development project – although 
the Stockton Event Center and Parking schemes were clearly problematic in their own right 
(see Section 5.1.3). Instead, Stockton had developed an unsustainable level of debt which, 
critically, could only be repaid if the future unfolded as the City and its redevelopment arm 
had predicted and hoped. Ultimately, the widespread dependence on the monetisation of 
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hopes and aspirations rendered the City of Stockton extremely vulnerable to the falls in 
revenue that it experienced during the foreclosure crisis. 
 
Table 6.4: Debt issuances by the City of Stockton, 2003-2009 
Year of 
Issuance 
Type of Issuance Purpose of debt 
issuance/project 
Amount (USD) 
2003 Certificates of Participation Hotel Stockton, 
Mercy Housing, 
Fremont Park  
$13 million 
2004 Redevelopment Agency 
Revenue Bonds (Arena 
Bonds) 
Stockton Events 
Center 
$46 million  
2004 Lease Revenue Bonds 
(Parking Bonds) 
Parking Garages $32 million  
2001 (2006) Lease Revenue Bonds Essential Services 
Building 
(‘Stewart/Eberhardt 
Building’) 
$13.5 million  
2006 Dept. of Boating & 
Waterways loan 
Marina improvements  $11 million  
2007 Lease Revenue Bonds New City Hall $40 million  
2007 Pension Obligation Bonds Unfunded pension 
liability 
$125 million 
2009 Lease Revenue Bonds Fire station, police 
communications 
center, parks and 
street  improvements. 
$35 million  
Source: Adapted from City of Stockton, 2012a: 5-9. 
 
Second, in the years preceding the housing crash, the City of Stockton expanded its 
workforce and provided employees with attractive compensation packages, which included 
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an automatic salary escalator, and also provided financial rewards for long-term service and 
a range of special achievements (City of Stockton, 2012a). In 2011-12, ‘employee services’ 
(salaries and benefits) accounted for 76% of Stockton’s General Fund budget (Evans et al., 
2012: 5). Although the City realised that these arrangements were unsustainable, causing it 
to declare fiscal emergencies in 2010 and 2011, its attempts to make reforms were contested 
by key labour unions (Stockton Police Officer Association and Stockton City Employees 
Association), preventing the City from closing its budget deficit, which in 2012/13 amounted 
to $29.5 million. 
Third, prior to 2007, the City of Stockton agreed to a string of measures that significantly 
increased its pension obligations and retiree health insurance commitments (City of 
Stockton, 2012a). A sudden fall in the value of the City’s assets during the subprime crisis 
created a gap between the expected revenues derived from the city’s asset base and their 
actual value. The emergence of this gap meant that Stockton developed a large unfunded 
pension liability, which, in 2012, amounted to $417 million (City of Stockton, 2012a: 5, 37).  
It is difficult to single out any one factor that caused fiscal crisis in Stockton. The City’s 
downward spiral towards its bankruptcy filing in June 2012 was fuelled by the confluence of 
multiple factors including a high rate of unemployment, a foreclosure crisis, a reduction in 
receipts from property, sales and utility taxes, and an unsustainable package of benefits for 
City employees and retirees. The mountain of debt that the City had built up, however, was 
perhaps the most telling factor. At its heart, the City’s project of capital investment, which 
necessitated its large-scale debt issuances, had the objective of enhancing the competitiveness 
of Stockton in relation to other cities. Underpinning this objective was the process of 
fiscalisation: the evolution of development strategies aiming to maximise tax base expansion 
and financial reward. In turn, however, such a fiscalised development strategy was only made 
possible by the use of financialised financing mechanisms (such as redevelopment) that 
pertained to capture the predicted future value of the City’s investments and bring this value 
forward in time. Ultimately, these processes unfolded so that at the point of bankruptcy, the 
City of Stockton was facing a wall of debt underpinned by nothing more than hope and 
aspiration. 
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6.1.3.3 The dissolution of California’s Redevelopment Agencies: a spatio-temporal fix 
and a new round of fiscalisation 
Stockton, along with other Californian cities, is currently facing a direct challenge from the 
State of California that compounds its fiscal woes, and that, going forward, severely inhibits 
its ability to invest in infrastructure and promote urban development.  
On the 29th June of 2011, in response to the growing fiscal crisis at the State of California, 
Jerry Brown, the Governor of the State of California, signed Assembly Bill 26 of the First 
Extraordinary Session of 2011 (‘A.B. 26’), which ‘froze and dissolved’ all of California’s 
Redevelopment Agencies (Maroon, 2013: 462). The purpose of A.B. 26 was to prevent the 
State haemorrhaging cash to Californian school districts, whose tax dollars were being taken 
by Redevelopment Agencies through the process of TIF. 
To elaborate, in California, Proposition 98 (‘Prop 98’) entitles school districts in California 
to a share of property tax receipts. It also provides that the State will fill the gap when those 
property tax revenues are insufficient to meet the schools funding needs. For example, if a 
school district has a budget of $100 million, and the school district retains $20 million in 
property taxes, it will receive $80 million from the State. 
Importantly, the acceleration in the rate of creation of redevelopment districts since Prop 13 
meant that an increasing proportion of the growing property tax base of cities was being 
syphoned off by Redevelopment Agencies. Engaging in TIF entitled the Redevelopment 
Agencies to 100 percent of incremental property taxes within a redevelopment district. As 
such, school districts had access to a lower proportion of the total tax take, which ultimately 
created a financial burden for the State: 
‘By 2009-10, [Redevelopment Agencies] were receiving over $5 billion in property taxes 
annually – a redirection of 12 percent of property tax revenues from general purpose 
local government use for redevelopment purposes. The State’s costs to backfill [school] 
districts for the property taxes redirected to redevelopment exceeded $2 billion 
annually’ (LAO, 2012b: 8). 
In short, because redevelopment channelled property taxes away from school districts, the 
State of California appeared to be footing the bill for the infrastructure and development 
financed by the Redevelopment Agencies – even though the redevelopment projects 
themselves were funded by new incremental property taxes. 
Through the dissolution of the Redevelopment Agencies, cities in California are undergoing 
a process of urban reterritorialisation. According to A.B. 26, each Redevelopment Agency 
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has been replaced by a successor agency in order to administrate the unwinding process. In 
Stockton, the City of Stockton has adopted this role. Each successor agency is allowed to 
continue to use incremental property taxes (in the Redevelopment Property Tax Trust Fund) 
to service redevelopment debts pre-dating the 1st January 2011. However, net funds from 
existing redevelopment assets and surplus redevelopment revenues are not inherited as 
property by the successor agency and must instead be redirected to ‘other local taxing 
agencies’ (LAO, 2012b: 9). 
Crucially, the dissolution of the Redevelopment Agencies has restructured the local tax base, 
inhibiting revenues from flowing into infrastructure and urban development, whilst 
benefiting the State of California financially by relieving pressures on the State’s school 
system. As such, future tax revenues are being diverted away from the City’s redevelopment 
arm for the purpose of accommodating a State fiscal recovery. 
By dissolving the Redevelopment Agencies and limiting the flow of funds away from school 
districts, the State of California was able to move some way towards addressing its own fiscal 
crisis. However, through the dissolution of the Redevelopment Agencies and, by extension, 
through removal of tax dollars away from cities, the State’s fiscal recovery has, to a significant 
degree, been at the expense of cities: 
At the start of this year, the State of California was insolvent to the tune of $25billion. 
Because of belt tightening by the Governor and because of larger than expected 
revenues, the State may actually be solvent for the first time in quite a while. But it has 
done so on the back of local government’ (Author’s interview, Partner, international 
law firm, 2013). 
The squeeze of Californian cities like Stockton compounds the levels of fiscal stress at the 
urban scale and rings chimes with Peck’s (2012; also see Davidson and Ward, 2014) concept 
of ‘austerity urbanism’: 
‘Not only is the State not helping cities that are struggling, because the State is broke 
too, they are actually grabbing every dime away from the cities that they can get.’ 
(Author’s interview, Judge, Federal Bankruptcy Court, 2013) 
For Stockton, then, the State of California’s fiscal crisis has been spatialised at the urban scale 
and driven down to the city’s institutions. Not only is austerity urbanism compounding 
Stockton’s fiscal woes, but it continues to be a prominent driver in a volatile process of 
reterritorialisation as cities face the prospect of bankruptcy, collapse and the possible 
dissolution as a territorial entity. 
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Nevertheless, the fiscalisation of urban development continues uninterrupted in California. 
Despite the closure of the redevelopment agencies, the State of California plans to 
reintroduce TIF into cities, but with the caveat that any such programme must also benefit 
the State. Cities can already use ‘Infrastructure Financing Districts’ (IFDs), although an 
attempt to expand their scope (‘Senate Bill 1156’) was vetoed by Governor Brown because 
it ‘would prevent the state from achieving the General Fund savings assumed in [the State’s] 
budget’ (McGreevey, 2012). However, a revised bill – ‘Senate Bill 1’ – has been introduced, 
which if passed would give cities the opportunity to create Sustainable Communities 
Investment Authorities, bodies which would have the power to engage in TIF – but without 
access to school district property tax revenues. 
Viewed as a whole, the Stockton case study establishes a significant link between 
infrastructure investment, the state’s financial condition and the process of 
reterritorialisation. In particular, the Stockton example has demonstrated that the 
fiscalisation of urban development (enabled by financialised investment practices such as 
‘Redevelopment’) became a core strategy in a fiscally constrained environment that was 
underpinned by the Prop 13 property tax reforms. Crucially, this project of fiscalisation, 
which could also be described as ‘speculative urbanism’ (Davidson and Ward 2014), left 
Stockton vulnerable to fiscal crisis and bankruptcy. At the same time, the State of California 
has adopted an aggressive approach to fixing its own fiscal crisis by dissolving the 
Redevelopment Agencies and grabbing resources from many of its already wounded cities. 
Not only has this instigated a new round of reterritorialisation, but it also has the potential 
to compound the City of Stockton’s woes and hamper any attempts to invest in infrastructure 
going forward. 
 
6.2 The financialisation of infrastructure investment and urban 
reterritorialisation in the UK 
As in the US, the financialisation of the funding and financing of infrastructure is tightly 
linked to changing patterns of urban governance in the UK. This section demonstrates that 
cities in the UK face similar pressures of fiscal stress, and are increasingly encouraged to 
engage in financialised investment practices in order to generate fiscal and financial returns. 
At the same time, however, there are unique structural factors in the UK, such as the 
centralist system of government, which result in different responses to fiscal challenges and 
which spawn different approaches to funding and financing infrastructure.  
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6.2.1 The shackles of centralism: ‘austerity urbanism’ in Sheffield 
Within the UK’s infrastructure funding complex, there is a structural tension between the 
neoliberal imperative of decentralisation and the national imperatives of centralised control, 
policy and power. The overwhelming narrative running throughout local government is that 
the centralist system of government in the UK restricts the evolution of new and innovative 
mechanisms for funding and financing infrastructure, which ultimately inhibits total levels 
of infrastructure investment and, by extension, economic growth. This narrative rests on 
three main assertions. First, local authority budgets are effectively controlled by central 
government, and depend on the flow of funds from the centre. Second, local authorities 
have a comparatively small revenue base in relation to central government, and in relation to 
local governments in the US and elsewhere. Third, although there is no centrally imposed 
limit on local authority borrowing, the small revenue base of local authorities restricts the 
amount of borrowing they can engage in whilst continuing to adhere to the Prudential Code. 
In sum, local authorities are muted in their ability to invest in infrastructure, stimulate 
economic growth and create jobs because they have not been given the freedom and 
resources to make such investments. 
It is arguable, however, that through reterritorialisation – in the form of restructuring the tax 
system, devolving financing powers, and giving local authorities the freedom to use financial 
technologies and instruments – the shackles of centralism could be removed, facilitating 
greater local authority investment in infrastructure.  
Nevertheless, reterritorialisation is fraught with tension and conflict, and, in the UK, an 
opposing force is provided HM Treasury, the central government’s economic and finance 
ministry, whose remit is to manage public spending, to direct the UK’s economic policy and 
to deliver national economic growth (HM Treasury, 2014): 
There has always been a fear in the Treasury that if you allow local authorities too much 
leeway, particularly in terms of borrowing powers, that you’ll undermine 
macroeconomic policy. That is vastly overstated, but at the moment, when the 
government is trying to reduce its deficit, it’s quite a powerful argument’ (Author’s 
interview, Director of Policy, Strategy & Communications, metropolitan borough 
council, 2012). 
Whilst it is indisputable that there is reluctance from the Treasury to decentralise control in 
areas such as public spending, it is also arguable that local authorities are hesitant about 
adopting greater levels of autonomy, and have limited capacity to do so. It is crucial, 
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therefore, that the conflicting forces of centralism and localism are not portrayed in simple 
binary terms, but rather as complex, multi-agent and multiscalar. 
One of the effects of having more local autonomy would be that it could no longer rely on 
central government handouts – a harsh reality that is one of the cornerstones of the system 
of fiscal federalism in the US. For Sheffield, this would be a particularly traumatic shift given 
the extent of its previous reliance on grant funds: 
‘I think from the late 90s until 2006 say, we were benefiting from significant funding 
from the RDA, Yorkshire Forward. We had ‘Objective One Status’ – the highest level 
of European funding – and we had a dedicated pot of funding specifically for the city 
centre, as well as funding available for the wider industrial areas. Fundamentally, if you 
look at the amount invested in that period, which is getting into £160-170 million of 
public money, the City Council’s share of direct capital contributions was probably 
below £10 million’ (Author’s interview, Strategic Development and Funding Manager, 
metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
Because Sheffield City Council has grown accustomed to the equalising effect of funding 
allocations from central and European sources, the prospect relying solely on a local revenue 
base is almost unpalatable, particularly when that revenue base is currently underperforming 
in relation to other parts of the UK. Unfortunately, in the face of cuts in government funding, 
Sheffield has not been afforded the option to continue its reliance on grants from London 
and Europe.  
According to the National Audit Office, between 2010-11 and 2014-15, the ‘real-terms 
reduction in funding from central government to local authorities’ amounts to £7.6 billion 
(National Audit Office, 2013: 4). Sheffield City Council has seen a total reduction of 30% in 
the funding received from central government since 2010-11 (Sheffield City Council, 2014c). 
This is forecast to increase to 50% by 2015-16 (ibid.). Although the City Council has made 
£180 million in savings between 2010-11 and 2014-15, it currently has a budget gap of £37 
million, which is expected to increase to £80 million by 2015-16 (ibid.). 
As a result of these cuts, the whole funding model for Sheffield City Council is being turned 
upside-down: 
‘At some point local authorities will be bankrupt. The biggest driver of spend in local 
authorities is social care. It’s massive, and is on a huge demographic uplift and going up 
all the time. At the same time, our grant is being cut… Now, if you think that our 
capacity for regeneration is in that gap [between revenues and commitments], the 
money and the capacity we get to deliver economic regeneration is getting massively 
 178 
squeezed. [The government] is actually massively reducing our capacity to invest in the 
very things that will deliver the growth’ (Author’s interview, Director of Finance, 
metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
While Sheffield City Council, along with many other local authorities in the UK, is having its 
funding cut, the challenge of creating jobs and generating economic growth remains. It is in 
the face of both fiscal and economic crisis that debates around devolution have emerged. 
For HM Treasury, devolving power to local authorities could provide a fix to national fiscal 
and economic crisis. By creating a system that rewards those local authorities that achieve 
economic growth, devolution could stimulate a recovery in the UK’s gross domestic product 
(GDP). Furthermore, by making local authorities more dependent on locally raised revenues, 
it is possible for the Treasury to reduce the outflow of funds to local authorities in order to 
reduce the national budget deficit. It is in this context, then, that the Treasury is willing to 
cede a degree of control over public finance. 
For city councils like Sheffield, the prospect of increased financial control is attractive 
because it provides the Council with the ‘tools’ and ‘freedoms’ to make capital investments 
and to pursue a more entrepreneurial, fiscalised and financialised approach to urban 
development. Crucially, however, greater freedom to finance infrastructure by borrowing 
and spending as they choose, comes at the expense of the safety net of the redistributive 
system that has existed hitherto: 
‘On the one hand [central government] is incentivising us to deliver growth. On the 
other hand it is taking away our ability to do that, and is working against a lot of the 
services that authorities need to deliver… The government is driving authorities down 
to an agenda of having their own money. Basically that massively disadvantages 
Northern Metropolitan Councils and Core Cities, and it benefits the South East… It’s 
not a level playing field… The danger now is the double whammy of austerity and the 
loss of [central government] money.’ (Author’s interview, Director of Finance, 
metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
It is strikingly apparent that devolution is an innately contradictory process: the ‘shackles’ of 
centralism that weigh down some local authorities, provide essential supporting mechanisms 
to others. For local authorities with a growing tax base, greater access to locally generated 
taxation and greater flexibility over borrowing against future tax income would open up a 
whole range of opportunities to innovate and engage in financialised investment practices. 
In contrast, for local authorities like Sheffield City Council, which is burdened by low 
economic growth and a shrinking tax base, more dependence on locally generated taxation 
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would be debilitating. Certainly, more devolution would create a highly uneven landscape of 
infrastructure investment across the UK. 
The localisation Non-Domestic Rates (NDRs) is illustrative of the challenges of restructuring 
a territorially distinct system of taxation in a climate of austerity and economic crisis. By 
allowing local authorities to retain 50% of NDRs collected within their territory, the new 
legislation, which came into force in April 2013, aimed to provide an incentive and reward 
for local authorities with a growing tax base, while protecting local authorities with a 
shrinking tax base. In short, local authorities have access to a tax base that they can leverage, 
grow and incorporate into a revolving programme of urban development, whilst at the same 
time keeping the safety net provided by a redistributive fund made up of from the central 
share of NDRs. 
Nevertheless, the modified NDR system is somewhat of an unsatisfactory compromise. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (see Adam and Miller, 2014: 264) has labelled the system as ‘ill-
designed’ because it simultaneously serves to incentivise and discourage development. 
Furthermore, in the attempt to find a balance between centralism and localism in the NDR 
system, local authorities have both a certain degree of freedom (accompanied by isolation and 
uncertainty) and an element of guaranteed support (accompanied by central control and 
domination): 
‘The government has assumed business rate growth nationally and cut our mainstream 
grant to code in that national increase. We need to work to get to whatever growth we 
can, but we have little or no chance of getting to that national increase, so, in effect, 
we’re automatically being cut more… We’re sat on a dilemma at the moment about 
trying to [meet our service obligations] using the tools that are available... But, our range 
of statutory responsibilities frankly don’t fit in to what our taxable base is. The 
government is going to have to confront that dilemma’ (Author’s interview, Director 
of Finance, metropolitan borough council, 2013). 
The partial localisation of NDRs illustrates the conflicting forces at play in the process of 
devolution, and in urban reterritorialisation more broadly. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
the ability of localities to retain taxes and to benefit from other measures of devolution is – 
to a significant degree – structurally constrained by the centralist system of government that 
is embedded in the UK. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which the 
constraints of a centralist system of government also provide structural limitations to 
infrastructure investment, and, equally, whether further devolution – if at all possible – would 
indeed facilitate greater levels of infrastructure investment. 
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6.2.2 Decentralisation and infrastructure investment in Newcastle: a fictitious 
relationship? 
The assertion made by proponents of decentralisation is that local authorities in the UK are 
inhibited from investing in infrastructure because they do not have adequate freedoms and 
powers. In particular, the lack of autonomy at the local level inhibits local authorities from 
engaging in financialised investment practices, which are becoming increasingly important 
for making investments in infrastructure because of the contemporary fiscal challenges that 
face local authorities and the need to generate returns on investment. Providing localities 
with more autonomy, then, could theoretically give them a greater ability to engage in 
financialised investment practices and – by extension – to increase their expenditure on 
infrastructure.  
A logical conclusion, then, is that decentralisation leads to higher levels of investment in 
urban infrastructure. However, as with the link between decentralisation and economic 
growth (see Pike et al., 2012), there is little coherent evidence to suggest a correlation between 
decentralisation and infrastructure investment. In response to this void, and using Newcastle 
as a case study example, this section questions how certain aspects of decentralisation can 
create the conditions required for infrastructure investment by facilitating the use of 
financialised investment practices. 
 
6.2.2.1 A diverse tax base 
With the exception of project-generated revenues and sources of income that have been 
specifically negotiated through City Deals (see below), locally retainable sources of revenue 
in Newcastle are limited to council tax and 50% of NDRs. In contrast, municipalities in the 
US can capture revenues as diverse range of taxes. The City of Chicago, for instance, could 
potentially structure a financing mechanism around any one of at least 29 locally raised taxes, 
including a ‘Sales Tax’, a ‘Hotel Accommodations Tax’, an ‘Airport Departures Tax’, a 
‘Parking Tax’ and a ‘Vehicle Fuel Tax’, as well as taxes on liquor, soft drinks, cigarettes, 
bottled water and boat moorings (City of Chicago, 2014b). 
A wider range of locally available taxes provides a larger and more diversified pool of revenue 
streams from which infrastructure projects can be funded. In addition, a large number of 
locally retainable taxes enables the local governing entity to pick and choose the most 
appropriate source(s) of taxation in order to ensure that the beneficiaries of the infrastructure 
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investment bear the cost of that investment (known as the ‘benefits principle’) (see Tiebout, 
1956; Musgrave, 1990; Oakland and Testa, 1996). Not all tax-based investments adhere to 
the ‘benefits principle’: for example, the wealth of users (and non-users) and their ‘ability to 
pay’ might also be taken into account (ibid.). Nevertheless, when looking to capture the value 
of an item of infrastructure in order to create upfront investment, it is perhaps most logical 
to use a source of taxation that will be generated by the piece of infrastructure at hand and 
that targets the infrastructure’s beneficiaries. Simply put, it would be more advantageous for 
a local authority like Newcastle, which wishes to use future tax receipts to finance a wide 
variety of infrastructure, to have access to a wide array of locally retainable taxes. Currently, 
Newcastle City Council is limited to Council Tax and a portion of NDR income, which 
massively reduces its fiscal management and investment capabilities. 
A more diverse tax base would also reduce the risks inherent in any one particular source of 
taxation. Indeed, the localisation of NDRs alone has created an overdependence on NDRs 
as a source of taxation, making the tax base of local authorities particularly vulnerable to 
NDR volatility: 
‘I would counter [the assertion that we are striving to gain more access to business rates] 
because business rates are very volatile, it’s not the world’s greatest tax base, it’s not in 
our control, and we don’t set the rateable values. There are [also] over £900 million of 
appeals outstanding... So actually, it strikes me at the moment as a slightly risky tax base’ 
(Author’s interview, City Treasurer, metropolitan borough council, and Treasurer, 
combined authority, 2013). 
Having a broader and more resilient tax base, then, would provide more certainty against 
which borrowing for infrastructure investment could occur.  
 
6.2.2.2 The power to set tax rates and to levy new taxes and fees   
In addition to having access to a wider range of taxes, the ability of Newcastle City Council 
to invest in infrastructure could also be improved by enabling it to set the rate of taxation 
and to levy new taxes and fees. The ability to set the rate for locally retainable taxes would 
give Newcastle City Council the ability to raise extra capital to fund schemes or to provide 
tax incentives for businesses to locate within their boundaries. 
According to the London Finance Commission (2013: 58), devolving taxes to local 
authorities in the UK would improve (democratic) accountability, align policy with local 
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needs, increase systemic efficiency, provide local government with more autonomy, and 
increase transparency. 
The suggestion that local authorities could set the rate of tax, however, is highly unpalatable 
for HM Treasury:  
‘[Local authorities could retain] a share of corporation tax, for example, if they are 
successful in attracting corporations, or could even have the ability to vary the 
corporation tax rate. But the Treasury are worried about displacement around simple 
tax increment financing schemes, so they are never going to allow variation in tax rates 
in different areas’ (Author’s interview, Partner, international professional services firm, 
2013). 
EU competition regulations provide a further challenge to the decentralisation of taxation in 
the UK. For example, ‘EU law prohibits varied rates [of VAT] within a member state’ 
(London Finance Commission, 2013: 70). 
In general, the question of devolving the power to local authorities to set the rate of taxation 
seems to hinge on the issue of fairness, the potential uneven implications of allowing 
variation in tax rates between localities (which could include a ‘race to the bottom’ whereby 
competing authorities perpetually reduce taxation to attract business), and the potentially 
negative economic implications for national productivity (despite counter arguments to 
suggest that tax competition leads to economic allocative efficiency (e.g. Tiebout, 1956; 
Oates and Schwab, 1988)).  
Perhaps most importantly, the counterargument to increasing the rate of taxation in order to 
raise funds for infrastructure investment is that the (increased) tax burden on residents and 
businesses that results could potentially undermine the economic case for investment in the 
first place. That is, the growth you were expecting to stimulate through new infrastructure 
investment is wiped out by the higher costs of doing business in a higher-tax environment. 
This is especially true in places like Newcastle, whose economy is relatively vulnerable to 
small increases in the cost of production. 
In sum, whilst levying new taxes or introducing changes in the tax rate give local authorities 
more flexibility to raise revenues for funding and financing infrastructure, such a form of 
decentralisation would be both problematic and contentious. 
This section has demonstrated that decentralisation could facilitate the implementation and 
use of financialised investment practices at the local level, and could enable local authorities 
to use these practices in a more controlled and efficient manner. It could be argued, 
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therefore, that fiscal decentralisation would create the conditions for a greater level of 
investment in urban infrastructure. Although the decentralisation argument appears to be 
gathering momentum, it must be considered alongside the complex and contradictory 
process of reterritorialisation that is taking place in the UK. In practice, the transition from 
a highly centralised system of government towards a more decentralised system where local 
authorities have some degree of genuine financial autonomy is fraught with power struggles, 
negotiations and trade-offs. Crucially, these dynamics are not confined to the binary of the 
local and national scales, but are exhibited across and through multiple spatial scales. To 
illustrate these complexities, the next section analyses the most significant codifications of 
devolution for the specific purposes of supporting infrastructure and urban development in 
the UK: ‘City Deals’ and ‘Growth Deals’. 
 
6.2.2.3 City Deals: negotiated devolution and the emergence of the city-region 
In July 2012, following a period of negotiation between city authorities and central 
government, eight ‘City Deals’ were announced (Table 6.5). These deals gave the respective 
cities: 
‘the powers and tools they need to drive local economic growth; [u]nlock projects or 
initiatives that will boost their economies; and [s]trengthen the governance 
arrangements of each city’ (HM Government, 2012: 1). 
Although the City Deals represent a codified commitment to providing cities with the powers 
to stimulate urban development and economic growth, it is questionable whether they 
represent ‘a radical devolution of power to England’s largest cities’ (Waite et al., 2013: 775): 
‘The idea of the City Deals is to have accepted within Parliament the link between cities 
and growth, and that more local control gets better growth and better competitiveness. 
I think, by and large, there is an acceptance of that, but what hasn’t really happened is 
any logical conclusion which is any real devolution’ (Author’s interview, Director, 
national policy think tank, 2013).  
Crucially, rather than representing systemic fiscal decentralisation, the City Deals take the 
form of individual and bespoke agreements between the government and the cities involved. 
In most of the City Deals, there is some semblance of fiscal decentralisation: Newcastle, 
Nottingham and Sheffield were granted permission to engage in TIF, while Greater 
Manchester was permitted to retain an additional portion of NDR revenues, and Liverpool 
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and Bristol were granted the permission to retain NDRs in a series of new Enterprise Zones 
or Areas (Table 6.5).  
 
Table 6.5: Fiscal decentralisation through City Deals? 
City Deal Measures of devolution and 
powers for funding and 
financing infrastructure 
Other fund allocations or financing 
tools for infrastructure (no explicit 
fiscal decentralisation) 
Greater 
Birmingham and 
Solihull  
N/A GBS Capital – a £1.5bn investment fund 
to deliver infrastructure projects 
(aggregates, recycles and invests public 
funds). 
Bristol and the 
West of England  
Five new Enterprise Areas 
which can retain 100% of their 
business rate growth for a 
period 25 years. Use of business 
rates to create £1bn economic 
development fund. 
New rail planning and delivery 
powers. 
A 10 year allocation of ‘local majors 
funding’ to fund Greater Bristol Metro. 
Ability to recycle savings from the Bus 
Rapid Transit Network locally. 
Leeds City 
Region 
N/A A £1bn West Yorkshire ‘plus’ Transport 
Fund financed by a levy on local councils, 
a 10 year allocation of ‘local majors 
funding’, and co-investment from 
Department for Transport. 
A £200 million city-regional investment 
fund from pooled business rates and 
other sources. Investment is matched 
central government. 
Liverpool (Part 
1) and Liverpool 
City Region 
(Part 2) 
A new Enterprise Zone in City 
Fringe Buffer Zone and Central 
Business District. 
A £75m mayoral investment fund (which 
includes funding from government). 
A new city-regional transport body that 
will establish a transport fund worth 
£800m over 10 years. 
An additional city-regional investment 
fund. 
Greater 
Manchester 
Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority retains a portion of 
Transport investment through an 
allocation of ‘local majors funding’. 
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additional tax revenue according 
to levels of growth created 
through infrastructure 
investment (‘Earn Back’) up to 
£30 million per year. 
Devolution of the Northern 
Rail franchise. 
Newcastle  An Accelerated Development 
Zone (ADZ) gives Newcastle 
the potential to invest £92 
million through tax increment 
financing. 
Investment programme to improve A1 
Western Bypass and improve broadband 
infrastructure. 
Nottingham A New Development Deal 
enables Nottingham to invest 
£8 million through tax 
increment financing 
Improvements to Midland Mainline and 
links to HS2. 
Investment in super-fast broadband. 
Sheffield City 
Region 
A New Development Deal 
enables Sheffield to invest £33 
million through tax increment 
financing 
Devolution of Northern Rail 
franchise. 
£700 million Sheffield City Region 
Investment Fund. Includes £30 million 
from Sheffield City Council and NDR 
revenues from a city centre development 
scheme. 
Transport investment through 10-year 
allocation of ‘local majors funding’. 
Better Bus Area pilot. 
Source: Adapted from HM Government, 2012; Marlow, 2012; Pike and O’Brien, 2014. 
 
However, the permission to engage in these activities is accompanied by a strict set of 
boundaries. For example, Manchester can only ‘earn back’ up to £30 million per year, 
Newcastle can only invest £92 million through the use of TIF in its ADZ, while Sheffield 
can only invest £33 million through TIF. Furthermore, a large proportion of the finalised 
agreements merely serve to confirm the availability of predominant central government 
funding instruments, such as the allocation of ‘local majors funding’ to fund transport 
projects, or provide ‘soft’ statements of support for investment in local infrastructure 
projects, both of which fall short of representing genuine measures of fiscal decentralisation. 
Perhaps most importantly, by granting individual cities the explicit permission to engage in 
(a small number of) very specific activities through what HM Government (2011: 1) refers 
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to as ‘tailored’ agreements, City Deals simultaneously serve to prohibit cities from engaging 
in any activities that require powers that have not been expressly granted to them. That is, 
whilst the City Deals enable cities to fund and finance infrastructure, they also limit the ability 
of cities to innovate and experiment, exclude them from using investment practices used by 
other cities, and inhibit them from making their own decisions about how local infrastructure 
is funded and financed. 
Despite their debatable influence on levels of decentralisation, the City Deals do appear to 
have instigated a perhaps less predictable process of reterritorialisation, in the form of what 
could be termed the rise of the city-region.  
Although Greater Manchester has been the spearhead of the city-regional movement, 
establishing the UK’s first CA in 2011 as a culmination of decades of city-regional 
collaboration, the fact that CAs have since been established in the North East, West 
Yorkshire, Sheffield City Region and Liverpool City Region is indicative of a trend towards 
the creation of city-regional governing institutions (Pike and O’Brien, 2014). The formation 
of CAs builds on the foundations laid by the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which 
were created by the Coalition Government to fill the void left behind by the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs), combining elected officials and local corporate elites to 
provide a more dynamic form of strategic governance and leadership (Pugalis, 2010). 
Together, the emergence of LEPs and CAs can be regarded as products of a wave of city-
regionalism that is searching to enhance local capacity for innovation, collaboration and 
growth – especially in the field of infrastructure investment (see Table 6.6) – in an otherwise 
centralist environment. 
The endeavours of both localities and the central government to modify, rescale and 
restructure urban governance systems in the UK are motivated by a series of converging 
factors which enable local economic growth and prosperity to be most successfully delivered 
through public sector interventions at the city-regional scale.  
In Newcastle, the emergence of the North East Combined Authority (NECA) and North 
East Local Enterprise Partnership (NELEP) can attributed to a range of factors that enhance 
the locality’s position at the bargaining table with Central Government in the devolution 
process, and that create a more attractive environment for infrastructure investment:  
 Enhanced negotiation capabilities. The newly created NECA arguably has a greater ability 
than its constituent local authorities to negotiate with central government for the 
devolution of powers to help fund and finance infrastructure (HM Treasury and 
North East Combined Authority, 2015); 
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 Policymaking across a functional economic area. The NECA and NELEP can prioritise 
transformational infrastructure projects that cross territorial boundaries and that 
could not be funded, delivered and managed at the individual local authority level 
(ibid.); 
 Pooling resources for infrastructure investment. The NECA can create new funding sources 
and engage in innovative financing practices by pooling funds with other 
jurisdictions. They can also amplify the spending power within the city-region by 
creating ‘funds of funds’ or ‘spends of spends’ (Pike and O’Brien, 2014; HM Treasury 
and North East Combined Authority, 2015); 
 Revolving investment funds. The pooling of local authority capital into a North East-wide 
investment fund potentially enables the adoption of otherwise unavailable 
financialised investment practices, such as revolving investment funds (see Section 
5.2.1 and ‘Earn Back’ below);  
 Combating austerity urbanism. By collaborating through formal arrangements, such as a 
CA, the impacts of fiscal stress upon levels of capital investment can be minimised 
and the risks of investing in infrastructure can be shared, thus alleviating the 
downward pressures of austerity urbanism. 
The imperative of pursuing new and innovative ways of funding and financing infrastructure 
that could stimulate job creation and reignite economic growth even in times of fiscal stress 
where traditional models of infrastructure investment are increasingly out-dated and 
unavailable, then, appears to be bound up in the changing nature of urban governance in the 
UK. Rather than taking place within a political vacuum, however, the negotiation of City 
Deals and the formation of CAs is taking place within a political economy in which the UK’s 
central government is still the dominant force and in which individual territorial units are 
increasingly competing for investment, jobs, tax base expansion, and ultimately their own 
survival. Not only does this make the ‘institutional fix’ of the Combined Authority an innately 
precarious and unstable one, but it also renders the City Deals a mere snapshot of what is a 
much longer complex, multidirectional and contradictory process of reterritorialisation.  
 
6.2.3 From the Transport Innovation Fund to Earn Back: financing Metrolink in 
Greater Manchester 
The Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) is possibly the most authentic city-
regional institution amongst England’s Core Cities. Far from being a product of City Deal 
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negotiation or fast policy transfer, GMCA has its origins in a rich heritage of city-regional 
collaboration (Figure 6.3).  
Importantly, for over 45 years, the evolution of city-regionalism in Greater Manchester has 
been closely linked with the city-region’s transport infrastructure needs and, in addition, a 
significant degree of strategic guidance and legislation from the national government. The 
South East Lancashire and North East Cheshire (SELNEC) Passenger Transport Executive 
(PTA) (Figure 6.3) was formed as part of the 1968 Transport Act which created a total of 5 
PTAs across the UK. In April 1974, when the Metropolitan County of Greater Manchester 
was formed, SELNEC was reinvented as the Greater Manchester Passenger Transport 
Authority (GMPTA). Although the Metropolitan County of Greater Manchester was 
dissolved and replaced by the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) in 
1986, the GMPTA continued its role as the city-region’s transport body. Between 1986 and 
2011 AGMA and the GMPTA worked in combination to deliver coherent strategic transport 
planning and infrastructure delivery across the city-region. In 2011, building on this legacy, 
Greater Manchester was designated the first Statutory City Region in the UK, while the 
GMPTA was renamed Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM). 
 
 
Figure 6.3 A history of collaboration: institution building in Greater Manchester 
Source: Author’s own. 
 
The most recent catalyst for collaboration, and arguably the trigger for the formation of 
TfGM and the GMCA, has been the Greater Manchester’s tram network, Metrolink. Not 
only is Metrolink a cross-jurisdictional infrastructure asset and thus at least requires some 
1968
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Passenger Transport Authority (PTA)
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•Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM)
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basic inter-jurisdictional collaboration and funding, but it is also an incredibly large and 
expensive item of infrastructure that could not be funded by a single local authority.  
Fundamental to the development of the Metrolink system was the need to attract investment 
from central government. In the early 2000s there was a plan to deliver a ‘Big Bang’ of 
Metrolink, building on the already completed ‘Phase 1’, the north-south spine from 
Altrincham to Bury, and ‘Phase 2’, a line out to Eccles in the west, by implementing three 
further phases, 3a, 3b, and 3c, which would extend the tram system to Rochdale, Ashton-
under-Lyne and Manchester Airport. Although central government support temporarily 
wavered, £575 million was eventually made available by the Department for Transport (DfT) 
in 2004. 
Whilst the money from the centre was essential to initiate the Metrolink expansion, it was 
insufficient to deliver the whole of Phase 3. As such, the GMPTA was forced to develop a 
mechanism that would provide a platform to generate a new source of revenue: 
‘At that time there were only 2 games in town… One was the Work-Place Parking Levy, 
and the other was the Transport Innovation Fund, which in other words is the 
congestion charge. We decided to go for the congestion charge option. In the round, a 
£3 billion project which would have delivered all the outstanding extensions on 
Metrolink at that time’ (Author’s interview, Chair, local transport authority, 2013).  
The Transport Innovation Fund proposed to create a £3 billion investment package by 
pooling funds from a variety of sources including £1.3 billion of capital grant from DfT, 
£200 million of resource grant from DfT (for Metrolink maintenance), £100million of local 
contributions, and £1.15 billion of borrowing undertaken by the GMPTA against future 
congestion charge revenues (GMPTA, 2008: 17). Before being implemented, however, the 
Transport Innovation Fund was subject to a referendum in December 2008, and every one 
of Greater Manchester’s ten districts voted against the Fund. 
Rather than shelving the plans and undoing years of work that included extensive planning 
and cost-benefit analysis, AGMA and the GMPTA pushed to build on the collaborative 
relationships engendered by the Transport Innovation Fund and to devise a new strategy for 
funding and financing Metrolink Phase 3. Two key events occurred on the back of the 
Transport Innovation Fund’s failure.  
First, it initiated the attempt to create a Combined Authority. The collaboration between 
Greater Manchester’s districts demonstrated that there were clear linkages between district 
ambitions and the city-region’s broader economic strategy. Moreover, it provided a coherent 
framework from which to make a convincing case to government for the devolution of 
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responsibility and powers. Consequently, Greater Manchester was granted Combined 
Authority powers in 2011.  
Second, the failure of the Transport Innovation Fund gave rise to the Greater Manchester 
Transport Fund (GMTF), a £1.5 billion fund, proposed in 2009, which is now emerging as 
one of GMCA’s most successful policies, and has been influential in causing the race for 
Combined Authority status in other city-regions across England. Crucially, the GMTF 
enabled the resumption of the Metrolink expansion and provided vital bargaining chip for 
GMCA in the City Deal negotiations with central government, and underpinned GMCA’s 
case for an ‘Earn Back’ mechanism. 
Following a similar model to the Transport Innovation Fund, the GMTF uses an objective 
appraisal model based on GVA to determine which schemes to prioritise, and is comprised 
a range of funding sources that are pooled into a single fund. The £1.5 billion funding 
package includes grants from DfT; a portion of Greater Manchester Integrated Transport 
Block Local Transport Plan funding (also central government grant); Metrolink fare box and 
revenues from other assets; and a levy on the 10 districts of Greater Manchester in the form 
of their usual contributions to TfGM, but with an additional an escalator of 3% over 6 years. 
In order to finance transport improvements upfront, the GMTF has borrowed 
approximately £400 million from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) and £600 million 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) (£1 billion in total). The easily accessible, flexible and 
affordable PWLB debt is complimented by the EIB facility, which, unlike the PWLB debt, 
enables GMCA to forward fix interest rates until 2015, thus de-risking a large chunk of the 
GMTF. 
There is an element of risk taken around establishing the GMTF, because it is predicated 
upon getting passengers to use the Metrolink system. The operating model for the Metrolink 
is effectively a profit share arrangement, whereby TfGM pay a private sector operator (Paris 
Regional Transport – RATP) to operate and maintain the Metrolink system and receive a 
portion of the fare box revenues. The risk of that the Metrolink might underperform 
commercially is effectively shouldered by the 10 Greater Manchester districts, because the 
recourse for the £1billion of debt sits with them: 
‘It’s our money going in. The risk sits with the 10 local authorities. They’re putting in 
the increased contribution. Other than the grant element, there is nothing going in from 
central government. The Combined Authority borrows the money. TfGM deliver the 
schemes in the main. The Combined Authority funds them either through the 
government grant it’s received or the borrowings, and then the Combined Authority 
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has a route back to the 10 districts in terms of its levy that it can raise’ (Author’s 
interview, City Treasurer, metropolitan borough council, and Treasurer, combined 
authority, 2013). 
There is certainly some risk associated with the substantial volumes of debt used to finance 
Metrolink, giving the GMTF the appearance of a financialised investment fund. However, 
the debt is borrowed largely against future district contributions, rather than uncertain future 
revenues based on tax base expansion or asset value appreciation, thus reducing the level of 
speculation in the GMTF.  
According to the GMCA, one of the key risks for GMCA and TfGM is being insulated from 
the financial benefits that have been created by the jobs and economic growth attributable 
to Metrolink. Indeed, GMCA’s contention is that the majority of the tax base expansion that 
results from its own investment is currently remitted to the national exchequer, rather than 
retained locally.  
In response to this risk, in its City Deal negotiations with the centre, GMCA bargained for 
powers to retain some of the fiscal benefits from their investments through the GMTF. 
GMCA claimed that with more access to the fruits of its investment, it could generate even 
more jobs, growth and productivity by recycling any returns back into Greater Manchester’s 
infrastructure stock. This gave birth to the idea of ‘Earn Back’.  
The premise of Greater Manchester’s Earn Back scheme, which was finalised in the 2012 
City Deal, is that it provides GMCA an opportunity to capture a greater portion of the value 
that is created through the GMTF’s investments, thereby rewarding GMCA for its 
investment to date and incentivising it to invest more in the future and, in particular, to create 
more economic growth.  
Earn Back enables GMCA to retain (or ‘earn back’) up to a maximum £30 million per year 
of NDRs over and above the standard 50% that it is otherwise entitled to retain. The exact 
proportion of this £30 million that GMCA is able to retain in any one year is calculated using 
a formula which takes into account the level of GVA growth in Greater Manchester. In 
short, Earn Back is a ‘payment-by-results’ mechanism, through which the central 
government donates a portion of its tax receipts to GMCA, but only if the investment in 
Greater Manchester’s infrastructure generates sufficient economic growth. 
Importantly, GMCA can borrow against anticipated future Earn Back receipts in order to 
finance the very infrastructure that might generate the required GVA increases. In contrast 
to the basic GMTF model, then, Earn Back takes on a more speculative guise: 
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‘Whilst the transport fund so far has been against the districts committing a contribution 
and effectively underwriting it, Earn Back is committing borrowings against a revenue 
stream which is largely uncertain because you don’t know what economic performance 
is. You can model what the outcomes should be, but it’s clearly at the more risky end 
of the spectrum’ (Author’s interview, City Treasurer, metropolitan borough council, 
and Treasurer, combined authority, 2013). 
Not only is Greater Manchester’s transport infrastructure strategy geared towards 
infrastructure investments that generate a return on investment in order to create a revolving 
fund, but it also incorporates an element of speculation, meaning that the revolving 
capabilities of the fund, and the fiscal security of the 10 districts that guarantee the debt, 
become uncertain. Although Earn Back is only worth £30 million per year and, thus, the 
speculative element of the GMTF is limited, the challenge for Greater Manchester is to 
manage the processes of fiscalisation and financialisation. Whilst the development of a city-
regional governance system has provided new opportunities for infrastructure investment, it 
has also paved the way for an increasingly speculative approach to infrastructure investment, 
meaning that GMCA risks fostering political, economic and fiscal tensions between the 10 
Greater Manchester districts and potentially creating the foundations for future fiscal crisis. 
 
6.3 Concluding remarks: urban governance, fiscal stress and 
reterritorialisation 
This chapter has shown that the financialisation of capital investment has transformative 
implications for urban territoriality and governance. Just as the financing practices used by 
cities varies according to spatio-temporal factors (Chapter 5), the ways in which the 
financialisation of capital investment affects urban governance and reterritorialisation is 
equally diverse. Accordingly then, this chapter has presented a fine-grained analysis of the 
actually existing financialisation in each of the six case study cities and its interaction with 
neoliberal processes of rescaling, restructuring and the fiscalisation of urban development. 
In the US, financialised investment practices appear to be a key ingredient in enabling fiscally 
stressed urban governments to pursue programmes of development that are strategically 
centred around the generation of financial returns and fiscal benefits. In Chicago, for 
example, the city government was partially able to close its 2014 budget deficit of $339 
million by using $30.3 million of surplus TIF revenues. According to the Civic Federation 
(2013), such revenues will play an increasingly important role in balancing the City of 
Chicago’s budget in the future. Because it securitises anticipated future tax receipts, TIF 
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enables the City of Chicago to make investments in infrastructure in spite of the absence of 
capital in its Corporate Fund. This process is referred to here as the fiscalisation of urban 
development. Crucially, as the examples of Chicago and Buffalo demonstrate, this cocktail 
of financialisation and fiscalisation intensifies inter-urban competition, incentivises the 
process of circumvention, and leads to the fragmentation of urban governance. Perhaps most 
significantly, the fiscalisation of urban development can foster a hazardous form of 
speculative urbanism, which, in the case of Stockton, led to fiscal crisis and ultimately 
bankruptcy. Indeed, Stockton provides an example of the most severe form of 
deterritorialisation, whereby, in bankruptcy, the City government is close to complete 
dissolution. 
For English cities, infrastructure investment takes place within the UK’s structurally 
embedded framework of centralism. Because central government is the ‘single source of 
constitutional power and authority’ (Wilson and Game, 2011: 33), cities’ ability to fund and 
finance infrastructure is almost inevitably defined in relation to central power and control. 
However, the pressures of fiscal stress and the emerging opportunities to engage in 
financialised investment practices are stirring up a challenge to the hegemony of the centre. 
In a series of bilateral agreements between individual cities and central government – the 
City Deals – the eight Core Cities have bargained for essential powers to engage in 
infrastructure investment. In reality, however, the City Deals incorporate only a select few 
examples of (very limited) devolution and have a negligible impact on local powers of 
‘initiation’ and ‘immunity’ (see Clark 1984; Chapter 4). Furthermore, as the example of 
Sheffield highlights, the devolution of power is an innately contradictory and uneven process. 
Nevertheless, the prospect of engaging in financialised investment practices and negotiating 
with the centre for a better deal continues to fuel the process of reterritorialisation, and across 
all three UK case studies there is evidence of the (re)emergence of the city-region. By 
collaborating formally through city-regional institutions, such as LEPs and CAs, local 
governments can increase their capacity to negotiate for devolution, target larger and more 
transformational forms of (trans-territorial) infrastructure, create larger pools of investment 
capital, devise new and innovative financing practices that are unavailable at the individual 
local authority level, and mitigate the impacts of fiscal stress and austerity urbanism. Greater 
Manchester provides the most developed example of city-regional institution building, and, 
demonstrates the benefits for funding and financing infrastructure by pooling funds and 
leveraging power and money from the centre. However, as with the US examples, the model 
of urban development pursued in Greater Manchester is at risks of fostering competition, 
fragmentation, and a hazardous form of city-regional speculation. 
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Chapter 7: The intensification of ‘splintering urbanism’ 
The processes of unbundling, segmentation and privatisation have underpinned the 
financialisation of infrastructure (O’Neill, 2010; 2013), and have been pivotal in enabling new 
sources of investment to flow into cities’ built environment. At the same time, however, the 
transition away from the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ towards a more unbundled, 
segmented and privatised model of infrastructure provision has fuelled a shift towards what 
Graham and Marvin (2001) term ‘splintering urbanism’. 
Whereas Graham and Marvin’s (2001) analysis of splintering urbanism highlights that 
privatised and market-based models of infrastructure provision lead to a highly uneven 
distribution of networked infrastructures across urban space, this chapter makes a case that 
splintering urbanism is in fact a core feature of the financialisation of the capitalist city. The 
chapter does not refute the argument made by Graham and Marvin, but rather it builds upon 
their theorisation of splintering urbanism to demonstrate that the financialisation 
infrastructure and capital investment intensifies the process of urban splintering. 
Like the process of financialisation itself, however, the extent to which the financialisation 
of infrastructure accelerates the process of splintering urbanism is highly place-dependent. 
Because underperforming and peripheral economies are less conducive to investment 
models that are premised on capturing the future value increases generated by an item of 
infrastructure, the financialisation of capital investment is less secure in these places, resulting 
in a polarised landscape of infrastructure investment. This Chapter argues, in part, that the 
uneven geographies of financialisation can be attributed to the unique ‘geographies of risk 
and return’ associated with a particular place, which is shaped as much by distinctive local 
economic geographies as it is by investor calculations or logics.  
Despite the continued – and in some instances increased – role of the state in funding and 
financing infrastructure, it is undeniable that the willingness and ability of financial 
intermediaries to invest in urban infrastructure assets is increasing. In some places, this is 
leading to a rapid growth in the private ownership of public assets, transforming them from 
useful and productive components of the built environment into purpose-built revenue 
generating machines. As the case study of Chicago in Section 7.2.1 illustrates, the 
privatisation of public infrastructure can be an attractive options for governments suffering 
from fiscal stress or looking for quick fixes to fiscal crisis, albeit fraught with often-
unforeseen risks and costs (Farmer, forthcoming). 
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Chapter 5 argues that more financialised models of infrastructure funding can increase need 
to generate returns on investment (both public and private), for example for servicing debt 
or for meeting value creation and value capture targets. Sections 7.1.3 and 7.2.2 further 
interrogate these sorts of funding practices and argue that the need to generate returns on 
investment incentivises governments and private enterprises to pursue an acceleration in the 
circulation of capital through the built environment. Although the ‘creative destruction’ of 
the built environment is already considered to be a key component of capitalist urban 
development (Harvey, 1985a; Weber, 2002), the Newcastle and Buffalo case studies below 
illustrate that the intensified search for returns on investment – necessitated by the 
financialisation of infrastructure and the adoption of financialised investment practices – is 
causing an acceleration in the process of creative destruction, which, in turn, has splintering 
implications for the city. 
Key elements of the financialisation of capital investment, such the issuance of public debt 
in the capital markets and the direct investment into the built environment by financial 
institutions, seem to be causing cities and financial markets to become more integrated and 
interdependent. A crucial effect of this interdependence is that cities become increasingly 
vulnerable to systemic crises, which potentially causes the emergence of fiscal stress and even 
bankruptcy. Section 7.2.3 explores the splintering implications of Stockton’s bankruptcy and 
especially aims to highlight the costs of the City’s previously speculative model of urban 
development and financial mismanagement for the citizens, employees and retirees of 
Stockton. 
 
7.1 The uneven geographies of risk in the UK: seeking a return on 
infrastructure investment 
Innovations in the structuring of infrastructure funding and financing, such as the evolution 
of public-private partnerships, have created opportunities for the private sector to assume a 
greater-than-ever role in urban infrastructure investment. Indeed, it has been argued in some 
quarters (e.g. Whitfield, 2010) that private investors are circling the UK’s public 
infrastructure assets like vultures, waiting to prey on the juicy returns available. 
Despite this dominant metanarrative, the ‘geographies of risk and return’ in many parts of 
the UK dictate that genuine opportunities for profitable infrastructure investment are limited 
and, consequently, that the public sector continues to be fundamentally important for 
defraying the costs of the nation’s infrastructure and – perhaps more importantly – taking 
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the risk that is associated with debt-based and sometimes speculative investments. This 
contention is explored further using the cases of Sheffield (Section 7.1.1) and Manchester 
(Section 7.1.2) below. 
Central to the public sector’s willingness to make infrastructure investments are the potential 
rewards of economic growth and job creation that could result. As urban governments strive 
to meet such strategic objectives through infrastructure investment, they draw on a series of 
increasingly entrepreneurial and financialised funding and financing practices. Due to the 
logic of accelerated capital circulation that sits at the heart of such funding and financing 
practices, as the case study of Science Central in Newcastle (7.1.3) demonstrates, the 
financialisation of infrastructure investment necessarily coincides with a shift in the strategic 
priorities of the City Council away from job creation and economic growth and towards the 
rapid recycling of investment through the built environment, with often splintering and 
destructive implications. 
 
7.1.1 The public and private geographies of risk and return in Sheffield City Region 
In a book entitled ‘The Global Auction of Public Assets’, Whitfield (2010: 213) proclaims 
that Sheffield is ‘fast becoming a PPP city’. To some, however, the prospect that Sheffield is 
becoming privatised – or, at least, dominated by PPPs – would seem improbable. After all, 
this city, fresh from industrial decline, is located in a part of the UK still referred to in some 
business circles as the ‘Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire’. 
Despite the existence of PPP arrangements for profitable enterprises such as waste 
management, corporate services and building services, the core infrastructure of 
contemporary Sheffield, for the most part, has been created through public investment. The 
Sheffield Supertram, for instance, completed in 1995 at a cost of £240 million, was funded 
almost in its entirety by £233 million of central government funds (DSC, 2000; Winkler, 
2007). Although the Supertram was sold to Stagecoach in 1997, and thus became privatised, 
the purchase price was a mere £1.15 million (only 0.5% of its original cost) (House of 
Commons Transport Committee, 2005: 9), which cannot be considered a substantial private 
investment in Sheffield’s urban infrastructure.  
The 1991 World Student Games (WSG) and its infrastructural components present a similar 
story of Sheffield’s dependence on public funding. The City Council paid £147 million to 
host and construct the facilities for the WSG, which ultimately has left a savage debt legacy, 
costing the City Council approximately £25 million per year until 2024 (Sheffield City 
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Council, 2010). Despite a refinancing agreement with the PWLB to reduce the cost of debt, 
the stifling costs of maintaining the WSG facilities have led to the Don Valley Stadium being 
earmarked for demolition. Perhaps the most telling aspect of this example, and a sign of 
Sheffield’s continued dependence on public sector investment, is the list of potential 
contributors to the ‘advanced park for sports and wellbeing’, which will replace existing 
facilities at the WSG site. These include Sheffield City Council, Sheffield University, Sheffield 
Hallam University, Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust, Sheffield City Region Local 
Enterprise Partnership and Sport England (Mark, 2013).  
Further evidence of the public sector’s continued significance in funding Sheffield’s 
infrastructure can be found in Sheffield City Council’s support for the Sevenstone 
development, which is underpinned by a purchase guarantee and a TIF scheme (Chapter 5).  
In contrast to Whitfield’s (2010) assertion that Sheffield is fast becoming a PPP city, then, it 
appears as if the public sector will continue to be both the engine of the city’s economy and 
the source of its infrastructure investment. 
The emergence of city-regional institutions has been a key feature of Sheffield’s recent 
reterritorialisation. A driving force in the formation of the Sheffield City Region LEP and 
the Sheffield City Region Combined Authority (SCRCA) has been the idea that public capital 
can be most efficiently channelled into ‘value-creating’ infrastructure projects through a 
collaborative city-regional investment framework (Section 6.2). To this end, the Sheffield 
City Region Investment Fund (SCRIF) has been a key product of Sheffield’s territorial 
reconfiguration. 
Arguably, the SCRIF represents the most comprehensive attempt in recent history to 
stimulate Sheffield’s city-regional economy through public investment. To date, a total of 17 
different infrastructure and development projects have been identified for up to £435.35 
million of investment through the SCRIF (Table 7.1). These 17 projects are prioritised 
according to their ability to generate productivity, jobs and growth – loosely defined as Gross 
Value Added (GVA). In a similar vein to the Strategic Investment Framework used by 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority (Chapter 5), the SCRIF uses a ‘Single Assessment 
Framework’ (SAF) based on a model called ‘FLUTE’ (Forecasting the interactions of Land-
Use, Transport and Economy) (Figure 7.1). 
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Table 7.1: Sheffield City Region Investment Fund, initial prioritised scheme list 
GVA/£ 
Rank 
Name £GVA 
(£m)  
Cost to 
SCRIF 
(£m)  
£GVA/ 
£SCRIF  
1 M1 J36 to Dearne Valley  3663.9 24.4 150 
2 Cudworth – Grimethorpe  204.2 5.3 39 
3 Sheffield City Centre  695.3 26.4 26 
4 Doncaster DN7  294.2 12.8 23 
5 Chesterfield Waterside  72.3 3.2 22 
6 Chesterfield Northern Gateway  102.6 7.9 13 
7 M1 J37 Claycliffe Link  143.1 11.9 12 
8 West Moor Link  193.1 16.3 12 
9 Upper Don Valley  604 53.4 11 
10 Doncaster Urban Centre  268 27.8 10 
11 Lower Don Valley - Waverley  407.8 45 9 
12 Gateway to the Sheffield City Region  131.6 15.8 8 
13 Harworth Bircotes (transport)  80.2 12.2 7 
14 North Doncaster A1-A19 Link  134.8 25.8 5 
15 Lower Don Valley - Sheffield  252.9 58.2 4 
16 Worksop and Vesuvius Works  77.1 26.5 3 
17 Barnsley-Doncaster BRT  81.2 62.5 1 
Total Potential Cost to SCRIF 435.35 
Source: Sheffield City Region, 2013a. 
 
In short, the FLUTE model measures how much, if any, ‘additionality’ will be generated by 
a particular public infrastructure investment (see GenEcon and MVA Consultancy, 2013: 13-
16). As such, it aims to justify particular interventions by showing that GVA increases within 
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the Sheffield City Region are the direct result of public investment, rather than the product 
of pre-existing market trends. For Sheffield City Region, the ability to make such a 
justification is essential for two main reasons. First, it legitimises the initial public investment 
in the eyes of HM Treasury and, therefore, substantiates SCRCA’s claims for powers from 
the Centre that will enable it to raise funds and make investments. Second, it provides 
SCRCA with some degree of assurance of a return on their investment (in the form of access 
to an expanded tax base), which is essential for the SCRIF to revolve and to recycle capital 
through Sheffield’s built environment. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The FLUTE model used by SCRIF 
Source: Willumsen, 2013. 
 
A key question that emerges from the analysis of SCRIF, however, is that if publically funded 
infrastructure can generate returns on investment in a way that can support a revolving 
infrastructure fund, then why are the projects highlighted in Table 7.1 not being invested in 
by the private sector? 
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Take the landmark SCRIF investment entitled ‘M1 J36 to Dearne Valley’ in Table 7.1, for 
example. This £24.4 million investment package includes: strategic highway infrastructure; 
295 hectares of site preparation work; and an estimated 3,600 units of housing (Sheffield City 
Region, 2013b). It is ranked at the top of SCRIF’s investment list because it is forecast to 
generate £3663.9 million in GVA, with a return on investment ratio of 1:150. It is undeniable 
that such an increase in GVA would be beneficial for the local economy. Importantly, 
however, the significant increase in GVA is not easily monetised: unlike in Greater 
Manchester where the GMCA has an ‘Earn Back’ mechanism (Chapter 6), the only financial 
returns available in Sheffield would be from growth in the existing local tax base (Council 
Tax and 50% of NDRs).  
The inability to monetise the broader economic and social benefits of infrastructure is also a 
key obstacle to private investment. For the private sector, GVA is not an adequate measure 
of return: the only relevant measures for financial institutions and investors are the risk-
adjusted ‘internal rate of return’ (IRR), which equates to a capital investment’s profitability, 
and the risk-adjusted ‘net present value’, which ‘estimates how much a potential project will 
contribute to shareholder wealth’ (Brigham and Houston, 2007: 361, 363). Although the ‘M1 
J36 to Dearne Valley’ clearly has the ability to generate GVA increases, this ability does not 
necessarily translate into an ability to generate profitability.  
Risk is also a key determinant of whether an investment in infrastructure takes place. For the 
private sector the primary risk of investing in an infrastructure project is that ‘the predicted 
revenues do not materialise’ (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002: 109). This risk can be broken down 
into a number of different categories, such as technical risk, construction risk, financing risk, 
political risk, etc. (ibid; AMP Capital, 2013; Weber and Alfen, 2010). For the public sector, 
risk is arguably less tangible. For example, an important risk is that a proposed investment 
will cost more than anticipated, potentially causing fiscal stress, hampering service delivery 
and inhibiting broader social and economic development. Because of these differences, it is 
possible to increase efficiency by allocating specific risks to the stakeholder who has the 
capacity to bear and manage those risks most effectively (Figure 7.2), thus providing 
justification for the public-private partnership (PPP) model of investment (OECD, 2007).  
In a PPP or PFI, the public sector (and the taxpayer) typically remains the party that funds 
the infrastructure. This is because it has access to income sources, such as taxation or 
government grants, which are not available to private investors, and which are available 
irrespective of the ability of the infrastructure to generate project-specific revenues. While 
the public sector could just fund and finance the scheme in isolation, bringing private finance 
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into a PPP can enhance the overall ‘Value for Money’ (VfM) that the infrastructure item 
represents for the taxpayer by creating efficiency savings and by transferring a range of risks 
to the private sector. From a private investor perspective, investing in a project that is funded 
from public sources is an attractive prospect because their return on investment is implicitly 
underwritten by the taxpayer: this benefit is sometimes codified by an explicit public 
guarantee of private revenues (PwC, 2011b). Although such an arrangement ensures that the 
public sector will bear the full cost of the infrastructure, it also reduces the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC)1 available to the private sector, thus reducing the return required by 
investors and, at least in theory, enabling the public sector to generate VfM. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Public and private risk allocation in a public-private partnership  
Source: Author’s own. 
 
Building on the ‘M1 J36 to Dearne Valley’ example, it should be noted that road 
infrastructure is a notoriously difficult asset to fund through private sources: there are a huge 
range of political, economic and financial challenges to funding and delivering toll road 
infrastructure (Bain, 2009a). More commonly, road infrastructure is funded by the public 
sector (using ‘availability payments’ or ‘shadow tolls’) while incorporating elements of private 
finance, such as in a PFI (Bain, 2009b). The reader should note, for instance, that even the 
                                                 
1 WACC is a measure of the average cost of debt capital and equity capital and the extent to which an investor 
or business is using borrowed money (Vecchi et al., 2013). 
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Chicago Skyway (below), a landmark example of private investment in road infrastructure, 
was actually funded by the City of Chicago. 
Perhaps the most important factor in the case of the ‘M1 J36 to Dearne Valley’ 
improvements and SCRIF’s other 16 projects, however, is the particular ‘geography of risk and 
return’ (see Section 2.4.1) that characterises Sheffield. The place-specific factors that would 
make private investment in an item of infrastructure in Sheffield seem risky, for example, 
could include: the fall in the average daily flow of vehicles on the M1 between Sheffield 
boundary and J34 from 101,077 in 2001 to 77,457 in 2012 (UK Traffic Data, 2014); the 
increase in Sheffield’s office vacancy rates from 6.7% in 2002 to 12.5% in 2009 (Centre for 
Cities, 2011: 19); or the comparatively low headline office rental values in Sheffield (Knight 
Frank, 2014).  
These factors, which are unique to Sheffield City Region, point towards the uncertain 
viability of funding infrastructure through demand-based project-generated revenues 
(private funding). Ultimately, the characteristics of Sheffield’s economy (i.e. its ‘economic 
geography’) mean that the role of the state in funding and financing infrastructure is just as 
important as ever. Even at where infrastructure is financed by the private sector, such as in 
a PPP, the state (and taxpayer) remains vital in providing the political and regulatory 
environment in which investment can occur (‘market making’) and in generating the 
underlying revenues that defray the costs of the infrastructure item at hand (funding). 
 
7.1.2 Private investment in Greater Manchester’s infrastructure? The persistent role 
of the state  
Like Sheffield, Manchester has its share of PPPs, including a £165 million Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) agreement between Manchester City Council and Amey and Laing Roads for 
the provision of street lighting, and a £3.8 billion PFI agreement between the Greater 
Manchester Waste Disposal Authority, nine Greater Manchester Waste Collection 
Authorities, and Viridor Laing (Greater Manchester) Ltd for the provision of waste 
collection and recycling services. Although it is undeniable that such PFI deals represent a 
degree of private sector investment, the financing mechanism at the heart of these PFI deals 
ensures that the private sector’s revenue needs are met by mortgage-style payments from the 
public sector partner (Froud, 2003; Leyshon and Thrift, 2007). That is, whilst they are 
financed by the private sector, they are funded by the public sector. 
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Through Earn Back (Chapter 6), the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) is 
arguably leading the way in the UK in terms of funding and financing infrastructure by 
monetising the economic benefits of its investments. Whilst it is essential to recognise that 
GMCA’s progress in this area is as a direct result of political, financial and legislative support 
from HM Government, it is also telling that GMCA is willing to borrow against speculative 
future increases in GVA and the associated revenue streams that it generates: it demonstrates 
that Greater Manchester’s economy has the capacity to grow, creating value that can be 
captured, and thus providing GMCA with an incentive to invest.  
Although this model of value capture works for GMCA, the prospect of generating a more 
straightforward commercial revenue stream from infrastructure remains as challenging as 
ever: 
‘If you look at a transport interchange, if you go to somewhere like Altrincham or 
Piccadilly, the opportunities for that to generate significant levels of commercial 
revenues are very limited. The revenue that [TfGM] can generate from transport 
interchanges is a departure charge, which is relatively small beer. [Otherwise], there 
really aren’t any opportunities in terms of generating public transport infrastructure that 
makes money… We could have had a differential face structure on Metrolink, which 
would have generated far more revenue than the current system, but it would have a 
very negative impact on the role that the tram system has within the wider transport 
network, and the role that it has within the economy of Manchester. So we see very 
clearly [a model that is less efficient at generating revenue] as an integral part of a 
functional economic area, and fulfilling environmental and social objectives’ (Author’s 
interview, Finance Director, local transport authority, 2013). 
Given the sparse opportunities for TfGM or GMCA to tap into project-generated revenues, 
it is perhaps to be expected that there are limited prospects for private sector investment in 
Manchester’s infrastructure. Indeed, despite the ability of public infrastructure investment to 
unlock economic growth in Greater Manchester, the same infrastructure does not appear to be 
able to generate the required level of packageable, securitiseable and tradable revenue streams 
to meet the desired risk-adjusted returns of private investors. 
There is no lack of investment-capital ready and waiting in the wings, even in the wake of a 
series of constraints placed on financial institutions’ investment and lending abilities since 
the financial crisis, such as the Basel III capital requirement regulations (Allen et al., 2012): 
‘It is crystal clear that there is no shortage of national and international capital that is 
looking to invest in development. The global markets are alive and kicking’ (Author’s 
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interview, Director of Investment Management, international investment management 
firm, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Unlisted infrastructure fund dry powder by primary regional focus, 
December 2006 - September 2013 
Source: Preqin, 2013: 7. 
 
If anything, an analysis of the levels of ‘dry powder’ (that is, money that is ready and waiting 
to be invested) within unlisted infrastructure funds confirms that there is an oversupply of 
capital in the markets (Figure 7.3). Instead of being a supply issue, then, it appears that the 
key obstacle to private investment in infrastructure is a lack of genuine opportunities for 
revenue and profit generation. 
This section has already established that the ‘geographies of risk and return’ and, specifically, 
the challenges of creating project-generated revenues – can limit the opportunities for 
infrastructure to be funded and financed solely by the private sector. In Manchester, for 
example, although office vacancy rates have decreased since 2012, the overall trend indicates 
increasing vacancy rates since 2004 (Jones Lang LaSalle, 2013). Furthermore, prime office 
rents have only increased at a compounded annual growth rate of 1% over the last five years 
(Cushman and Wakefield, 2014), substantially below growth rates in the City of London 
(4.3%) and London’s West End (6.6%) (ibid.). While the relative underperformance of 
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Manchester’s commercial property market does not in itself mean that infrastructure projects 
cannot generate project-generated revenues, these statistics reveal the relatively unfavourable 
geographies of risk and return in Manchester. 
The activities of the Greater Manchester Pension Fund (GMPF) are indicative of these 
geographies. The GMPF manages and invests the pension contributions of public sector 
employees and their employers in the Manchester city-region, including all ten Greater 
Manchester Councils, as well a range of other public sector employers. Local authority 
pension funds have been lauded as a potential source of much-need investment in local 
infrastructure (DCLG, 2012b). In practice, `however, GMPF functions like any other 
pension fund, aiming to provide sufficient returns to meet pension obligations (in FY 
2013/14, the fund made a return of 7%) (GMPF, 2014): 
‘[Pension funds] are not doing it for the love of growth in the economy. They’re looking 
for a commercial return from it. That’s what they’re there for. They’re not charities’ 
(Author’s interview, City Treasurer, metropolitan borough council, and Treasurer, 
combined authority, 2013). 
As a result, there is an innate tension between any ambition of the GMPF to invest in local 
infrastructure and its actual ability to do so. Currently, GMPF is invested in £98 million of 
infrastructure assets and has committed a further £144 million to this sector. However, this 
investment is not dedicated to local infrastructure projects and is instead deployed wherever 
it can generate the best returns for the fund. That said, GMPF actively invests in regeneration 
schemes in the UK through its Property Venture Fund. Key investments in Greater 
Manchester include a stake in the development of ‘Airport City’, an £800m project in the 
Airport Enterprise Zone, and a 270,000 sq. ft. office block in St Peters Square. Nevertheless, 
even the Property Venture Fund invests more in London and the South East (approximately 
25%) than it does in Manchester and the North West (approximately 20%) (GMPF, 2014), 
providing further evidence that the geographies of risk and return are not balanced in its 
favour in the local context of the Manchester city-region.  
There is no doubt that Greater Manchester presents a different case from Sheffield City 
Region. Nevertheless, for all of the hype surrounding the Greater Manchester’s resurrection 
as the economic jewel of the North, public investment has been absolutely central to its 
recent success. The most notable examples of publically funded infrastructure include 
Metrolink (Chapter 6), Manchester Airport (Chapter 5), the Commonwealth Games Stadium 
(now the Etihad Stadium) and Manchester’s conference centre (‘Manchester Central’) 
(Chapter 5). Even projects like Media City in Salford, which is regarded as a symbol of 
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Greater Manchester’s transition towards a successful knowledge economy fit for the 21st 
Century, received over £30 million of funding from the North West Regional Development 
Agency (NWDA). Further still, one of Media City’s ‘spin-offs’, the Sharp Project in 
Manchester, has also had substantial public sector funding, receiving £2.6 million in ERDF 
funding, £3.3 in NWDA funding, and £4.7 million from Manchester City Council (Ekosgen, 
2013: 11). 
Despite the ‘rise of the infra funds’ (Orr, 2007) and the ‘rise of a global infrastructure market’ 
(Torrance, 2009b), the state has arguably never had a larger role to play in funding and 
financing infrastructure. While some landmark infrastructure projects in core economic 
areas, such as Thames Tideway Tunnel in London, can be funded through private sources 
(i.e. the ‘customer’) (Thames Water, 2013), other similar scale infrastructure projects in 
London, such as Crossrail (also in London), still require substantial public sector funding 
and support (Butcher, 2014). Even in the Thames Tideway Tunnel, there is a substantial role 
for the state to play in terms of regulation.  
In more peripheral or underperforming areas, such as Sheffield and Manchester, however, 
the state’s role in funding infrastructure can be regarded as even more important. At the 
same time that its role is increased, the state is exposed to a greater array of challenges in 
places like Sheffield and Manchester: public sector organisations in these locations also suffer 
from more fragile tax bases and weaker levels of tax base growth, factors which are becoming 
especially important given the current wave of fiscal devolution to local authorities in 
England, and which, when combined with greater infrastructure spending responsibilities, 
could create spaces of fiscal stress (Chapter 6). More broadly, the revelation that the state’s 
role is indeed as significant as ever – if not more so – highlights the importance of making a 
conceptual distinction between funding and financing, and reinforces the need a more detailed 
and fine-grained analysis of financialisation of public capital investment and its implications. 
 
7.1.3 Taking risks on viability gaps? Decentralisation and the intensification of 
creative destruction in Newcastle 
One of the major barriers to private development and privately funded infrastructure in 
Newcastle is the lack of viable development opportunities. Whereas Newcastle City Council 
has previously relied on a steady flow of grant funding from the centre, the availability of 
such funding – especially in a form specifically designed to close viability gaps – has dried up 
since the Coalition government embarked on its project of deficit reduction through austerity 
and spending cuts: 
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We have a fundamental problem [in Newcastle] of growing values in what is a low-
demand market… The whole public sector funding regime has changed radically from 
one of gap funding, to one of equity investment, and the level of equity investment 
today is considerably smaller than the funding available through [previous] gap funding 
regimes, both from Europe and from the central government (Author’s interview, 
Partner, local property consultants, 2012). 
The lack of central government funding, in combination with (not unrelated) processes of 
fiscal decentralisation (Section 6.2), has put more onus on local authorities across England 
to address the challenges of funding infrastructure and urban development through 
initiatives that are led, funded and delivered locally. 
Local authorities like Newcastle City Council have been keen to take on the mantle of 
delivering infrastructure and local economic development, despite these activities remaining 
outside of their statutory obligations, because development initiatives can help meet their 
own strategic objectives, such as economic growth and job creation. The Core Strategy and 
Urban Core Plan for Gateshead and Newcastle upon Tyne, for example, states ‘economic 
prosperity’ as the first of its five key strategies, for which it identifies some key policy actions:  
‘Gateshead and Newcastle must promote the growth of key sectors including globally 
competitive universities, a cluster of hospitals, a thriving knowledge economy driven 
through research and innovation, a strong financial and professional services sector, 
good road and public transport accessibility and access to a skilled labour force’ 
(Gateshead Council and Newcastle City Council, 2014: 53). 
In line with the above policy actions, Newcastle City Council has pursued a development 
project called ‘Science Central’, which aims to combine ‘the world-renowned scientific 
expertise of Newcastle University’ with ‘leading-edge businesses’ (Science Central, 2014), 
potentially creating up to between 2000 and 5000 new jobs by 2020 (Pearson, 2010). The 
brownfield site in the heart of Newcastle on which Science Central is currently being 
assembled was previously home to the Tyne Brewery, where Newcastle Brown Ale was 
brewed until the Brewery closed in 2004.  
While the site’s centrality gives it additional strategic significance, its history as a Brewery and 
previously as a coal-mining site also creates a unique set of infrastructural and development 
challenges and costs: 
‘The site was used by the brewery, and there were lots of buried foundations and lots 
of contamination. Before the brewery, there was a lot of terraced housing and industry 
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on site. Before that, there was quite a lot of coal mining. So it’s a very complex site’ 
(Author’s interview, Senior Project Manager, local development firm, 2014). 
In addition to the infrastructural challenges and their related costs, a further challenge for 
Science Central is preserving the value of the site (and the land in particular) while remaining 
loyal the strategic objectives of fostering world-renowned scientific businesses. By shunning 
market demands for other forms of say retail-led development, the unquestionably well-
intentioned strategic objectives of Newcastle City Council have arguably reduced the value 
of the site. 
As a result of this combination of challenges, the early phases of Science Central have 
attracted very little private investment. After the closure of the Tyne Brewery, the site is 
estimated to have been acquired by Newcastle City Council, One North East and Newcastle 
University for between £33 million and £50 million (Pike, 2014). In addition to this initial 
capital outlay, public money has also funded the first phase of site preparation: 
‘In terms of funding for phase 1 [of Science Central], the budget is £31.5 million to 
deliver soft landscaping, hard landscaping, and the enabling work. The £31.5 million is 
made up of £8 million each from the University and Newcastle City Council. In 
addition, the City Council have applied for and secured investment from the Regional 
Growth Fund (RGF), which is £6 million. There is also money coming in from the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) of about £5.5 million. There was also 
then a pot of money right at the start of the project of about £4 million, which was 
made up of equal amounts between the City Council, the University, and One North 
East’ (Author’s interview, Senior Project Manager, local development firm, 2014). 
Importantly, Science Central is also part of Newcastle City Council’s Accelerated 
Development Zone (ADZ), its tax increment financing (TIF) scheme (Section 5.2.2). 
Consequently, the City Council’s investment is predicated on generating an uplift in the non-
domestic rates (NDRs) payable by businesses located within Science Central. As discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6, the process of securitising uncertain future tax base growth is highly 
speculative, potentially providing rich rewards but also exposing cities to a new set of risks.  
Whilst it appears that the development of Science Central is not an explicit example 
fiscalisation (that is, the pursuit of development specifically in search of fiscal rewards), 
emergent processes of fiscal decentralisation and devolution in England are placing 
increasing pressure on the City Council to find ways of meeting its strategic objectives 
through developments that, through the generation of increased tax revenues, are effectively 
self-funding (Chapters 5 and 6). Arguably, the Science Central project represents such an 
attempt. Crucially, the contention here is that the need to meet its debt-service obligations, 
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in addition to the attraction of recycling any excess revenues back into the urban 
environment, provides a strong incentive for Newcastle City Council to accelerate the 
circulation of capital through the built environment and, in turn, to actively promote the 
process of creative destruction. In short, the faster that this brownfield site in the heart of 
Newcastle can be turned into a tax-generating parcel of commercial property, the better.  
According to Pike (2014), the process of creative destruction, or ‘fast development’, is 
certainly evident in the Science Central case:  
‘The approach to redeveloping the Tyne Brewery site can be characterised as ‘fast 
development’. Newcastle City Council, the then Regional Development Agency One 
North East and Newcastle University were quick to acquire the site with the aspiration 
of deploying the land as part of their ‘Science City’ regeneration vision of urbanising 
the knowledge economy… The pursuit of ‘fast development’ meant local actors rushed 
to clear the site and demolish the brewery buildings to create a clean slate for the new 
vision of science and technology-led urban renewal’ (Pike, 2014).  
Unfortunately, the process of creative destruction can have splintering implications for urban 
environment. In particular, Pike (2014) bemoans how key aspects of Newcastle’s 
‘internationally resonant’ culture and heritage, significant historical and architectural 
artefacts, and other key ‘elements of authenticity and uniqueness’ were lost through the 
process of fast development on the Tyne Brewery site. Indeed, Pike asserts that: 
‘[g]iven its rapid rhythm and desire to quicken the circulation of capital, ‘fast 
development’ brooks little dissent and encourages no reflection’ (Pike, 2014).  
What is perhaps most telling about the Science Central example, however, is the extent to 
which Newcastle City Council – as the agent of creative destruction – had a clear incentive 
to pursue this form of ‘fast development’. The financialised investment mechanism at the 
heart of the Science Central deal, Newcastle City Council’s ADZ, necessitates the accelerated 
circulation of capital through the built environment: both the City Council’s ability to meet 
its debt-service obligations and the future recycling of surplus capital back into the urban 
environment are entirely dependent on the speed at which the Science Central development 
can be transformed from downtrodden brownfield site to a thriving hub of knowledge-
driven private enterprise. 
Admittedly, the slow rate of development since the demolition of the Tyne Brewery makes 
it possible to question the extent to which this case resembles ‘fast development’. However, 
the key point remains that Newcastle City Council’s intent is to accelerate the circulation of 
capital through the built environment in order to fund and finance Science Central. If 
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anything, the inability to stimulate commercial development demonstrates just how 
precarious and crisis-prone the financialisation of infrastructure investment can be.  
On revisiting the composition of Science Central’s funding package, it is evident that not all 
the funding is tied to Newcastle City Council’s ADZ. However, going forward, as sources of 
central government funding continue to dry up, and as the processes of fiscal decentralisation 
and devolution continue to unfold in the UK, the opportunities for local authorities to 
engage in financialised investment practices, as well as the potential risks and rewards of 
doing so, will only increase. Accordingly, the accelerated circulation of capital through the 
built environment will become a strategic imperative, which will have increasingly splintering 
implications for the UK’s cities. 
 
7.2 The splintering implications of financialised investment in the US 
The highly variable geographies of risk and return are equally evident in the US. Arguably, 
Chicago, as a hub of global commerce and finance, is in a strong position to leverage the 
benefits of financialisation. Indeed, Section 7.2.1 below demonstrates how Chicago’s 
infrastructure assets are becoming an increasingly attractive investment proposition for 
financial institutions. At the same time, however, by entering complex contractual 
agreements with financial institutions for the maintenance and operation of its infrastructure 
assets, the City of Chicago – despite its institutional sophistication – has unduly taken on a 
new set of unforeseen risks and costs. 
The example of Chicago stands in stark contrast to that of Buffalo, a city which struggles to 
attract private investment, especially within its dwindling downtown and ageing post-
industrial wastelands. In an attempt to reinvigorate the city, governing officials have designed 
their policy interventions, such as capital investment in site remediation and preparation, to 
create a landscape that is as attractive as possible to private capital. By lubricating the process 
of demolition and redevelopment in the hope of unlocking private investment, however, the 
City of Buffalo and its supporting development agencies have set upon a policy of creative 
destruction, in which urban churn is favoured over wider social and economic objectives. 
Whereas prior to the subprime crisis in 2007-8, Stockton was perceived as one of California’s 
most buoyant property markets, the City’s current state of fiscal crisis illustrates how the 
prospect of financial and fiscal returns clouded the severe risks that were associated with the 
City’s speculative investment practices (see 5.1.3 and 6.1.3). The full extent of the 
consequences of Stockton’s bout of speculative urbanism is still far from clear. Nevertheless, 
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the on-going bankruptcy process serves as a lesson in the potentially splintering implications 
of forging closer relationships and interdependencies with financial markets.  
 
7.2.1 Long-term infrastructure leases in Chicago: a fiscal fix with splintering 
implications 
The leasing of public assets to private investors is a form of PPP that can help deliver, operate 
and maintain essential urban infrastructure. Technically, asset leasing can also be used as a 
tool to fund and finance the development of new infrastructure. Current practice, however, 
suggests that asset leasing, rather than being used specifically as a tool to fund or finance 
infrastructure, is used more broadly as a way of providing funds to a public authority – in 
return for access to an existing infrastructure asset and its revenue streams – for the purpose 
of stabilising the public authority’s financial condition. As one of the most visible forms of 
private investment in infrastructure, asset leasing, therefore, occupies a strange place in the 
landscape of infrastructure funding: it is a tool which, for the most part, neither funds nor 
finances infrastructure.  
The City of Chicago, for instance, has used the leasing of public assets to private investors 
as a strategy to raise capital in order to address its persistent Corporate Fund deficit (Civic 
Federation, 2013). By leasing-out a selection of assets, the City has raised enormous sums of 
money, enabling it to meet its current financial needs, as well as to set aside provisions with 
the intention of mitigating future fiscal crises.  
In addition to performing as a mechanism for plugging holes in public sector budgets, long-
term infrastructure leases also provide a rare opportunity for large volumes of yield-seeking 
capital to be channelled into the built environment, generating stable, index-linked returns 
and creating diversity within investor portfolios (Inderst, 2010; Solomon, 2009).  
Perhaps most notably, the Chicago examples show that new risks are actually assumed by 
the public sector through the lease process. For example, lease contracts may contain hidden 
costs, unforeseen liabilities and clauses that restrict the process of urban planning and 
strategic development (Ashton et al., 2014; Farmer; forthcoming). A further consequence of 
the lease ‘transaction’ is that it initiates a long-term process of institutional and regulatory 
adaptation, such as the ‘deployment of supplementary regulatory powers’ in response to the 
City’s obligation to preserve investor returns (Ashton et al., 2014: 10). Not only can 
infrastructure leases can have splintering implications for the urban environment, then, but 
they also provide further evidence of the continued role of the state in a financialised world 
– albeit in new and reterritorialised forms. 
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7.2.1.1 Chicago Skyway: a quick budgetary fix 
The first landmark infrastructure lease in Chicago came in 2005 when the City of Chicago 
leased the Skyway, a toll bridge on the city’s South Side that links the Interstate 90 (I-90) 
between Chicago and Indiana, to a private consortium, Cintra-Macquarie, for a period of 99-
years at a cost of $1.83 billion.  
The Skyway is not a new item of infrastructure: it was originally built in the 1950s at a cost 
of $101 million (1958 prices) (CDOT, 2005). Between its opening in 1958 and the signing of 
the lease contract in 2005, the Skyway had been owned and operated by the City of Chicago 
(City of Chicago, 2005). Prior to the lease, the City had already issued two series of bonds 
against bridge’s future toll revenue, Skyway Tollbridge Revenue Bonds Series 1996 ($180 
million), and Skyway Tollbridge Revenue Bonds Series 2000 ($139 million) in order to pay 
for a $260 million renovation programme (City of Chicago, 2004).  
Although the lease transaction provided funding to service these debts (see Table 7.2), this 
was only achieved by securitising the future tolls that the City would have been entitled to 
receive anyway. In addition to the fact that the City of Chicago was perfectly able to maintain 
and operate the Skyway over the preceding 46 years, this implies that a lease was not needed 
for maintaining or renewing the infrastructure itself, which could continue to have been 
funded through project-generated revenues and financed through the bond markets. 
The decision to lease the Skyway, however, was reached during a period in which the City’s 
fiscal health appeared to be entering a period of decline. For example, the City faced budget 
deficits of $140 million, $116 million, and $155.5 million in FY2002, FY2003, and FY2004 
respectively (Civic Federation, 2001, 2002, 2003), and its direct debt rose from $1.7 billion 
in FY1995 to $5.1 billion in FY2004, representing an increase of 202% (Figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.4: City of Chicago direct debt, FY1995-FY2004 
Source: Civic Federation, 2005: 31. 
  
It would perhaps be too far to suggest that the City was in fiscal crisis, although these figures 
suggest that Chicago was at least entering a phase in its history that might be characterised 
by fiscal stress. Further weight can be given to this interpretation by analysing the ways in 
which the revenue from the Skyway lease was used (Table 7.2).  
 
Table 7.2: Distribution and use of revenue from the Skyway lease transaction 
Skyway Lease Revenue Destination of Funds Status 
$500 million Skyway Long-Term Reserve 
Fund 
In tact (legally restricted) 
$855 million Used to retire Skyway debt 
and other City debt 
All $855 million was used by 
2005 
$100 million Human Infrastructure Fund Drawn down by 2009 
$375 million Mid-Term Reserve Fund Drawn down by 2011 
Source: Civic Federation, 2013: 105-6. 
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Although a large portion (up to $855 million) of the Skyway lease revenues were used to 
retire existing Skyway debt – or, in other words, to fund the renovations that took place at 
the turn of the Millennium – and at least $375 million was used to stave off fiscal crisis over 
a period of 6 years after the lease, with a further $500 million being reserved for fiscal 
emergencies that arise over the long term (Table 7.2). Had the City of Chicago been in better 
shape fiscally, the Skyway lease could have been used to create a revolving fund that could 
have reinvested revenues into other aspects of the City’s infrastructure. Although the Human 
Infrastructure fund is an attempt to do this, it only accounts for 5% of the $1.83 billion raised 
through the deal. 
In 2010, the rating agency Fitch downgraded Chicago’s general obligation debt from AA to 
AA+ with a negative outlook while Moody’s downgraded the City’s debt to from Aa2 to Aa3 
with a stable outlook (Fitch Ratings, 2010; Moody’s Investors Service, 2010), both citing the 
over-dependence on revenues from long-term leases for maintaining budgetary stability. The 
Civic Federation (2010, 2013), an organisation that promotes a sustainable and long-term 
approach to public financial planning, has also expressed concern about the City’s recent 
dependence on revenues from the Skyway deal and other leases to balance its budget. Whilst 
it is surely true that asset leases cannot act as a sustainable model of generating revenues for 
the City over the long term, it should perhaps be emphasised that the critiques of the Civic 
Federation and credit rating agencies have more to do with the ill health of the rest of 
Chicago’s finances and less to do with any immediate negative consequences of asset leases 
per se.  
Indeed, there are certainly positive aspects to the Skyway privatisation and the privatisation 
of road infrastructure more broadly: 
‘The private sector is going to manage [Skyway] to a level that it continues to perform, 
and the public will continue to get that value out of that. Our toll way system, until 
recently, had been pretty much a failure: it was crumbling; the tolls were low; the City 
was afraid to raise the tolls; and there was extortion. It has since turned around 
dramatically, so that today it’s probably the best toll way network in the country’ 
(Author’s interview, Executive Vice President, regional planning agency, 2012). 
Despite the tangible benefits that can be achieved through private sector efficiencies, the 
evidence available from the Skyway deal appears to show that fiscal stress (current and 
impending) was the key driver of the lease. In a more fiscally stable environment, the public 
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sector may well have chosen to retain ownership of the Skyway and thus benefit from a 
stable income of toll revenues over the long term. 
 
7.2.1.2 Chicago Parking Meters: from quick fix to long-term liability 
The Skyway deal signalled the start of a period in which the long-term lease model was rolled 
out across Chicago to a number of other suitable forms of infrastructure. Perhaps the most 
notable example is the lease of the city’s parking meters to Morgan Stanley Infrastructure 
Partners (MSIP) in 2008 for a term of 75 years at a cost of $1.15 billion. 
Like the Skyway deal, the parking meter lease can be understood in the context of growing 
fiscal pressures on the City. In July 2008, the City’s budget deficit was forecast to rise to $469 
million for FY2009, while its direct debt for FY2008 had risen to $6.1 billion (or $2,115 per 
capita) (Civic Federation, 2008, 2009). Indeed, an analysis of the use of revenue generated 
by the lease transaction almost mirrors that of the Skyway deal, with the exceptions that there 
was no significant outstanding debt to retire from any recent renovations and that a greater 
proportion of the revenue was dedicated to providing budgetary relief (Table 7.3).   
 
Table 7.3: Distribution and use of revenue from the Parking Meter lease transaction 
Parking Meter Lease 
Revenue 
Destination of Funds Status 
$400 million Parking Meter Long-Term 
Reserve Fund 
$320 million drawn down to 
date 
$325 million Mid-Term Reserve Fund Drawn down by 2011 
$100 million Human Infrastructure Fund $83.5 million drawn down to 
date 
$326 million Discretionary Budget 
Stabilization Fund 
Drawn down by 2010 
Source: Civic Federation, 2013: 109. 
 
In addition to providing further evidence that the City of Chicago has used long-term asset 
leases as a fix to its short-term fiscal challenges, the parking meter deal also exhibits the on-
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going risks, liabilities and costs that a public sector lessor can face well beyond the signing of 
the lease agreement. 
It is important here to separate the genuine on-going risks, liabilities and costs from the 
general controversies of the lease. Of great frustration to the public, for instance, was the 
poor implementation of the privatisation: despite large rate increases, coins remained the 
only method of payment, meaning that paying for parking was simply impractical. Taken in 
isolation, however, this short-term frustration did not pose any genuine form of threat to the 
City, taxpayer or user (in fact, arguably the lease proceeds actually prevented tax increases or 
service cuts in the short term). 
Nevertheless, it is beginning to emerge that the lease has also exposed the City to some 
longer-term risks and liabilities: 
‘Not only did [the Mayor] give away those metres for 75 years, but also if there are 
handicapped people parking in the spaces and not paying, we have to reimburse [the 
investors] for that. Every time we have a street resurfacing and we have to close the 
street for a couple of days to put new asphalt on it, we have to repay them for lost 
revenues. If we want to move some spaces because we want to put a curb cut in there, 
we have to reimburse them for that… We’re planning for bus rapid transit in the city. 
But, if we want to take away a lane, and dedicate it to busses, we’ve got to compensate 
them for all that lost revenue. So we’ve essentially given up the right to control the 
public way’ (Author’s interview, Executive Vice President, regional planning agency, 
2012). 
In a damning analysis of the parking meter lease, Farmer (forthcoming: 28) argues that the 
concession agreement has ‘left future residents with less control over their streets, higher 
transportation costs, new layers of expenditures and debt, fewer revenue-generating 
resources, and the bulk of the risks and costs to the system’. 
Farmer’s contention is that there is a contradiction at the heart of the long-term lease model: 
the very attempt to safeguard an infrastructure asset’s long-term revenue generating ability – 
a prerequisite for investor participation – necessarily creates new obligations, risks and costs 
for the City. 
Following the parking meter lease, for instance, when planning and developing new transport 
infrastructure such as a bus system, or, similarly, when improving accessibility for disabled 
persons, the City of Chicago and its planning agencies have been contractually obliged to 
ensure there is no negative impact on the concessionaire’s income from the meters. As a 
result, the City incurs a cost, either socio-economically by being forced to implement a 
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revised, restricted and potentially sub-optimal policy initiative, or financially in the form of 
‘true up’ payments to the concessionaire, which compensate it for loss of revenues (Table 
7.4).  
Over the 75-year lease term, there is a risk that the City will be continuously and severely 
hampered by these costs. Indeed, whereas MSIP is expected to generate $11.6 billion from 
the parking meters, the City of Chicago could be forced to pay MSIP $1 billion in ‘true ups’ 
(Farmer, forthcoming: 16) – almost the same value as the entire lease agreement. 
Crucially, over such a large timescale, the City’s obligation to preserve the value of these 
meters, and the need to subsequently manage and mitigate the costs of doing so, necessitates 
a continuous process of institutional adaptation and restructuring (Ashton et al., 2014, 
Farmer, forthcoming). From the outset, the ability of governments to engage with global 
flows of capital and financial intermediaries depends on them developing the institutional 
capacity to be agile, reactionary and decisive (Ashton et al., 2014). During the course of a 
lease, institutional structures that threaten the sacrosanctity of the asset’s revenue generation 
capability are pressurised to restructure in order to align with this overarching objective. For 
example, since the parking meter deal was struck, the City of Chicago’s Commissioner of 
Transportation has become subordinate to the City’s Department of Revenue with respect 
to parking meter management and revenue collection (ibid.). Furthermore, in some parking-
related matters, the Department of Revenue is also now free to act beyond the scrutiny of 
other City officials and internal monitoring procedures (ibid.).  
 
Table 7.4: The risks and costs of the Chicago Parking Meter lease 
Risk Costs Implications 
Fee increases CBD: 
2008: $3 per hour 
2013: $6.50 per hour 
Rest of Loop: 
2008: $1-1.50 per hour 
2013: $4.00 per hour 
Other areas:  
2008: $0.25-0.75 per hour 
2013: $2.00 per hour 
Between 2008 and 2013, parking 
meter fees increased by between 
117% and 700%.  
In 2006 (before the lease) the 
parking meters generated $22 
million during the year. In 2011, 
Meters generated $80 million. 
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Non-compete 
clauses, adverse 
action clauses 
and true-up 
adjustments 
In 2012, MSIP claimed up to $61 
million in ‘true-up adjustments’. 
Although this has been challenged, the 
anticipated total cost of true-up 
adjustments is still $242 million. 
The City agreed to pay a further $54.9 
million to CPM for losses of revenue 
due to free parking for disabled 
persons. 
The threat of true-up adjustments 
means that there is a permanent 
constraint on the ability of the 
City to freely undertake urban 
planning and development, 
especially in the area of transport 
planning.  
 
Preserving 
investor returns 
The parking meter lease agreement has 
positioned the ability of the meters to 
generate revenues as sacrosanct, 
prioritising private revenue generation 
over other policy objectives. 
Private value creation has become 
central to public policy, e.g. 
removal of rush hour parking 
bans and stricter enforcement of 
fines for parking offenses. 
Source: Ashton et al., 2014; City of Chicago, 2008; Dardick; 2014; Farmer, forthcoming; Waguespack, 
2008. 
 
The contention could be made that the risks and costs associated with the Chicago parking 
meter deal specifically result from the relative inexperience of the City in leasing 
infrastructure, the City’s hasty approach to signing the concession agreement, and its 
desperation to achieve a short-term fiscal fix. However, following Ashton et al. (2014) and 
Farmer (forthcoming), the key driver of new costs and risks appears to be the long-term and 
‘transactional’ nature of infrastructure leases in general. Indeed, the lease places inherent 
pressures on the municipal government to maintain the value of the asset throughout the 
entire lease term. Crucially, in turn, these pressures can create new sources of fiscal stress, 
drive new phases of state and institutional restructuring and reterritorialisation, and have 
splintering implications for the urban environment. 
 
7.2.1.3 Chicago Infrastructure Trust: governing urban problems through financial 
markets 
In March 2012, Rahm Emmanuel, the Mayor of Chicago, created the Chicago Infrastructure 
Trust in order to find innovative ways to fund ‘transformative infrastructure projects’ in 
Chicago. The Infrastructure Trust is expected to contribute approximately $1.7 billion of the 
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$7 billion of infrastructure spending targeted by Rahm Emmanuel over his term as Mayor 
(Kirkman, 2012). In particular, the objective of the Trust is to use innovative and bespoke 
mechanisms to channel private sector investment into the city’s infrastructure, whilst 
maximising the creation, capture and extraction of value. In essence, the creation of the 
Chicago Infrastructure Trust represents an attempt to rollout the asset-leasing model (above) 
by forging investor-government partnerships that are equipped to adapt and respond to the 
different needs of a wide range of infrastructure across the city. 
Despite early calls for the Chicago Infrastructure Trust to function like an infrastructure bank 
or fund, for example by pooling capital from a range of private investors, the Trust has 
indeed developed into more of a specialist public sector investment partner. As such, it plays 
a deal-making role, providing private investors with access to public assets, and a structuring 
role, creating special-purpose vehicles through which finance can be raised ‘off balance sheet’ 
and returns can be provided to private investors or can be earmarked for reinvestment into 
Chicago’s infrastructure.  
The Chicago Infrastructure Trust’s first three projects have focused on making energy 
efficiency savings by retrofitting publically owned buildings. The aim of a retrofit is to 
implement measures such as replacing inefficient boilers and thin windows, improving 
lighting and adding insulation, which would create energy savings that translate into annual 
financial savings that can be securitised in order to defray the upfront costs of the retrofit. 
After any debt has been serviced, savings will be used to provide returns to the Trust’s private 
financiers and, finally, to the Trust itself.  
Forecasts had indicated that the initial value of these projects would be anywhere between 
$50 million and $115 million each (Chicago Business Journal, 2012; Ruthhart, 2013). 
However, project complexity (Figure 7.5) and technical challenges, such as the difficulty of 
structuring an appropriate financing package that transfers risk away from the City of 
Chicago whilst also remaining attractive to investors and contractors alike, have led to 
shrinkage in the size of deals.  
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Figure 7.5: Feasibility of approved or proposed Chicago Infrastructure Trust projects 
Source: Chicago Infrastructure Trust, 2014a. 
 
Although the Trust currently pertains to have a project pipeline of over $1 billion (Chicago 
Infrastructure Trust, 2014a), the only deal that has closed so far is a $12.9 million contract 
to retrofit 60 municipal buildings (ibid.). Such a modest deal, with a return on investment of 
only 4.95% (ibid.), is not necessarily going to grab investors’ attention. Other projects in the 
pipeline include: two further retrofit schemes, one of the city’s swimming pools and another 
of the city’s streetlights; a scheme to deliver compressed natural gas fuelling infrastructure 
by leasing city-owned properties to private providers of compressed natural gas fuel; a 
scheme to provide ‘4G wireless’ on the Red and Blue lines of the Chicago Transit Authority 
subway system by selling licencing agreements; and a Property Assessed Clean Energy 
(PACE) scheme, which would provide renewable energy upgrades to commercial buildings 
which would be funded by incremental property taxes and financed by the Trust and its 
private investors (Chicago Infrastructure Trust, 2014a, 2014b). However, these schemes are 
all in their infancy and almost certainly subject to change. 
The unexpectedly barren first two and a half years of the Chicago Infrastructure Trust is 
perhaps illustrative of the challenges of rolling out the asset-leasing model and tailoring it to 
small and bespoke projects that have proven to be complex and not particularly profitable. 
Arguably, it also signifies a sense of caution that has developed in City Hall following the 
controversies of recent large-scale asset leases such as that of the parking meters.  
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However, the gradual evolution of the Trust does reflect the continued willingness of the 
City of Chicago to embrace the process of financialisation as a solution to its growing fiscal 
pressures and persistent economic challenges. Indeed, Ashton et al. (2014: 14) maintain that 
the Trust is the latest example of the City’s growing attempts to ‘govern urban problems 
through financial markets’. The impending acceleration of activities by the Chicago 
Infrastructure Trust, therefore, may force the City to enter into a new series of tempestuous 
negotiations with financial intermediaries, and thus produce a similar – if not increasingly 
complex and opaque – set of risks, obligations and costs for the City going forward. 
 
7.2.2 The Buffalo funding model: countering urban decline or fuelling creative 
destruction?  
The geographies of risk at play in Buffalo determine that the state must continue to perform 
a central role in funding and financing infrastructure. However, in the shared context of fiscal 
stress and economic stagnation, the reaction of Buffalo’s governing entities to this need takes 
the shape of a wave of entrepreneurial policymaking, which frequently prioritises the 
objective of capturing value from the built environment that can either be harvested or 
recycled back into the further value-creating projects. 
Specifically, Buffalo’s governing institutions face the challenging task of managing urban 
decline by investing what limited resources they have in carefully selected strategic locations 
that might serve to rejuvenate the city’s hollowed-out centre. As well as opportunities for 
revival, vacant areas of urban land can simultaneously be black holes into which public sector 
capital is indefinitely sucked. Indeed, there is a successful industry in Buffalo that thrives off 
the flow of public capital into these urban areas by offering services which accelerate the 
destruction and recreation of the built environment under the pretence that this process is 
helping to meet strategic objectives. Crucially, this process of ‘creative destruction’ could 
have severe and negative consequences for Buffalo, especially including the displacement or 
exclusion of low-income and minority communities from newly redeveloped areas. 
Although the processes of deindustrialisation and suburbanisation are no longer at their most 
potent, Buffalo’s post-industrial heritage continues to constrain its transition towards a 
modern knowledge-based economy (Glaeser, 2007). Furthermore, these processes continue 
to expose Buffalo to a very particular form of urban development, namely the recurrent 
investment of public capital in large derelict or vacant areas in the hope of transforming the 
city’s fortunes: 
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‘We have had a fifty year fixation on silver bullets and islands of development. They are 
sprinkled throughout the region, whether it’s the Stadium in Orchard Park or the 
Convention Centre downtown, it’s just one after the other… It is something to do with 
the sheer availability of vacant land’ (Author’s interview, Executive Director, local 
community development organisation, 2013). 
In addition to the sheer availability of empty or unproductive urban land, there is a very 
evident political-economic driver of such large-scale and purportedly ‘transformative’ urban 
development projects: 
‘It is just a classic growth machine complex. It’s five developers and they like big 
projects. They like to build them and they like to finance them, it’s the same story: 
wielding their power to allocate public capital – usually it’s to capture public capital, 
privatise the gains and socialise the risks… Generally I think those projects have done 
very little to strategically position Buffalo for growth even within a capitalist 
framework… but I guess there is a desperation that comes out of deindustrialisation 
that makes you a little more prone to fantasies, to white knights coming in and saving 
you’ (Author’s interview, Executive Director, local community development 
organisation, 2013). 
Most infrastructure or urban development projects in Buffalo are not viable in their own 
right. In other words, due to the unique economic geography of Buffalo, these projects do 
not yield sufficient project-generated revenue in order for them to be privately funded. 
Powerful developers, however, can put pressure on Buffalo’s governing institutions to use 
public capital to fill these viability gaps, and, as long as there is the potential to ‘leverage in’ 
a satisfactory ratio of private dollars to public dollars spent, the argument can be made that 
this use of public capital meets strategic objectives such as economic growth and job creation. 
The Metro Rail transit-oriented development that sits at the heart of one of Buffalo’s current 
landmark urban development projects, the Buffalo-Niagara Medical Campus, is a good 
example of how public interventions are justified in this light: 
‘The Metro Rail transit-oriented development is heavily weighted in favour of private 
investment as opposed to public. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t increments of 
public subsidy – there is actually gap financing right across the project – but we see a 
shift in public investment fostering private. The whole theory of the Buffalo Billion 
Investment Fund is that $1 will leverage $5 of private investment, so we’re looking for 
that kind of ratio’ (Author’s interview, Dean, local university, 2013). 
In total, the Buffalo-Niagara Medical Campus will cost $375 million (McCarthy, 2013). In 
combination, the completion of the Buffalo-Niagara Medical Campus and another landmark 
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project, the Erie Canal Harbor Development (or ‘Canalside’), will require $2 billion of 
investment, of which approximately 50% will be from public sources, plus a further $1billion 
of investment in related transit infrastructure.  
 
Table 7.5: Sources of funding for Phase 1 of the Canalside development, Buffalo 
Funding Source Amount of 
Investment 
New York Power Authority $92,828,507 
New York State $21,000,000 
Empire State Development 
Blueprint 
$5,000,000 
Private Development $340,897,950 
Total $459,726,457 
Source: New York State Urban Development Corporation and Empire State Development, 2013: 15. 
 
Table 7.5 outlines the funding sources for Phase 1 of the Canalside development. Private 
investment has been ‘leveraged’ in by public capital at a ratio of approximately 3:1. Although 
this seems like a productive use of public capital, an alternative reading of the Canalside 
development could emphasise that for every three dollars of private investment, one dollar 
of public investment is required to make the scheme viable.  In other words, whilst the 
private sector is investing its own capital, it is using public capital as a tool for de-risking 
development and for catalysing the circulation of its own capital through the built 
environment.  
The effect of this model of urban development is the emergence of a series of collaborative 
partnerships between local political and economic elites, which have the sole intention of 
‘doing projects’ and ‘churning money’. This is creative destruction in motion, and it is a win-
win for the parties involved: policymakers can evidence tangible progress whilst proclaiming 
the number of private dollars ‘leveraged in’, developers can reap the profits, and local 
quangos, such as the Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs), fulfil their funding 
requirements: 
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‘A lot of these deals, we’ve come to call ‘building harvesting’. What happens is like with 
the AM&A’s [department store] deal they had lined up: $15million to acquire and 
demolish… The money would come from some State agency. The Erie County 
Industrial Development Agency, because they were the mechanism that collected and 
dispersed the money, would get to keep 20%. That’s over £2million on one building 
demolition… All these IDAs, by law, have to be self-funding. How are they funded? 
Well they live off 20% of whatever money they can pull in, so they have to flip land, 
flip buildings and pull in money any way they can’ (Author’s interview, Principal, local 
law firm, 2013). 
The implications of this process of creative destruction can be highly fragmentary for the 
urban environment and the city’s residents. Particularly notable in Buffalo is the impact that 
this model of urban development has for reinforcing the separation between what Graham 
and Marvin (2001) call ‘spaces of seduction’ and ‘networked ghettos’ (Section 2.4). 
The new Buffalo-Niagara Medical Campus, for instance, could have become an anchor 
institution for social and economic development in East Buffalo, a historically deprived area 
of the city. However, Buffalo’s development elite exerted sufficient influence over the actors 
involved to ensure that the scheme was located in a more profitable location: 
‘When we saw the original outlines of the way in which they were going to develop the 
Buffalo-Niagara Medical Campus, Ellicott Street [in the West] was going to be the spine 
of the neighbourhood rather than Michigan Avenue [in the East]. We had a shouting 
match, because we wanted the spine to be Michigan. Because if Michigan is the spine, 
development might drive towards the East, rather than towards the West. There was a 
lot of debate, but the Medical Campus cut a deal with the local minister, and the minute 
that deal was cut, everything was lost’ (Author’s interview, Director, university 
department specialising in urban studies, 2013). 
On the surface, whether a development is located either three blocks east or three blocks 
west seems largely insignificant. However, a closer look at Figure 7.6 indicates that changing 
the location of a transformative development project by a few blocks could dramatically 
influence the type of community that stands to benefit from the development. Out of 102 
metropolitan areas in the US, Buffalo is the 6th most racially segregated (Population Studies 
Centre, 2010). The East Side, which is a majority black area (Figure 7.6), has suffered 
disproportionately from this segregation: median income on the East Side is as low as 
$14,000 per year, average house prices are only $40,000, while indicators such as violent 
crime are higher than the Buffalo average (City Data, 2014; Realtor.com, 2014; WGRZ, 
2014). 
 226 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Racial dot map of Buffalo based on 2010 US Census data 
Source: Cable, 2013.  
 
In a sense, though, the specific location of the Buffalo Niagara Medical Campus is of minor 
importance. Even if it had been located in the heart of East Buffalo, it might still have had 
negative and splintering implications. Miner (2014), for instance, questions the extent to 
which new landmark developments, such as the Buffalo Niagara Medical Campus, 
Larkinville and Canalside, are helping poor inner-city neighbourhoods. On the contrary, 
Miner argues that, actually, the ‘Buffalo Boom’ is in fact excluding lower-income and 
minority groups from the benefits of urban development and is thus augmenting the 
downward cycle of inner-city poverty.  
Indeed, the contention here is that patterns of inequality and racial segregation in Buffalo are 
(at least partially) caused by the ways in which infrastructure and urban development are 
funded and financed. Although less explicitly financialised than in Chicago, the Buffalo 
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model, which has its origins in the city’s encounters with deindustrialisation and 
suburbanisation, prioritises the circulation of capital through the built environment, fuels the 
process of creative destruction, and has splintering implications for Buffalo and its urban 
environment. 
 
7.2.3 At the market’s mercy? Exploring the implications of Bankruptcy in Stockton 
For Stockton, the processes of financialisation and fiscalisation that were at the heart of the 
City of Stockton’s project of speculative urbanism in the early and mid 2000s have had visibly 
splintering implications for the city’s urban environment. In particular, the City’s bankruptcy 
filing in June 2012, which was underpinned by the City’s over-indebtedness and partially 
caused by its highly financialised and speculative capital investment programme (Section 
5.1.3), entered the City into a damaging process of fiscal adjustment. Through the adjustment 
programme (see US Bankruptcy Court, 2013c), the City had little option but to cut wages 
and salaries, terminate employee and retiree benefit and healthcare packages, increase taxes, 
cut services and significantly reduce capital expenditure. These measures, together with the 
broader economic impact of the subprime crisis and ensuing economic crisis, have had 
severely splintering implications for Stockton.  
 
7.2.3.1 From healthcare to homicides: the impacts of fiscal crisis on Stockton and its 
citizens 
The fact that the City of Stockton was enduring a period of fiscal crisis became apparent well 
before the City filed for bankruptcy in 2012. For instance, between FY2008-9 and FY2009-
10 the City’s General Fund revenues dropped by almost 20% from $203.1 million to $166.9 
million (City of Stockton, 2014a: 3). At the same time that its revenue base was collapsing in 
wake of the subprime and economic crises (Section 6.1.3), the City was also faced with the 
spiralling costs of its labour force, retirees and debt obligations.  
At first, the City attempted to address its fiscal crisis internally. In order to close the gap 
between falling revenues and rising costs, the City reached into its financial reserves until to 
the point of exhaustion, after which it decided to begin making cuts in jobs and services in 
an attempt to balance its budget. Between FY2008-9 and FY2010-11, the City made $52 
million of ‘savings’ by cutting the level of wages paid to its employees (City of Stockton, 
2014a: 3). Depending on their role within the institution, employees’ wages were cut by 
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between 9% and 23% (ibid.). At the same time, the promise of retiree medical coverage was 
rescinded for all employees.  
Over the same period in which the City of Stockton implemented these substantial cuts to 
benefits and pay, $38 million of worth redundancies and service reductions were also made, 
exposing Stockton’s employees and residents to even further pain (City of Stockton, 2014a: 
3). In total, the City’s police force was reduced by a quarter, its fire service shrank by almost 
a third, and 43% of staff in non-safety roles were made redundant. Just as the cuts to benefits 
and pay had serious negative implications for retirees, these cuts to services and the 
workforce had drastic and splintering implications for the citizens of Stockton. 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Number of homicides in Stockton, 2008-2013 
Source: City of Stockton, 2013c and Blankstein, 2014. 
 
Between 2009 and 2013, the 25% reduction in police services equated to a total of 99 police 
officer positions, 53 civilian positions and 40 part-time policing positions being cut (Jones, 
2013). The effects of these cuts have not been incidental. For example, there has been a 
direct correlation in the number of homicides committed in Stockton and the reduction in 
police forces: between 2008 and 2012, homicides increased by almost 200% (Figure 7.7). 
Rates of other violent crimes have generally been more stable over this period. However, 
between 2011 and 2012, the number of violent crimes also increased from 4,155 to 4,630 per 
100,000 population (Blankstein, 2014). 
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Although the cuts implemented by the City of Stockton were unprecedented and ‘unheard 
of among Californian cities’, they were insufficient to balance the FY2012-13 budget, which 
still faced a shortfall of $26 million (ibid: 4). As a result, in February 2012, the City began 
‘AB506’, a mediation process with its creditors (City of Stockton, 2012a), which signalled the 
start of the process that culminated in the City filing for bankruptcy on the 28th June 2012.  
The bankruptcy process itself had further negative implications for Stockton’s employees 
and residents. The Pendency Plan, which was adopted on 26th June 2012, reinforced cuts in 
employee salaries and benefits that had taken place over the previous four years, and outlined 
plans to phase out all benefits for retirees by 2014. In July and August 2012, a series of 
agreements were finalised with labour unions, resulting in further cuts to employee benefits 
and pay of $39.6 million (City of Stockton, 2014a). 
Due to the severity of the City of Stockton’s fiscal crisis, it was essential that the process of 
cost cutting was also combined with measures to increase the City’s levels of revenue 
generation. Because of the persistence of Stockton’s faltering tax base and its broader 
economic underperformance, there has been limited potential for raising additional revenue 
through existing sources. In order for the City to forge a sustainable financial future and a 
viable plan of adjustment, therefore, proposals were drawn up to implement a new local sales 
tax. In November 2013, a proposed 0.75% increase in the Stockton’s sales tax (‘Measure A’) 
was approved by voters and adopted by the City, alongside another measure to improve 
public safety by hypothecating 65% of revenues raised by Measure A to implement the 
Marshall Plan Violence Reduction Strategy (‘Measure B’).  
In reality, the City of Stockton’s fiscal crisis has had severe and damaging implications for 
the city’s residents and businesses. For some, such as City employees who have lost their 
jobs or pensioners who have lost their health insurance, the City’s spiral towards bankruptcy 
has been a disaster, while the crisis has also had an unprecedented impact upon the quality 
of local public services such as fire and police, with knock-on implications for public safety 
and wellbeing. The citizens, employees and retirees of Stockton have – to a greater or lesser 
extent – been helpless in their ability to negotiate the currents of global change that eventually 
sent the City of Stockton over the edge of the fiscal cliff. Nevertheless, they have had to bear 
a significant portion of the costs of the City’s pursuit of an overly speculative development 
strategy in the early 2000s and its related yet unforeseen trend towards structural over-
indebtedness and ultimate insolvency. 
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7.2.3.2 Conceptualising bankruptcy: splintering urbanism and the future of capital 
investment in Stockton 
Stockton’s bankruptcy provides an invaluable lens through which to observe and make sense 
of the interdependencies between the municipality and its employees, citizens and creditors, 
while also posing questions as to the ability of Stockton to invest in infrastructure going 
forward. More broadly, cases of municipal bankruptcy can inform our understanding of the 
relationship between cities and the financial markets that emerges during the adoption of 
financialised investment practices and can help to shape debates around the ways in which 
cities can and should negotiate the process of financialisation and the intensification of 
systemic competition. 
The decision by the City of Stockton to cut pay, benefits, jobs and services well before 
considering entering the process of mediation and eventually filing for bankruptcy implies 
that the employees, retirees and citizens of Stockton were first in line to suffer the effects of 
fiscal crisis, while other stakeholders, such as the investors who purchased the City’s bonds 
should remain protected. While this pattern of events might viewed as absolutely necessary 
for maintaining fiscal discipline amongst municipalities and for preserving the integrity of 
the municipal bond market, it nevertheless represents only one of a number of ways in which 
the City’s descent into fiscal crisis could have been addressed.  
Because municipal bankruptcy – with the exception of other recent yet relatively minor cases 
(see Davidson and Ward, 2014) – has historically been such a rare occurrence (Spiotto, 2012), 
the negotiations between the City of Stockton and its creditors have been fraught with 
conflicting political and financial interests, the legal authority and credibility of which have 
been highly uncertain. As a result, the City of Stockton, its creditors and the presiding federal 
court have had the challenging task conceptualising municipal bankruptcy, its processes and 
implications almost entirely anew.  
Although the Pendency Plan issued by the City of Stockton on 26th June 2012 suspended 
debt payments to creditors, the legality of this suspension and the overall eligibility of the 
City for Chapter 9 bankruptcy were immediately challenged by the City’s creditors. In 
particular, objections were raised by a group of municipal bond insurers, referred to as the 
‘Capital Market Creditors’, which included Assured Guaranty, National Public Finance 
Guarantee (“NPFG”) and Franklin Templeton (“Franklin”). Table 7.6 provides an overview 
of Stockton’s outstanding obligations at the start of the bankruptcy process.  
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Table 7.6: City of Stockton's outstanding debt obligations during bankruptcy 
Creditor and Detail Amount ($ millions) 
Association of Retired Employees - Retiree Medical Costs $545.0 
Assured Guaranty 2007 Pension Obligation Bonds 124.3 
NPFG 2004 Arena Lease Revenue Bonds 45.1 
Assured Guaranty 2007 400 E Main Building Bonds 40.4 
Franklin Funds 2009 City Facilities Lease Revenue Bonds 35.1 
Jarvis City General Fund to Utility Fund Statement 32.0 
NPFG 2004 Parking Structure Lease Revenue Bonds 31.6 
Sports Team Lease Subsidy (Thunder and Ports) 15.6 
AMBAC 2003 Certificates of Participation 12.6 
NPFG 2006 SEB Building Lease Revenue Bonds 12.1 
State of California Department of Boating Marina Development Loan 10.8 
Marina Towers Judgment 1.9 
Price Judgment 1.4 
Total $907.9 
Source: City of Stockton, 2014a. 
 
The largest obligation is to the Association of Retired Employees, who claimed that cuts to 
healthcare benefits would cost approximately 1,100 retirees a total of $545 million over their 
lifetimes. The settlement reached in August 2013 provided current and former workers with 
only $5.1 million of compensation for lost retiree health benefits (only 1% of the estimated 
cost of future healthcare needs) (Church, 2014). Although it required a vote of agreement 
from the Association’s members, this settlement is a clear indication that both the City of 
Stockton and the Judges presiding over the mediation and litigation processes have 
prioritised long-term General Fund stability over employee and retiree wellbeing. 
Perhaps the most contentious cases, however, are those of Capital Market Creditors, the 
municipal bond insurers who together had approximately $300 million of liabilities in default. 
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It is important to note that the Capital Market Creditors were not the original investors in 
the bonds, rather the parties that insured the investments. Nevertheless, it remains the case 
that the Capital Market Creditors took a calculated business decision to insure the City of 
Stockton’s debt, for which they would have received insurance premiums. In this way, the 
Capital Market Creditors can be regarded as fundamentally different from the employees, 
retirees and citizens who also stand to lose from Stockton’s bankruptcy: 
‘These insurance companies have made a calculated decision based on risk analysis to 
undertake this particular business, whereas the employees and the pension holders don’t 
really have that opportunity’ (Author’s interview, Employment Attorney, local law firm, 
2013). 
The bond insurer with the biggest liability is Assured Guaranty, which has between $155 
million and $170 million of liabilities in default. Despite the fact that Assured Guaranty made 
a calculated decision to attempt to profit from insuring these risks, the bankruptcy court has 
viewed that they are entitled to a substantial settlement. In order reach an agreement over 
the $40.4 million of outstanding variable rate bonds that the City issued to acquire the ‘400 
E Main Building’, and the $124.3 million of pension obligation bonds that were issued to 
enable the City to meet its pension contribution obligations in 2007 (see Table 6.4), a 
settlement package was devised that passed the legal title of ownership of the ‘400 E Main 
Building’ to Assured Guaranty, which the City of Stockton would lease back until 2022 (Chin, 
2013; City of Stockton, 2014a). The settlement also provided that the City will make 
additional ‘Lease Ask Payments’, ‘Special Fund Payments’ and ‘Supplemental Payments’ of 
$250,000 per year between 2023 and 2053 (City of Stockton, 2014a). Through the 
combination of these measures, Assured Guaranty expects to get a ‘full recovery’ on its 
liabilities (Chin, 2013). The nature of City’s settlement with Assured Guaranty, then, 
contrasts starkly with its settlement with the Association of Retired Employees which 
provides employees and retirees with a ‘recovery’ of under 1%. 
The City has also negotiated a settlement with National Public Finance Guarantee (NPFG) 
over $45.1 million of outstanding debt obligations in respect of the 2004 Arena Lease 
Revenue Bonds and a further $31.6 million in respect of the 2004 Parking Bonds (see Section 
5.1.3). Because the revenues for servicing these bonds are ring-fenced (the tax increment 
from the Events Center project and the ‘lease back’ payments from the City to the 
Redevelopment Agency were always intended to be used for debt service (see Section 5.1.3)), 
NPFG, like Assured Guarantee (above), have pressed the City for full repayment. Even 
though this settlement implies that the ownership of the Stockton Arena will stay with the 
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City, the uncertainty over the future TIF receipts means some debt repayments may yet come 
from the City’s General Fund, inflicting further damage upon the City. 
The negotiations with Franklin will perhaps have the biggest ramifications for the people of 
Stockton, and ultimately for pension holders across the US. Franklin has persisted in its 
objections to the City of Stockton’s Pendency Plan and rejected any settlement agreement 
on the grounds that the City should reduce its payments to CalPERS (the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System) in order to free up money to compensate Franklin. While 
the City of Stockton argues that CalPERS Pension Plan Participants are entitled to their 
existing pension benefits and that California State law makes CalPERS ‘an arm of the State 
of California’ which thus ‘protects it against impairment in a chapter 9 case as a result of the 
protections of the Tenth Amendment’ (US Bankruptcy Court, 2014a: 2), Franklin maintains 
that federal law can ‘preempt’ State law and, therefore, that retiree benefits can – and should 
– be impaired in Stockton’s Bankruptcy case (ibid.). Although the federal court had ruled 
that the impairment of retiree benefits is a possibility, Stockton’s plan to preserve its 
payments to CalPERS has since been approved (US Bankruptcy Court, 2014b). That said, 
Franklin are appealing the decision, and, as such, the outcome remains uncertain (Kasler, 
2014).  
Table 7.7 shows a comparison of the estimated sources of ‘restructured savings’ that will be 
made by the City of Stockton between 2013 and 2041. Of a total of $1.1 billion savings, $796 
million or 70% comes from city employees and retirees. Investors and insurers only lose out 
on $326 million (contributing towards only 29% of total restructured savings).  
The bankruptcy filing has also had substantial implications for the City of Stockton’s ability 
to make future investments in infrastructure. In the short term, at least, it appears as if the 
City of Stockton’s General Fund will not be able to support new infrastructure investments. 
Of the $738 million of required investment outlined in the FY2014-15 – FY2018-19 Capital 
Improvement Plan, for example, only $2.775 million (0.4%) is funded from the General 
Fund. Nevertheless, 47% ($347 million) of projects in the Capital Improvement Plan do have 
identified funding sources, although 97% of these are defined as ‘restricted’ or ‘non-
discretionary’ (that is, from ring-fenced sources of income, such as Measure K tax receipts 
which can only be spent on transportation projects) (City of Stockton, 2014b).  
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Table 7.7: Comparison of the City of Stockton's estimated sources of restructured 
savings between FY2012-13 and FY2040-1 
Area of Savings General Fund Other Funds Total % of Total 
Labour-Prior $25 $17 $42 4% 
Labour-Future 167 107 274 24% 
Retirees 263 190 453 40% 
Debt 326 0 326 29% 
Other 38 0 38 3% 
Total 820 313 1,133 100% 
Source: City of Stockton, 2014a. 
 
Although Stockton can still technically issue debt (Mochizuki, 2012), its weak credit rating – 
currently at Ca (meaning ‘highly speculative and… likely in, or very near, default, with some 
prospect of recovery of principal and interest’) (Moody’s Investors Service, 2013b, 2014) – 
indicates that it will be unable to engage in more speculative debt-based investment practices 
for the short and medium term. Despite the emergence of Infrastructure Financing Districts 
as a replacement for the dissolved Redevelopment Agencies (see Section 6.1.3), then, it 
appears that the opportunities for infrastructure investment in Stockton, at least for the time 
being, are extremely limited. 
Overall, the effects of fiscal crisis and bankruptcy can be regarded as devastating for the City 
of Stockton’s employees, for its retirees and citizens, and for future capital investment 
projects. This analysis echoes Peck’s (2013) assertion that municipal bankruptcies in the US 
have played out in an intensely neoliberal and destructive manner: 
‘The logic of municipal bankruptcy, which favours the ‘creditors’ bargain’, not only 
represents the antithesis of Keynesian redistribution, it also threatens to substitute fiscal 
technopolitics for actual politics… [F]iscally constrained municipal politics have 
become framed by and subjugated to the hegemonic model of long-run tax restraint 
and rolling expenditure cuts’ (Peck, 2013: 19-20). 
In addition to the negative consequences of the City’s bankruptcy for its employees, retirees 
and citizens, and for raising finance to invest in infrastructure going forward, the Stockton 
case serves to illustrate the systemic nature of competition within a financialised world. In 
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part, Stockton is in its present predicament because of its pursuit of wealth creation, inward 
investment, asset value appreciation and tax base expansion, all of which were regarded as 
key to its competitiveness in relation to other cities. At the same time, Stockton was 
presenting itself to investors as a competitive destination for investment (in terms of 
providing risk-adjusted returns) in relation to other debt-issuing entities on a national – if 
not international – stage. Going forward, in light of bankruptcy, the competitiveness of the 
City of Stockton as a debt issuing entity appears to be lower than ever: no longer can it 
borrow money or attract investment, and, for the time being, no longer can it pursue a 
financialised programme of capital investment. 
 
7.3 Concluding remarks: financialisation and the intensification of 
splintering urbanism 
Primarily, this chapter has sought to interrogate the implications of the financialisation of 
infrastructure and urban development. Although the ways in which financialisation plays out 
are unique to any particular place, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate the broader 
splintering implications that the emergence of financialised models of infrastructure funding 
and financing has for the urban environment.  
The analysis of funding and financing in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 illustrate that even as 
infrastructure assets are becoming privately owned or invested in by private investors, the 
cost of paying for the infrastructure is often ultimately borne by the public sector. This is 
particularly evident in more peripheral and underperforming areas, as the case studies of 
Manchester and Sheffield demonstrate. Although innovations in the structuring of 
infrastructure funding, such as the evolution of public-private partnerships, can facilitate the 
flow of yield-seeking capital into the urban environment, the consequences of these complex 
and often opaque funding packages can be that the public sector continues to fund the 
delivery of new infrastructure assets, while the private sector captures or extracts the value. 
Indeed, this piece of analysis raises questions about the utility of private investment in urban 
infrastructure and suggests that the state will continue to have a significant role in funding 
and financing infrastructure going forward.  
The analysis of the privatisation of public assets in Chicago builds upon the notion that the 
financialisation of infrastructure can have costly implications for the public sector. Through 
an examination of high-profile asset leases, such as Chicago Skyway and Parking Meters, 
Section 7.2.1 demonstrates that privatisation deals can expose the public sector to a whole 
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series of new risks, cost and obligations. In particular, the work of Ashton et al. (2014) and 
Farmer (forthcoming) is drawn upon to illustrate how asset leases place an inherent pressure 
on governments to maintain the value of privately owned public assets in order to facilitate 
the generation of profits for investors and shareholders. Crucially, these pressures can lock 
cities into unfavourable financial arrangements, restrict the ability of city governments to 
plan and develop their cities, and enable deep-seated fiscal issues to go unnoticed and 
unchallenged. 
Opportunities for economic growth, wealth creation and meeting other strategic objectives 
can be unlocked by funding models that enable or incentivise an acceleration in the rate of 
urban development. However, as sections 7.1.3 and 7.2.2 portray, in Buffalo and Newcastle, 
the acceleration of the destruction and recreation of the city centre appears to have become 
a strategic end in itself. Crucially, this strategic end – otherwise conceptualised as the process 
of ‘creative destruction’ – can have severe and negative consequences for the urban 
environment, such as increasing inequality or racial segregation, or – as demonstrated by the 
demolition of the Tyne Brewery site in Newcastle – by destroying a city’s unique and 
invaluable heritage and identity. Perhaps most significantly, as the financialisation of 
infrastructure funding and financing intensifies, city authorities become increasingly 
dependent on an accelerated process of urban development in order to generate sufficient 
revenues to repay their debts or to reinvest in the urban environment, whilst unwillingly 
exacerbating the negative and splintering implications of this form of urban development. 
Finally, in an analysis of the City of Stockton’s bankruptcy, Section 7.2.3 highlights the 
splintering implications of the speculative and highly financialised model of urban 
development pursued by the City during the early 2000s. In some respects, the splintering 
implications of bankruptcy are clear: people have lost their jobs, service levels have 
plummeted, City employees have suffered pay cuts, and both employees and retirees have 
had the healthcare benefits wiped out. However, these impacts are a direct result of the 
specific way in which Stockton’s bankruptcy and its relationship with the capital markets 
have been conceptualised. Indeed, an alternative conceptualisation of who should bear the 
costs of Stockton’s bankruptcy could have been entirely possible. Nevertheless, the 
bankruptcy ruling taken place through a generally accepted legal process, and thus provides 
warnings to other cities about the potential costs of their interactions and increasing 
interdependencies with financial markets. 
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Chapter 8: Funding and financing urban infrastructure in the 
UK and US: conclusions and reflections 
Against the backdrop of a dangerously widening infrastructure gap and a global economy in 
crisis, infrastructure investment has taken on new meaning and significance. For 
governments looking to stimulate growth, create jobs and reinvigorate their economies, 
infrastructure has become a beacon of recovery. For investors, infrastructure provides a 
potential solution to the constant search for returns in what is an over-crowded and turbulent 
global marketplace.  
The growing importance of infrastructure investment, however, is matched by an 
increasingly problematic series of challenges. Economic stagnation has limited the ability of 
infrastructure items to generate revenues, reducing the opportunities for private investment, 
especially in peripheral areas. Furthermore, the emergence of fiscal stress across all levels of 
government is severely hampering the efforts of policymakers to mount Keynesian-style 
investment programmes. 
Nowhere has the challenge of funding and financing infrastructure been more evident than 
in the arena of the city. Internationally, cities are suffering from a lack of infrastructure 
investment, while their built environment continues to offer measly returns to private 
investors and their governing institutions buckle under the pressure of fiscal stress. Indeed, 
in the contemporary economic climate, the armoury of mechanisms available to fund and 
finance infrastructure has been insufficient to unlock the desired levels of investment. 
Through an in-depth analysis of urban infrastructure in the US and UK, this thesis has argued 
that the confluence of these factors is fuelling a transformation in the funding and financing 
of infrastructure, with unprecedented implications for urban development and the broader 
urban environment.  
By way of conclusion, this chapter summarises the key themes that have been addressed in 
the thesis and builds on the core arguments made in order to answer the four main research 
questions presented in Section 2.5. This final discussion also draws out the ways in which 
the study has addressed gaps in the literature and made a number of conceptual and 
theoretical contributions. Although no attempt is made to provide a definitive set of policy 
recommendations, the findings of this research do have consequences for our understanding 
of the role of governments in funding and financing infrastructure, which, in turn, could 
potentially have knock-on implications for policymaking in practice. Finally, the chapter 
outlines the limitations of this study and sketches out some areas for future research. 
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8.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis has compared the funding and financing of urban infrastructure in the UK and 
the US through an empirical analysis of the case studies of Buffalo, Chicago and Stockton in 
the US and Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield in the UK. 
From the outset, in order to maintain clarity and coherence throughout the thesis, a clear 
definition of infrastructure is adopted, detailing infrastructure as the interrelated physical 
components of the urban environment requiring significant capital investment, which have multiple transferable 
meanings and representations, and which enable economic growth and capitalist development (Section 1.1). 
Similarly, an attempt is made to define and distinguish between the terms ‘funding’ – the 
sources of income that defray infrastructure costs over time – and ‘financing’ – the financial arrangements 
that enable the costs of a project to be met as they are incurred (Section 1.2). 
Having established the key drivers and parameters of the study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
reviews the disparate literatures relevant to the funding and financing of urban infrastructure. 
A core aim of the literature review is to develop a more coherent analytical framework 
through which the funding and financing of infrastructure can be better understood. Perhaps 
the most important body of literature in this respect is the work on ‘financialisation’ – a 
process defined by Pike and Pollard (2010) as the increasing influence of financial markets, 
their processes and intermediaries in contemporary capitalism. Through financialisation, the 
key determinants of infrastructure investment are shaped by the imperatives of capital 
accumulation and the acceleration of capital circulation (Section 2.1). Indeed, taking a political-
economic perspective, the process of financialisation is regarded as increasing the extent to 
which the value of the built environment can be used to facilitate speculation and to provide 
a refuge and source of growth for yield-seeking surplus capital. Although, as O’Neill (2013) 
maintains, the financialisation of infrastructure involves the segmentation, unbundling and 
privatisation of infrastructure, a political-economic reading also enables the state to be a 
conceptualised as key actor in facilitating and shaping the process of financialisation. 
Notably, the role of the state in funding and financing infrastructure is itself becoming 
financialised (Weber, 2010). 
Over time, the state’s investment in – or regulation of – infrastructure has been subject to 
change. Importantly, the core characteristics and territoriality of the state itself have 
undergone a similar process of evolution. Section 2.2 introduces Brenner’s (Brenner, 1999, 
2004a, 2004b) concept of ‘reterritorialisation’ in order to suggest that the latest changes in 
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the state’s role as an infrastructure investor – characterised by the process of financialisation 
– are embroiled in the constant process of state restructuring and geographical change. 
Crucially, in parallel with the processes of financialisation and the increasing influence of 
extra-local financial intermediaries, the governance of urban infrastructure is developing a 
multiscalar territoriality that goes way beyond conventional city limits. 
However, it is not only the process of financialisation that is placing pressure on the state to 
adapt and evolve: in wake of the global financial and economic crisis, governments across all 
levels are facing unprecedented fiscal pressures (Section 2.3). Drawing on a body of literature 
that emphasises the effects of financial and economic crisis on governments’ budgets, and 
on the politics of austerity that have emerged as a result, the thesis questions the ability of 
governments to invest in infrastructure going forward. Under significant pressure to 
reinvigorate their economies, it is argued that the growing use of speculative forms of debt-
driven investment could have substantial and damaging implications for the future financial 
condition of urban governments. 
Beyond the implications for governments’ financial condition, Section 2.4 examines the 
potential consequences of financialisation for urban development more broadly. In 
particular, Graham and Marvin’s (2001) conception of ‘splintering urbanism’ is used to 
develop potential explanations of the impact of financialisation. Indeed, the argument is 
made that the continued unbundling, segmentation and privatisation of infrastructure – 
processes which facilitate the financialisation of infrastructure (O’Neill, 2013) – lead to a 
series of uneven, destructive and splintering outcomes.  
Having designed the thesis’s research questions in light of the literature review (Section 2.5), 
a robust methodological framework is then developed in order to ensure that the research 
questions can be answered most effectively through the empirical data analysis (Chapter 3). 
Perhaps the most important feature of the methodology adopted here is the comparative 
element, which ultimately defines the study. As such, Section 3.1 provides an overview of 
comparative methodologies, highlighting common features from examples in the literature, 
such as the identification of similarities and differences between cases. Ward’s (2010b) call 
for a more ‘relational’ understanding of comparative research is also addressed and heeded. 
As part of a relational approach, the positionality of the researcher within a theory-practice 
nexus, in which academic and practitioner discourses overlap to shape knowledge, policy and 
practice, is also considered.  
The methodology chapter also undertakes a detailed analysis of possible case study selection 
techniques, and aims to defend the case studies chosen in this research (Section 3.2). The 
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‘city’ is chosen as the primary unit of analysis (instead of comparing individual funding 
mechanisms or infrastructure projects) because of the need to interrogate the contextual 
specificities of place that are so important to the funding and financing of infrastructure. The 
decision to use ‘critical cases’ as the method of case study selection is also justified, with 
emphasis placed on the potential ability of critical cases to enable new theoretical insights 
(Barnes et al., 2007). The choice of the US and the UK as comparator countries and of the 
specific case study cities is similarly informed by their ability to address the key research 
themes that this thesis seeks to address. Finally, the chapter outlines a case for using semi-
structured interviews and documentary analysis as the primary methods used in this research 
(Section 3.3).  
The geographical context of an infrastructure project is highly influential for how it is funded 
and financed. The federal system of government in the US, for example, has a marked impact 
on the finances of state and local governments (Chapter 4). Even though cities in the US can 
be regarded as more autonomous than British cities, their ability to fund and finance 
infrastructure is still constrained by the State-imposed mandates and budget constraints that 
characterise the American system of fiscal federalism (Section 4.1). Nevertheless, innovations 
in governance structures and forms of finance available from the municipal bond markets 
enable city governments and their sub-components in the US to evade certain State 
restrictions, thus facilitating new and entrepreneurial forms of infrastructure investment. 
In a similar vein, infrastructure funding and financing in the UK is hugely influenced by the 
prevailing system of governance. English cities and their governing institutions are 
subordinate to a relatively more powerful central government in Westminster (see Pike and 
Tomaney, 2009), which undermines their autonomy and often hampers their ability to invest 
in infrastructure (Section 4.2). Despite the persistent shackles of centralism, the emergence 
of spatially uneven development across the UK has fuelled debate about whether local 
governments should have more powers in order to help stimulate economic growth and 
development. Although a more devolved model of local government could create more 
options for funding and financing infrastructure and could potentially lead to economic 
convergence between London and the South East and the other ‘regions’, there is a real 
danger that decentralisation could isolate and suffocate some of England’s more peripheral 
and underperforming cities (Section 4.2.1). For the time being, at least, it appears as if the 
structurally embedded centralism of the UK will continue to define English local government 
and the ways in which local authorities invest in infrastructure. 
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In both the UK and the US, the geographical and contextual factors that influence 
infrastructure investment are not confined to the national scale. Rather, each case study city 
is influenced by its own unique multiscalar geography. From industrial decline, to 
suburbanisation, to city-regional collaboration, to enduring political regimes, each city case 
study city has its own distinctive political economy that shapes the landscape of infrastructure 
investment (Sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3). 
The unique characteristics of place necessitate that each infrastructure investment is in some 
way bespoke. The extent to which any individual funding or financing mechanism can be 
considered financialised, therefore, is also highly variable between different projects and 
places. This geographical variation is emphasised in Chapter 5, which on the one hand 
explores the evolution of a range of investment strategies that prioritise the generation of 
financial returns and the recycling of capital through the urban landscape in Manchester, and 
on the other hand demonstrates that traditional models of funding and financing (such as 
State and federal grants) are still important in Buffalo, NY. That said, the emergence of tax 
credit syndication programmes and use of PILOT increment financing at Buffalo Lakeside 
Commerce shows that even in challenging economic conditions, where future revenue 
generation and asset value appreciation are highly uncertain, there are some opportunities 
for engaging in financialised forms of investment. 
The argument that the geographies of financialisation require a nuanced and fine-grained 
approach is reinforced through an in-depth analysis of tax increment financing (TIF) in the 
cities of Chicago, Newcastle, Sheffield and Stockton (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). In particular, the 
highly sophisticated risk management techniques that are employed by the City of Chicago 
– in what can still be expressed as a speculative form of investment – are juxtaposed with 
the limited ability of English local authorities to pass risk onto the private sector in the early 
stages of an infrastructure project. Rather than resulting from inexperience or negligence on 
the part of the local authorities, however, the contrasting approaches to risk management are 
defined by the varying powers that the different city governments have in terms of being 
able to employ certain risk management techniques, such as the issuance of certificates of 
participation (COPs). Also significant are the contrasting economic geographies of 
Newcastle, Sheffield and Chicago, especially with regards to the more vibrant commercial 
property sector in Chicago, which is influential in determining the willingness of private 
sector actors to take on construction and development risk in infrastructure projects. An 
analysis of ‘redevelopment’ in Stockton provides further evidence of the variability of TIF 
across different cities: built around the foundations of a ‘lease-out-lease-back’ mechanism, 
TIF (or ‘redevelopment’) in Stockton resembles an extremely complex process, which, prior 
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to bankruptcy, had enabled the city government to pursue an aggressive yet highly speculative 
model of urban development. Ultimately, Chapter 5 calls for a more refined, nuanced and 
geographically sensitive conceptualisation of the process of financialisation. 
Beyond encouraging a more entrepreneurial and commercially sensitive form of 
policymaking, the financialisation of capital investment has some profound implications for 
the form, structure and territoriality of the state (Chapter 6). In particular, the opportunity 
to address fiscal stress and economic stagnation through new funding and financing practices 
is placing pressure on the state to adapt, change and undergo a process of reterritorialisation.  
For example, the systems of governance in Chicago and Buffalo, cities which are either in or 
have recently undergone a period of severe fiscal stress, are evolving to accommodate new 
models of infrastructure investment in the hope of stimulating economic growth and 
generating fiscal rewards (Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). The adoption of infrastructure and urban 
development strategies specifically because of their potential to generate increased levels of 
tax income or other financial rewards for the municipality can be described as the 
‘fiscalisation’ of urban development. In conjunction with this idea, the Chicago and Buffalo 
examples indicate that the increasing ability of fiscally stressed cities to engage in fiscalisation 
– enabled by the use of financialised investment practices – is creating an intensification in 
the levels of competition, not only between rival municipal jurisdictions, but also between 
different levels of government and a whole host of other economic agents that are active 
within the capital markets.  
The argument that the fiscalisation of urban development causes an intensification of what 
is labelled ‘systemic competition’ is taken up in an in-depth analysis of Stockton, CA (Section 
6.1.3). The Stockton example illustrates how the combination of fiscalisation and a highly 
speculative form of urbanism made the city government highly vulnerable to the fiscal effects 
of the subprime- and global financial crisis. Stockton’s bankruptcy certainly represents a 
worst-case scenario of pursuing a financialised model of urban development. In the midst of 
crisis, however, Stockton has also been exposed to a largely State-driven form of 
reterritorialisation in which Californian Redevelopment Agencies have been abolished by the 
State Legislature in order to stop the haemorrhaging of funds from the State’s budget. This 
new round of reterritorialisation provides enormous challenges for the City of Stockton 
going forward. 
In the UK, the process of reterritorialisation has emerged as part of and in response to the 
perceived need to make large-scale investments in infrastructure, despite a severe lack of 
resources across all levels of government (Section 6.2). Indeed, the cases of Sheffield, 
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Newcastle and Manchester illustrate how the challenges of engaging in financialised 
investment practices under a centralist framework of government are driving new rounds of 
reterritorialisation: namely, the decentralisation of sources of taxation, such as ‘business 
rates’; the emergence of ‘City Deals’, a codified form of negotiation for powers between city 
governments and the centre; and the creation of new city-regional institutions, such as Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and Combined Authorities (CAs). While the Greater 
Manchester case stands out given the success of mechanisms such as the Greater Manchester 
Transport Fund and ‘Earn Back’, the examples of Newcastle and Sheffield demonstrate that 
the combination of financialisation and reterritorialisation are often partial and full of 
challenges. For example, while more access to the local tax base and the devolution of 
financing powers provide new opportunities for engaging in financialised models of 
investment, they also remove the security of central government grants and the redistributive 
safety net that is inherent in the UK’s centralist system, potentially isolating local authorities 
and exposing them to the harsh realities of fiscal independence. 
In addition to certain fiscal consequences, financialised investment practices can have 
broader implications for the urban environment. Whilst capitalism has long been defined by 
its contradictory outcomes, the extreme acceleration of the circulation of capital that 
characterises financialisation has arguably intensified its uneven and destructive effects. Most 
importantly in the context of this thesis, the process of financialisation appears to have 
intensified the ‘splintering’ implications infrastructure investment (c.f Graham and Marvin, 
2001) (Chapter 7). 
The tendency towards unevenness displayed by financialised models of infrastructure 
investment can be explained, in part, by developing an analysis of the geographies of risk and 
return. In Manchester and Sheffield, for instance, characteristics of their respective local 
economies, such as the meagre opportunities for asset value appreciation in the commercial 
property sector or the uncertain demand for new infrastructure services such as transport 
improvements, necessarily limit the opportunities for financial intermediaries to generate a 
return on investment (Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2). In other words, the embedded economic 
geographies of Manchester and Sheffield mean that infrastructure can seldom be funded 
from private sources. Where opportunities for private investment do exist, it is mostly in the 
form of providing the financing in public-private collaborations, which are typically 
underpinned by public sources of funding. Rather than transferring risk to the private sector, 
this kind of arrangement requires substantial public sector support and risk taking. 
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One of the most notable examples of the assumption of new risks and obligations by the 
public sector specifically in order to create and preserve value for the private sector is the 
City of Chicago’s sale of public assets to private investors on long-term lease agreements 
(Section 7.2.1). Drawing on the work of Farmer (forthcoming) and Ashton et al. (2014), an 
in-depth analysis of the Skyway and Parking Meter deals suggests that even after a lease 
agreement has been completed, there are a wide range of financial, political and economic 
risks that emerge for the city government, especially due to its obligation to preserve the 
value of the built environment for private gain. In addition, the Skyway and Parking Meter 
leases provide evidence of the splintering implications of financialised models of investment, 
such as a loss of control over strategic planning initiatives and a series of financial penalties 
for contract breaches. The continued roll-out of Chicago’s long-term lease model through 
vehicles such as the Chicago Infrastructure Trust can be understood as a response to the 
City’s challenging fiscal environment that delivers short-term financial rewards but 
simultaneously creates long-term risks, costs and unwanted obligations. 
As Sections 7.1.3 and 7.2.2 demonstrate, splintering implications of financialised capital 
investments are also evident in Buffalo and Newcastle. The exact processes through which 
these splintering implications emerge, however, are unique to the historically 
underperforming economies of Buffalo and Newcastle and the current fiscal challenges 
facing their governing entities. In Buffalo, the desire of its governing entities to stimulate 
development and growth results in a sudden influx of public capital into selected urban 
wastelands, helping to generate profits for a small group of powerful construction and 
development companies, with little benefit for the wider city, as money simply gets ‘churned’ 
through the built environment. This form of ‘creative destruction’ (c.f. Harvey, 1985a), 
increasingly facilitated by financialised investment practices, is also evident in Newcastle. 
Indeed, drawing on Pike (2014), the case study of Science Central is used to illustrate how 
the potential for fiscal benefits and financial rewards have stimulated a process of ‘fast 
development’, which has destroyed an iconic aspect of the city’s heritage. 
Perhaps the most extreme forms of splintering urbanism have been evident in the context 
of the bankrupt City of Stockton (Section 7.2.3), which has plummeted into fiscal crisis as a 
result of a prolonged period of speculative urbanism and financialised infrastructure 
investment. Crucially, the ways in which Stockton’s bankruptcy case has been conceptualised 
has seemingly rewarded the capital markets at the expense of the employees, retirees and 
citizens of Stockton. Not only has the fallout from the City’s programme of fiscalisation 
resulted in job losses, pay freezes, benefit cuts and a significant reduction in core services, 
such as policing, but it has also severely limited the ability of Stockton to engage in debt 
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finance and capital expenditure more broadly going forward. The Stockton example is 
striking for its severity, but because it underlines the interconnections between municipal 
authorities and the capital markets and highlights the extent of cities’ vulnerability to systemic 
competition. 
 
8.2 Addressing the research questions 
The first of four research questions addressed by this thesis is ‘How is infrastructure funded and 
financed in cities in the UK and the US? And to what extent are these processes being financialised?’  
Perhaps the most important finding of the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 5-7 in 
regard to this research question is that there is a huge degree of variation in the ways in which 
infrastructure is funded and financed. This variation is evident between different places but 
also between projects within the same city. Whilst the national and regional setting remains 
vitally important – and thus the distinction between the UK and the US remains valid – the 
factors that shape the funding and financing of infrastructure are necessarily unique to any 
individual project and its specific (multiscalar) spatio-temporal context.  
Despite this variegation, there are some broader trends that can be identified that characterise 
the funding and financing of infrastructure in the UK and the US. Indeed, this research has 
demonstrated that the funding and financing of infrastructure is undergoing a process of 
transformation: away from traditional models that are becoming increasingly unavailable and 
out-dated, towards more financialised models.  
Like the basic funding and financing arrangements of an infrastructure project, the process 
of financialisation is also defined by variation and unevenness. Rather than all funding and 
financing practices adhering to all ten key characteristics outlined in Table 2.2, each 
investment process displays different degrees and forms of financialisation: any one funding 
or financing mechanism, for instance, might involve financial intermediaries, require urban 
governments to speculate against uncertain future revenue streams, use financial 
technologies, and transform infrastructure into a financial asset defined by risk and return, 
all to a greater or lessor extent. Crucially, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, the uneven and 
inconsistent ways in which these features define infrastructure investments is evidence of the 
process of financialisation at play. 
The second research question is ‘What is the role of the state in funding and financing infrastructure? 
Is this role changing? And, if so, what are the implications for the organisation of the state?’ 
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In face of the unbundling, privatisation and financialisation of infrastructure, the stage ought 
to be set for a decline in the influence of the state in the funding and financing of 
infrastructure. However, the findings obtained from the six case study cities examined in this 
research indicate that this is not the case. Instead, the state continues to play a central role in 
the funding and financing of infrastructure, adapting in any way possible in order to meet 
the challenges of stimulating economic growth and societal progress. 
In part, the endurance of the state as a key actor in the landscape of infrastructure investment 
can be attributed to the volatile and uncertain contemporary economic conditions in which 
opportunities for private value creation and profit accumulation are less abundant than they 
might otherwise be: the challenge of making infrastructure productive is especially apparent 
in underperforming and peripheral economies, which are characterised by unfavourable 
geographies of risk and return. In these conditions, the state is the only actor with the 
capacity to take risk and invest, and is the only actor encouraged to do so by extra-financial 
motives, such as the stimulation of economic growth and the creation of jobs.  
But, the presence of an investment void into which the state much step is not the only factor 
driving its continued – if not increased – role in the funding and financing of infrastructure. 
Crucially, the ability to use more financialised models investment has enabled the state to 
invest in infrastructure in circumstances where it would previously have been impossible. 
Whether through the ability to use securitisation to borrow against fictitious future revenue 
streams or to structure a deal so that debt remains off-balance-sheet, there are a range of 
ways in which the state can embrace the process of financialisation in order to make 
previously inconceivable investments. 
Even in cases of what appears to be the unadulterated privatisation of an infrastructure asset, 
the state plays a key role as a regulator, market maker and value preserver. Whilst, of course, 
the capacity and willingness of governments to act varies widely (depending on the political-
economic context at hand), the fundamental importance of the state is consistent throughout 
the six case study cities. 
In both dealing with the implications of financialisation and attempting to harness the 
infrastructure investment opportunities that it generates, the state and its multiple 
component parts have undergone a process of reterritorialisation. In some senses, this 
process resembles the continuous processes of state evolution, rescaling and restructuring 
that already occur within the confines of neoliberal capitalism. Nevertheless, the process of 
financialisation – and, more specifically, the financialisation of infrastructure investment – 
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has undoubtedly added a new dimension to the production and reproduction of the state 
and its territoriality.  
The third research question is ‘Why are fiscally stressed governments investing infrastructure? How is 
fiscal stress causing changes in the way that infrastructure is financed and funded, and with what implications?’ 
Government budgets have come under enormous strain in wake of the global financial and 
economic crisis. Some governing institutions, especially at the urban level, have experienced 
unprecedented levels of fiscal stress due to the confluence of a number of factors, including 
local tax base shrinkage, a reduction in financial assistance from other levels of government 
seeking to consolidate their own fiscal position, the underperformance of previous 
investments, and the rising costs of core services and activities. In light of these challenges, 
amongst the very few options for stimulating economic growth, creating jobs and generating 
increased tax receipts, infrastructure investment appears to be the most viable option 
(alternatives, such as making changes in monetary policy, for instance, are not available to – 
or within the remit of – most urban governments). 
While fiscally stressed governments invest in infrastructure in order to create jobs and 
economic growth, the potential for creating a fix to fiscal crisis is also a key driver. Evidence 
from all six case studies suggests that the pursuing fiscal benefits from infrastructure 
investments – a phenomenon described as the ‘fiscalisation of urban development’ – is 
indeed a central determinant of urban governments’ infrastructure investment decisions. 
Crucially, although fiscally stressed cities have traditionally struggled to make the upfront 
investments needed to capitalise on the financial rewards and fiscal benefits of infrastructure, 
the emergence of financialised investment practices has created new opportunities for 
governments with a worsening financial condition to access the capital required to make such 
investments.  
Indeed, the empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis demonstrates that fiscal crisis has 
been a major incentive for urban governments to find increasingly innovative and 
entrepreneurial ways of investing in infrastructure and urban development. By taking 
advantage of technologies such as securitisation, financialised models of investment enable 
governing institutions to capture the future value of infrastructure and bring it forward into 
the present, enabling them to defray the costs of infrastructure regardless of the health of their 
underlying finances at the time.  
Whilst, of course, the use of financialised investment practices could enable governments to 
generate new sources of income and expand their tax base, thus ensuring the future 
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sustainability and competitiveness of the city going forward, there is also the possibility that 
engaging in speculative, debt-driven and financialised forms of funding and financing could 
make city governments vulnerable to fiscal stress and crisis, especially in the case of a broader 
systemic crisis. Less dramatically, the fiscalisation of urban development also serves to 
intensify inter-jurisdictional competition for resources, and thus contributes to the 
fragmentation, circumvention, and reterritorialisation of existing systems of government and 
governance. 
The fourth and final research question posed in this thesis is ‘To what extent does the 
financialisation of infrastructure and capital investment have splintering implications for cities and the process 
of urban development?’ 
Financialisation can be interpreted as incentivising the acceleration of capital accumulation 
and circulation – two of capitalism’s core features – and, by facilitating the process of capital 
switching, as intensifying the process of overaccumulation. As such, financialisation can be 
regarded as amplifying the contradictory and crisis-prone characteristics of capitalism. In 
addition to the new opportunities for funding and financing infrastructure created through 
the process of financialisation, then, the financialisation of infrastructure investment has also 
created a range of potential risks and costs for urban governments and the urban 
environment more broadly. Indeed, evidence from the empirical analysis conducted in this 
research demonstrates that the financialisation of infrastructure investment is intensifying 
the process of urban splintering. 
The links between financialisation and the intensification of splintering urbanism is perhaps 
most clearly exemplified by what can be described as the acceleration of creative destruction 
– a process through which the demolition and redevelopment of the urban landscape serves 
to reinforce patterns of class domination and uneven development. When using debt-driven, 
speculative and financialised funding and financing mechanisms, there is a need for the 
infrastructure item at hand to generate returns on investment as quickly and as effectively as 
possible (in order to minimise the cost of debt service requirements, or in order to generate 
surplus capital that can be ‘recycled’ or ‘revolved’ back into further infrastructure 
investments). There is a clear incentive, then, for policymakers and investors to pursue the 
acceleration of capital circulation through the built environment, causing an intensification 
of creative destruction and augmenting its splintering implications. 
Equally important to the intensification of splintering urbanism is the extent to which the 
state takes on new and often unforeseen risks when engaging in financialised investment 
practices. This is most obvious when the state combines with the private sector, such as in 
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public-private partnership arrangements. Where the geographies of risk and return dictate 
that infrastructure cannot be funded and financed purely from private sources, the state – 
given its broader strategic objectives – assumes risk on behalf of the private sector, ensuring 
that the private sector can generate value from the infrastructure and that this value is 
contractually safeguarded going forward. Paradoxically, such a move forces the strategic 
objectives of the state to move away from issues such as social cohesion, economic growth 
and inclusive urban development towards the preservation of investor returns and 
shareholder value. 
Finally, there are the splintering implications of failed investments. The speculative nature of 
many financialised investment practices means that the non-materialisation of revenues that 
are required to meet the costs of the infrastructure at hand is a very real possibility. Although 
the fiscal stress that this causes for urban governments might seem like a mere administrative 
issue, the reality of a stifling debt burden is that it requires expenditure cuts to be made 
elsewhere in order to free up funds for debt service. Indeed, when caused by failed 
speculative investments, fiscal crises are mediated through the financial markets in a way that 
prioritises investor recoveries over urban development and citizen wellbeing. The dominance 
of financial interests in the prevailing legal discourse makes pay freezes, benefit cuts, job 
losses and service reductions an almost inevitable consequence of a failed financialised 
infrastructure investment. 
 
8.3 Contributions to the literature 
A key objective of this research has been to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the 
funding and financing of urban infrastructure by developing a conceptual and theoretical 
framework that addresses some shortfalls in the existing academic literature. The contention 
made in Section 1.4 was that gaps in the literature are not only inhibiting our understanding 
of infrastructure investment, but are also adversely affecting our understanding of the 
broader process of capitalist development. 
 
8.3.1 Reinforcing the distinction between funding and financing 
Although the distinction between terms funding and financing with respect to infrastructure 
investment has been made in a select few commercial reports and policy documents 
(Australian Financial Services Council and Ernst and Young, 2011; Maxwell-Jackson, 2013; 
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PwC, 2014), there has certainly been a lack of common conceptual understanding within the 
academic literature.  
Drawing on these examples, this thesis has defined ‘funding’ as the sources of income that defray 
infrastructure costs over time and ‘financing’ as the financial arrangements that enable the costs of a project 
to be met as they are incurred. 
Without such a conceptual understanding, making sense of the landscape of infrastructure 
investment becomes an impossibility. Take the following example. A common question for 
urban policymakers is ‘How can we attract more private investment in infrastructure in our 
city?’ Of course, the intention of this question is to ask ‘How can we ensure that the private 
sector funds more infrastructure so that the cost does not fall on the shoulders of the 
taxpayer?’ Nevertheless, the question could actually be interpreted to mean ‘How can we 
ensure that the likes of pension funds and bond investors provide more of the upfront capital 
to finance our infrastructure [the cost of which will ultimately be borne by the taxpayer]?’ 
Clearly, then, failing to acknowledge the difference between funding and financing could 
have damaging implications on both a practical and analytical level.  
Distinguishing between funding and financing has been fundamentally important for this 
research. By developing this distinction as part of a conceptual framework for understanding 
the landscape of infrastructure investment, this thesis has arguably made an important 
conceptual contribution. That said, there is certainly more work that could be done in 
developing and refining the definitions put forth here, especially with regards to other 
investment classes and industries. 
 
8.3.2 Evidencing actually existing financialisation and conceptualising its variation 
Perhaps the most significant shortcoming of the literature is its inconsistent and at times 
incoherent conceptualisation of financialisation. Although the concept of financialisation has 
had a muted influence on mainstream understandings of the role of finance in the 
contemporary economy (Engelen and Faulconbridge, 2009; Muellerleile et al., 2014), it has 
the potential, if more thoroughly developed, to serve as an invaluable tool for analysing the 
global financial system and for explaining the contradictory and uneven geographies of 
capitalism. 
A key reason for financialisation’s disjointed conceptualisation is the lack of empirical 
evidence and concrete examples of ‘actually existing’ financialisation (Christophers, 2012; 
French et al., 2011; Pike and Pollard, 2010). In addition, although the strength of the concept 
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is its emphasis on the variegation and multiscalarity of financial systems, academic analysis 
has focused on subjects like the global financial crisis at the expense of issues such as the 
drivers and implications of financialisation at the local and urban scales (Weber, 2010). 
In order to address these gaps, this thesis has undertaken a fine-grained empirical analysis of 
the funding and financing of urban infrastructure. By selecting six case study cities in two 
countries, each with their own distinctive characteristics, the study has interrogated the extent 
to which the process of financialisation is contingent on the specificities of place.  
The variability of financialisation is made apparent by the evidence presented in Chapter 5. 
Sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1, for instance, distinguish between a more financialised approach to 
funding and financing infrastructure in Greater Manchester (for example, through revolving 
funds such as the North West Evergreen Fund and the Manchester City Council Capital 
Fund) and the less financialised grant arrangements used in Buffalo to fund and finance 
projects such as the Buffalo Lakeside Commerce Park.  
The evidence presented in Sections 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 is equally as compelling. A 
comparison of tax increment financing (TIF) in Newcastle, Sheffield, Chicago and Stockton, 
for instance, not only serves to illustrate that the mechanics of TIF vary from place to place, 
ensuring that different city governments take on different levels of risk and indebtedness, 
but also that some features of the financial engineering process do not always adhere to the 
narrative of financialisation as a contradictory and crisis-prone process. Indeed, 
financialisation can fluctuate from being speculative, opaque and risky in some instances to 
being sensible, innovative and productive in others. 
Although the evidence from this research indicates that instances of financialisation are 
dependent on place and therefore necessarily unique, there are nevertheless some similarities 
between individual cases of infrastructure investment that enable emergent trends and 
broader themes to be drawn out of the complexity and diversity of financialisation. These 
broader themes are presented in Table 2.2 as the common characteristics of financialised 
investment practices, but deserve some extension and development here.  
1. The growing influence of financial intermediaries. Evidence from this research suggests that 
there is a growing influence of financial intermediaries in funding and financing 
infrastructure. This is despite the continued (if not increased) role played by the state. 
Chicago’s asset leasing deals (Section 7.2.1) illustrate how this might be so: whilst the 
likes of Cintra-Macquarie and Morgan Stanley have leased major infrastructure assets, 
the City of Chicago still plays a crucial role in preserving the value of the built 
environment.  
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2. The increasing interdependencies between cities and financial markets. This research has shown 
that the interdependencies between cities and financial markets, which became 
evident in the sub-prime and financial crises (Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; Pani and 
Holman, 2013), can also be regarded a characteristic of the financialisation of 
infrastructure investment. When an infrastructure project is financed through the 
capital markets, for instance, an interdependency is created between the municipal 
bond issuer and the investor: the issuer requires debt in order to raise capital, while 
the investor needs bonds to generate a yield on its surplus capital. If the issuer fails 
to meet debt repayments, the issuer may lose its credit rating, have its assets 
possessed or even face bankruptcy, while the investor may be forced to take a 
reduced repayment or ‘haircut’. Similarly, in public-private partnership arrangements, 
interdependencies develop around areas such as risk sharing, revenue generation and 
asset value appreciation (see Section 5.2.1 and Chapter 7). 
3. The increasing use of financial technologies, such as securitisation. The financialisation of the 
funding and financing of infrastructure has undoubtedly involved the emergence and 
widespread use of financial technologies and structuring arrangements, most notably 
including securitisation (see Section 2.1.2). Although securitisation is especially 
apparent in the example of TIF in Newcastle, Sheffield, Chicago and Stockton 
(Chapter 5), it is also evident in some form across all six of the case study cities: the 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority securitises future Earn Back receipts to 
invest in Metrolink (Section 6.2.3), for instance, while the Buffalo Urban 
Development Corporation securitises PILOT receipts through the Buffalo 
Brownfield Redevelopment Fund (Section 5.1.2). Other financial technologies and 
bespoke structuring arrangements, such as certificates of participation, are also 
emerging. 
4. The use of increasingly speculative investment practices that rely on the prediction, calculation and 
modelling of the future. The empirical analysis provided evidence of the speculative use 
of ‘fictitious’ future revenues for financing infrastructure projects upfront. Whilst 
this point largely draws on the same body of evidence as the point on securitisation 
above, it is important to recognise that speculation and securitisation are not 
synonymous: for example, the organisational capacity and experience of the City of 
Chicago, its higher level of autonomy, and the city’s more vibrant commercial 
property sector arguably make TIF less speculative than in Newcastle or Sheffield 
(Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). Similarly, in Stockton, CA, the use of redevelopment was 
arguably made more speculative by the lease-out-lease-back mechanism at the heart 
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of the TIF scheme, and the City of Stockton’s broader plunge into over-
indebtedness.  
5. A transformation in the purpose, function, values and objectives of government, which are being 
brought in line with those of financial actors and institutions. Because financialised investment 
practices often rely on the creation of future revenues to defray the costs of the 
infrastructure at hand, the pursuit of revenue-creation and generating a return on 
investment becomes a strategic priority. Section 5.2.1 provides evidence, for 
example, of the transition of Manchester City Council towards an institution that has 
taken on some of the characteristics of an investment bank in order to revolve capital 
through the built environment. Similarly, Science Central in Newcastle and the new 
Medical Campus in Buffalo provide examples of the strategic prioritisation of the 
accelerated circulation of capital throughout the built environment specifically to 
generate revenues for recycling back into the urban landscape (see Sections 7.1.3 and 
7.2.3). 
6. An increase in public sector indebtedness and risk taking. A new post-financial crisis 
regulatory environment has combined with stagnating asset values and commercial 
revenues to limit the private sector’s ability to fund and finance infrastructure. At the 
same time, widespread fiscal stress has inhibited governments from using traditional 
sources of funding and financing. Together, these constraints have provided an 
incentive for governments to engage in risky debt-based investment programmes. 
Perhaps with the exceptions of Buffalo, which still has a steady stream of funding 
from the State of New York, and Stockton, which is still reeling from its last round 
of debt-fuelled speculation, urban governments in all four other case study cities are 
rapidly adopting new debt-based investment practices. 
7. The transformation of infrastructure from a physical and productive component of the urban 
environment into a financial asset defined by risk and return. Financialised investment 
practices cannot be used to fund or finance an item of infrastructure that does not 
create monetisable value. As a result, infrastructure has adopted the characteristics 
of a financial asset that is defined by risk and return, rather than by its physical or 
economic characteristics. 
8. The increasing control over infrastructure by yield-seeking surplus capital. Although the state’s 
role in funding and financing infrastructure continues to be hugely important, this 
research has demonstrated that the influence of yield-seeking surplus capital over the 
built environment of cities is also growing as part of the process of financialisation. 
The fallout from the Chicago asset leases (Section 7.1.2), for instance, is illustrative 
of the penetration of extra-local financial actors into local systems of governance and 
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regulation, and provides evidence of how ‘actually existing’ financialisation drives the 
creation of what Torrance (2008) identifies as multiscalar systems of governance. 
9. The transformation of infrastructure into an engine for economic growth and tax base expansion. 
The objective of creating returns on infrastructure investment is often aligned with 
the aspiration of generating new sources of taxation and expanding the income 
gained from existing taxes. Indeed, the process of financialisation both enables and 
fuels the fiscalisation of urban development, through which the prospect of tax base 
expansion becomes central to infrastructure investment strategies. The opportunity 
to generate fiscal benefits through infrastructure investment has caused an 
intensification in the levels of inter-governmental competition and fragmentation, as 
the examples of Buffalo and Chicago exhibit (6.1.1 and 6.1.2). 
10. The highly geographically uneven ability to engage successfully – if at all – in funding or financing 
infrastructure. The continuing process of financialisation ensures that opportunities for 
infrastructure investment are becoming increasingly geographically uneven. Indeed, 
because infrastructure projects in places with underperforming economies have 
limited prospects for revenue generation and asset value appreciation, the 
opportunities for utilising financialised models of investment are drastically reduced. 
While factors such as the type, quality, cost and size of infrastructure are of course 
important, the underlying economic geography of a place is absolutely fundamental 
in determining whether the value required to fund and finance a project can be 
created or not. The examples of the Greater Manchester Pension Fund (GMPF) and 
Sheffield City Region Investment Fund (SCRIF), in particular, illustrate how what is 
termed ‘the geographies of risk and return’ influence opportunities for infrastructure 
investment through financialised funding and financing practices. 
In sum, this thesis has demonstrated that whilst the process of financialisation is certainly 
influenced by place, it is not entirely geographically contingent. Indeed, there are broader 
stories about how the financialisation of infrastructure investment is unravelling and what 
implications it has for urban development. Perhaps most importantly, these empirically 
driven themes can certainly be used to inform an enhanced understanding of the process of 
financialisation more broadly. 
 
8.3.3 Towards a political economy of financialisation? 
Beyond highlighting the characteristics of ‘actually existing’ financialisation, this thesis 
follows calls from French et al. (2011), Hall (2013), Pantich and Konings (2009) and Pike 
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and Pollard (2010) to take a political-economic approach to conceptualising financialisation. 
In particular, this analysis has challenged the narrative that financialisation is a behemoth of 
borderless privatisation that is sapping away the power and relevance of the state. Rather, 
the evidence from this research indicates that, in the contemporary economy, the role of the 
state is perhaps more important than ever, especially with respect to infrastructure 
investment. 
In contrast to accounts of the financialisation of infrastructure that emphasise the 
securitisation of traditionally public infrastructures by specialist infrastructure investors (e.g. 
Allen and Pryke, 2013; O’Neill, 2013), this research builds on Weber’s (2010: 252) analysis 
of the ‘financialization of urban development public policy’ to illustrate that the state is 
intimately bound up in the process of financialisation. 
The notion that capital investments made by the state can be regarded as ‘financialised’ 
(Section 8.3.1), implicitly challenges the view that financialisation involves the switching of 
capital from the primary, secondary and tertiary circuits of capital to a separate and distinct 
‘quaternary’ circuit representing the financial system (Section 2.1.2; also see Aalbers, 2008; 
Harvey, 1982; 1985b). Indeed, rather than implying a separation of the state and the financial 
system, it implies a transformation of the state, its activities and ultimately its territoriality into 
something that is more financial. Crucially, such an analysis begins to deconstruct what Bryan and 
Rafferty (2013: 134) term the ‘canonical categories’ (such as ‘production’, ‘circulation’ and 
‘fundamental value’) of political-economic traditions such as Marxism, enabling a more 
sophisticated understanding of financialised capitalism. 
In order to make sense of financialisation’s implications for the state, this thesis has drawn 
on the concept of ‘reterritorialisation’ (Brenner, 1997, 1998, 1999). Informed by the work of 
Lefebvre (1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978) and Harvey (1982, 1985c), Brenner develops the 
concept of reterritorialisation to explain the processes of spatial reconfiguration and 
territorial reproduction that are necessary to sustain capitalism during globalisation. What 
this research has shown is that the proliferation of financialisation has created new and 
unique rounds of reterritorialisation. Indeed, the increasingly contradictory and crisis-prone 
characteristics of financialised capitalism have demanded new forms of spatio-temporal fix, 
which, in turn, have unprecedented implications for territorial organisations and the spatiality 
of cities. 
Because the state is at the heart of the financialisation of infrastructure investment, and – 
through the capital investment process – is arguably becoming financialised in its own right, 
the analysis of the funding and financing of infrastructure presented in this research has 
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provided a unique lens through which to view and interrogate the reterritorialising 
implications of financialisation.  
In the case study of Buffalo, for instance, the financialisation of capital investment appears 
to be incentivising municipal governments to circumvent State-imposed debt limitations 
through the creation of new special district governments, which can then engage in more 
speculative forms of debt-based infrastructure investment (Section 6.1.2). Similarly, in 
Chicago, the already fragmented system of governance is becoming reinforced by the 
enhanced competition for tax revenues driven by the need for municipal governments to 
access new sources of income to defray the costs of infrastructure projects (Section 6.1.1). 
In Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield, the emerging opportunities to engage in 
financialised investment practices are energising challenges to the dominant centralist model 
of governance in the UK, inciting new rounds of devolution and decentralisation, and 
fuelling the emergence of new city-regional institutions such as Local Enterprise Partnerships 
and Combined Authorities (Section 6.2). 
By developing a political-economic approach to financialisation, then, this thesis has not only 
demonstrated the continued importance of the state in the funding and financing of urban 
infrastructure and in the financialised economy more broadly, but it has also begun to 
interrogate the implications of this role for the territoriality and organisation of the state 
going forward. 
 
8.3.4 Linking financialisation with fiscal crisis and the financial condition of the state 
Even though the actions of national governments in the wake of the global financial crisis, 
such as bailing out catastrophically failing financial institutions (which arguably triggered 
sovereign debt crises the world over), have received some attention (French and Leyshon, 
2010; Lapavitsas et al., 2010), and a small body of analysis (Davidson and Ward, 2014; Hall 
and Jonas, 2014; Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; Peck, 2013) has made more explicit links 
between financial and fiscal crises, there has undoubtedly been a lack conceptual analysis 
linking the process of financialisation with the financial condition of the state. In order to 
address this gap, this thesis has developed a more systematic analysis of the relationship 
between fiscal stress and financialisation. 
Most basically, using the funding and financing of infrastructure as a lens, this thesis has 
argued that fiscal stress is a key driver of financialisation, as well as being a potential 
consequence it. Drawing on an understanding of fiscal stress as the worsening of a 
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government’s financial condition to an extent that the government can no longer meet its 
financial and service obligations (Hendrick, 2011), this thesis has argued that fiscal stress has 
instigated the search for more innovative and entrepreneurial models of infrastructure 
investment which enable cash-strapped governments to tap into future and fictitious sources 
of revenue. By nullifying the otherwise harsh realities of fiscal crisis in this way, governments 
have served as a catalyst to the process of financialisation.  
Just as financialised models of investment have given governments the opportunity to invest 
in infrastructure in times of fiscal stress, the process of financialisation has also enhanced the 
prospect of creating fiscal benefits from infrastructure investments (such as improvements 
in a government’s financial condition or the creation of additional resources for future capital 
investments). In particular, the need to generate future returns on investment when using a 
financialised investment practice (in order to repay debt) means that the infrastructure item 
at hand potentially has the capability to generate surplus revenues (either directly or 
indirectly) for the benefit of a government’s balance sheet. 
Misczynski’s (1986; also see Chapman, 2008; Lewis, 2001; Schafran, 2013; Wassmer, 2002) 
concept of the ‘fiscalization of land use’, which suggests that planning decisions are 
influenced by a development’s ability to generate additional tax receipts and thus improve a 
government’s financial condition, has been extremely helpful in beginning to explain this 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, Misczynski’s analysis attributes the emergence of fiscalisation 
solely to the existence of constrained fiscal environment, and thus neglects the funding and 
financing arrangements that are required to ‘unlock’ the fiscal benefits of development. In 
contrast, this research as shown that – when a government is fiscally stressed – strategies of 
fiscalisation are only made possible by engaging in financialised models of investment. The 
case study of Stockton, for example, which also highlights the potential pitfalls of fiscalisation 
(such as the possibility of over-indebtedness, fiscal crisis and bankruptcy), shows that 
fiscalisation was fuelled by the availability of financialised investment practices (Section, 
6.1.3).  
The emphasis on the development process itself (and, in particular, on the processes of 
funding and financing) begins to extend fiscalisation’s conceptual relevance beyond the 
discipline of town planning. Furthermore, the assertion that fiscalisation drives and is driven 
by the process of financialisation is a clear and tangible example of how the fiscal stress and 
the financial condition of governments are interlinked with the process of financialisation. 
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8.3.5 Developing the concept of splintering urbanism 
It can be suggested that the variety and diversity of infrastructure transformations and their 
implications are such that ‘one cannot speak of “splintering urbanism in general” in any 
meaningful analytical way’ (Coutard, 2008: 1819). Nevertheless, Coutard (2008: 1819-20) 
concedes that, if more sensitive to the variegations of capitalism, the splintering urbanism 
thesis could offer a ‘fruitful and valuable analytical framework’ for developing ‘innovative 
understandings’ of contemporary urban development. 
In this research, Graham and Marvin’s (2001) splintering urbanism thesis is particularly 
useful because of the ways in which it describes and explains the processes of unbundling, 
segmentation and privatisation, which, as O’Neill (2010, 2013) suggests, have facilitated and 
driven the financialisation of infrastructure. As suggested by Coutard (2008), however, the 
current conceptualisation of splintering urbanism seem to be limiting its ability to fully 
explain the contemporary urban and infrastructural landscape. Specifically, the focus of 
Graham and Marvin’s analysis on the physical distribution of infrastructure networks, rather 
than on the actual process of unbundling itself, has the effect of limiting splintering 
urbanism’s explanatory power.  
In order to respond to this shortcoming, this research has shifted the analytical focus towards 
the process of unbundling and, more specifically, the changing patterns of investment that it 
enables. Crucially, the financialisation of infrastructure and capital investment appears to 
have exacerbated the uneven flow of finance into the built environment. The void of private 
sector investment in infrastructure in both Manchester (Section 7.1.2) and Sheffield (Section 
7.1.1), for instance, highlights the challenges of attracting global flows of finance to areas 
defined by an unfavourable ‘geography of risk and return’. Because the underlying economic 
geographies of Sheffield and Manchester limit opportunities for revenue generation and asset 
value appreciation, the state is forced to intervene and, ultimately, to assume potentially 
harmful risks. 
Even in a more favourable environment for private investment, such as Chicago, the 
splintering implications of infrastructure investment are intensified by financialisation. 
Building on the work of Ashton et al. (2014) and Farmer (forthcoming), for example, this 
thesis has shown that the City of Chicago has been exposed to a new set of risks and costs 
by leasing high-value infrastructure assets to consortiums of financial intermediaries in order 
to create short-term fixes to fiscal crisis. As a result of its commitment and contractual 
obligation to preserve the value-creating ability of the leased infrastructure assets, the City of 
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Chicago has lost control over some areas of urban development policy and planning, and 
suffered real financial losses. 
A further conceptual contribution is achieved by applying a political-economic 
understanding of financialisation to the concept of splintering urbanism. In particular, the 
accelerated circulation of capital through the built environment – encouraged by 
financialisation – appears to have intensified what Harvey (1985a: 27) terms ‘creative 
destruction’. Indeed, the case studies of Buffalo and Newcastle (Sections 7.1.3 and 7.2.2) 
demonstrate how the heightened imperative of capital circulation that accompanies 
financialised investment practices leads to bland, exclusionary and even destructive urban 
development outcomes. 
 
8.4 Limits of the study and future research 
As a comparative study between cities in the UK and the US, the empirical scope of this 
research is necessarily limited. Indeed, although this chapter has argued that there are some 
shared characteristics between different models of funding and financing infrastructure and 
that some crosscutting analytical themes are beginning to emerge, a wider range of case 
studies would almost certainly show evidence of further variation and yield some new 
analytical insights. 
To expand and build upon the research presented here, then, a first step might be to adopt 
a broader range of case study cities within the national frameworks of the US and the UK. 
This would challenge the emergent analytical themes to explain trends in the funding and 
financing of infrastructure in places that share the same overarching national contexts but 
that have their own unique economic geographies. It might also be informative to develop a 
sector-specific analysis within these two countries, concentrating for example on urban rail 
infrastructure, road infrastructure or brownfield site remediation and preparation. Not only 
would this help to develop a more fine-grained analysis of the geographies of financialisation 
within the UK and the US, but it would also draw out the nuanced ways in which the funding 
and financing of infrastructure varies according to the sector or infrastructure item at hand. 
Moving beyond the national confines of the US and the UK, conducting further research 
into the funding and financing of infrastructure in other comparator countries would also 
uncover a different set of investment practices. On the one hand, this might challenge the 
assertions made in this research regarding the core drivers and implications of infrastructure 
investment, and, therefore, question the extent to which investment practices are becoming 
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financialised. On the other hand, however, the conceptualisation of financialisation 
developed in this thesis is premised on the idea that the extent and nature of financialisation 
is dependent on the specificities of an infrastructure item’s spatio-temporal context and, as 
such, would predict such variation.  
Beyond adding to the empirical scope of this thesis, a potentially fruitful area of further 
research would be to build upon the political-economic approach to financialisation 
developed here. Although this research brings the state back to the centre of the process of 
financialisation, its role in facilitating – if not driving – a more financialised form of capitalism 
certainly requires further examination. Even in the field of infrastructure investment, where 
the rise of the infrastructure fund looks likely to continue, there is a whole range of analytical 
challenges regarding the state’s interaction with financial markets, their intermediaries and 
processes. In particular, there is a need to build on the distinction between ‘funding’ and 
‘financing’ developed here and to interrogate the specific relationship between the state and 
the investor at the ‘site of investment’, such as in a PPP arrangement, in order to understand 
who is bearing the risk of investing and at what cost. 
Finally, it is also essential that future research takes a more nuanced and fine-grained 
approach to understanding of the role of the state in the process of financialisation more 
broadly. This will help move beyond debates about the ‘rise’ and ‘fall’ of the state and enable 
researchers to focus on constructing detailed accounts of financial markets and their 
processes. Indeed, a programme of research aimed at developing informed examples of 
‘actually existing financialisation’ would not only enhance our understanding of the global 
financial system and its role within contemporary capitalism, but would also provide a rich 
source of policy recommendations and ideas, and, therefore, ultimately enhance the 
relevance and impact of a geographical approach to finance. 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
Case Study Title Type of Organisation Date 
Buffalo, NY President Local law firm 03.05.13 
Chair and Professor of Law State public benefit corporation 01.05.13 
Regional Development 
Specialist 
Development agency and 
chamber of commerce 
23.04.13 
Vice President Development agency 24.04.13 
President Development agency 03.05.13 
Director University department 
specialising in urban studies 
26.04.13 
Executive Director of the 
Office of Strategic Planning 
Municipal authority 26.04.13 
Chairman Regional development firm 26.04.13 
President Local development firm 30.04.13 
President Local business consultancy 22.04.13 
Special Counsel Local law firm 23.04.13 
Partner Local law firm 25.04.13 
Partner Local law firm 03.05.13 
Partner Local law firm 25.04.13 
Partner Local law firm 25.04.13 
Partner Local law firm 25.04.13 
President Private foundation 03.05.13 
Councilmember Municipal authority 25.04.13 
Vice President Private foundation 03.05.13 
Executive Director Development firm and 
community organisation 
01.05.13 
Professor of Economics & 
Finance 
State public benefit corporation 30.04.13 
Principal Local law firm 01.05.13 
Dean University 22.04.13 
Chicago, IL Principal Local architectural firm 12.11.12 
Partner Local law firm 29.10.12 
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Chief of Staff Planning agency 08.11.12 
Project Manager Municipal authority 14.11.12 
Director of Debt Management 
and Investment Banking 
Relations 
Municipal authority 7.11.12 
Director of Financial Policy Municipal authority 7.11.12 
Dean University department 
specialising in planning 
25.10.12 
Associate Professor University department 
specialising in public 
administration 
13.11.12 
Senior Vice President Local evelopment firm 02.11.12 
Managing Director and Chief 
Research Officer 
Local investment management 
firm 
16.11.12 
Executive Vice President Planning authority 31.10.12 
Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer 
Local architectural firm 14.11.12 
Director of Capital Markets State agency 24.10.12 
Deputy Director and Capital 
Budget Manager 
State agency 08.11.12 
President Local government research 
organisation 
14.11.12 
Project Manager Local government research 
organisation 
14.11.12 
Director of Communication 
and Outreach 
Planning agency 14.11.12 
Project Manager Federal agency 24.10.12 
Operations Specialist Federal agency 24.10.12 
Managing Director International investment bank 26.10.12 
Stockton, 
CA 
Principal Local economics consultancy 18.04.13 
Executive Director State agency 16.04.13 
Deputy Executive Director State agency 16.04.13 
Judge Federal bankruptcy court 08.04.13 
President and Chief Executive 
Officer 
Local development firm 19.04.13 
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Chief Executive Officer Local business improvement 
district 
15.04.13 
Chief Executive Officer Investment management firm 08.04.13 
Partner International law firm 11.04.13 
Executive Director Planning agency 18.04.13 
Partner International law firm 15.04.13 
Managing Director of Public 
Finance and Investment 
Banking 
International investment bank 15.04.13 
Director State agency 16.04.13 
Employment Attorney Local law firm 09.04.13 
Columnist Local media corporation 15.04.13 
Assistant Professor of Urban 
Studies and Planning 
University 19.04.13 
Manager Planning agency 10.04.13 
Senior Regional Planner Planning agency 10.04.13 
Senior Regional Planner Planning agency 10.04.13 
Deputy Treasurer State agency 16.04.13 
Superintendent Local school district 17.04.13 
Economics Leader Writer International media corporation 02.04.13 
Professor of Economics University 08.03.13 
Executive Director Planning agency 10.04.13 
Manchester National Head of 
Infrastructure, Projects and 
Energy Group 
International law firm 02.08.13 
Director National policy think tank 05.07.13 
Partner Local development firm 12.07.13 
Partner International professional 
services firm 
02.07.13 
Director Local development firm 03.07.13 
Professor of Project 
Management 
University 04.07.13 
Director University business school 04.07.13 
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Head of Finance Metropolitan borough council 02.07.13 
Treasurer Metropolitan borough council 02.07.13 
Managing Director National development firm 01.10.12 
Director of Economic Strategy Local policy think tank 30.10.13 
Development Director Local development firm 02.07.13 
Chair of the Transport for 
Greater Manchester 
Committee 
Transport authority 01.07.13 
Finance Director Transport authority 01.07.13 
Newcastle Policy Manager Metropolitan borough council 09.10.13 
Regional Senior Director National commercial property 
agents 
04.02.14 
Associate Director, National 
Markets: Land and 
Development 
National commercial property 
agents 
04.02.14 
Partner Local property consultants 29.08.12 
Member House of Lords 28.09.12 
Director of Policy, Strategy & 
Communications 
Metropolitan borough council 03.09.12 
Councillor Metropolitan borough council 14.09.12 
Councillor Metropolitan borough council 05.10.12 
Senior Accountant Metropolitan borough council 10.09.12 
Accountant Metropolitan borough council 10.09.12 
Policy and Information Officer Metropolitan borough council 11.09.13 
Director of Finance and 
Resources 
Metropolitan borough council 03.09.12 
Economic Adviser and 
Associate Fellow 
National policy think tank 28.08.12 
Senior Project Manager Local development firm 11.02.14 
Deputy Chief Executive  Metropolitan borough council 09.10.13 
Finance Director Local development firm 26.02.14 
Corporate Director Metropolitan borough council 09.10.13 
Head of Strategic 
Development 
Metropolitan borough council 09.10.13 
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Principal Local development consultancy 04.09.12 
Sheffield Director National asset management firm 14.10.13 
Director National development firm 27.09.13 
Partner International law firm 26.09.13 
Strategic Development and 
Funding Manager 
Metropolitan borough council 10.07.13 
Director of Finance Metropolitan borough council 10.07.13 
Principal Planning Officer Metropolitan borough council 23.08.13 
City Development Manager Metropolitan borough council 26.09.13 
Councillor Metropolitan borough council 15.10.13 
Professor of Public Policy 
Analysis and Evaluation 
University 24.09.13 
Other 
specialist 
interviews 
Director of Policy (Finance) National property consultancy 07.08.12 
Assistant Policy and Technical 
Director 
National agency 03.08.12 
Adviser National agency 26.07.12 
Director of Investment 
Management 
International investment 
management firm 
14.09.12 
Managing Director National development firm 30.08.13 
Director National development firm 26.07.12 
 
